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JANUARY, 1915 —————— APRIL, 1915

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Edited by HAROLD COX

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The Edinburgh Review

JANUARY, 1915 No. 451

ENGLAND AND THE LOW COUNTRIES

1. **Histoire des Relations Diplomatiques entre le Comte de Flandre et L'Angleterre au Moyen Age.** Par ÉMILE VARENBERGH. Brussels. 1874.
2. **Histoire de Belgique.** Vols. I.–IV. Par H. PIRENNE. Brussels. 1902–11.
3. **La Neutralité de la Belgique.** Par ÉD. DESCHAMPS. Brussels. 1902.
4. **Rechte und Pflichten der Neutralen Staaten.** Von P. HEILBORN. Berlin. 1888.
5. **The Map of Europe by Treaty.** Vols. I.–IV. By Sir E. HERTSLET, K.C.B. London. 1875–91.
6. **Belgium, her Kings, Kingdom, and People.** By JOHN DE COURCY MACDONNELL. John Lane. 1914.
7. **The History of English Patriotism.** By ESMÉ WINGFIELD-STRATFORD. John Lane. 1913.

WHAT Aristotle said of Revolution is true also of War. 'It is not the causes of revolutions which are unimportant, but only the occasions.' The 'occasions' of wars have, generally speaking, been quite unimportant. It was the amputation of Captain Jenkins' ear that opened a world conflict between Great Britain and the Bourbons; it was the flinging overboard of some tea-chests into the waters of Massachusetts Bay that occasioned the final breach between England and her American Colonists; it was Bismarck's

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revision and publication of the Ems telegram that evoked a declaration of war from Paris in 1870. In these and other cases the immediate occasion was trifling ; the essential causes of the wars that followed were, on the contrary, of profound and far-reaching significance.

The great war of 1914 forms an exception to the rule. As regards the participation of Great Britain, the occasion was hardly less significant than the deep, long-operating, and fundamental cause. The latter must, of course, be traced to the fixed determination of Kaiserism to challenge the world-empire of Great Britain. That subject has, however, been endlessly discussed, and it need not detain us. We are here concerned with the proximate occasion of the war, and as to impartial opinion that also is agreed. The immediate occasion is to be found in the cynical disregard displayed by Germany for solemn treaty obligations, and her shameless violation of the neutrality of Belgium.

Whether Great Britain would now be at war if Germany had respected Belgian neutrality is a question which fortunately we are not called upon to consider. It should, however, be noted that the ' strong bid ' for British neutrality made by the German Chancellor on July 29 referred primarily not to Belgium but to France.* Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg had the effrontery to suggest that Great Britain should stand by and see France defeated, humiliated, and stripped, at any rate of her colonial possessions, by Germany. It need not be said that by assenting to such a suggestion this country would have incurred indelible infamy. The Prime Minister rightly denounced the Chancellor's proposal as ' infamous,' and Sir Edward Grey's despatch is on record to prove that it was, without a moment's hesitation, repudiated. † That we should have acted otherwise—that we should have accepted the naval assistance of France in the Mediterranean and then have left her northern coasts at the mercy of the German marine—is happily unthinkable.

Nevertheless, it is certain that the actual and proximate occasion of the war between Great Britain and Germany was the unprovoked attack of Germany upon Belgium. To the

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* Correspondence respecting the European Crisis, No. 85.

† Correspondence, No. 101, Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 30.

scientific student of politics this occasion was not less significant than the cause.

The modern kingdom of Belgium occupies, like the Swiss Confederation, a peculiar position in the European economy. That position rests in a formal sense upon a series of international agreements. Article VII. of the Treaties of London (November 15, 1831, and April 19, 1839) runs as follows: 'Belgium . . . shall form an independent and neutral State. 'It shall be bound to observe such neutrality towards all other 'States.'* Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia were the assenting parties to the Treaties of London, and by those Powers the independence and neutrality of Belgium were solemnly and specifically guaranteed.

But the matter does not rest there. In August 1870, during the Franco-German War, France, Prussia, and Great Britain entered into further engagements on the subject. Great Britain then, as always, was gravely concerned for the maintenance of Belgian independence. Napoleon III. had been strongly suspected of designs upon it; that there had been negotiations on the subject between the Emperor and Prince Bismarck is indisputable. By whom they were initiated it is more difficult to decide.

Out of the tangled and complicated story some points, however, emerge with tolerable clearness. On the one hand, it is certain that on the eve of the critical struggle with Austria in 1866 Bismarck was supremely anxious to secure the neutrality of the Emperor of the French; nor is he likely to have been over-scrupulous as to the means of securing it. On the other hand, it is equally certain that, after the rapid and decisive victory of Prussia in the Seven Weeks' War, Napoleon III. was anxious to secure 'compensations' for France. But the boot was now on the other foot. Bismarck had no longer any use for Napoleon's friendship. On the contrary, he was already contemplating and preparing for the war with France, which in his reading of 'the logic 'of history' must inevitably follow upon that with Austria.

Where, then, did the question of Belgium come in? According to Bismarck's own version, Napoleon III. had privately discussed the matter with him, while he was ambassador in

* Cf. Hertslet, 'Map of Europe by Treaty,' pp. 863, 985.

Paris, as far back as 1862. It may well have been so, for the Emperor's mind, as Lord Palmerston wrote at the time, was 'as full of schemes as a warren is full of rabbits.' Moreover, negotiations of this nature would help to explain Napoleon's passivity in regard to the Danish Duchies in 1863–4. In September 1865 Bismarck met Napoleon at Biarritz, just at the moment when the Prussian minister was completing his plans for the diplomatic isolation of Austria. That the question of Belgium was again under discussion is more than likely. But if promises were made or hopes were held out, Bismarck was careful to leave no scraps of paper behind him. Verbal negotiations suited Bismarck's game better than formal despatches, while Napoleon was as fond as Louis XV. of secret diplomacy. In June 1866, on the eve of the Seven Weeks' War, there were definite negotiations between Bismarck and Count Benedetti, the French ambassador at Berlin. If the report of the latter may be accepted (and it was made at the time), Bismarck refused to consider the possibility of ceding Rhenish Prussia, but hinted that he might be able to obtain for France the Prussian district of Treves together with Luxemburg, or parts of Belgium or of Switzerland. Benedetti, on his part, claimed to have made it clear to Bismarck that the idea of seizing Belgian or Swiss territory would not be entertained at Paris. If, then, there had been previous negotiations on the subject, either Benedetti was in ignorance of them or his diplomatic guile and subtlety were at least equal to those of Bismarck. And this has not been suggested.

The Seven Weeks' War ensued. Prussia won the resounding victory of Sadowa (July 3, 1866), and France, thereupon, promptly put forward a formal demand for the cession of the Bavarian Palatinate, Mainz, and the Prussian territory on the Saar. Bismarck, however, was no longer in a complaisant temper; the demand was unconditionally refused, and France accepted the rebuff. But before the end of August negotiations were resumed at Berlin, and this was probably the moment when the 'Draft Treaty' was indited which Bismarck published to the world on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War.

That Draft Treaty has been the subject of so much discussion, and its terms are intrinsically so important, that it

seems desirable to reproduce the *ipsissima verba* of the document as it first appeared in 'The Times' on July 25, 1870:

'*Projet de Traité.*

'Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse et Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français jugeant utile de resserrer les liens d'amitié qui les unissent et de consolider les rapports de bon voisinage heureusement existant entre les deux pays, convaincus d'autre part que pour atteindre ce résultat, propre d'ailleurs à assurer le maintien de la paix générale, il leur importe de s'entendre sur des questions qui intéressent leurs relations futures, ont résolu de conclure un traité à cet effet et nommé en conséquence pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

'S.M. etc.

'S.M. etc.

'Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des articles suivants :

'"Art. I.—Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français admet et reconnaît les acquisitions que la Prusse a faites à la suite de la dernière guerre qu'elle a soutenue contre l'Autriche et contre ses alliés.

'"Art. II.—Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse promet de faciliter à la France l'acquisition du Luxembourg ; à cet effet la dite Majesté entrera en négociations avec sa Majesté le Roi des Pays-Bas pour le déterminer à faire à l'Empereur des Français la cession de ses droits souverains de ce Duché moyennant telle compensation qui sera jugée suffisante ou autrement. De son côté l'Empereur des Français s'engage à assumer les charges pécuniaires que cette transaction peut comporter.

'"Art. III.—Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français ne s'opposera pas à une union fédérale de la Confédération du Nord avec les États du Midi de l'Allemagne à l'exception de l'Autriche, laquelle union pourra être basée sur un Parlement commun, tout en respectant, dans une juste mesure, la souveraineté des dits États.

'"Art. IV.—De son côté, Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, au cas où Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français serait amené par les circonstances à faire entrer ses troupes en Belgique ou à la conquérir, accordera le secours de ses armes à la France, et il la soutiendra avec toutes ses forces de terre et de mer, envers et contre toute Puissance qui, dans cette éventualité, lui déclarerait la guerre.

'"Art. V.—Pour assurer l'entière exécution des dispositions qui précèdent, Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, et Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français contractent, par le présent traité, une alliance offensive et défensive qu'ils s'engagent solennellement à maintenir. Leurs Majestés s'obligent, en outre et notamment, à l'observer dans tous les cas où leurs États respectifs, dont elles se garantissent mutuellement l'intégrité, seraient menacés d'une agression, se tenant pour liées, et de ne décliner, sous aucun prétexte, les arrangements

militaires qui seraient commandés par leur intérêt commun conformément aux clauses et prévisions ci-dessus énoncées." ' *

The terms of this remarkable document are extraordinarily free from ambiguity. France was to recognise a federal union between all the German States, south as well as north, except Austria, and in return was to be assisted by Prussia to purchase Luxemburg from the King of the Netherlands and, should circumstances require it, to invade and absorb Belgium.

'The Times' pledged itself to the 'authenticity' of the document, and wrote in its leading article:

'It is not difficult to extract from the paper itself the secret of its origin. We might easily deduce from internal evidence, if we were not otherwise assured of the truth, that the proposed Treaty was submitted by France to Prussia. . . . The proposed Treaty was rejected at the time it was tendered. . . . It was rejected, but, unless we are misinformed—and, speaking with all reserve on a subject of such importance, we are satisfied that our information is correct—the Treaty has been recently again offered as a condition of peace. Means have been taken to let it be understood that the old offer was open, and that a ready acceptance of it would save Prussia from attack. The suggestion has not been favourably received. . . .'

Whatever the origin of this project, we now know that it was revealed by Bismarck. His motive was obvious. He intended to excite British susceptibilities on a question which has always been regarded by us as vital, and thus to alienate British sympathies from France. In the realisation of this purpose he was completely, if temporarily, successful.

Bismarck's version was promptly repudiated in France: by Benedetti, by Gramont, and by the Emperor himself in a letter indited from Metz (28th of July).

'M. de Bismarck a dit au prince Napoléon à Berlin:—"Vous cherchez une chose impossible. Vous voulez prendre les provinces du Rhin qui sont allemandes, et qui veulent le rester. Pourquoi ne pas vous adjoindre la Belgique, où existe un peuple qui a la même origine et parle la même langue? . . . S'il (l'Empereur) entrait dans ces vues, nous l'aiderions à prendre la Belgique" . . . En un mot, c'est la Prusse qui a fait l'offre, et c'est nous qui avons éludé de répondre.' †

* A facsimile of this document will be found in 'Archives Diplomatiques,' 1871–1872, vol. iii. 280–81.

† For the full text of the Emperor's letter cp. Fitzmaurice's 'Life of Lord Granville,' ii. 40; see also Lord Newton's 'Life of Lord Lyons,' i. 302–4.

Still, the Draft was in Benedetti's handwriting, and it was written on the paper of the French Embassy.

Count Benedetti's own explanation of the incident was as follows :

' Dans une de ces conversations, et afin de me rendre un compte exacte de ses combinaisons, j'ai consenti à les transcrire en quelque sorte sous sa dictée . . . M. de Bismarck garda cette rédaction, voulant la soumettre au Roi. De mon côté je rendis compte au Gouvernement Impérial des communications qui m'auraient été faites. L'Empereur les repoussa dès qu'elles parvinrent à sa connaissance. Je dois dire que le Roi de Prusse lui-même ne parut pas vouloir en agréer la base.'

The precise truth as to the genesis of the proposal may never, perhaps, be ascertained ; but as to the effect of the publication there is no obscurity. Both Germany and France were eager to convince the world in general and Great Britain in particular of their innocence, and readily agreed to enter into renewed engagements to respect the neutrality of Belgium. Those engagements were embodied in two separate treaties concluded by Great Britain with Prussia and France respectively.

By the Treaty of the 9th of August 1870 the King of Prussia declared his ' fixed determination to respect the neutrality of ' Belgium so long as the same shall be respected by France,' and at the same time entered into an engagement with Great Britain to maintain ' then and thereafter the neutrality of ' Belgium.' Two days later a precise counterpart of the Anglo-Prussian Treaty was concluded between Great Britain and France. In these treaties Great Britain pledged herself to co-operate with either Germany or France, as the case might be, against the Power which should violate the neutrality of Belgium. It was expressly provided, however, that the co-operation of Great Britain should be strictly confined to the consequences of the violation of Belgian neutrality, and that her military operations should not extend beyond the limits of Belgium.*

One word may be added to emphasise the significance of this incident. Bismarck's diplomacy in 1870, however faithless and unscrupulous, at least testifies to his belief that to violate Belgian integrity was to touch England to the quick. In this he judged aright. As early as January 1869, Queen

* Hertslet, op. cit., pp. 1887 and 1890.

Victoria had written to remind Lord Clarendon, who was Foreign Secretary at the time, that 'she had invariably 'expressed the strongest opinion that England was bound, 'not only by the obligations of treaties, but by interests of 'vital importance to herself, to maintain the integrity and 'independence as well as the neutrality of Belgium.' Mr. Gladstone was not less anxious than the Queen, and insisted 'that the day when this nation seriously suspects France of 'meaning ill to Belgian independence will be the last day of 'friendship with that country, and that then a future will 'open for which no man can answer.'

In 1870 it suited Prussia's hand that Belgium's neutrality should be respected by both combatants. But for some time past it has been clear that the situation had altered. It was natural, therefore, when the dogs of war seemed likely to be loosed in 1911 that Belgium should seek renewed assurances in Berlin. In reply, the German Chancellor declared 'that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian 'neutrality.' And again, on April 29, 1913, Herr von Jagow replied to an interpolation in the Reichstag: 'Belgian 'neutrality is provided for by International Conventions, 'and Germany is determined to respect those Conventions.' On July 31, 1914, Herr von Below, the German minister at Brussels, declared his conviction 'that the sentiments 'expressed at that time had not changed.' *

If Herr von Below was at once sincere and well-informed the change of sentiment at Berlin must have been extraordinarily rapid. On August 2 German troops entered Luxemburg, and on the same day the German Government announced at Brussels its intention of sending troops into Belgium. Belgium promptly (August 3) retorted that she would be faithful to her international obligations and would repel, by force if need be, every attack upon her rights. On the following day (August 4) England formally required Belgium to 'resist with all the means at her disposal' any attempt to force her 'to abandon her attitude of neutrality,' and promised to join Russia and France in affording her assistance.

* See Diplomatic Correspondence respecting the War, published by the Belgian Government (Cd 7627).

The result of these negotiations is now matter of history. To tell the story of Belgium's heroic resistance, to appraise its military value to the strategy of the Allies, and still more its moral significance for the world at large, will hereafter demand the pen of a Thucydides. Happily, we are concerned with only one aspect of the story.

The insolent demand of Germany and the defiance of Belgium immensely strengthened the hands of the British Cabinet. Here was the one issue which could be counted on to close the ranks in England—the one issue which could be made intelligible to all classes in the electorate. In the event, the decision of the Cabinet was endorsed with a unanimity which none could have dared to anticipate. That unanimity was evoked by something more than admiration for the pluck of a small nation; by more than resentment at the wanton attack of an overbearing bully; by more than regard for treaty obligations and international good faith. Consciously or, more probably, unconsciously, the nation was obedient to an instinct which at several great crises has inspired the action and the policy of England. That instinct has established a political tradition, and on that tradition is founded one of the soundest and most persistent maxims of English statecraft: that under no circumstances may the Low Countries be absorbed by, or pass under the exclusive influence of, either of their powerful neighbours. Thus, for countless generations, the Netherlands have been the pivot of our Continental policy.*

I.

The land which has now won for itself imperishable fame under the name of Belgium has undergone many vicissitudes both of designation and political allegiance. The Kingdom of Belgium has subsisted only since 1831. United with the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1814, it had for the twenty years previous to that date formed an integral part of France. During the eighteenth century (1714-1794) it had been one of the many Provinces in the miscellaneous empire of the Austrian Haps-

* This phrase seems reminiscent of Mr. Wingfield-Stratford, from whose brilliant History of English Patriotism several suggestive hints have been taken.

burgs. From the days of Philip II. down to the Peace of Utrecht (1714) it had adhered to Spain and had been known as the Spanish Netherlands. In the fifteenth century it had formed part of the great inheritance of the Valois Dukes of Burgundy, and from them had passed, through the marriage of Charles the Bold's heiress, Mary, to the acquisitive Hapsburgs. Earlier still, on the low lands forming the deltas of the Rhine and the Scheldt and the Meuse, there had been a bundle of Duchies and Counties and Bishoprics, rendering a somewhat uncertain allegiance to the Emperor, or to the King of France. But no shifting of political allegiance and no change of nomenclature has ever sufficed to break the traditional connexion between the Low Countries and England. Flanders, Burgundy, the Spanish Netherlands, the Austrian Netherlands, or Belgium—the land has always possessed for England the same compelling interest—the same profound political significance.

Of this persistent connexion a few salient illustrations must suffice. In the middle of the eleventh century the great problem for England was whether she was to remain in barbaric and insular independence under a native dynasty or to form part of the empire of the Normans. Both Godwin, the great West Saxon Earl, and William the Norman realised the importance of securing, in the impending struggle, the friendly neutrality if not the active assistance of Flanders. Earl Godwin found in Judith, a daughter of the reigning Baldwin, a wife for his son Tostig ; William the Bastard married another daughter, the Countess Matilda. The Norman made the better thing of it, for numbers of Flemings fought under his banner at Senlac, and after the conquest established themselves permanently in England.

Thus far, the connexion between the two countries had been dynastic, political, strategical. A new and even stronger tie was now to be forged. From the thirteenth century to the sixteenth ' wool was king,' and during that period wool formed the chief economic bond between England and Flanders. Gradually the fact became recognised in England, particularly among the monks of the Cistercian Order, that in the fleeces of English sheep we possessed an asset of the highest value both in a commercial and political computation. A continuous intercourse was henceforward maintained between England and the Flemish cities, such as Bruges, Antwerp, and Ghent, now

rapidly attaining the industrial pre-eminence they so long enjoyed. In the twelfth century the Flemish merchants had already got a special street of booths in the famous fair of Winchester. A charter granted to Bruges in 1240 makes mention of the 'Hansa of London'—a league which at one time included as many as seventeen towns. All the Flemish towns of any importance were members of the league, and, at one time, it embraced also Châlons, Reims, St. Quentin, Courtrai, Amiens, and Beauvais.* Of all the cities, however, Bruges and Ghent were the two which maintained the closest and most continuous relations with England. In the course of the thirteenth century this connexion was subjected to a severe political strain. The consolidation of the French kingdom under the Capetian dynasty, and its expansion towards the Rhine, seriously threatened the independence of Flanders. The Counts were indeed drawn, almost irresistibly, into the political orbit of France. But in Flanders the cities counted for at least as much as the Princes, and while the Princes looked to Paris, the cities looked to London. Thus the great victory at Courtrai (1302), won by the citizens against the chivalry of France, was hardly less a triumph for the English connexion than for the democratic party in the Flemish towns.

But French ambition, though repulsed, was not finally repelled. In 1328 Philip VI. avenged the humiliation of Courtrai by a great victory at Cassel. The immediate sequel of this victory was an order to the Count of Flanders to arrest all the English merchants in his dominions. To this challenge Edward III. retorted by placing a strict embargo upon the export of wool to the Flemish towns. Great was the consternation in Ypres, Ghent, and Bruges, and the Flemish merchants soon made it clear that if their Count was willing to take orders from Paris the cities were not. Thus the high-handed action of Philip VI. proved to be the prelude to a drama upon which the curtain did not fall until the middle of the fifteenth century.

The causes of the Hundred Years' War have formed the theme of innumerable academic disputations, and it is no part of my purpose to add to the number. Many things combined in the earlier years of the fourteenth century to embitter the relations

* Ashley, 'Economic History,' i. 109.

between the Kings of England and France. On the one side there was the natural anxiety of the French Crown to absorb the English possessions in Gascony and Guienne ; on the other, an equal anxiety to be rid of the embarrassing alliance between Scotland and France. But the *causa causans* of the war was the determination of the English King and of the Flemish towns to keep a door open for the entrance of English wool into Flanders. That object was vital to both countries. From the time of Edward I. onwards the English Crown was increasingly dependent upon the export duty on raw wool. That duty was at one time 100 per cent. *ad valorem*, and it is satisfactory to know that in this case the whole of the tax fell upon the foreigner. Had England not possessed a virtual monopoly of the commodity such a result would, of course, have been impossible. But, in the case of a monopoly, bold financial methods rarely lack justification. If the export duties formed an important item in the Plantagenet budgets, the wool itself was essential to the industrial prosperity of the Flemish cities. Against such strong bonds of mutual self-interest the diplomatic connexions of the French Kings and the Flemish Counts availed nothing.*

In the fifteenth century there was a change in many of the conditions of the struggle. But one feature remained constant—the alliance between England and the Low Countries, now united under the Valois Dukes of Burgundy. And the interesting fact is that the alliance was quite irrespective of dynasties and parties. The great position attained by Henry V. in France rested fundamentally upon the Burgundian alliance. ' This is the hole through which the English ' entered France.' So said a Carthusian friar when exhibiting the skull of John, Duke of Burgundy, to Francis I. And he spoke truly. The marriage of John, Duke of Bedford, to Anne, sister of Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy, cemented the alliance during Henry VI.'s minority. Momentarily broken by the Treaty of Arras (1435), it was renewed under the Yorkists when Edward IV. married his sister Margaret to Charles the Bold of Burgundy, at whose court he subsequently took

* It is worthy of note that when, in 1340, Edward III. assumed the title and quartered the arms of King of France, the step was aken to satisfy the scruples of his Flemish allies.

refuge when, in 1470, he was compelled to flee from England. To the Yorkists, indeed, the alliance was as important commercially as it had been strategically and politically to the Lancastrians. The accession of Henry Tudor threatened the connexion. The Yorkist plots which embarrassed the earlier years of Henry VII.'s reign were hatched at the Court of the Duchess Margaret But the community of economic interests proved too strong for dynastic antipathies, and the *Intercursus Magnus* of 1496 marked the renewal of commercial friendship.

II.

With the opening of the sixteenth century the modern European problem, of which the Netherlands have formed the pivot, comes still more clearly into view. Hitherto the European States-system had existed only in embryo; but with the absorption of feudal principalities into strong and centralised national monarchies (as in France), with the agglomeration of kingdoms (as in Spain), and the development of the royal power, Europe was confronted by a new danger.

Four times in the course of four centuries has the equilibrium of Europe, and the national independence of the several States, been menaced by the domination of a single Power: in the sixteenth century by the Hapsburgs, in the late seventeenth by the Bourbon monarchy of France, a century later by Napoleon Bonaparte, and in the twentieth century by the Hohenzollern. The issue of the latest attempt we may not yet predict. In each of the three earlier crises the European equilibrium was preserved by the efforts of England; in each, England's intervention was stimulated by an attack upon the Low Countries; in each her military operations were mainly concentrated upon Belgium.

Few words are needed to demonstrate the truth of this generalisation.

The crisis of the sixteenth century was produced by the astonishingly rapid rise to pre-eminence of the Hapsburgs. Proverbially fortunate in their marriages, they never used their favourite method with better effect than in this period. Grandson of Maximilian and Mary of Burgundy, grandson

of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile, the Emperor Charles V. attained a position which was indeed imposing. That of his son Philip II., despite the partition of the Hapsburg inheritance, was even more menacing. To the Crown of Spain, the Lordship of the Low Countries, the Duchy of Milan, the Kingdom of the Sicilies, and the Empire of Spanish South America, Philip in 1580 added the Crown of Portugal, and with it acquired the great Empire of Portugal in the far East and the far West. His marriage with Mary Tudor had threatened to bring England also into the net of the Hapsburg system. But Mary's childlessness averted the danger for the moment; Elizabeth's prudent procrastinations still further postponed it; the revolt of the Netherlands sensibly relieved the pressure, and the danger was finally dissipated by the defeat of the Armada. In the prolonged contest between Philip II. and the Netherlands the defeat of the Armada was indeed only an incident, but it was far from being an insignificant one. The brilliant Don John of Austria, Philip's bastard brother, clearly perceived the interdependence of the two questions:

'The true remedy for the evil condition of the Netherlands,' he wrote (27th May, 1576), 'in the judgment of all men is that England should be in the power of a person devoted and well-affectioned to your Majesty's Service; and it is the general opinion that the ruin of these countries and the impossibility of preserving them to your Majesty's Crown will result from the contrary position of English affairs.'

Thus in the Low Countries England found the weapon with which to withstand the threatened domination of the Spaniard. Yet Elizabeth had little liking for the indispensable instrument of her policy. The Dutch were not only rebels but Calvinists, and as such were doubly abhorrent in the Queen's eyes. But Elizabeth never allowed her personal prejudices to blind her eyes to the interests of her country. Help, therefore, was sent from England to the Netherlands, at first surreptitiously, and only in sufficient quantity to keep the insurrection alive without enabling it to achieve complete success. The seizure of the treasure destined for Alva (1568) was an enterprise altogether to Elizabeth's liking, and as the struggle became sterner more generous and effective help was forthcoming. The proffered sovereignty of Holland and Zeeland

was prudently declined in 1575, but the murder of William of Orange in 1584 marked a serious crisis in the affairs of the Netherlands; consequently, in 1585, Elizabeth concluded a definite alliance and sent her favourite Leicester to their assistance. Leicester's intervention availed little, but three years later the cause of the Netherlands was saved by the defeat of the Armada.

Drake's victory, however, did more than keep alive the flickering flame of Dutch independence; it did more than assure the safety of England; it restored the threatened equilibrium of Western Europe. Ten years later Philip II. died, a defeated and disillusioned man. The menace of a Spanish domination was at an end. The might of Philip II. had shattered itself against the stubborn resistance of the Netherlands, encouraged and sustained by Queen Elizabeth, and finally assured of success by Drake's brilliant victory off Gravelines.

III.

After Philip II., Louis XIV. By the middle of the seventeenth century France was rapidly superseding Spain as the pre-eminent foe to the 'liberties of Europe.' The old French monarchy—built up by the patient labours of a succession of great administrators—was now nearing its zenith under 'le roi soleil.' Richelieu, by consistent pressure applied to nobles and Huguenots, had subdued the last opponents of absolutism and centralisation. To the young sovereign Louis XIV. he bequeathed, as Bismarck bequeathed to William II., a weapon of dangerous potency. Supreme in his own kingdom, Louis XIV. determined to make France dominant in Europe. For this also the way had been prepared, though unintentionally, by Richelieu. The aim of the Cardinal's foreign policy was thus stated by himself:—'Rendre à la 'Gaule les frontières que lui a destinées la nature, de rendre 'aux Gaulois un roi gaulois, de confondre la Gaule avec la 'France, et partout où fut l'ancienne Gaule d'y rétablir la 'nouvelle.' In the eyes of all Frenchmen 'les limites naturelles' were the Ocean, the Pyrenees, the Mediterranean, the Alps and the Rhine. Richelieu went some way towards attaining those frontiers. By the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) France got

a firm grip upon the middle Rhine. The three Lorraine Bishoprics—Metz, Toul, and Verdun—first taken in 1552, were confirmed to her; she got Breisach and the Austrian Alsace, though the great fortress of Strasburg was specifically reserved to the Empire; she acquired the right to garrison Philipsburg; other Rhine fortresses were to be demolished, and no works were to be allowed on the right bank between Bâle and Philipsburg. Secure on the line of the Vosges, in the Meuse Valley, and on the middle Rhine, France now held a position of enormous strength for defence, and unfortunately also for offence. The Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659) was the complement of the Treaty of Westphalia. By the acquisition of Roussillon and Cerdagne the French frontier was scientifically advanced to the Pyrenees; Pinerolo was to guard the frontier towards Savoy, and, on the north-east, a large part of Artois passed into French hands.

Mazarin would have liked even more. As long ago as 1646 he had written: 'L'acquisition des Pays-Bas espagnols fournirait à la ville de Paris un boulevard inexpugnable.' This great prize was denied to the Cardinal for the moment, but the marriage of Louis XIV. to Marie Thérèse of Spain opened up possibilities which, despite his wife's renunciation, he steadily strove to convert into concrete realisation.

Louis' first opportunity came with the death of his father-in-law, Philip IV. of Spain, in 1665. For the last six years his diplomacy had been ceaselessly directed towards the attainment of two objects: the nullification of the Queen's renunciation, and the isolation first of his intended victim, Spain, and then of his potential rival, the Emperor Leopold. In 1665, with shameless audacity, Louis XIV. claimed, in virtue of a pretended 'right of devolution,' the greater part of the Spanish Netherlands together with parts of the 'Free County' of Burgundy and the Duchy of Luxemburg. The military operations which followed were a triumphal progress. Turenne made himself master of the Spanish Netherlands in three months; Condé overran the Free County in three weeks.

But Nemesis already lay in wait for the over-bold conqueror who threatened at once the 'liberties of Europe' and the integrity of Belgium. Down to this attack upon Belgium, England had looked on quite unmoved at the rapid advance of France. Neither the Treaty of Westphalia nor that of the

Pyrenees had opened the eyes of England to the fact that Spain was hopelessly decadent; that a new Power had arisen, and was already on the march towards that dangerous pre-eminence from which Spain had been hurled by the defeat of the Armada. Cromwell, indeed, had put six thousand of the best troops in Europe at the disposal of Mazarin, and had thus helped, shortsightedly, to upset the equilibrium. Lord Bolingbroke's judgment may have been jaundiced, but there is force in his criticism:

'Our Charles I. was no great politician and yet he seemed to discern that the balance of power was turning in favour of France some years before the treaties of Westphalia. . . . Cromwell either did not discern this turn of the balance of power long afterwards, when it was much more visible; or, discerning it, he was induced by reasons of private interest to act against the general interest of Europe. Cromwell joined with France against Spain, and though he got Jamaica and Dunkirk he drove the Spaniards into a necessity of making a peace with France that has disturbed the peace of the world almost fourscore years, and the consequences of which have well-nigh beggared in our times the nation he enslaved in his.'

Dunkirk, the sole fruit of Cromwell's Continental enterprise, was sold to Louis XIV. by Charles II. in 1662, and England, under the restored dynasty, entered upon the most shameful period of her foreign policy. But not even Charles II.'s venal and cynical contempt for national ideals and national interests could induce the nation to look on unconcernedly while Louis XIV. was making himself master of the Spanish Netherlands. The patriotic diplomacy of Sir William Temple was rewarded, in 1668, by a triple alliance between England, Sweden, and the United Provinces; Louis XIV., to his lasting chagrin, was arrested in the full tide of conquest, and by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1668) was compelled to relax his hold on the Free County of Burgundy. Still, he was permitted to retain the towns and districts of Charleroi, Binche, Ath, Douai, Tournai, Oudenarde, Armentières, Courtrai, Bergues and Furnes, and thus to secure for France an improved frontier between Dunkirk and Charleroi.

Having accomplished so much, Louis then turned to deal with the triple allies who had balked him of a still greater prize. Sweden was always disposed to be complaisant towards France; Charles II. was effectually secured by the Treaty of Dover (1670); the Dutch were never forgiven.

Four years after the Treaty of Aix, Louis launched his attack upon the United Provinces (1672). The attack was conceived in a spirit of measureless contempt for, and blind rage against, the 'insolent merchants' who had dared to frustrate the well-laid plans of the Most Christian King. The Dutchmen were republicans, they were Protestants, they were prosperous in trade and powerful in arms; above all, they stood between Louis and his darling project: the incorporation of the Spanish Netherlands and the attainment of the Rhine frontier from source to delta. The war of 1672 was a campaign of hatred, and the passion, so inimical to coolness in arms or in diplomacy, recoiled upon the man who indulged it. For this war proved to be the turning-point in the reign of the *Grand Monarque*. 'In Holland,' says the greatest of modern French historians, 'the political system of France made shipwreck.' All the maxims of statecraft bequeathed to Louis XIV. by Henry IV., by Richelieu, by Mazarin and Colbert were, in a moment of passion, forgotten. Policy was quenched in mad thirst for revenge. The Palatinate was laid waste; Franche-Comté was conquered; the Jura became—for the first time—the eastern frontier of France. But brilliant as were his victories in the field, more permanent forces were working against Louis XIV. The attack upon the Provinces brought back to power the Orange party, and, in William III., Louis XIV. encountered an opponent of indomitable persistence. England, dragged into the struggle on the side of France by the cupidity, or, as some will have it, by the Machiavellian astuteness, of Charles II., withdrew from the war in 1674, and re-entered it as an enemy of France in 1678. Peace was concluded in that same year at Nimeguen. France retained Franche-Comté and a strong line of fortresses, including Ypres, Maubeuge, Saint Omer, and Valenciennes, stretching from Dunkirk to the Meuse. On the other hand, many of the towns acquired in 1668 were handed back to the Spanish Netherlands to protect the Dutch against future attack. But by far the most significant result of the war was personal. It confided to the Prince of Orange the championship of European liberty.

William III. was firmly resolved to save Europe from the domination of France. To this end he formed, in 1686, the League of Augsburg. But no merely Continental coalition

would, as he perceived, avail. He entered, therefore, into negotiation with the opponents of his Stuart father-in-law, and in 1688 he accepted their invitation to come to England. The Stuarts owed their undoing to their Gallican sympathies and to their zeal for Roman Catholicism. The instinct of their subjects was perfectly sound. The English people do not, as a rule, follow the intricacies of Continental diplomacy either closely or intelligently. But they cherish a few unalterable prejudices, and of these the strongest is, as we have seen, relentless hostility to any Power which threatens the equilibrium of Europe or the independence of the Low Countries. Louis XIV. was a palpable transgressor ; Louis XIV., therefore, must be crushed, even if the process should involve the substitution on the English throne of a Dutchman for a Gallicized Scot. William III. had as little liking for the English people as they for him, but he submitted to the inconvenience and humiliation of wearing a ' constitutional ' crown for the sake of achieving his purpose as a European diplomatist.

The war which was closed, or rather interrupted, by the Treaty of Ryswick (1697) was, as both the leading actors were aware, a mere prologue to a greater drama. Both Louis and William wanted to take breath before the mortal combat. For that combat William prepared Europe by the formation of the Grand Alliance in 1701. Even then, however, his supreme purpose might have been frustrated by the English Parliament had not his opponent made a colossal blunder.

The English people would never have gone to war about the ' Spanish Succession ' had not Louis XIV., in arrogant folly, occupied Luxemburg, Namur, Mons, Charleroi, Oudenarde, and the sea towns of Ostend and Nieuport. The recognition of the ' Old Pretender ' added fuel to the flames of English anger, and when a few months later (March 1702) William III. passed away he died happy in the knowledge that his life's purpose was achieved, and that the execution of his policy was safe in the hands of the greatest soldier ever reared in England.

The victories of Marlborough, with a single brilliant exception, were all won in the ' cockpit ' of Europe. Dean Swift, writing for once as a venal scribe, might denounce the strategy of the Whigs and their self-seeking General. But the argument of the ' Conduct of the Allies ' was as paradoxical as it was

brilliant. In making the Netherlands his principal campaigning ground the Duke of Marlborough was faithful to the ingrained instincts of the English people, nor did he betray their interests. Still less did the Tories, in concluding peace, surrender any principle which it was important to maintain. On the contrary, the Treaty of Utrecht secured to this country great and manifold advantages: in the Mediterranean, in North America, in Spain, in the South Seas; but not the least of those advantages was the stipulation that neither France nor the French King of Spain should be left in possession of Belgium. To achieve this end we had fought one of the greatest of our wars.

IV.

A greater was still to come. Among the lovers of peace the younger Pitt was one of the most ardent. Trained in the school of Adam Smith, he was ambitious to initiate far-reaching domestic reforms, fiscal, administrative, and economic. Even after the outbreak of the Revolution in France he did not abandon his objects or the hope of attaining them. So late as February 1792 he ventured to anticipate for Europe a period of prolonged peace, and his famous sinking-fund scheme was based upon that anticipation. Never was fate more perversely ironical. Within twelve months England had plunged into a war from which she did not finally emerge until 1815.

What was the force which drew us into the vortex? Many things combined to inflame passions between England and France, but the immediate and essential causes of the war were curiously parallel to those which, in August 1914, compelled the intervention of Great Britain against Germany. Ardently as he desired the maintenance of peace, Pitt refused to permit the French Republic to make void, at its will, a solemn international obligation, or to threaten the integrity of Belgium. By the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) the navigation of the Scheldt had been definitely and exclusively reserved to the Dutch. In 1793 the French Republic declared it to be open to all nations. The excuse put forward for this high-handed action was hardly less obnoxious than the original offence; the Convention affirmed 'that the river takes its rise in France, and 'that a nation which has obtained its liberty cannot recognise 'a system of feudalism, much less adhere to it.' Pitt promptly

disavowed this spurious sentiment and repudiated the subversive doctrine on which it rested. 'England,' he declared 'will never consent that another Power shall arrogate the 'power of annulling at her pleasure, and under the pretence 'of a pretended natural right the political system of Europe 'established by solemn treaties and guaranteed by the consent 'of all the Powers.'

Not only with false doctrine was England at war. Before the end of 1792 France had invaded Belgium and was threatening Holland. She fell back before the advance of the allies in 1793, but in the following year she again occupied and annexed Belgium, and in 1795 Holland was transformed into the Batavian Republic in close dependence upon France. Henceforward, for nearly twenty years, Belgium formed an integral part of France, and, like the rest of the country, was divided up into symmetrical departments.

It has long been the fashion to assert that in joining the allies against France in 1793 Pitt was guilty of a grave error. In the light of recent events the Whig historians must be invited to revise their text-books. If the argument of this paper is sound, Pitt had no option. Unless he was prepared to see international engagements torn up by a single Power, he was bound to protest against the opening of the Scheldt; unless he was prepared to defy the unbroken tradition of English policy, he was bound to resist the incorporation of Belgium into France. A distinguished Viennese historian, Professor Fournier, has himself insisted that it was the French absorption of Belgium which 'lent an irreconcilable character to 'the war with Britain and made that Power a central factor in 'European politics.' *

No one realised the importance of the Low Countries more clearly than Napoleon. Towards the close of 1800 he declared to his confidant Roederer that if necessary he would fight single-handed against the world 'to keep the Stadholder out of 'Holland and to retain for France Belgium and the left bank 'of the Rhine.' To Antwerp he devoted special attention when he was preparing for the invasion of England in 1804-5. A dockyard was to be constructed big enough to contain twenty-

* Napoleon I., i. 86.

five battleships, with a corresponding flotilla of frigates and sloops; a gigantic fortress was to be built on the opposite side of the river Scheldt to protect the dockyard and arsenal, and thus Antwerp would be 'a loaded pistol held at the head of 'England.' *

To this fact, and all that it imported, Lord Castlereagh was as keenly alive as Napoleon. It was this which in 1809 inspired the scheme of an expedition to Walcheren, a scheme brilliantly conceived by Castlereagh and disastrously executed by Lord Chatham and Sir Richard Strachan. It was this which Castlereagh had ever in mind during the Peace negotiations in 1813 and 1814. We can imagine, therefore, his dismay when in November 1813 Metternich proposed that France should be allowed to retain Belgium. 'I must par-'ticularly entreat you,' he wrote to Aberdeen, 'to keep your 'attention upon Antwerp. The destruction of that arsenal 'is essential to our safety. To leave it in the hands of France 'is little short of imposing upon Great Britain the charge 'of a perpetual war establishment.'† What was true of France in 1814 is true of Germany in 1914. For Great Britain—quite apart from questions of international obligations—no peace was or is possible which leaves Belgium in the hands of a potential enemy. Napoleon knew it, and confessed to Colonel Campbell at Elba that for the sake of Antwerp he had lost the throne of France. If Castlereagh had not insisted upon the giving up of Belgium, peace, he declared, would have been made at Châtillon.‡ Without corroboration, Napoleon can never be believed; but in this instance he spoke truly.

Napoleon's abdication did not, however, solve the problem of Belgium. To the Austrian Hapsburgs it had been a perpetual nuisance ever since they had acquired it at the Peace of Utrecht, and they had made no secret of their anxiety to exchange it. The acquisition, in 1814, of Venice more than compensated them. But what was to be done with Belgium?

The idea of the formation of a strong barrier State, inter-

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* Rose, 'Napoleon,' i. 439.
† Castlereagh Correspondence, 3rd Series, i. 75.
‡ Rose, op. cit., ii. 399.

mediate between France and the Empire, had long been in the minds of European diplomatists. Here was the opportunity for realising it. Accordingly, by the first Treaty of Paris (1814), Belgium was united with Holland in a Kingdom of the Netherlands under the House of Orange.

The union thus consummated proved to be curiously ill-assorted, and it lasted only until 1830, when the Belgians threw off a yoke which from the first had galled. In 1831, as we have seen, the Kingdom of Belgium came into being under the guarantee of the Great Powers. But the position of Belgium, neutral and independent, is too intricate, its place in the diplomatic history of the nineteenth century is too important, to be discussed in the concluding sentences of the present article.

In the foregoing pages I have been concerned to concentrate attention upon a single point of quite exceptional significance. Between the people of England and the people of the Netherlands there has existed for a thousand years a connexion and a friendship almost unbroken. In its origin that friendship was based largely on an obvious geographical fact ; but other considerations, political, strategical, dynastic, and, above all economic, quickly and firmly cemented it.

It was remarked by Bossuet and repeated by De Witt that the English people are more unstable than the sea which encircles them. Fickleness and uncertainty are the characteristics ordinarily attributed to our diplomacy by Continental observers. But to one maxim of statecraft, to one line of policy, England has been, as the above pages prove, extraordinarily constant. Against the predominance of any one Power we have always stood as adamant, and we have consistently used the Low Countries as the most convenient weapon with which to resist such predominance. Each Power which has in turn threatened the European equilibrium has announced its ambitious design by an assault upon the independence of the Low Countries. By the side of the Low Countries England has invariably taken her stand.

It has mattered nothing what dynasty has been on the throne, or what party has been in power : Plantagenets and Lancastrians, Yorkists and Tudors, Whigs, Tories, and Radicals—all alike have accepted it as a fixed and pivotal

maxim of English policy that the Low Countries must never be at the disposal of any Power—be it Spanish, French, or Prussian—which is in a position to threaten the 'liberties' of Europe.'

Happily, the crisis of 1914 has provided no exception to an unbroken rule. Never have the ancient saws of British policy been re-affirmed with more complete unanimity and more determined purpose. Never has the resentment of the English people been more passionately aroused than by the wanton, cynical, and treacherous assault of Germany upon Belgium. Never has English sympathy gone out more truly and more tenderly than it has to the innocent and hapless victims of German 'Kultur,'—the heroic and suffering people who have always been our friends, and are now our guests.

J. A. R. Marriott.

EUROPE AND THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY

1. **Die Nationalitätsfrage und die Sozialdemokratie.** By OTTO BAUER. Vienna. 1907.
2. **Der Deutsche Gedanke.** By PAUL ROHRBACH. 60th thousand. Leipzig. 1914.

THE avowed object of the present war, so far as Great Britain and her Allies are concerned, is to put a stop for ever to the ambitions of the central military Empires which have so long imposed upon Europe the crushing burden of the armed peace, and finally plunged the world into the greatest armed conflict of all time. It is recognised, however, that the attainment of this object will not in itself put an end to the continued menace of war, and that, in order to ensure a lasting peace, it will be necessary for the victors to agree on such a rearrangement of the boundaries of States as to satisfy all reasonable ambitions. As to the principle on which this rearrangement is to be carried out we have had more than one authoritative pronouncement, and it seems to be generally agreed that, in the event of the ultimate victory of the Allies, the attempt will be made 'to reform the geography of Europe 'on national lines.' The confident hope is further expressed that such a reform will make possible a policy of general and permanent disarmament. Thus, for the first time in history, the principle of nationality is put forward by a combination of Great Powers as the basis of the territorial settlement to follow a general war.

Those who have studied the complexity of the problems involved in such a settlement are able to realise the stupendous character of the task to which the Allies have committed themselves, and how all but impossible it will be not only to arrive at such an adjustment of all national claims as shall ensure a long period of peace, but even to negotiate such an adjustment without stirring up immediate causes of dissension. And since, in this difficult task, it will be very necessary that the British Government should be supported

by an instructed public opinion, it is important that we should know, if nationality is assumed to be the only satisfactory basis of settlement, why this assumption is made. We ought further to have clear ideas of what is meant by a nationality, what are its essential elements, what are the reasons that justify its existence, and therefore what are its rights. Finally, and most fateful of all, it is necessary, if we are not to be lulled by false hopes into a perilous sense of security, to realise how far it is possible to fix boundaries to nationalities, and to preserve them when fixed. The object, then, of the present article is to examine into this question of nationality and to estimate the claim of the principle of nationalities to be the only basis of a territorial settlement that shall give guarantees for permanent peace.

In the attempt to do so we are met at the outset by a difficulty due to the ambiguity of the terms 'nation' and 'nationality.' Legally defined, a nation is the aggregate of the subjects or citizens of a particular sovereign State, and nationality is the quality of such subjection or citizenship. But the word 'nation' has also a wider meaning, which the New English Dictionary embodies in the following inclusive definition: 'A nation is an extensive aggregate of persons closely associated with each other by common descent, language, or history, 'so as to form a distinct race or people, usually organised as a 'separate political State and occupying a definite territory.' This definition, it may be remarked in passing, is open to criticism, as involving some confusion of thought; and we are not assisted by the definition of 'nationality' as primarily synonymous with 'nation,' but 'frequently a people potentially but not actually a nation,' while a 'people' is defined as 'a body of persons composing a community, tribe, race 'or nation.'

The truth is that the vagueness of our terms reflects the vagueness of our ideas about a problem the intricacies of which we have only recently been called upon to unravel. No satisfactory definition of the word 'nation' is possible because, save in its legal sense, it conveys no definite idea; and the same is true of the word 'nationality.' Yet a clear definition of terms is the essential preliminary to any fruitful discussion. It is proposed, then, for the purposes of the present argument, to use the word 'nation' in the sense of 'the sum of people

'constituting a sovereign and independent body politic,' the Latin *populus* as distinguished from *natio*. The word 'nationality' it is proposed to deprive of its legal connotation, and to define a nationality as 'an extensive aggregate of persons 'conscious of a community of sentiments, experiences, or 'qualities which make them feel themselves a distinct people.' The various elements that produce this consciousness will be discussed later. They have a practical bearing on the problem with which we are immediately concerned—namely, that raised by the increasing tendency of nationalities, thus defined, to aspire to become nations. The complexity and perils of the issues involved in these aspirations may be illuminated by the fact that in the actual polities of the world nationalities and nations nowhere coincide. It is, then, of great practical importance to determine what are the essential qualities of nationality and what are its necessary relations to the conception of the State.

On few subjects, it may be remarked at the outset, has there been so great a difference of opinion as on the question as to what constitutes nationality. Fichte, whose task it was to inspire the patriotic movement for the liberation of Germany, explained it, in terms of his transcendental philosophy, as a thing divine and spiritual, a manifestation of the eternal mind of God, revealing itself in the national soul; the common language of the people, developed out of and intimately connected with every phase of its common experiences, is in his view the sacramental sign and bond of communion of this soul. So, too, for Mazzini, the prophet of the Italian *risorgimento*, nationality was a thing sacred, not to be profaned by a cold analysis of its elements, but believed in and suffered for as a prime article of faith. No one who knows anything of the history of the rise of nationalities during the last hundred years will be inclined to underrate the part played in it by such prophets. It is none the less true that their enthusiasm by itself explains nothing and would have achieved nothing; it is like fire, itself a subtle and mysterious element, which yet needs very material fuel to feed its destructive and creative force. The explanation of the phenomena of nationality, as other thinkers have realised, must be sought, not in the region of metaphysics, but in that of observed facts

If we examine the composition of the several nationalities, we find these elements: race, language, religion, common habitat, common conditions, mode of life and manners, political association. These elements are, however, never all present at the same time, and none of them is essential. As for community of race, even where this is put in the forefront of the claim of nationality, it is mainly a politic fiction. Two of the most conspicuous heroes of the Magyar movement in Hungary, for instance, Kossuth the national leader and Petöfi the national poet, were by race Slovaks; Mickiewicz, the great Polish national poet, was a Little Russian; Treitschke, the apostle of Prussian militarism, was by descent a Czech and by birth a Saxon; Dahlmann, the master-builder of the German idea in the earlier half of the last century, was born a Swede; Benjamin Disraeli, the creator of modern British Imperialism, was by race an Italian Jew. In Eastern Europe, where the rivalry of nationalities is most acute, the races are as mixed and indeterminate as the colours in a kaleidoscope, and none can set boundaries between them. With nationality in the Americas, North and South, race has little or nothing to do; and the same is true of France, of Germany, and of the United Kingdom itself.

Language is as little as race the criterion of nationality. It may be, as Bluntschli says, the expression of a common spirit and of intellectual intercourse, and as such it may be brought powerfully to the aid of nationality, as in the case of the Czech language in Bohemia, or, still more strikingly, of the English language in the United States. But nationality and inherited community of language are not identical. The Swiss are a distinct nationality, though they speak four different languages. Community of language, on the other hand, has not prevented the British and Americans from developing different nationalities.

Religion, again, though it has played, and still plays here and there, notably in Eastern Europe, a great part in creating and stereotyping nationalities, has no necessary connexion with nationality, of which the unifying or disintegrating force is now, generally speaking, stronger than religious community or division. A common habitat and common conditions are doubtless powerful influences at times in determining nationality; but what part do they play in that of the Jews, or the

Greeks, or the Irish of the dispersion? As for manners and mode of life, these are apt to raise stronger barriers between classes than between nationalities. Lastly, political association, though, as in the case of the Swiss, it sometimes encourages the spirit of nationality, is more often its result than its cause.

All these elements, then, may or may not contribute to the formation of a nationality; but when we have summed them up we are no nearer to the solution of the problem of its formation. Some theorists seek this solution in a psychological process. It is only psychologically, according to Bluntschli, that nationality can be understood.

'A nationality,' he says, 'only comes into being slowly, by a psychological process which gradually produces in a mass of men a distinctive form of existence and community of life, and stereotypes these as the inheritance of the race. A nationality has never been created out of a lot of people arbitrarily driven or attracted together. Even a willing agreement and social contract of many individuals cannot create a nationality. Its formation demands the co-operation of the experiences and fortunes of several generations, and it has only become firmly established when its peculiar characteristics have become hereditary by their transmission from generation to generation.' *

This may be true of the evolution of new nationalities; it is not true of the creation of a new sentiment of nationality in even large masses of individuals. It is, for instance, the boast of the United States that they can annually absorb some million of alien immigrants, and that one generation suffices to give them not only the name but the full sense of American nationality. The process is, perhaps, not so rapid as formerly, and here and there separate cultural groups, such as the German cities in the Lake States, tend to survive. But even these are not nationalities within the nation, in the same sense as the Poles in Prussia or the Czechs in Austria; their national sentiment is mainly American, and in time their culture too will be American.†

A nationality, according to Bluntschli, is a *Culturwesen*, an individuality conscious of hereditary qualities that differentiate

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* Allgemeine Statslehre (5th ed., Stuttgart, 1875), i. p. 92.

† Herr Bauer includes the Germans in the United States in the German *Nation*, as distinguished from *Volk*. But this is only very partially and very temporarily justifiable.

it from other masses of people whom it regards as foreign. But this does not explain the whole of the phenomena nor the ultimate driving force, so to speak, of nationality. The German historian Karl Lamprecht comes nearer the truth when he adds another element, the economic, as the creative force in the evolution of nationality. He too, like Bluntschli, finds a general law for this evolution in the development of the *Volksgeist*, but he explains the development by changes in economic conditions. Nationality, that is to say, is but a manifestation of the instinct of men to group themselves for the defence of their common interests, and it follows that the groups thus formed tend to shift and change with the ebb and flow of the economic struggle for existence.

This is the thesis which the Austrian Socialist, Herr Otto Bauer, sets out to establish in his 'Nationalitätsfrage.' 'National and social development,' he says, 'are not two 'different, clearly separable provinces of human development 'in general; it is the battles of the economic classes, every-'where active, the changes in the means and the conditions of 'work which determine the strength or weakness, the death 'and rebirth of nationalities.' Going back over the history of Europe for the last hundred years, he points out the great and often decisive part played by economic forces in the rise of the spirit of nationality in Europe, and in the creation of the great national States. He devotes a special study to the question of the nationalities in Austria-Hungary, which may be considered for this purpose as the laboratory of Europe, and he finds that the determining factors, so far as the broad masses of the people are concerned, are not cultural but economic. After all, as he rightly urges, the vision of the generality of the people—the peasants and labourers—is limited by their holdings and their workshops; they are incapable of that consciousness of a wide-spread, common, inherited culture which is supposed to be the hall-mark of nationality; but they are dissatisfied with their lot, resentful of the dominant powers whom they make responsible for this lot, and are ready therefore to group themselves against them.

This revolutionary tendency, which among the lower classes of the dominant races is anti-national and cosmopolitan, is apt among the subject races to express itself in nationalism.

It is most strikingly exemplified, perhaps, among the countries of the Hapsburg Monarchy, in Bohemia, where the flood of Czech nationality follows the channels opened by industrial change, and the German nationality is succumbing not so much to cultural as to economic pressure. The same process is observable beyond the boundaries of Austria-Hungary. Russia for a time crippled the power of Polish nationalism in the Congress Kingdom by an economic revolution, when, in 1864, she turned the Ruthenian serfs into peasant proprietors. Another economic change, due to the growth of industrialism, redressed the balance by creating a Polish middle class and a Polish proletariat. So, too, in Germany Polish nationalism, once the affair of the comparatively narrow classes of nobles and gentry, has with the growth of industrialism become a passion of the masses. In all the eastern marches of Germany, in Silesia, in Posen, and in East and West Prussia, the German element has for years past been succumbing to the irresistible flood of Polish nationality, of which the unifying force is the economic opposition of the Slav proletariat and peasantry to the German governing and capitalist classes. The efforts of the Prussian Government to stem the tide by the State-subventioned immigration and settlement of Germans have failed, for the German colonists can only maintain themselves by joining the general movement and becoming as Polish as the rest.*

It is clear, then, that there is an economic basis for nationality, and that, whatever other elements may enter into it, a sense of community of material interests is always present. It may be said, indeed, that this sense is the strongest and most essential factor, in the absence of which nothing else will serve to maintain the common sentiment. Common origin, common language, and a common tradition of culture and laws will not avail to preserve the unity of a nationality when the material interests of its parts come into violent conflict. This truth received its most momentous illustration in the secession of the Southern States of the American Union in 1860–61 and the bitter struggle that followed. The principle

* In the autumn of 1911 the Frankfurter Zeitung published a remarkable series of articles with facts and figures illustrating the failure of the Prussian attempts to stop this process of Slavisation.

of State sovereignty and independence on the one side, and that of the American national union on the other, did but disguise the true causes of the struggle, which were less political than economic; the agricultural South was determined to preserve its economic system, based on negro slavery; the industrial North was primarily inspired, not by an abstract love of coloured humanity, but by the economic objection of the wage-earning classes to the slave system.

At this point we are brought face to face with the question of the relation of nationality to the nation or national State. In considering this we are apt to be confused by the romantic and idealistic tinge given to the idea of nationality by the poets and philosophers of the struggles for freedom. A nationality, conceived as something divinely inspired, is believed to have not only the capacity but the right to become a nation, and its legitimate growth to be necessarily stunted if it be prevented from doing so. For Bluntschli, for instance, a nationality is an incomplete organism which can only become completed as an effective 'personality' by political organisation as a nation or State, and some such idea has underlain the liberal enthusiasm of that 'principle of nationalities' which during the last hundred years has so profoundly changed the map of the world. But when we come to examine the principle, as stated by its most conspicuous champions, we find no clear conception of what it ultimately involves, while the main question—namely, what constitutes a nationality—is begged. The late M. Émile Ollivier, for instance, defines the principle of nationality as follows:

> 'Ce principe est que toute association d'hommes nommée peuple est une individualité indépendante, libre, souveraine, jouissant du droit imprescriptible de disposer d'elle-même, soit à l'intérieur, soit à l'extérieur.'

If the word 'peuple' be taken in its usual non-political sense, this statement is obviously untrue or represents at most an aspiration; if it means a *nation*, then the principle as here defined is merely that of the sovereign independence of nations, i.e. States, which has always been a fundamental doctrine of international law; it is, that is to say, a conservative, not a revolutionary principle. But this is not what M. Ollivier means by it; for him, as the apologist of the Liberal Empire,

the principle of nationality was dynamic, not static; it involved a re-grouping of the nations, not—as Alexander I. of Russia had once proposed—by the formation from above of homogeneous populations fenced off by their natural boundaries, but by free vote of the populations concerned—the Napoleonic *plébiscite*. This principle of nationalities, he says, in 'L'Empire 'libéral,' is to be carefully distinguished from the theory of great agglomerations, the 'natural limits' of the race, for race has nothing to do with it.

'Dans la politique des nationalités il n'y a pas de limites naturelles. Les véritables frontières sont celles que constitue la volonté des populations. . . . L'idée de race, selon elle, est une idée barbare, exclusive, rétrograde, n'ayant rien de commun avec l'idée large, sacrée, civilisatrice de patrie.'

This, in effect, is also the answer given by Renan to the question: '*Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*' Community of interests, he says, cannot alone make a nation; there is a sentimental element in nationality, and a *Zollverein* is not a *patrie*. He has equally rejected other elements; and summing up his argument, he concludes:

'L'homme n'est esclave ni de sa race, ni de sa langue, ni de sa religion, ni du cours des fleuves, ni de la direction des chaînes de montagnes. Une grande agrégation d'hommes, saine d'esprit et chaude de cœur, crée une conscience morale qui s'appelle une nation. Tant que cette conscience morale prouve sa force par les sacrifices qu'exige l'abdication de l'individu au profit d'une communauté, elle est légitime, elle a le droit d'exister. Si des doutes s'élèvent sur ses frontières, consultez les populations disputées.' *

This solution of a difficult problem would be admirably simple were the rivalries of nationalities confined to the frontiers of States, which we have the best reason to know they are not, and were these frontiers themselves a mere question of marks on the map. But in any case, as Herr Bauer points out, this 'psychological-voluntarist' theory begs the whole question of nationality, for it does not explain the factors that determine the will of populations to form a nation or to attach themselves to a nation already formed—supposing they are conscious of possessing a choice. It does not, that is to say, give us the real connecting link between nationality

* Discours et Conférences (Paris, 1887).

and the State, nor does it explain why in the nineteenth century, for the first time, nationality was erected into a *Staatsprinzip*.

Without following Herr Bauer in all the conclusions he draws, we may agree with him that it is the economic factor in nationality that has been active in producing this result. A *Zollverein* may not constitute a *patrie*, but it may, as the experience of Germany proved, be a powerful element in the constitution of one. Enthusiasm for the abstract rights of man could not have bound together the provinces of France in a sense of common nationality; it was the economic gains of the Revolution, the creation of a nation of prosperous *bourgeois* and of peasant freeholders, that made the *patrie*. It needed the passion of Mazzini and Garibaldi for an ideal Italy to rouse the Italians to throw off the yoke of an oppressive and alien system; but it was the long, prosaic labours of Cavour that laid firmly the economic basis of Italian unity. Instances might be multiplied; but those cited may suffice to show that, whatever may be the elements in nationality—race, inherited culture, religion, historical memory—it is only a strong sense of common interests that can create and preserve a *nation*.

To say this is not to exclude the factor of sentiment; but the sentiment of nationality is not a thing apart, as something especially holy; it is, as Mr. Balfour has pointed out, one of a group of such sentiments for which there is unfortunately no common name. Man is a gregarious animal; he has the group instinct, and this implies also the instinct of self-sacrifice for the sake of the group: *esprit de corps*, the civic sense, local or national patriotism. All human associations are directed to some common good, and from the point of view of the group sentiment it matters little how this good is conceived—whether as material or spiritual. A trade union is an association for a purely economic purpose; but it demands self-sacrifice on the part of its members, and it certainly develops a strong sense of *esprit de corps*. To say, then, that the strongest and most permanent bond of a nation is the sense of common interests is not to belittle the value of loyalty to a national cause. 'It is loyalty and fidelity to causes, however mistaken 'they may be, which,' as Mr. Balfour has said, 'not only make 'human society possible, but make it noble.'

We have become so accustomed to nationality as the basis, or as the only sound basis, of the State, that we are apt to forget how very modern is this conception, which to many, if not to most, people, is rooted in the very nature and justice of things. Yet nationality, as we understand it, played up to the time of the French Revolution but a very subordinate part in the development of the European States system. The economic basis of this system before the Revolution was not the grouping of masses of people drawn together by a sense of their common interests, but the old feudal idea of the identity of sovereignty and territorial proprietorship. Of all the European States only Great Britain was a national State in the modern sense, a result due partly to its insular position, which had early given to the British people a strong feeling of their separate and common interests, partly to the constitutional development which had secured, at least for the propertied classes, a determining voice in the management of this commonwealth. Russia was a theocratic Empire exploited in the sole interests of its Autocrat; for a Russian national sentiment had not yet been built up on the Slavophil doctrine of the intimate union of autocracy, orthodoxy, and nationality. Poland was an aristocratic republic, with land-ownership and slavery for its economic basis. For the rest, the Continental sovereigns were not national leaders, but simply great landlords (*Landesherren* is the German word still in use), who looked upon their subjects very much as an English duke regards the people upon his estate, sovereign rights by no means excluding the conception of sovereign duties. And sovereignty being thus personal and proprietary, its distribution was subject to all the chances of the laws of inheritance, with all the resulting confusion of boundaries and jurisdictions, a confusion which reached its height in Germany, which had lost all but the semblance of Imperial unity and was split up into some three hundred sovereign States.

Against this purely personal and proprietary conception of sovereignty the French Revolution was a declaration of war. The Revolution itself was the result largely, if not mainly, of economic causes, viz. the bankruptcy of the *Ancien Régime* under which France had been managed, or mismanaged, as the king's personal estate. In the Assembly at Versailles, the representatives of the French people, comparing their

grievances, became conscious of the community of their interests; a new passion of nationality was created, and the old feudal States General were turned, by the confusion of the orders, into the National Assembly. A new France now came into existence, of which the economic basis was formed by the emancipated *bourgeois* and peasant proprietors. The king, since he could not or would not adapt himself to his new rôle of 'Chief Servant of the Nation,' was overthrown, and the Republic, 'one and indivisible,' threw down the gage of defiance to monarchical Europe, ostensibly in the name of liberty, equality, and fraternity, but really in that of French nationality, with which, to the French themselves, the cause of humanity seemed to be bound up.

This conception of nationality as a creed to be propagated, an ideal to be imposed—the bitter fruits of which the world is still harvesting—was a new thing, and its revolutionary force was not at first realised by the Powers against whom it was directed. It was only when their very existence was menaced by the astonishing victories of the Republican arms, and by the revelation of the boundless ambition of Napoleon, that the sovereigns at last awoke to some sense of the new forces at work, and appealed, not in vain, to the national sentiment of their peoples, now also awakened, in the common struggle against alien oppression. If in the reconstruction of Europe by the Congress of Vienna the sentiment of nationality, aroused during the War of Liberation, was all but entirely ignored, this was not wholly due to any cynical disregard by the sovereigns of the promises made in their hour of need. From the point of view of international altruism, indeed, the proceedings of the Congress were unedifying enough, but it was not merely dynastic egoism that prevented the new aspirations of the peoples from being taken into account. The supreme need of Europe, after twenty years of revolutionary turmoil, was peace; and peace could not have been secured by substituting one revolutionary principle for another. This was the view of Pitt when, in 1804, he ignored the Emperor Alexander I.'s proposal to make the principle of nationality the basis of an eventual reconstruction of Europe, and laid down as the only sound foundation of the ultimate settlement the re-establishment of the traditional public law which the Revolution had violated, and the restora-

tion, so far as possible, of those prescriptive sovereign rights which the Revolution had overthrown. Such was actually the ostensible basis of the settlement made by the great Congress, though the principle of 'legitimacy' was honoured as much in the breach as in the observance. In the inner circle of the Powers at Vienna only Alexander I. of Russia displayed, under the inspiration of his friend Prince Adam Czartoryski, an enthusiasm for the rights of nationalities in general, and of Polish nationality in particular. For British statesmen, trained in the school of Pitt, as for Metternich, a 'nation' was simply the sum of people owing allegiance to a particular sovereign State*; it was the old legal conception of nationality which could not possibly, under the circumstances of the new era, form a permanent basis of peace. The provisional character of 'the treaties' was, indeed, recognised by other observers besides Friedrich von Gentz. They were, in fact, not based on any consistent principle at all, but were of the nature of diplomatic compromises intended to obviate immediate perils and to give to Europe that breathing-space of peace of which it stood so urgently in need.

The territorial settlement of a hundred years ago, though it secured peace for a considerable time, ultimately broke down because it took little or no account of the new sentiment of nationality. It is, indeed, futile—as the fashion has been—to blame the statesmen of that age for not realising the new factor introduced by this sentiment. It is easy to realise it now, with the history of the last hundred years to enlighten us; it was by no means obvious then. Nor, if it had been realised, would it have been possible at that time to reform the geography of Europe on national lines with any chance of such a reconstruction surviving. A hundred years ago Europe was on the eve of a vast economic revolution which was destined profoundly to change not only the whole social structure, but also the political structure of the European peoples. It is difficult enough, even now, when everywhere national groups are clearly recognisable, to define the frontiers

* Even Canning could still speak of the 'Turkish nation' and, in connexion with the insurrection of the Greeks, repudiate the right of Europe to intervene in its internal affairs.

of these groups. In 1815 they had, for the most part, no existence ; for the sentiment of nationality which was destined to act as so powerful a solvent of the system established by the Congress of Vienna was, in the greater part of Europe, in spite of the impulse given to it by the French Revolution, still in its weak beginnings.

In Germany a German national sentiment hardly as yet existed. The mass of the people were quite content to speak of themselves as Prussians, or Bavarians, or Saxons, and the unitary enthusiasm evoked during the War of Liberation survived, for the most part, only among the professorial class, and in the students' *Burschenschaften*. In Bohemia the faint dawn of Czech nationalism was only apparent in the efforts to revive the national language and literature, efforts encouraged as harmless by the Austrian Government. Even in Hungary, where the national consciousness had never become extinct, it was not till the third decade of the century that Count Stephen Széchenyi placed himself at the head of that movement of national revival which was to culminate in the rebellion of 1848.* It was years again before Croat nationalism became, under the goad of Magyar chauvinism, uncomfortably articulate, and later still that the other Slav nationalities in Hungary were to discover that they too had national aspirations. The Poles, unsatisfied by the instalment of liberty vouchsafed to them by the Emperor Alexander I., were already articulate enough ; but here too nationalist sentiment was practically confined as yet to the noble, land-owning classes. As for the Ruthenians, the mass of them had become under Polish oppression as the beasts of the field, and it was not till the middle of the century that they, or some of them, discovered that they also had the makings of a nation. Southward of these the Roumans or Vlachs had little national sentiment save common hatred of their Turkish and Greek taskmasters. As for the Bulgarians—by race Finno-Ugrian, by language Slav—they were unconscious of their separate existence, and were still content to be confounded as Orthodox believers in the *milet* or nation of the Greeks. Of the Balkan nationalities, before 1815, only the Serbs had risen in insurrection and,

* It is noteworthy that Széchenyi's best work was in the sphere of economic reforms.

with the countenance of Russia, achieved a modified independence; and they had been inspired less by memories of their former national greatness than by resentment at the tyranny of their Janissary rulers, and Orthodox hatred of the infidel. Panslavism, which was to aim at embracing, under the aegis of Holy Russia, all the Slavonic peoples in a common aspiration, had not yet emerged, as the most formidable of Frankensteins, from the philological laboratories of German professors.

Even in Italy, though the nationalist hopes excited by the Napoleonic *régime* survived, there was behind them, as yet, no strong or united popular feeling, and Metternich was perfectly right, at the time when he spoke of Italy as a 'geographical expression,' in denying that there was any serious or widespread national movement. Where he was wrong was in not realising that the gross defects of the Austrian administration, which he frankly admitted, would end by creating one.

It was, in fact, the repressive policy of the reactionary Powers, which, in endeavouring to beat out the flickering embers of the great Revolution, stirred up fires of a yet more formidable character. The nationalities of Europe became conscious of themselves through a common sense of injustice, of moral and physical and intellectual discomfort—the result of sheer bad government. The philologists alone could not have created the national sentiments which have transformed and are transforming the map of Europe, nor could the poets, the prophets, and the historians. They gave form and a voice to the sentiment that existed or was born; but the sentiment itself was due to the instinctive drawing together of the peoples, conscious of common interests and aspirations, for mutual support against systems of government that had become intolerable to them. Once set going, the sentiment of nationality becomes an end in itself; it develops into a sort of religion, fierce and exclusive and intolerant in proportion as it is new; and, like a new religion, seeking to propagate itself, it becomes in turn a conquering and oppressive force. The truth of this is clear to all eyes in the case of Germany. But the case of Germany is peculiar only in the immense organised force behind this aggressive sentiment. If we study the rise of any of the new nationalities on the Continent during the

last century we find that the will to exist is transformed, sooner or later, into 'the will to power': that is to say, not only to dominate over and to absorb those refractory elements within the national boundaries whose sentiment leads them to gravitate towards other groups, but ruthlessly to extend the national boundaries themselves at the cost of such other groups.

The Germans differ from the other nationalities only in the characteristic thoroughness with which they have formulated their theory of nationality and translated this theory into practice. A nationality is for them an organism which, like all other organisms, when it ceases to grow begins to decay. It follows that the patriot can admit no limits to the process of growth. The late Professor Cramb, in his 'Germany and England,' has revealed to the English public how deeply the idea has sunk into the consciousness of the German people and the influences which have endowed it with something of religious idealism.

'The Prussian school of historians,' he says, 'has written the history of Germany as the exposition of a single divine idea—the movement towards unity under Prussia, and the creation, not of a new Empire, but of a new phase of Empire. It is only under the Hohenzollerns and the domination of Prussia that, according to Treitschke, the true genius of Germany has at last found its expression; and just as the greatness of Germany is to be found in the governance of Germany by Prussia, so the greatness and good of the world are to be found in the predominance there of German culture, of the German mind—in a word, of the German character.'

To establish this predominance force may be necessary, for war is 'the father of all things'; and this is the reason that the German nation is now in arms, not, as in Bismarck's latter days, to protect what it had won, but to extend its dominion. Bernhardi, the Prussian soldier, enforces the moral of Treitschke, the Prussian historian. 'For us,' he says, 'there 'are two alternatives and no third—world-dominion or decline, '*Weltmacht oder Untergang*.' More significant still is the repetition and emphasis of the same idea by Herr Paul Rohrbach in his 'Der Deutsche Gedanke'; for he is no admirer of Prussian methods, and attributes to Prussian narrowness the failure of the German Idea to attract the Germanic peoples still beyond the pale of Germany.

'Of the German Idea,' he says, 'one need not say, as of the Roman, that it must dominate the world or cease to be, but it must share in the domination of the world or cease to be. The Empire is not an end but a beginning. We stand on the threshold of a new epoch in the world's history, an epoch that will see the final predominance of the white race in the world; and of the European peoples only the German has so far developed alongside the Anglo-Saxon that it appears to be numerous and strong enough to claim for its national idea the right to a decisive co-operation in the formation of this coming age. . . . For us there is no standing still; we have the choice of sinking back to the place of the peoples to whose nationality territorial boundaries are set (*Territorialvölker*) or of conquering a place beside the Anglo-Saxons.'

Significant from the point of view of the essentially economic basis of nationality are his reasons for the necessity of this expansion. The wonderful commercial and industrial growth of Germany, he says with much truth, has been the outcome of two distinctively German national virtues, a highly developed sense of individual duty and an infinite capacity for work for its own sake. But for the continued existence of this economic prosperity an expanding world-market is absolutely essential.

'A cessation of growth,' he says, 'would be for us a catastrophe both internal and external, for under our present conditions it could not possibly be natural or voluntary, but would only happen when another people or combination of peoples should hurl us to the ground in such a way as to make us infirm for a long time to come.'

Stated thus, as the outcome not of a mere militarist instinct of domination but of an economic necessity, the will to dominate is represented as the natural impulse of all healthy peoples which feel themselves unduly cramped within their national boundaries; and war is conceived as, under certain circumstances, the legitimate means of furthering the economic well-being of nations. If this be so, the triumphs of the principle of nationality would seem to have done no more for humanity than to substitute for the old dynastic rivalries of princes the far more bitter and ruinous rivalries of nations, conceived as economic groups competing one against the other in the universal struggle for existence. We may believe the German idea to be largely if not wholly mistaken, the outgrowth of an abnormal ambition and an unreasonable fear—for no mere jealousy of Germany's prosperity would

have moved Great Britain to attack her; but unless we are to maintain that the circumstances that gave birth to this idea are peculiar to a particular phase in the growth of a particular nation, we must recognise it as a possible, if not an inevitable, outgrowth of the national spirit anywhere and at all times.

It may be possible, then, though it will not be easy, as a result of the present war, to reform the geography of Europe on national lines; but it may be doubted whether, as some fondly imagine, the accomplishment of such a reform would justify us in turning our spears into pruning-hooks. 'No man 'has the right to fix boundaries to the march of a nation,' cried the late Charles Stewart Parnell; and the words are engraved in letters of gold on his monument in Dublin, as embodying the prime article of the Nationalist creed. Or again in the words of Herr Rohrbach:

'In every great and powerful nation the instinct of self-preservation reveals itself in the form of a natural pressure to expand, which only finds its frontiers where it meets other national-political counteracting forces strong enough to resist it.'

Such being the spirit of nationality, it is permissible to express a doubt whether the efforts of the Powers to fix boundaries to it will ever succeed in making peace permanent. There is a danger that when the victory of the Allies is assured, and the reaction that is certain to follow the war sets in, there will be a clamour for a too hasty disarmament. It will be natural if, after such exhausting efforts, people look with exaggerated expectations to the work of the Great Peace Congress to come. With just such expectations Europe, a hundred years ago, looked forward to the meeting of the Congress of Vienna. In his account of the final results of the Congress, Friedrich von Gentz wrote:

'Universal expectation had perhaps never been roused to such a pitch as before the opening of this dignified assembly. Men had promised themselves an all-embracing reform of the political system of Europe, guarantees for universal peace—in a word, the return of the Golden Age. The Congress has resulted in nothing but restorations, which had already been effected by arms, agreements between the great Powers of little value for the future balance and preservation of the peace of Europe, quite arbitrary alterations in the possessions of the smaller States; but no act of a higher nature,

no great measure for public order or for the general good, which might compensate humanity for its long sufferings or pacify it for the future.'

There is no just reason to assume that the efforts of the Allies will end in a disillusionment as complete as that which followed the publication of the Vienna Final Act. After the awful desolation wrought by the present war it is to be hoped that all the Powers will realise that the supreme need will be a peace based upon an equitable adjustment of national claims. But if the peace secured is to be more than an armed truce, a change must come over the spirit of the nations themselves. The peoples of European culture must be taught that it is no true patriotism to set up their own particular national idea as a norm for all the world; and that it is a crime against humanity to attempt to propagate that idea by any other force than example. Further they have to learn that the separate interests which form the basis of national groups must not be permitted to outweigh the common interests which unite these groups in the great commonwealth of nations.

W. Alison Phillips.

'ITALIA IRREDENTA'

1. Trieste. By RUGGERO FAURO. Rome. Provenzani.
2. L'Italia d'Oltre Confine. By VIRGINIO GAYDA. Torino. Bocca.
3. L'Europe et la Question d'Autriche au seuil du XXe Siècle. Par ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME. Paris. Plon. 1901.
4. The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi. Compiled by T. PALAMENGHI-CRISPI. Translated by MARY PRICHARD-AGNETTI. London. Hodder and Stoughton. 1914.

I.—CRISPI AND IRREDENTISM

WHEN, on July 25, 1866, Garibaldi's advance was arrested upon the heights of Trent by a telegram from General Lamarmora, Chief of the General Staff, stating that 'the 'political conditions demanded the immediate conclusion of an 'armistice,' he at once withdrew his troops across the frontier, but all over Italy profound dissatisfaction was felt. Garibaldi himself obeyed the order reluctantly, and the conviction remained throughout the country that had it not been for the too hasty conclusion of peace Italy's political boundary in those regions would have coincided with her natural fortification. We learn from Crispi's diary that in reply to the question why he had not supported the just demand of Italy to obtain possession of the Trentino, Bismarck answered: 'The question 'of the cession of territory was dealt with by the two Emperors, 'Napoleon and Francis Joseph, and settled by them, before the 'conclusion of peace and without our intervention.' Crispi remarks on this that it was evident that Napoleon's intervention in Italian affairs in 1866 'once more resulted in 'disaster to the work of Italian unification. Prussia was not 'free to act, nor were we ourselves. Venetia was ceded only as 'she is included within the limits of the administrative frontier, 'and we were thus debarred from obtaining possession of the 'Western Alps.'

Such was the origin, or at least the occasional cause, as scholastic philosophers would say, of the Irredentist movement

in Italy. That movement soon formed itself into a definite party with a positive programme. As early as 1868 Irredentists had their headquarters at Palmanova, near the Austrian frontier, and two years later the Irredentist paper, *La Confine Orientale d'Italia*, appeared at Udine. The extreme and reckless propaganda of the party, together with the corresponding severity of the Austrian police, created and maintained a very delicate situation for Italian statesmen who wished to remain on friendly terms with Austria, the more so that the Irredentist demand intrinsically commended itself to all Italian patriots. One attitude towards the question had to be adopted for home consumption and another for export to Vienna.

For the position of the Austrian Government was uncompromisingly anti-Irredentist. Signor Palamenghi-Crispi quotes at length an exceedingly interesting letter from Andrássy, the Austrian Foreign Minister, to Count Wimpffen, the Ambassador of the Dual Monarchy at Rome, dated March 1874, in which he expresses very clearly the grounds on which his government disapproved of the movement. After deploring the policy adopted by a section of the Italian press of 'seeking 'to encourage certain malcontents at Trieste and in the 'neighbourhood of Trent,' Andrássy goes on to say that the agitation confuses the conditions prevailing at the time of the unification of Italy with those obtaining at the time of his writing. Of all the conditions of that time not one has survived. The friendly relations which now exist between the two nations rest upon mutual recognition of the territorial frontiers established by treaties, and, whether originally traced with justice or not, form the unalterable basis of the maintenance of such relations. Should any party demand, on the basis of common language, the cession of the Southern Tyrol or any part of the Austrian sea-coast, would not Austria herself be justified in demanding the 'Quadrilateral' as being indispensable to the defence of her territory? Furthermore, should the justice of any rectification of frontiers based on linguistic or ethnographical considerations be admitted in the case of Italy, similar claims would be advanced in other border regions of the Empire. Various races lived under the protection of the House of Hapsburg. Where would it be possible to find a stopping-place in the application of the principle?

Suppose similar claims advanced by Germany and Russia. Nothing but universal conflict could result from such discussions.

It must be admitted that Andrássy's arguments were not without weight as regards Irredentism in its wider sense. To apply the principle of nationality all round would have undoubtedly involved a work of decomposition and reconstruction provoking innumerable acts of violence and rivalry, and inevitably compromising the peace of Europe. On the other hand, they were of but little force as against such a natural demand as that of the Italian inhabitants of the Trentino for the recognition of the boundary line which nature herself had traced for Italy.

By 1889 the Irredentist Movement, gaining impetus from every severe or arbitrary measure adopted by the Austrian authorities, had spread over the greater part of Italy. Rome and Milan were the two most important centres of propaganda, and all the members of the party worked together to create such a state of discord between Austria and Italy as should bring the Triple Alliance to snapping point. In July 1889 the Irredentist party published the following manifesto:

'ITALIANS!

'When governments and parliaments forget the rights and duties of the nation, from the great soul of the people there bursts a cry in which all the rights and duties of the moment are epitomised: the cry of *Trieste and Trent!*

'It is the instinct of the collective body, it is the national conscience which shouts these names aloud at the proper historical moment.

'The danger is grave and immediate. We are bound by obligations of which we ignore the nature. We are aware only that an odious alliance binds us to our enemies.

'Italy is threatened with a war in which she will be forced to participate for the good of others, and against her own interests, which war, whether she be victorious or conquered, will leave her the slave of the foreigner. Meanwhile we live enslaved, as if condemned to perpetual servitude. But of our own affairs we ourselves must be the arbiters.

'Let us avail ourselves of every means within our reach; public opinion may prevent great disaster, and all will be forced to respect the determination of the people.

'Let us forestall the dangers that threaten. Let us form a mighty league in the name of Trieste and of Trent. This motto,

this cry that stirs us in a note of warning, is the bugle-call that unites us!

'Rome, 17th of July, 1889.

'NOTICE!

'The patriotic and political workmen's associations, the societies of veterans and of soldiers having participated in our country's wars, labourers' clubs, and all those among the patriots who desire to promote the country's welfare and are prepared to respond to the present appeal, are hereby invited to forward their declarations of adhesion without delay, and to take immediate steps for the constitution in their respective districts of Committees and Centres of Action, all having the same programme, and all being in direct communication with that Central Committee at Rome, whence they will receive the necessary instructions concerning the task towards the accomplishment of which they are to contribute.

'Communications to be forwarded to the following address only:

'Committee for Trieste and Trent,
Rome.'

Crispi at once intervened energetically. Not only did he prohibit the posting of this manifesto, but he also dissolved the Committee, and, by means of a circular published two days later, forbade the assemblies for which the Secret Executive of the Irredentists had everywhere made arrangements. Excitement ran high, and the attempts to organise anti-Austrian demonstrations continued. Crispi was nevertheless firmly resolved to suppress them. We find him telegraphing on the 22nd of July to the Prefect of Ravenna, rebuking him for not having consigned to the judicial authorities the authors of 'certain seditious outcries uttered at an Irredentist meeting 'at Conselice,' adding that 'such omissions were not only 'injurious to the government's prestige, but also emboldened 'those whose purpose it was to disturb public order.'

The fact is that Crispi's position was by no means easy. He sympathised, as every Italian patriot was bound to do, with the purpose of the Irredentists; on the other hand, the Triple Alliance was a vital element in his policy, and he felt that the path of diplomatic friendliness was the only one that could possibly lead to the emancipation, and, failing that, to the amelioration of the lot of the Italian subjects of the Dual Monarchy. Nor did he fail to make such representations on the subject by diplomatic channels as he felt might be

useful. He even invoked the intervention of Bismarck. He wrote to the Italian Ambassador in Berlin on the 29th of July, desiring him to 'beg the Prince Chancellor in my name to 'exhort Vienna to act with greater prudence and moderation. 'A more lenient attitude towards her Italian subjects on the 'part of Austria would greatly facilitate my task of dealing 'with the Irredentists.'

Bismarck did not decline. He sent secret instructions to Prince Reuss, the German Ambassador at Vienna, to avail himself of a favourable opportunity, and speak privately to Kálnoky, the Foreign Minister, urging greater moderation and prudence on the government in their dealings with their Italian subjects. The Irredentists, not unsupported by French intrigues in Italy, as the government thought, continued to rage. Imbriani and Cavallotti, two leading deputies of the Left, started the enrolment of a legion of young men who were to make a raid on Dalmatia. Crispi retorted by placing a strong guard on the frontier, and at length succeeded in convincing the leaders of the fruitlessness of their enterprise. On the 13th of September an attack was made on Crispi, one Caporali, who had frequented Imbriani's meetings, throwing a large cobble-stone in his face. Crispi's line became more determined than ever, and on the occasion of a banquet given in his honour at Florence in October he made trenchant declarations on the subject of Irredentism.

'For some time past,' he said, 'a dangerous movement has been seeking, by means of insidious language, to mislead and inflame the spirit of the people. I allude to that movement which clamours for the *redemption of Italian lands which do not belong to the Kingdom.* Our adversaries use this ideal to create disturbances, and it is indeed an ideal well calculated to inflame those weak and unreflective minds *which, nevertheless, are prone to generous enthusiasms.* Surrounded as it appears to be by the ardent poetry of patriotism, Irredentism is the most dangerous of those errors by which Italy is to-day distracted.'

The words we have italicised show the direction of Crispi's sympathies in spite of the correct diplomatic form of his utterance. This diplomatic correctness was greatly appreciated at Vienna. De Launay, the Italian Ambassador to Austria, reported a conversation in which the Emperor said to Kálnoky that he was pleased that the King of Italy

was supported by a Prime Minister of such ability. Kálnoky also sent his own 'enthusiastic congratulations' on the Florence speech, and the official 'Fremdenblatt' published an article that can only be described as a panegyric of the Italian Prime Minister. Thus the statesmen concerned by this adroit skating gave time for the thin ice to harden and make a firm path on which the nations might travel.

The following year a thunderbolt fell. The Austrian Government dissolved the Pro Patria Society, which had its headquarters at Trent and branches in every region in Austrian territory where 'unredeemed' Italians were to be found. The cause of this action was the adhesion of the Pro Patria to the Dante Alighieri Society at Rome, which was notorious for its openly hostile attitude towards the Dual Monarchy. The Dante Alighieri Society protested that its aims, as those of the Pro Patria, were merely to 'maintain bonds of an 'intellectual, moral, and historic nature,' and were in no way political. Crispi at once took up the cudgels and wrote to Nigra, the Italian Ambassador at Vienna, saying that Count Taaffe, the Austrian Minister, had made two serious mistakes in his decree; the president of the Pro Patria had not sent the supposedly incriminating telegram of adhesion to the Dante Alighieri; and in any case the latter society possessed a purely literary character, the members being all men of moderate views, incapable of any action which would involve the government in international difficulties.

'I cannot hide from you, however,' he continued, 'that the Austrian decree has produced a painful impression on the minds even of the most moderate among us, who are asking themselves if this be the way to maintain that alliance between Italy and the neighbouring Empire which is of such importance to us.'

He added that it was generally believed in Italy that Taaffe's well-known clericalist views, which rendered him hostile to the Triple Alliance, had influenced him in taking a step which could not but place that alliance in jeopardy. Nigra, in his reply, explained that diplomatic etiquette would not permit him to make a formal protest to Count Taaffe in connexion with an act which was purely one of internal administration, but that he would take the first opportunity of mentioning to the Austrian Minister in conversation that he had been deceived with regard to the nature and aims of both the

societies involved. He did not think that Taaffe's clericalism had anything to do with his action—all Austrian statesmen were more or less clericals—but that his motives were purely political. He further begged to point out that if the dissolution of the Pro Patria had produced an unfavourable impression in Italy, various injudicious actions of that society had had a correspondingly unfavourable effect in Austria. He concluded by hinting that the maintenance of the alliance would come up for discussion in a couple of years, and that then would be the time to discuss seriously what were the advantages to both parties of keeping it up.

These remarks elicited a very important declaration from Crispi as to his view of the alliance. It is so significant with regard to the Italo-Austrian situation and Crispi's relation thereto that we quote his letter at length:

'(Private.) Rome, 31st of July, 1890.

'To His Excellency Count Nigra, Vienna.

'Signor Conte,—I am in receipt of yours of the twenty-seventh. . . . Allow me to say a few words upon a subject which has incidentally found a place in our correspondence, and which is of the greatest importance. I will not go back to the origin of the alliance, and I admit that it was Italy who took the initiative in the matter. [Nigra had insisted on this point in his letter.] But I can weigh the situation as it really is, and it cannot but be to the advantage of both parties to discuss it impartially and in a truly disinterested spirit.

'I am convinced that the alliance is useful to both Italy and Austria. Italy must safeguard her frontiers. As she may not for the present have France for her friend, and this is unfortunate, she must at all costs hold fast to Austria, and avoid compromising this friendship. Should Austria escape us, she would immediately ally herself with France for the defence of the Pope. And the consequences would be incalculable. On the other hand, Austria needs Italy, who, under certain circumstances, might be able to render her signal service. Austria, sure of her position towards the Alps and the Adriatic, would be free to act in the East, where her true interests lie, and where she is liable to be assailed at any moment by those who are her real enemies.

'Austria is what she is, and should she seek to alter her state she would run the risk of destruction. Her very being, however, depends on her respecting all the nationalities contained within the Empire's boundaries.

'As for Italy, I am free to admit that she has an interest in the maintenance of Austria's integrity. For us that country is a

mighty barricade against possible and more dangerous adversaries who must not be allowed to approach our frontiers.

'Under these conditions no sources of disagreement should be allowed to exist between Italy and Austria, and sooner or later the boundary question must be settled amicably.

'It should be borne in mind, however, that if the Austrian alliance is unpopular in Italy, this is because the memory of the national struggle and of imperial misgovernment is still fresh amongst us.

'It is therefore essential that Austria should make us forget her past, and that she so shape her policy as to avoid wounding the spirit of nationalism that is still so keenly alive in the Italians. These observations, Signor Conte, must prove to you that my views are certainly conciliatory, and that whatever request I may make of the Austrian Government will always be in the interest of both countries.

'Yours sincerely,
'F. Crispi.'

In spite of great popular discontent, Crispi stuck to his position. He forbade under penal sanctions the holding of meetings in Italy protesting against the dissolution of the Pro Patria, and towards the end of August dissolved a number of associations, committees, and clubs of a politically Irredentist character. Re-elected at the general elections of 1890, he retired, in January 1891, before what Signor Palamenghi-Crispi describes as a 'truly vindictive' vote of the Chamber. In 1894, when he was again at the head of affairs, the Austro-Hungarian Government once more gave him just ground for complaint by obliging the Italians of Istria to use the Croat language as well as the Italian on all public signs and posters.

An immense sensation was produced throughout the Italian-speaking districts of the Austrian Empire, and profound dissatisfaction was not long in spreading in Italy. Crispi wrote to Nigra complaining bitterly of the difficulties put in his way by the Cabinet of Vienna.

'This movement in Istria is most inopportune. It supplies the government's adversaries with a pretext for agitation. . . . Austria might indeed have shown greater prudence. Being a polyglot Empire, she should see that her strength depends upon respecting all those nationalities of which the State is composed.'

He adds that the Austrians are unwise in trusting the Slavs, whose eyes are fixed on Petersburg, and that the task of uprooting the Italian language on the opposite shores of the

Adriatic, in itself difficult, will be rendered impossible by violence. 'It would be easier to make the Slavonians Italians 'than the Italians Slavonians.' Not content with writing to Nigra, he applied once more to the predominant partner of the alliance. Count Lanza, the Italian Ambassador at Berlin, was instructed to see the Emperor personally and 'entreat him to interfere, that this question of tongues may be 'finally settled and the Italian be treated with the same respect 'as the Slavonic.' Lanza made difficulties and was sharply reprimanded. The intervention, however, took place, and Count Eulenberg, the German Ambassador in Vienna, was instructed to advise the Austrian Government in the way Crispi desired.

We have dwelt at length on the relations of Crispi to the question of Irredentism, because nothing shows so clearly as the story of those relations the real nature of the problem involved. It is more than doubtful whether without her alien friends Italy would have been able either to achieve or retain her independence. Anyhow, that independence was as a matter of fact obtained through diplomacy as well as by the sword, and the method of its achievement laid down the measure of its limitations. Moreover, by a curious piece of irony, it was the hostility of France, whose sovereign had done so much for Italian freedom, that drove the new nation into the arms of Germany and of Austria, her hereditary oppressor and foe. All this made up a situation of extraordinary delicacy and complication. It was impossible, in the face of the absolute necessity of the Austrian alliance, for the Italians of the Kingdom to go to the assistance of their brothers in Austrian territory. And yet their need was great. However successfully the Austrians may have ruled the other subject races of their Empire, Italians were too much for them. A great gulf was set between the bureaucratic mind of Vienna and the supple mentality of the Italian race. Force Austria had, and force she used. It is time to consider her methods and their results.

II.—The Trentino

It should be borne in mind that the union of the country now known as the Trentino with the Austrian Empire is purely political, and dates from no earlier than 1802. It may

be well to recall what the actual history of the district has been.

After the Goth, Frankish, and Lombard invasions and the vicissitudes of the early Middle Ages, the city of Trent and the surrounding country called the Trentino were awarded to the independent Prince Bishop of the city as an immediate fief of the Empire in 1027, remaining independent under the rule of the Bishops until 1803. During those centuries it was regarded as a free principality under the suzerainty of the Emperor. It is expressly stated in the declaration of the choice of Trent for the great Council of the sixteenth century that its selection was due to the fact that, while the city was under the protection of the Emperor, it was not under his influence. The theoretical independence of the Bishop was rendered practical by the fact that his territory was separated from the rest of the Empire by the ecclesiastical principality of Brixen, also governed by its Prince-Bishop and standing in the same constitutional position towards the Empire as Trent. Throughout those centuries, the territory, although on the direct road from the north to the south of Europe, enjoyed almost unbroken peace and great prosperity. There were occasional wars with Venice, but the Trentini invariably defended themselves successfully against the Venetians. The first person to effectively disturb the peace of the country was Napoleon, who realised in his early Italian campaigns its great strategic importance. He was able to defeat the Austrians by taking advantage of the disposition of the two main roads of the country which lead respectively right into the heart of Venetia and Lombardy. As soon as the Austrians had received this demonstration of the military importance of Trent, its independence was doomed, and when at the German Diet of 1803 the mediatisation of all ecclesiastical fiefs was decreed, they put in a successful claim to the possession of the district. The Bishop and population protested; they did not understand how a decree of the German Diet could deprive them of an independence which they had enjoyed for seven centuries.

Meanwhile the battle of Austerlitz was fought, and at the treaty of Pressburg the Tyrol was assigned to Bavaria, who thereupon claimed the Trentino as part of her booty. This claim surprised the Trentini as much as the pretensions of Austria. By historical association, by race, by language, by

national and social characteristics, they were wholly different from the Tyrolese, with whom they had never had any connexion whatever. The Bavarians, who appear to have possessed already the 'mailed fist' theory of politics, did not argue, but deposed the Bishop in 1808. The Bavarian rule did not last long, and in 1810 Trent was assigned to the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy. Finally, at the Peace of Vienna in 1815, it was given as part of the Tyrol to Austria. It is noteworthy that the Austrians do not base their rights to the Trentino on the mediatisation decree of the German Diet. They simply refuse to regard the district as a separate entity, and consider it as part of the administrative area of South Tyrol. Even the use of the word 'Trentino' is looked upon as quasi-treasonable.

The line of demarcation between the Austrian and the Italian population is very clearly defined. South of the mountainous range which separates the valleys of the Noce and the Avisio from the upper basin of the Adige, the Italians live in a compact mass amounting to about 370,000, the Austrian population being about 12,000, of whom two-thirds are soldiers and government employés. It is true that the Austrians endeavour to enlarge the limits of their nationality by penetration into the Italian zone, but such efforts are merely sporadic and individual. Geography is at the base of what may be called the social physiology of every country, and the problem of the Trentino is highly individualised by its territorial separation from the other Italian provinces of the Austrian Empire. On the Adriatic coast from Cormono to Cattaro, the territorial continuity of the Italian population naturally gives rise to a complete coincidence of interests. It is not so with the Trentini. Their nearest co-nationalists are at Trieste, separated from them by miles of country racially and linguistically Germanic. Whether by accident or design, the Trentino is singularly lacking in good roads of communication. So much is this the case that when the leaders of the Nationalist party wish to meet they invariably select some city of the Kingdom for the purpose, as being easier to reach from the Italian centres in Austria than any place within the frontier.

The Trentino is indeed but the natural prolongation of the Kingdom, a limb cut from the geographical integrity of Italy

by the artificial barrier of a custom-house. The whole system of the Alpine valleys that compose the Trentino open out naturally into Italy towards the Po. Its vegetation, consisting of the vine, the mulberry, and the olive, differentiates it from the Tyrol with its broad pastures and pine forests. In the valleys of Sarca and Chiese the Lombard dialect is spoken ; in the valley of Valmya and in the district of Primiero, the Venetian ; while in the central valley of the Adige, in the neighbourhood of Trent, the two dialects meet, and are fused in a strictly local and characteristic language.

The economic life of the Trentino has always been turned in the direction of Italy. United under Austrian rule to Lombardy and Venetia, it had developed important industries, of which the silk trade was the chief. The liberation of these regions from the Austrian rule excluded the Trentino from its natural markets. Nor do the people of the Trentino obtain any compensating market within the Austrian Empire, for it is impossible for them to compete with Bohemia and Moravia, those ancient industrial centres of the Empire, resting on a huge organisation of capital, with communications maintained in every direction by an immense network of railroads and waterways. The economic as well as the geographical conditions of the Trentino have placed such competition out of the question. The black-and-yellow posts of the Austrian Customs cut off the industries of Trentino from their inevitable, their only possible markets. It is a pathetic circumstance of their ruin that it has been directly due to the resurrection of their Mother-land.

For ruin is the only word to describe their condition. Their industries are dead. The silk trade has completely disappeared, except for the sale of cocoons to the manufacturers of Milan. After the failure of their industries the inhabitants turned to exclusively agricultural occupations. These, too, have suffered from the successive epidemics that have attacked the vines. Many peasants have emigrated to America. The population has remained stationary where it has not notably diminished. This long and exhausting depression, complicated by the political action of the government, explains all the typical characteristics of the inhabitants. They have become in the main a purely agricultural people. The urban population does not amount to more than 13 per cent. of the whole.

There are but few 'Signori.' This explains the fact that in the Trentino the Nationalist movement does not find much collective expression. The peasant there, as elsewhere, is by nature timorous and passive. He is inclined to respect existing authority for its own sake, regardless of what it represents in the country. The first thing is for him to make ends meet, year by year. His heart is dumb It is possible, also, that the ecclesiastical rule, under which his forbears have lived for so long, has contributed to a certain intellectual inertia which can only be intensified by the misery of his economic conditions.

The main feature of the government of the Trentino is its essentially military character. A closely knit line of fortifications, on the maintenance and improvement of which more than thirty million crowns have been spent during the last ten years, barricades its valleys and connects the chain of its mountains, of which the higher peaks are all crowned with casemates. An enormous number of troops lives on the population at rates which, given the poverty of the country, are altogether inadequate. There were in the Trentino at the end of 1913 six brigades of infantry, a brigade of siege artillery and one of mountain artillery; that is to say, thirty-six battalions of infantry, three battalions of engineers, three squadrons of cavalry, five battalions of siege artillery, ten batteries of mountain artillery, and two batteries of heavy field guns. This huge number of troops, double what it was ten years ago, constitutes a veritable military occupation. Drawn from other parts of the Empire, they are inspired from Vienna with a strong anti-Italian feeling. The Archduke Eugene, who, in years gone by, was Inspector-General of the Tyrol and the Trentino, initiated what he called the system of the 'iron hand,' and his political ideas continue to dominate to-day. The *mot d'ordre* is firm and consistent repression of nationalist feeling among the indigenous population. This is part of the military conception of government towards which Austria has always been prone. No civil authority is allowed to stand against it for a moment. The '*Patriotische 'Gefühl der Armee'* is supreme.

Military patriotism is further assisted by a special corps of military police. This extraordinary institution, entirely separate from any State or municipal body and presumably

unique in Europe, depends on the military command of Innsbruck. It is seldom seen, but felt everywhere. It was constituted in 1907 and has its principal seat at Bolzano, with local committees in all important centres. Its agents have for their principal occupation the collection of the reports of their spies concerning the movements of Nationalists. The military police report direct to the Minister of War at Vienna, and they completely control the operations of the ordinary State and municipal functionaries. They can make arrests without any civil warrant, and the ordinary processes of law cannot avail their victims. Thus in time of peace is constituted what practically amounts to a state of martial law.

Signor Gayda, in his recent 'L'Italia d'Oltre Confine,' has collected some unusually preposterous instances of the high-handed and arbitrary fashion in which these jack-boots in office exercise their functions. According to a speech delivered in the Viennese Parliament on the 12th of December 1911, by Cesare Battisti, one of the representatives of Trent, the military authorities issued a circular to the civil government in which the lines of an extreme anti-Italian propaganda were laid down as follows: All concessions for manufactures or labour were to be refused to subjects of Italian race inhabiting the Trentino. If a good pretext could be found, they were to be expelled. No Italian capital was to be allowed to be employed in any Trentine industries. No importation of cattle from Italy was to be permitted. All Italian societies were, if possible, to be dissolved, and even the Alpine Club of Trent was not to be allowed to construct refuges on the mountains. Attempts were to be made to gain territory on the frontier by provoking 'incidents' at points where the line of demarcation between Italy and Austria was confused. A list of suspects was to be drawn up to provide possible hostages in case of war. Signor Battisti was able to give documentary proof of every point of this incredibly fantastic programme.

The case of the railway on the banks of the Lake of Garda is another typical instance of the way in which military government works out. It was proposed to construct for the benefit of tourists a line of railway from Desenzano to Riva along the whole length of the lake. The advantage to the inhabitants was great and obvious. There was no question of the employment of Italian capital. A French bank took the

financial responsibility. At first the Austrian military authorities did not seem to object, but the Roman War Office took exception to the scheme on grounds of national defence. The objection of the Italian Government was met by a guarantee of a million and a half lire to provide a fort which should neutralise any strategic advantage which might accrue to Austria from the existence of the railway. Rome having consented, Vienna began to find difficulties. Finally, the Chief of the General Staff, General Conrad, refused to pass the scheme without a guarantee of twelve-and-a-half millions of crowns to build new Austrian fortifications. The enterprise, of course, came to nothing.

It will have been seen that the troubles of the Trentino come mainly from the refusal of the Austrian Government to recognise the nationalist feelings of the inhabitants. These people are governed (with a total disregard of history, geography, and ethnology) as if they were Austrians—in fact a great deal worse than they would be if they really were Austrians. The difficulty lies in the absorption of the Trentino in the administrative area of the Tyrol. The government maps simply do not recognise the existence of the Trentino; it is *Süd-Tirol* and nothing more. Probably some form of administrative autonomy under the Austrian Crown would have contented many of the inhabitants: for they have never formed part of the existing Kingdom of Italy. But the circumstances and condition of their life force them into Irredentism. Annexation to the Kingdom is their only chance of freedom. Austria has adopted the policy of crushing their national aspirations, and is now apparently condemned to persevere in a course of oppression. Any gift of 'Home Rule' would now probably be too late.

III.—Trieste, Fiume, Istria, and Dalmatia.

We will now consider briefly the claims of the Italian populations on the coast of the Adriatic who are at present subjects of Austria and Hungary. The coast from the Italian frontier to close upon Fiume belongs to Austria. Fiume and about sixty miles of coast are part of the Hungarian province of Croatia; and, finally, we have the long coastline of Dalmatia belonging to Austria, but quite detached from the other posses-

sions of the Austrian Crown. As regards the whole of this long piece of territory, whether Austrian or Hungarian, the general statement may be made that, subject to certain qualifications, the rural population is in the main Slavonic, and the urban population Italian. The Italian element decreases in the rural population as we get further away from Italy and further from the coast into the hinterland. The semi-urban element, which devotes itself to fishing and maritime pursuits and has trading relations with the Italian-speaking towns, is wholly Italian. The real urban population is preponderantly so. We say 'real urban' advisedly, as recent statistics prepared by the government, which throughout the district supports the Slavs against the Italians, apparently show that the Italian population has become a minority in several of the towns of Dalmatia. This appearance is not due to a fall in birth-rate or to emigration, but entirely to the dodge of 'Stadterweiterung,' or, as we may translate it, Borough Extension, which by designedly extending the limits of the town and taking in a sufficient amount of adjacent rural Slavs is able to show on paper a Slavonic majority. This is, however, mere juggling with words, and the real town populations continue to be, as they have always been, essentially Italian. (The Austrians have tried the same trick in Istria and the districts nearer Italy, but the more mixed character of the rural population in those regions has balked their plans.) Moreover, even where the Italian element is in a numerical minority it unfailingly represents all the wealth, education, and civilisation of the country, which may not constitute a democratic argument in favour of the Italians, but ought, one would think, to be taken into consideration by the Imperial and Royal governments if they wish to deal fairly with these provinces.

Leaving the Italian frontier behind us, we come first to the two tiny Austrian principalities of Goritza and Gradisca. Goritza is in the hinterland, and Gradisca on the coast. Both contain a mixed population of Italians and Slavs, the Italian inhabitants of Gradisca being in a large majority. We next come to Trieste. Trieste is an essentially Italian town in appearance and character. The census of 1900 for the town and territory gives a proportion of over 77 per cent. Italian, less than 3 per cent. German, and the remaining 20 per cent. belonging to other races, of which the preponderating element

is the Slavonic. The Germans are mainly government officials or heads of banks. The Slavs are for the most part in the country. The wealthy and prosperous urban population is overwhelmingly Italian—Italian in language, literature, art, architecture, and music; in fact, in everything that makes an Italian. This large and intelligent population has been continuously bullied for generations. We are aghast at methods of terrorism in war, but, as in the case of the Trentino, the Austrians have not hesitated to introduce in peace measures which could only be justified under a state of martial law. Bad enough for the peasants of the Alpine valleys, such methods are absolutely intolerable in a highly developed commercial community like Trieste. Signor Fauro has given a full account of Austrian methods in the exhaustive monograph quoted at the head of this article. In spite of these measures the Triestini have repeatedly affirmed their Italian sentiments, and if the principles of government and justice have anything to do with each other, the Italians of Trieste ought to be united to their mother-land.

Austrians argue that the possession of Trieste is a commercial necessity for the hinterland and the Empire. From a moral point of view this argument is not worth much. The last few months have seen terrible things done on the ground of military necessity. Ought a hateful form of government to be allowed to continue under the pretext of commercial necessity? Is the happiness of over two hundred thousand people to count for nothing? But apart from ethics the commercial argument is not very strong. The hinterland for fifty miles north of Trieste is inhabited by a rural population partly Italian, but mainly Slavonic and distinctly uncommercial. There is no settled German population within sixty miles, and then we come to the Alpine inhabitants of Styria and Carinthia, who are equally guileless of commerce. What is meant here by the hinterland are the industrial districts of South Germany and Bohemia, several hundreds of miles distant. It is an absurd and extravagant proposition that Trieste should remain Austrian for the sake of those far-distant populations. With equal force Switzerland might claim Genoa, or the Rhine provinces and Westphalia might demand the possession of Rotterdam.

As a matter of common sense, the argument cannot be

considered until we know the future of Austria and Germany after the war. If Austria joins Germany she will have an outlet on the North Sea. If Austria remains with Hungary, and Hungary retains Croatia, she will have an outlet on the Adriatic at Fiume. (There are sound reasons, which will shortly be mentioned, why Italy should abandon any claims to Fiume.) If Bohemia is severed from Austria, her industrial importance will largely disappear. It is sometimes suggested that Trieste should become an imperial free port. People who take this position forget that from 1719 to 1891—for a period, that is, of 172 years—Trieste enjoyed that privilege. The freedom or closing of the port did no sort of harm or good to the Italian inhabitants. How could it? As far as their private lives are concerned, they are in no way affected by such a point. What does affect them is the government under which they live. A wiser and more practical suggestion is that Trieste should be declared by treaty a free port under Italian suzerainty. This, failing annexation by Italy, would be perhaps the best solution of the problem. The Italian inhabitants would be free to manage their own affairs, and, apart from being perfectly capable of doing so, they would not wish to endanger their rule by doing anything injurious to the interests of the town as a whole.

We now come to the peninsula of Istria, which has the shape of an inverted cone, with the apex pointing to the south. The population is 350,000, of which the Italian element numbers about 40 per cent. They are, as usual, in the towns and along the coast. Practically all the towns of importance, such as Capo d'Istria, Città Nuova, Parenzo, Rovigno, Pola, are either on the coast or in close proximity to it. It would be quite feasible to draw a boundary-line which would give to Italy the Italian-speaking towns and the coast-line up to and including Pola. This territory would contain a heavy Italian majority, numbering about 80 per cent. of the whole population. Here again we have towns of purely Italian characteristics; while in Pola, an Italian-speaking town of 45,000 inhabitants, Italy would acquire an important naval base. Italian interests in the Adriatic are far more vital than those of any other country, a fact of which they have shown their appreciation by their occupation of Vallona during the course of the present war. It would seem, then, that

Italy may fairly claim Gradisca, Trieste, and the coast-line of Istria, and it should be remembered that, in so restricting her claim, Italy is surrendering in the hinterland of Istria her claim to Goritza, with its Italian population of over 150,000.

After Istria we come to the Hungarian province of Croatia. Here the only plausible Italian claim is to the town of Fiume, where again the Italians form the most important element of the population. Their numbers amount to 48 per cent., the Hungarian and German elements being respectively 7 per cent. and 2 per cent., while the remaining inhabitants are Slavs. But, in spite of this fact, there are no Italians to speak of outside the town itself. There is a genuine large Slavonic hinterland, and, at the back of it, Hungary, which has a right to a port. There does not seem to be sufficient intrinsic justification for the Italian claim to Fiume. What its future will be is hard to say. It must depend greatly on the possibility of the establishment of a comprehensive Southern Slav State.

Without fully discussing this question, we venture to suggest that such a possibility depends in a great measure on whether the Orthodox Serbs, who predominate in Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Southern Dalmatia, are able to ensure an effective religious freedom to the Catholic Slavs who inhabit Northern Dalmatia, Croatia, the non-Italian part of Istria, Goritza, Carniola, and other districts in the southern parts of the Austrian and Hungarian dominions. The populations belonging to the two religions are not far from numerically equal, and if the Serbs and Montenegrins have a greater reputation for military prowess, the Catholic Slavs, particularly in Croatia, are far ahead of their Orthodox brothers in education and everything that makes for civilisation. If the union of the Southern Slavs can be effected Fiume must belong to them, and in order to satisfy the commercial needs of Hungary it should be declared by treaty a free port under the suzerainty of a Southern Slav State.

As regards the Irredentist claim to Dalmatia, it must be admitted that, ethnically speaking, it is of the slightest. The Italians form less than 10 per cent. of the population. Nevertheless the Italian sentiment for Dalmatia is perhaps stronger than for any other territory but Trieste. This sentiment is frequently based on wholly false arguments. Thus it is often

urged that the cities of Dalmatia are old Venetian settlements among a Slavonic population. Nothing can be further from the truth. Zara, Ragusa, and Spalato were from the first Latin cities, and we have their earliest statutes and public acts written in Italian and dating from a period anterior to the existence of Venice. Their language is an Italian dialect quite unrelated to the Venetian, and as a matter of fact much nearer Tuscan. Cattaro, the furthermost point from the Italian frontier, sent, in the thirteenth century, appeals to the universities of Rome, Bologna, and Padua. There is no question of these cities having been alien settlements. No doubt the rule of Venice increased Italian influence there, and Ragusa obtained a constitution modelled on the Venetian. It was increasing intellectual intercourse with Italy that developed Italian influence. No population of the same size in Italy has produced so long a roll of fame in art, literature, and science as the Italian-speaking portion of Dalmatia. Schiavone of Zara was Titian's master. All this, admittedly, gives no right to the Italian Dalmatians to rule their more numerous and less educated alien brothers. What, however, is bitterly resented in Italy is the continuously sustained effort of the Slavonic majority to denationalise the Italian-speaking towns. The moment that the Slavs find themselves in a majority on the municipal councils they proceed to force the Illyrian language, as they call it, in the schools, suppressing Italian, in which municipal affairs of the country have long been conducted. On the whole it does not appear that the Irredentist claim can be validly maintained in Dalmatia, but the liberties of the Italian population ought to be secured by treaty rights.

This brief sketch of 'Italia Irredenta' is necessarily rather elementary and superficial. With more space at our disposal both the intrinsic justice of the claims of Irredentism and the intolerable tyranny of Austria might have been dealt with in much greater detail. Enough has, however, been said to show how vital and urgent is the problem. International necessity has up till now prevented the Italian Government from reflecting in any adequate degree the feelings of the Italian people with regard to it. That necessity, perhaps, no longer binds Italian statesmen. They can hardly face

with equanimity any European settlement after the war that will still leave their brothers in bondage. It has indeed been suggested in some quarters that the Cabinet of Vienna, at the instigation of Berlin, has offered the bribe of the Italian-speaking provinces of the Empire in return for the neutrality of Italy at this moment of crisis. It may be so. But it should be remembered that it is by no means certain that Austria will be in a position to dispose of her territory after the war. And supposing that she still can do so, she has not a very good record in matters of international good faith, not to speak of the reputation of her predominant partner. This only is certain, that all the friends of Italy are anxious that she should well weigh the whole situation and then act in accordance with her deepest interests and the heroic traditions of her glorious past. *Ainsi soit-il!*

ALGAR THOROLD.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION

1. **The South African Scene.** By VIOLET R. MARKHAM. Smith, Elder and Co. 1913.
2. **South Africa, 1486-1913. Vol. VI.** By A. WYATT TILBY. Constable. 1914.

ON May 31, 1902, the representatives of Great Britain, of the South African Republic, and of the Orange Free State, sitting in an unpretentious building at Vereeniging ('Union'), signed conditions of peace. On December 6, 1906, the late South African Republic, then the Transvaal Colony, was made a self-governing State of the Empire. Less than a year later, the Orange River Colony was dealt with in the same way. Almost immediately afterwards the Government of the Cape Colony, headed by Dr. Jameson, resolved upon a great act of party suicide. Looking to a resurrection as a portion of that United South Africa which had been the dream of statesmen in Cecil Rhodes's day and before it, the Cabinet set on foot negotiations for union. With wise courage these negotiations were fostered by Lord Selborne as governor of the two new colonies, and carried to a successful result by a convention of notables which sat at Durban and Cape Town under the presidency of the late Lord De Villiers. As the result of this convention the Cape Colony, Natal, the Transvaal, and the Free State were united into one British Dominion, and on May 31, 1910 the Union of South Africa was born. Rhodesia remained outside for the time being, but its representatives attended the convention, clearly looking to union in the not remote future. Two acts of the convention call for special attention, as happy indications of its spirit. By the first, the name of the Orange Free State was restored; by the second equality was given to English and Dutch as official languages of the Union. Equally happy was the choice of Prime Minister. General Botha, the organiser of victory for the Republican armies at Colenso and subsequently Prime Minister of the Transvaal when it became a self-governing State, was by general

consent chosen to be the first Prime Minister of the new Union. In the day of war he had shown himself a dauntless patriot and a great soldier; as Prime Minister of an individual State he had acted as a sagacious statesman. The supreme test of his character and capacity as patriot, soldier, and statesman was still to come.

The new Union represented a great experiment. How would the experiment work out? Consider the circumstances. The British in South Africa represented the race which had won in the war. By a great act of political faith they yielded up party power to the race which had invoked and lost the judgment of the stricken field. It was known only too accurately that in the Orange Free State the British could not return any racial representatives to the new Parliament, while in the Transvaal they could return only a minority. The British in the Cape Colony and Natal well knew that, did they decline to surrender their separate Colonial entities, the Imperial Government would not think of forcing them to do so. Obeying one of those secret impulses which might almost justify Englishmen in flattering themselves that they are favoured of the gods, they followed the more generous course. Like the supreme test of General Botha, their reward came in the fateful year 1914.

Miss Markham is the most recent detached yet responsible observer of the working of the new institutions, and she is also able to compare the new South Africa with the old. As a critic she is shrewd, candid, and kindly. Her book has the pleasant flavour of an equal appreciation of the leisured life of the stately old Dutch homesteads of the Cape Peninsula, and of the eager, strenuous activity of the mining areas. Substantially it bears out impressions of political life since the Act of Union such as would be got by reading the South African daily press, for as to the major points of controversy the book and the daily press agree. Many controversies which at this distance appear trivial are fought out in South Africa with the same bitterness that is aroused among party politicians here by controversies of about equal intrinsic importance. One port is at all times prepared to show that the Government of the day is corruptly favouring its rival port; the farming community of a neglected district will persistently assert that the Government has wasted millions upon railways to swamps

inhabited by bandits, instead of making a handsome profit by building a line through fertile country inhabited by pure and enlightened patriots. To the same order belong complaints made from time to time of the appointment of public officials, especially when it is found that the appointee is a supporter of the party in power. In such cases the Government is always able to show that the appointee possesses qualifications which his opponent, who is not a supporter of the Government, unfortunately lacks. The phenomenon is not peculiar to South Africa, and will continue to appear until imperfect human nature undergoes a radical change. There is more seriousness in the charge that officials already filling important posts are by one means or another jockeyed out of them. But these, after all, are matters of domestic significance.

There have been, however, two controversies of far greater import. The first is happily so far settled that it is past the dangerous stage. It is the question of the treatment of the British Indians in South Africa. As between English- and Dutch-speaking South Africa, this was never an occasion of acute controversy. On the contrary, the English-speaking communities were usually more clamorous for drastic action against the Indians than any section of Dutch-speaking South Africa, except the Orange Free State, which was for long almost a unit in the demand for the entire exclusion of all Asiatics, Imperial obligations and responsibilities notwithstanding. Thanks in chief measure to the steady fortitude and the unswerving sincerity of Mr. Gandhi, who is something of an Indian Tolstoi, and to the scarcely less remarkable moral courage of General Smuts, the all-powerful Minister of the Interior, in reconsidering his own attitude, the situation has been sensibly, and it is to be hoped permanently, relieved. It is not the least of England's strokes of good fortune in the war.

The other question has directly affected the relationships of the two chief nationalities in South Africa, and with grave ill consequences. It has indeed contributed to bring about the rebellion now happily at an end. Clause 137 of the Act of Union runs as follows :

' Both the English and Dutch languages shall be official languages of the Union and shall be treated on a footing of equality and possess and enjoy equal freedom, rights, and privileges : all records, journals,

and proceedings of Parliament shall be kept in both languages, and all Bills, Acts, and notices of general public importance or interest issued by the Government of the Union shall be in both languages.'

In the daily life and circumstances of South Africa, there are two interpretations of these words possible. There is the interpretation of the formalist, the logician, the language enthusiast, who, ignoring the leading cases of the United States, Ireland, and Switzerland, contends for language as the supreme test of nationality. On the other side there is the interpretation of the common-sense man of affairs, who would by all means print official notices in the two languages, but would regard it as folly and injustice to force a British child to be taught all subjects through the medium of Dutch, or a Dutch child to be taught similarly through English. Left to themselves, the people of South Africa, even so early as the Peace of 1902, or at latest after the grant of the Free State Constitution in 1907, would have adopted the common-sense policy obtaining in the Cape Colony before the war—that, namely, of leaving the two languages to work out their own fate according to the needs of the community.

An illuminating instance of the essential reasonableness of the bulk of the two nationalities came to light soon after the peace. During a somewhat heated language debate in the old Cape Parliament, it was shown that although the School Committees throughout the Colony had by law the right to select the medium, less than 5 per cent. of the Committees in the purely Dutch-speaking districts had chosen Dutch. A generation, even a score of years, ago, if one had gone into the ordinary, cultivated Dutch family of the Cape Peninsula and addressed one's friends in Dutch, one would have been held guilty of a solecism, unless, of course, one were a Netherlander. The war, quite naturally, changed all that. For a time, to go into those same circles and use English would have made as disagreeable an impression as would be made if one spoke German in a South Kensington drawing-room to-day. At present, after embittered controversy, language matters are settling down into the kindly, common-sense position once more. Generally speaking, the principle now adopted, as Miss Markham found, is for the child's mother-tongue to be the medium of instruction in the lower standards, English being introduced as the medium for the Dutch child

in the higher standards, whereas the English child keeps the English medium throughout, and learns Dutch as a second language.

Very largely this reasonable settlement is due to the courageous initiative of one man. The Free State has always been the centre of the language difficulty, for the perfectly simple reason that in the past there had been less mixing of British and Dutch there than elsewhere in South Africa except Natal, where there is no language controversy, because the population is practically all British. When in 1910 Dr. Viljoen, a South African Dutchman educated at Stellenbosch and Amsterdam, was appointed by General Hertzog, Director of Education in the Free State in succession to a Scotsman, Mr. Hugh Gunn, the prevailing impression was that the British settlers, who had already gone to the extreme length of setting up separate schools, were to be made the victims of a racial crusade, the outcome of which would be to embitter racial relationships disastrously. Dr. Viljoen at once proved himself not merely a Dutch patriot but a South African patriot. He refused to take up any standpoint save that of the educationist, and setting aside all partisan claims he evolved the system already mentioned, which looks solely to the interests of educational efficiency. Bearing in mind Dr. Viljoen's birth and political antecedents, one may without exaggeration compare his achievement with that of Dr. Jameson during his Premiership of the Cape in respect of its disappointment of the Extreme Right of his own party.

But a chapter of bitter controversy has intervened, and it is necessary to refer to this because in all human probability the strong feeling aroused by it and the steady undermining of General Botha's position with a section of his own race are largely accountable for the recent rebellion. One of the numerous compelling personalities thrown up by the Dutch Republics during their two-and-a-half years' epic struggle with the British Empire is General John Barry Hertzog. The second prenomen may mean an ancestral strain of Irish logicality, which, joined with Dutch tenacity, makes a formidable combination. During the war General Hertzog was less in the public eye in a military connexion than were his comrades, Generals Botha, Smuts, de Wet, de la Rey and Beyers; but whenever he was heard of, it was as a stout and resourceful

combatant and the trusted adviser of President Steyn, the head of his State.

After the peace he became a member of the first cabinet of the Orange River Colony, and his department speedily contributed more 'copy' to the newspapers than all the rest put together. Several of his leading officials resigned, and their chief always showed that they were wrong and not he. Some of us are painfully familiar in the family circle with the member who invariably proves himself or herself right, and insists upon the full honours of argument. Most of us, in yielding the honours, feel how willingly we would yield the victor also. Without pressing the comparison too closely home, we may conjecture that more than once, in the early stages of his career as a Minister, General Hertzog would have been asked to resign had ordinary party differences existed in South Africa instead of differences nominally of party but really of race, or had lawyers of cabinet rank been more numerous in the Nationalist party. Before long General Hertzog stood revealed as the 'sea-green incorruptible' of his race-party. Scholar, philosopher, constitutional lawyer, he somehow lacked, when yoked to the daily task of administration, the homely quality of workability. He was Minister of Education in his own State, and some of the most trusted officials preferred retirement. He became Minister of Justice in the Union, and the process was repeated on a wider scale. For a time he held the portfolio of Native Affairs; and here his logicality took a turn which threatened tragic results, for he publicly patronised the policy enunciated by a few fellow-logicians, of segregating the native races in South Africa, an enterprise about as practicable as the segregation in England, say, of all whose incomes are under thirty shillings a week.

But the language question was the one through which General Hertzog's temperament wrought most mischief. Upon a community which had been making its way on the whole contentedly enough, he impressed his view that its grievances in regard to language-rights were clamorous. That section of the Dutch-speaking people which was least willing to take up membership of the Empire was not slow to act upon his hint. Demands for language-duplication were raised in dozens of quarters in which matters had gone on so well under the old system as to suggest that not outraged patriotism but perverted

ingenuity accounted for the present agitation. General Botha and the other Ministers had not observed the grievances the existence of which obsessed their logical, uncompromising colleague. Most of them, like the sensible men they are, when they addressed a Dutch audience used Dutch, and when they addressed a British audience used English. The Prime Minister himself, who until mature manhood had used practically no English, set himself to master our tongue, and those who have heard him make a speech in that language will agree that the English is as attractive as the impulse that led to its acquirement was statesmanlike and courteous. It was easy to misrepresent such courtesy as a going over to the ancient enemy. Yet the more closely General Botha and his colleagues considered the position, and especially the needs and potentialities of the mining and commercial industries, the more they were led by the plain teaching of events to take up a more and more sympathetic attitude towards the English-speaking, mainly town-dwelling population, with the result that General Hertzog and his friends took the next logical step, and accused them of treachery to the old cause and the old gods. At this stage General Botha, irritated at the logical processes of his embarrassing colleague, turned the tables by resigning and then re-forming the cabinet without General Hertzog.

Such, in broad outline, was the situation in South Africa when Miss Markham visited that country. Here is her general summary, which may be accepted as accurate, if the word 'Dutch' be read as meaning the bulk of the population living out of cities :

'The whole framework of government is English to a degree the Dutch little recognise themselves ; but these changed conditions have been accepted quietly, almost imperceptibly, by the rank and file, thanks to the presence of their own people in power, as they could never have been accepted under English guidance. Suspicions which would have been aroused, obstructions which would have occurred, have to a large extent been avoided by the present position. The Union has been consolidated with less friction under Dutch rule than would have been set up by the process under English rule. There have been difficulties with the racialists as it is, but those difficulties would have been magnified tenfold in any other circumstances.'

Suddenly, at the end of July 1914, across a community

thus undergoing reconstruction, there fell the black shadow of a world-war, followed a day or two later by the terrible reality. It was speedily to develop a situation exceeded in essential bitterness and in thrilling episodes by that in Belgium alone. And among other things it was to reveal to the world at large 'one of Plutarch's men.' The extent to which the war was to rend afresh a social fabric even yet only in the earlier stages of repair was not apparent at once. For the moment all went well. A movement was set on foot, which undoubtedly represented the feelings of the majority of Dutch as well as British, with the object of sending a contingent to aid the Mother-Country, and it was commonly expected that General de Wet would command it. He was destined to play a very different part. General Hertzog, who, as a man educated partly in Holland, was well able to estimate the sufferings of her neighbour and the outrages inflicted upon her, denounced Prussianism with all his accustomed uncompromising vigour. A special session of Parliament was summoned, and the news that the Government would propose a resolution assuring the Imperial Government of sympathy and support in appearance gave satisfaction to all sections of the population. But only in appearance; for between the outbreak of war and the meeting of Parliament, a little over a month, what had been obvious from the first to the Government, and to all who realised the meaning of international relationships and Imperial obligations, penetrated the unwilling consciousness of the dwellers on the land in the remote parts of the Union: the Union Government would have to undertake the conquest of German South-West Africa.

To most people in Great Britain, this seemed a simple and natural operation enough. German South-West Africa has a white population within 15,000. The Union's white population exceeds a million and a quarter. Where could be the terrible difficulty in a situation such as this? As will be seen from what follows, the military problem was not, and is not, so simple as it seemed. But the military problem, though difficult, was not the most serious embarrassment in which the Botha Government found itself.

People who have not lived in South Africa cannot easily realise to how great a degree the life of the country is veined with German character, energy, and enterprise. President

Kruger came of German stock—a circumstance which led the Kaiser and the German public to draw totally erroneous conclusions regarding the political leanings of the South African republics of the old days. One of the most popular ministers of the Crown that Cape Colony ever had was an old Bavarian soldier. Alfred Beit, who financed Rhodes's policy of expansion so ungrudgingly, was from Hamburg. Such names as Albu, Eckstein, Reyersbach, Neumann, Goerz, Brakhañ, Francke, Niehaus, Hirschhorn, Leinberger, Wagner, Müller, Michaelis, and Rolfes, denoting German descent, occur in the records of mining and commercial life all over South Africa, in connexions which bear testimony to the character and influence of their owners. But indeed in every city and town, and almost every village, Germans are to be found, and usually they are among the most progressive and public-spirited citizens. The German Evangelicals have for generations supported missions among the natives in all parts of South Africa. The Moravian Church founded one of the best high schools for girls which South Africa has ever had. When the sandy flats of the Cape Peninsula were thrown open for settlement, neither the British nor the Dutch thought the difficulties surmountable, but German settlers went in and wrested success from the desert. After the disbanding of the German Crimean Legions, hundreds of other German colonists faced the hard conditions of farming life in what was then British Kaffraria, and held their own.

Until lately, the German colonist naturalised, and in due course became a British citizen, and often his son was English of the English. But the opening-up of the Rand goldfields has attracted another class of German to the country, often the representative of a German firm, liable to be moved on elsewhere at any time, or the professional servant of a mining corporation, engaged for a term of years. Such men, possibly because of the existence of a German colony next door, more probably because they are birds of passage, have not naturalised. The relationship of German and Boer has been curious. As fellow-citizens under the British flag, or under the flag of the old republics, each got on with the other easily enough. If the Boer went to South-West Africa, as he occasionally did, in some cases out of desire for change, and in some because he wished to get away from British authority, he

usually quarrelled with the German official and came back to British territory, grumblingly remarking that the Deutschers were even worse than the Engelsch.

Enough has been said to show that the German strain is almost as much part of South African life and society as the British or the Dutch. But there is one thing more specially to be borne in mind. That section of the Dutch-speaking people which lives farthest from the cities is the section which is brought most closely into touch with the settlers in German South-West Africa, the majority of whom are not ex-residents of British South Africa, but people who have gone out from Germany direct as officials, farmers, or, more usually, farmer-soldiers—that is, ex-army men who hold land on tenure of military service. German and Dutch live the same life. They have the tie of practically a common language; for Dutch differs little structurally from Low German. Only an imaginary line separates their countries. Their form of religious observance is practically the same, and they intermarry. To some, even of those who went into rebellion, it might have seemed possible to fight, or allow their sons to fight against uniformed Prussians on the far-away fields of Flanders. But the notion of falling upon their fellow-farmers, for no reason except that they were sprung from another race in Europe, seemed a monstrous inversion of the ordinances of God. And to do this for the benefit of Great Britain, which but yesterday was herself at war with their own South African republics!

Upon the other hand, the duty which presented itself to the minds of General Botha and his colleagues was as urgent and inexorable as the dilemma in which it placed them was cruel and complete. Only upon two hypotheses was any course possible other than that which they adopted. If the Imperial Government had had at its instant disposal 50,000 or 60,000 troops from England or from Canada or Australasia, and had hurled them upon German South-West Africa, the country might have been taken, after a long struggle, without the Union officially participating. But the Imperial Government required all its troops in Europe, and nothing is more certain than that South African public opinion, Dutch equally with British, would have denounced the Botha Government had it permitted others to come in and seize the heritage of South

Africans. Beyond this, it is certain that English-speaking South Africans by the thousand would have joined such an Imperial expedition, and it is equally certain that many Dutch-speaking South Africans would have gone over to help the Germans, with consequences throughout the Union too hideous to contemplate. Again, if the Germans of the South-West had been only a few dozens or even a few hundreds they might have surrendered to the Union voluntarily without dishonour. As it was, numbering something approaching 15,000, of whom 6000 to 8000 were garrison troops or soldier-farmers, they could no more do this than could an equal number of Englishmen and Scotsmen have surrendered in similar circumstances. They know that German South-West Africa is of all Germany's colonies the dearest to her, not only because it was her first colonial enterprise, but also because it is watered with German blood. Many of the men now in the colony fought the Hereros during the rebellion which cost Germany twenty millions of money and several thousand lives, and in the municipal gardens at Swakopmund there rests a piece of German sculpture—a German marine pierced by a poisoned arrow, and dying on the edge of a rock, while his comrade leaps to avenge him—which tells its tale of racial aspiration as truly as does that of the embattled farmers at Concord.

Since, then, it was impossible either for the Imperial Government to send an army to German South-West Africa, or for the German colonists to surrender voluntarily, the direct participation of the Union Government in the war became inevitable. To leave German South-West Africa alone was out of the question. There was first the fact that the colony was being used as a place of refuge for German sea raiders, singly or in squadrons. One of these raiders chased a South African steamer before the war was a fortnight old. Further, the colony had a high-power wireless station, probably in touch with Berlin, and in any case capable of interfering with our naval operations to an extent which might be vital. But even if all considerations of Imperial obligation were left out of account and the affair were viewed solely from the South African standpoint, there still remained the duty owed to the sentiment of the English-speaking South Africans. They had quietly accepted a political position which had placed a Dutch Government in power, galling as this must have been to many of them. Their

feelings had been exasperated by the belief, well or ill-founded, that in the Transvaal the first electoral registers had been unfairly compiled. They had been baulked of their expectation that the country would pass under a Coalition Government representing both races. The disappointment of this hope was in no sense due to General Botha, who, on the contrary, did all he possibly could to further a policy which is a reasoned certainty of the near future. But the feeling of disappointment remained, and had been deepened by the unfortunate alarums and excursions of General Hertzog.

Another consideration of a purely material character made immediate action against German South-West Africa imperative. South Africa contains one of the world's greatest gold fields, and if Germany could have seized the three million sovereigns per month produced by the Rand her financial measures would have been materially helped.

There was further the government of the native races, which General Botha, as the Minister chiefly responsible for native affairs, must have had prominently in his mind, with a knowledge denied to many of his adverse critics. There is a considerable native population under the Germans, and now that the issue between the two Empires has been raised, it would be a most dangerous proceeding to leave either in a position to tamper with the loyalty and peaceableness of the other's native subjects. This consideration makes it certain that after the war Germany cannot be permitted to retain her South-West African possessions.

Finally, and not altogether irrelevantly, the German authorities in South-West Africa themselves forced the issue by attacking a Union force on Union territory. One of the opponents of General Botha has not scrupled to assert that the attack was provoked, and that the frontier spot where it occurred is not Union territory. The suggestion is not flattering to the German soldiers, or to that able and resourceful officer, General von Heydebreck, by whom they are led.

For all these reasons, General Botha and his colleagues decided, rightly, inevitably, that the German colony must be seized. They therefore called out the Active Citizen Force, under General Smuts's Defence Act of 1912. This measure represents an admirable compromise between the voluntary

and compulsory principles, and as such may be worth consideration by the people of Great Britain if any re-organisation of the military system should be undertaken after the war. The country is divided into military areas arranged on a basis of population and industrial and political character. Each district must produce a certain number of men of military age for service in the Active Citizen Force. If there is a shortage it must be made good by ballot. Far from such balloting having been found necessary, well over double the number of men at which the Force was estimated had joined of their own motion at the time of Miss Markham's visit, some months before the outbreak of the present war, and the total has risen largely since. The Act contemplates that fifty per cent. of the citizens of military age shall undergo training during four years—a withdrawal from ordinary work for a few days being all that is necessary each year—or shall serve as members of rifle associations for the same period, with liability for war service if called upon. So far the Act has worked admirably; but it was only put into operation during 1913, and the Force has had to meet some of the bravest and best trained soldiers of Europe before its own equipment could be completed, or its members become accustomed to the system and to their officers. General de Wet was for some time a member of the Council of Defence formed under the Act, and the permanent command of the Force was entrusted to General Christian Frederick Beyers, whose career ended in tragedy a few weeks ago, beneath the waters of the stream which has figured so prominently in the history of South Africa.

It was a career full of promise until the foredoomed adventure of the recent rebellion. Beyers was the son of a Stellenbosch farmer, and like most South African men of landed stock, who have avoided the almost national habit of eating too much of the wrong kinds of food, was handsome and of a dignified presence. His father put him to what, relatively to the cost of education and the intellectual equipment demanded of its practitioners, is the most remunerative calling in South Africa, that of attorney. He went to the Rand in its early days and there established a lucrative practice. A keen politician always, he joined the Republican commandoes in 1899 immediately war broke out, and rose by his talents and character from private to general. His personal influence was such that

he was chosen to preside over the peace conferences of the Republican commandoes, which were held at a point upon the Vaal no great distance from that at which, a dozen years later, he was to lose his life. He was in 1902 bitterly opposed to making peace, and this circumstance and his oratory, which was of the robust variety, and plentifully adorned with scriptural quotations, gave him a firm hold upon the political affections of the not very numerous 'bitter-enders,' whose narrow religious views were his own. When, therefore, he was proposed by the government party as the Speaker of the first Transvaal Parliament, English-speaking South Africans received the news with consternation. The event belied the expectations of the extremists on both sides, as completely as Dr. Jameson's Premiership at the Cape had done, or Dr. Viljoen's Directorship of Education in the Free State was to do. So entirely upright and impartial was General Beyers as Speaker that, at the end of the first session, Colonel Sir Aubrey Woolls-Sampson, a bluff, honest English soldier who had divided the House against the election of Beyers, went to his room and apologised for having doubted his racial impartiality. A year or two later, when the Union Parliament came into being, the English-speaking party, led by Sir Starr Jameson, wished to make Beyers Speaker of the South African Parliament, but failed to carry with them the independent group led by Mr. Merriman, whose support was essential. Had this plan, so creditable alike to the English-speaking South Africans and to General Beyers, been carried into effect, it is possible that Beyers would have been saved from himself and the rebellion averted.

Indeed, the rebellion might still have been averted, but for the five weeks' interval which elapsed between the declaration of war and the meeting of the Union Parliament. The break gave time for jealousies to ripen, rival plans to be discovered, and intrigues to be set on foot from Berlin and German South-West Africa. A meeting of Parliament within five days would probably have obviated the cold fit which the delay of five weeks developed. Even then, the case which General Botha made out for prompt action was so strong that all would doubtless have gone well, if his hold over his party had not been previously weakened. As it was, opposition developed within the ranks of his own nominal supporters.

This was at once seen to be formidable, and General Hertzog felt strong enough to divide the House against the Prime Minister's motion pledging the country to support and prosecute the war with vigour. General Hertzog's amendment declared the invasion of German South-West Africa to be against the interests of the Union and the Empire. Twelve members were found to vote for it, out of over a hundred.

A few days later came a series of political bomb-shells, any one of them sufficient to overturn a Prime Minister made of feebler stuff than General Botha. General Beyers resigned the Commandant-Generalship in a letter in which he publicly urged Union citizen-soldiers not to engage in an attack upon German South-West Africa. Colonel Maritz, an officer of the Defence Force holding an important command in an area adjoining the German territory, went into rebellion, imprisoned certain of his officers and men who declined to follow him, and exhibited to an officer of the Union an insolent 'treaty,' which he said the German authorities had provisionally made with him, offering to 'recognise' the Union as an independent republic. Maritz, who was by this time receiving German pay as an officer, demanded that within twenty-four hours Generals Hertzog, de Wet, Beyers, Kemp, and Muller should be allowed to meet him where he was, otherwise he would invade the Union. Within a fortnight of the publication of this news, three of the Generals mentioned by Maritz were in full rebellion. They included the veteran de Wet and the ex-Speaker Beyers. De Wet had won renown during the South African war, not, as General Botha had won it, as a great soldier, able to prepare the dispositions for a big battle and to win it, but as a dashing and elusive leader of guerillas. After the peace he had become Minister of Agriculture in the Orange River Colony. As a Minister he was a complete failure. He was narrow, racial and reactionary, both in his appointments and in his administration, and he was by no means above reproach in other more personal connexions. Moreover, he was filled with a rancorous jealousy of General Botha, for the right understanding of which we must go back to the days before the war, when General Botha was usually found among the Progressives, while General de Wet, so far as he held any political position at all, was a supporter of President Kruger through thick and thin.

Since the peace, de Wet has done nothing whatever to mitigate the punishment earned by his present offence. He has never had sufficient political imagination to enable him to understand that men like Generals Botha and Smuts had not become less loyal to their Dutch traditions by rendering justice to the English-speaking South Africans who constitute forty to forty-five per cent. of the population of the Union ; nor has he had sufficient generosity of mind to approve their motives even had he understood them. The Union Government may on consideration of all the circumstances decide to visit upon General de Wet something less than the legal penalty of his acts. If it so decides, British opinion here and in South Africa should realise that the decision will be less due to General de Wet's personality than to the necessity of healing quickly the wounds in the South African political body, especially the Free State part of it. It is unnecessary to add that public opinion will accept the decision with the loyal acquiescence which is the least tribute due from the British Empire to General Botha, the valiant soldier and patient statesman who has served it so unsurpassedly well. Even if it were only personal sentiment on his part to desire to deal leniently with an old comrade who is also an old man, this would not be much to concede to the man who has once and for all broken down racialism as a serious factor in South African politics. But there is more in it than this. Dutch South Africa is as much a country of clans as ever Scotland was, and there are not only de Wet and his fellow rebels to be considered, but wide circles connected with them by blood, many of whose members have been actively loyal. Moreover, General de Wet's mental health is not certain. In a heated speech delivered at the town of Vrede, he with entire gravity gave as his main reason for going into rebellion the fact that his local magistrate once fined him five shillings for thrashing one of his native farm hands!

Something else happened during the interval between the declaration of war and the meeting of the Union Parliament —a personal tragedy, which had remarkable political consequences, or, at least, accompaniments. Of the three Republican generals who visited England after the South African war, and who made so markedly favourable an impression upon the British public, Botha, de Wet, and de la Rey, the last,

who was least prominent in the public eye, was perhaps the best beloved in the countryside among his own people. General de la Rey, who represented the Huguenot strain in Dutch-speaking South Africa, which is ever on the look-out rather for means of union than occasions of difference, was a man of rare sweetness and strength of character, profoundly religious and of stainless honour. During his successful leadership of the Republican commandoes in the Transvaal, he was accompanied by Mr. Van Rensburg, a clergyman belonging to that section of the Dutch Reformed Church to which de la Rey was attached. Mr. Van Rensburg is reputed to possess the gift of second sight. Once, at least, he foretold victory for General de la Rey when to all other eyes defeat seemed certain. This established his reputation with the General as a prophet of infallible power. Some time before the present war—though proof of the precise date is lacking—Van Rensburg gave out that he had seen across the sea five great bulls fighting, and one of them, a blue one, had torn a great hole in the side of another, a red one. In all his prophecies, which have been numerous, a red bull has symbolised England. The blue bull on this occasion was made to stand for Germany. He also said he had seen the South Africans bound upon a warlike expedition for a neighbouring State (which could only be German South-West Africa), but received at the border in conference by those against whom they had moved, and returning joyfully, without firing a shot. General de la Rey, to whom Van Rensburg seems to have been what in other days would have been called a domestic chaplain, was without doubt gravely disturbed by these prophecies. It is said that after the declaration of war by Germany he was at first impulsively and wholeheartedly on the side of the Allies, but that consideration of Van Rensburg's prophecies caused him to change his attitude. A well-known Senator—a keen business man of Hebrew descent, and with at best an academic interest in prophecy—convinced him temporarily that he was wrong, and that a fresh change of attitude was necessary. But, finally, the prophetic influence is said to have prevailed, and it is probable that if he had lived he would have thrown in his lot with Beyers. He was actually on his way to Lichtenburg in company with Beyers when he was accidentally shot dead by the police who were searching for a gang of bandits.

It is not many years since Botha, de la Rey, and de Wet were being fêted in London; it is fewer years since General Beyers attended the last peace manœuvres of the German Army as the honoured representative of South Africa; and now de la Rey has met death by a policeman's bullet, Botha has led commandoes against the remaining two, of whom one has already died as a rebel and a fugitive, and the other has surrendered to justice.

The movement is now crushed and broken, and it is difficult to estimate the total of those who were engaged in it; but apparently 20,000, or under four per cent. of the Dutch-speaking population, would be an outside figure. Of these, not a hundred were men of leading in their territorial areas and not a dozen men of general South African reputation. The main body of the rebels consisted largely of landless men who believed that any change in their condition must be for the better, and whose notion of government by a Dutch cabinet is that money paid in taxes by the British should be taken from the Treasury and handed out to themselves. But included among the rebels were two men, at least, whose influence was tremendous, and when to the positive factor of their disaffection is added the negative factor represented by a well-understood silence in at least two other quarters, the prompt suppression of the rebellion becomes a remarkable achievement. General Botha's reputation as a military strategist was established long ago; on this occasion he added to it a lightning-like rapidity in attack, due we may suppose, not merely to military ability, but in little less measure to an outraged sense of honour and a burning indignation at an indefensible attack upon free institutions. Naturally, he was supported by the English-speaking population, but it is certain that but for the rock-like steadiness of the Dutch-speaking people—many of whom in their sense of what was due to their own honour and to the Empire of which they are members went out on commando and shot down their own close relatives—the rebellion could not have been so quickly suppressed.

In the hour of victory General Botha has shown himself the statesman of natural sagacity and insight, by urging upon the loyalist population the wisdom of mercy in its judgment upon those who were seduced from their allegiance, and this attitude is likely to attract to him for service against German

South-West Africa many of the best types of Dutch-speaking South Africans. The present leaders of the Union army—Generals Botha, Smuts, Mackenzie, and Lukin—know how serious the enterprise before them is, owing not only to the presence of a force some thousands strong, well armed and equipped, but even more to the nature of the country, which is largely a sea of sand, wherein progress by any means of transport is scarcely possible. Scores of miles are passed without signs of human habitation. Farms even of 10,000 or 12,000 acres are so poor that they will scarcely serve each to keep a family. Malaria has to be guarded against in the vast tropical area in the north, which penetrates into Rhodesia via the well-known Caprivizipfel, which, as its name implies, is a 'wedge' or 'neck.' The rainfall is in many parts not over four inches per year. Swakopmund, the chief town, considers itself one of the driest spots on earth, and with reason, for its usual rainfall is something under an inch. In some of the higher and more exposed parts, the nights and early mornings are as cold as Winnipeg in winter.

Nature in one of her sportive moods has chosen to set in this desolate region, by the side of mazes of rock and sand, two wonderful things. One is the Ana (or Aana) tree, which is said to give the best stock-feed in the whole world. The other is a diamond field which may be described as a real Tom Tiddler's Ground.

Seven or eight years ago the British in South Africa, who might have had German South-West Africa many a time in the last fifty years, awoke to the fact that the country possessed mineral wealth of a remarkable kind. Vast quantities of small diamonds were discovered, and are still being discovered, in some of the dunes which stretch for hundreds of miles along the Atlantic; gems borne there by the sea, possibly from submarine channels, and certainly providing a world's miracle in the way of diamond mining. So far, practically the whole of the country between Lüderitzbucht and Swakopmund has been proved to be diamond-bearing in this way. Strange to say, no great mines, no volcanic mines, have yet been found, but the quantities of small, loose diamonds are so vast that they have for the time being demoralised the diamond trade of the world. When the war broke out a conference was sitting in London, representing the German

South-West Africa and other diamond mining interests, and it is said that, if the arrangements arrived at in favour of the German Regie which controls the fields had been published, they would have surprised the British public.

Walfisch Bay, which is British and is to German South-West Africa as a front door is to a house, has a few hundred people, mostly coloured, whose children, owing to the neglect of the commonest precautions, die at an almost incredible rate, though the climate is naturally not unhealthy. The town has a south-westerly wind, which is as disagreeable as the Cape south-easter and more permanent. The people are in the main fishermen by trade, and in politics indurated cynics, especially on the subject of the conduct of Governments towards places far distant from their capitals.

For at least a century and a quarter Walfisch Bay has been recognised as a place of considerable potential importance. In the closing years of the eighteenth century a Captain in the Navy took the bay in the King's name and hoisted the British flag. A generation or so afterwards it was surveyed. In the early sixties reports of mineral wealth reached Cape Town, but the authorities moved with stately deliberation, and nearly another ten years passed before they suggested to the Imperial Government that the Cape should be allowed to take the whole of the coast from the Orange River to the Portuguese colonies. 'The discussion then dropped' till 1875, when the Cape Parliament passed a resolution in the same sense. There was another halt of several years, and then Lord Carnarvon consented to the annexation, provided it stopped short at the bay and a short distance around it. Captain Dyer was sent in a warship to make observation, and was told by the handful of English people, who for some inscrutable reason had made their way thither, that the settlement if it was to be habitable at all must include a place called Rooi Bank (Red Bank), nearly twenty miles away, the only spot where there was fresh water. Dyer was firmly of the same opinion, and issued a proclamation declaring Rooi Bank part of the British Empire, but so worded it that controversy arose afterwards as to whether Rooi Bank or a nearer place, called Rooi Kop (Red Head), was really meant. It was only the difference of a word, but those familiar with Anglo-German relations during the last few years before the war are aware that the difference might have

had serious results but for the wise arbitrament of His Majesty the Spanish King.

There is only one future for the country now that the present issue has been raised. The whole of German South-West Africa must become British, the larger part going to the Union and the rest to Rhodesia. The rounding off of the Rhodesian territory is geographically desirable, and is fairly due as a recognition by Great Britain of the magnificent work done for South Africa by the Chartered Company. New railway connexions will then be made with the Cape-Cairo line, and it is to be hoped that care will be taken not to disorganise the finances of any of the ports or lines concerned in the through traffic. There need be little doubt that the fine work which German settlers have done during the last ten years, both on the coast and in the hinterland, mercantile, farming and mining, deserves and will receive all possible consideration. We may at any rate be sure that, with operations in the hands of leaders like the generals of the South African Union, there will be no deeds of devastation in German South-West Africa like those committed by the Prussian commanders in Belgium.

ALBERT CARTWRIGHT.

THE NAPOLEONIC WARS IN ENGLISH POETRY

IT has always been noted in our history that the engagement of the British nation in important warfare does not have the result of stimulating the British poets to immediate celebration of battles. There are many causes which may be cited as inducing this silence, and some of the most powerful of them were suggested by Professor Gilbert Murray in the very remarkable address which he delivered last November before the Academic Committee. In the following pages I shall not endeavour to exaggerate the value of the verse which was put forth in England, on the subject of the war, during our great struggle with Napoleon, but shall be content to disengage it, perhaps for the first time, from the mass of work more abundantly, and often with a brighter inspiration, produced by the various poets of that age. Thus reserved, with everything round it winnowed away, it may appear more significant, and at all events more bulky, than is usually admitted or supposed. Our critics have been in the habit of saying that the great wars of a century ago did not interest our poets. It will be easy to show that this was not the case, although it is probable that we shall find that none of them contrived to give a wholly articulate expression to their anxiety and their exultation.

The Classical School of the eighteenth century had included in its formulas a recognised method of treating warfare metrically. The nations of Europe had been incessantly fighting one another, and England had constantly been involved in struggles which an alliance now intensified and a convention now alleviated. Our prolonged and sporadic expeditions into strange tropic harbours and among fabulous races had an element of romance and wonder which it is very remarkable that no English poet took up and recorded, even if only in the stiff and cautious imagery then admissible. As a matter of fact, however, no bard was inspired by Trichinopoly in 1752, or even by Quebec in 1759. Martinique fired no imagination,

and Ticonderoga had to wait more than a century unsung. The only exception was Vernon's expedition against Cartagena in 1739. This event stirred the imagination of a number of bards, and in particular of Thomson. It led, with little doubt, to the composition of 'Rule, Britannia,' which, in spite of its bluster and its bad grammar, is a specimen of patriotic lyricism not to be despised. Cartagena was also the theme of Glover's 'Admiral Hosier's Ghost,' the best naval ballad of the eighteenth century, and its treatment in 'The Seasons' will not be forgotten.

What the Classical School did best in the field of military poetry, however, was the elegy of pathetic resignation over the death of individual warriors. In this class Collins' 'Ode 'for 1746,' and Gray's elegy on Sir William Williams of the 'fine Vandyck head,' are highly polished examples. The sentimental relation of the wounded or exhausted soldier to his home and family was described effectively by Burns and by Bloomfield. There was the rollicking treatment of a naval theme of which 'Black-eyed Susan' is the type. Greatly commended in the third quarter of the eighteenth century were the martial ballads of Thomas Penrose, the doleful incumbent of Beckington-cum-Standerwick, who imitated Gray in stanzas which described how

> 'Faintly bray'd the battle's roar
> Distant down the hollow wind;
> Panting terror fled before,
> Wounds and death were left behind,'

and how ghastly 'Edgar' looked, half-buried with the hostile dead. And finally there was the conventional battle-composition, of which the culminating example, the towering master-piece, was Erasmus Darwin's 'Battle of Minden,' which our grandmothers were accustomed to recite at school with the applause of listening parents:

> 'So stood Eliza on the wood-crowned height,
> O'er Minden's plain, spectatress of the fight,
> Sought with bold eye amid the bloody strife
> Her dearer self, the partner of her life;
> From hill to hill the rushing host pursued,
> And viewed his banner, or believed she viewed.'

We dare not continue the stupendous narrative, but we

must note that this appeared to our ancestors the best and indeed the only legitimate type of military epos, and that its tradition affected every writer who attempted to picture warfare long after the romantic method had displaced the classic. It was supposed to be romantic, and we have only to turn to 'Marmion' to see that Clara at Flodden is the younger and somewhat less maniacal sister of Eliza of the red and rolling eye.

Between the purely Classical School and the revival of poetry there is, perhaps, but a single example of war-poetry that need be mentioned. Yet honour is due to Sir William Jones, whose 'Alcaic Ode' reflects the stubborn courage and loyal support of the weak which England's attitude in the isolation of 1781 called forth. It has a noble ring, and is too little known :

> 'Such was this heaven-loved isle,
> Than Lesbos fairer, and the Cretan shore!
> No more shall Freedom smile?
> Shall Britons languish, and be men no more?
> Since all must life resign,
> Those sweet rewards which decorate the brave
> 'Tis folly to decline,
> And steal inglorious to the silent grave.'

It has been necessary to indicate thus rapidly what were the forms dedicated to the celebration of warlike events by literary tradition down to the advent of Napoleon. If that event, and the military spectacle involved in it, had been delayed for ten or fifteen years, the texture of the English war-poetry inspired by it would be of a different character. We are accustomed to date the revolution in our national verse by a reference to the publication of 'Lyrical Ballads,' in the autumn of 1798, or, more exactly, to the appearance of 'Tintern Abbey' in that volume. But, as a matter of fact, not only were the non-Lakist poets slow in accepting the Wordsworthian formulary, but it was only in certain cases and in particular classes of poetical work that the Lakists themselves adopted it. Wordsworth's famous preface of 1800 repudiated the use of 'poetic diction' and 'falsehood of description,' and stated that he had found it 'expedient' to abstain from the use of several conventions 'which have been foolishly repeated 'by bad poets.' But Wordsworth himself, in pieces like

'Artegal and Elidure' and even 'Vaudracour and Julia,' in which it was necessary to record action in solemn numbers, fell back to a surprising extent upon the use of the conventional 'poetic diction' of the eighteenth century. It is not until we come down to Keats, who lies beyond the war frontier altogether, that we find the classic diction completely abandoned. It will presently be seen how necessary it is to bear this fact in mind.

Until Napoleon suppressed the bread riots in Paris, in October 1795, his figure was generally unobserved on this side of the Channel. He was watched with gathering attention during his Italian campaigns, but he was no object of popular interest until the summer of 1798, when, urged by the Directory to attack England, he took the route of Egypt for that purpose. By August, when his fleet was destroyed by Nelson in Aboukir Bay, he had become the centre of excited observation. Wordsworth, to whom our declaration of war upon the new French Republic five years previously had given the greatest shock which his moral nature had ever received, gradually and after painful revulsions of feeling abandoned his enthusiasm for France. He had always been much interested in the military life, and every student of 'The Prelude' must remember the extraordinary episode of the soldier he met by Winander side—

> 'Long were his arms, pallid his hands; his mouth
> Looked ghastly in the moonlight,'

—from whom Wordsworth imbibed such strange instruction in military wisdom. His sonnets dedicated to 'National Independence and Liberty' prove the ecstasy with which his soul as a very young man accepted the struggle of the nations in their great expectancy. He was purged of moral dross by the vital energy around him:

> 'the fife of war
> Was then a spirit-stirring sound indeed,
> A blackbird's whistle in a budding grove.'

But the stupendous march of events roused no lyrical expression from lips so ready to communicate emotion in song.

In August 1802, when the signing of the Treaty of Amiens had quieted Europe for a moment, Wordsworth once more

visited France, and now for the first time he occupied his verse with the current state of affairs in that country. At Calais he paused to express his anger at the servility of the French, who had just made Bonaparte Consul for life, and who

> 'With first-fruit offerings crowd to bend the knee
> . . . before the new-born Majesty.'

His famous third Calais sonnet contrasted this crafty servility with the sublime senselessness of republican joy in July 1790; in his fourth sonnet he

> 'grieved for Bonaparté, with a vain
> And an unthinking grief,'

and insisted that

> 'Tis not in battles that from youth we train
> The Governor who must be wise and good.'

The splendid sonnets on the extinction of the Venetian Republic and on the subjugation of Switzerland appear to have been composed in 1802. In the whole of this group of poems, which revolve around the subject of warfare without directly engaging upon it, Wordsworth contemplates Napoleon in his successive feats of arms with growing indignation and apprehension, and when we reach, in 1803, the various pieces dealing with the expected invasion, some of them among the most majestic in the language, we cease to deny to Wordsworth the title of a war-poet. At the present moment, when the question of a raid upon this country by an alien enemy is the subject of general discussion, we cannot but be moved to read the extraordinary lines which Wordsworth wrote 'in anticipation' in October 1803:

> 'Shout, for a mighty victory is won!
> On British ground the Invaders are laid low;
> The breath of Heaven has drifted them like snow,
> And left them lying in the silent sun,
> Never to rise again! The work is done.
> Come forth, ye old men, now in peaceful show
> And greet your sons! drums beat and trumpets blow . . .
> Clap, infants, clap your hands! Divine must be
> That triumph, when the very worst, the pain,
> And even the prospect of our brethren slain,
> Hath something in it that the heart enjoys.'

On another occasion the pacific Wordsworth, walking by starlight along the shores of Grasmere Lake, rejoiced to see 'the ruddy crest of Mars,' and felt his heart contract with joy in the splendour of fighting 'by just revenge inflamed.' His memory went back to the time when 'a band of military officers,' then his friends, now his national foes, had been 'the 'chief of my associates in Paris,' and the fever of soldierly ferment once more inflamed his cheeks.

Coleridge, in spite of his having so remarkably enlisted in the King's regiment of Light Dragoons, had no love either of soldiers or of horses. His contributions to the poetry of the Great War were meagre, and were confined to the period of his youth. When he was asked to record some impressions of the fighting, he surprisingly replied 'I have no wish to qualify 'myself for the office of Historiographer to the King of Hell.' The seventh strophe of the 'Ode on the Departing Year,'—

> 'Not yet enslaved, not wholly vile,
> O Albion! O my Mother Isle!'

—is the earliest expression in verse of our splendid isolation. In 1798 the perilous position of England extracted from Coleridge, who saw Somersetshire treated like La Vendée, the wild eclogue called 'Fire, Famine, and Slaughter.' His admirable ode, 'France,' and the less admirable but very curious 'Fears 'in Solitude' belong to the spring of the same year. In April Coleridge was suffering agonies of apprehension, and his outpourings showed little confidence in the military resources of England:

> 'Spare us yet awhile,
> Father and God! O! spare us yet awhile!
> Oh! let not English women drag their flight
> Fainting beneath the burden of their babes.'

The prayer was heard, but the attitude of the suppliant lacked Wordsworth's dignity. During this time of anxiety Coleridge was unnerved by the dread of invasion; 'my 'repeated night-yells,' he says, 'have made me a nuisance in 'my own house.' In 'The British Stripling's War Song,' written a year later, the poet grew more daring:

> 'My own shout of onset, in the heart of my trance,
> How oft it awakes me from visions of glory;
> When I meant to have leapt on the Hero of France,
> And have dashed him to earth, pale and breathless and gory.'

Over the bad epigrams which Coleridge perpetrated at the time of the Peace a veil should be drawn, and on the whole his performances as a war-poet are not above the level of his prowess as a Light Dragoon.

The rigid Southey was not affected, as was his softer friend, by the terrors of possible invasion, but he was obsessed with indignation at the practices of the press-gang. From Westbury, in this same year 1798, he sent forth a naval poem, called 'The Victory,' which is a chain of stiffly expressed but pathetic reflections on the horrors of being carried off from home and wife and children by 'lawful violence.' This abuse much affected Southey, and it tinges all the studies of naval warfare in his 'English Eclogues' of 1799. He takes a grim joy in the story of the woman who tied her nightcap round her husband's head, and let herself be whisked away by the press-gang. In his strong division of feeling with regard to the Republic, Southey was not prepared to express himself with martial lyricism, and it was not until the Peninsular campaign was in full progress that he was interested in the war. It was not until Waterloo that he was deeply moved by it.

Meanwhile, as it is supposed in 1806, Wordsworth was inspired to compose the 'Character of the Happy Warrior,' over which we must pause a moment, since it is, above all doubt, the most important English contribution made to the poetry of warfare during Napoleonic times. We must take this long gnomic poem in connexion with the series of sonnets to National Independence and Liberty which have already been mentioned, for it is the culmination and crown of them. The death of Nelson at the battle of Trafalgar had completely reconciled Wordsworth to the attitude of England towards France, an attitude which had awakened in him at first only sentiments of shame, and then of dubious acquiescence. The poet had not yet attained the height of patriotic serenity which breathes through the arduous and Roman pages of 'The Convention 'of Cintra,' but he could now contemplate the shattering of the French navy without any of those 'ghost-like hauntings 'of shame' which had afflicted him in 1803. He could share the British ecstasy; he thrilled to the immortal signal, 'Eng-'land expects every man to do his duty.' The Happy Warrior

is not a direct portrait of Nelson, for Wordsworth still retained some puritanical objections to the Admiral's supposed private character, but it is a study of exalted devotion to the loftiest principles of national chivalry, as exemplified by Nelson. The Happy Warrior is one

> 'Who, doomed to go in company with Pain,
> And Fear, and Bloodshed, miserable train!
> Turns his necessity to glorious gain,'

and who, in the hour of severest tension,

> 'Is happy as a Lover, and attired
> With sudden brightness, like a Man inspired.'

It is not necessary to dwell on the majestic felicities of a poem which is one of the noblest which ever passed from the pen of a godlike prophet. It is, in the intellectual sphere, hardly less dominant than Trafalgar or Waterloo in the more eminent sphere of action.

After this, it must be confessed that our decline to less heroic levels is rapid and final. The actual presence of English and French forces contending on the soil of his beloved Portugal stirred the interest of Southey at last. His 'Inscriptions,' a section of his work which has few readers to-day, will on examination be found to contain a sort of broken record of the Peninsular War, in painfully tuneless blank verse. Here are tumid celebrations of Vimiero, Coruña, Talavera, the Douro, Busaco, and Torres Vedras. Wordsworth was interested in the adventures of Palafox and the Spanish guerillas, and felt drawn to write a series of sonnets about 'noble Biscayans' and 'the indignation of a high-minded 'Spanish,' but they are among the most stilted of his compositions. From these petrified curiosities we turn with satisfaction to Charles Wolfe's ode called 'The Burial of Sir John Moore at Coruña,' which still, after a hundred years, palpitates with delicate life. First printed in 1817, this famous poem was probably written at least three years earlier. It has been vulgarised by excess of popularity, but if we endeavour to examine it as though we had never read it before we can but be struck by its freshness, its picturesqueness and its sincerity. Here, at last, the

Darwin and Penrose style, the decayed eighteenth-century verbiage, has completely disappeared :

> ' We buried him darkly at dead of night,
> The sods with our bayonets turning ;
> By the struggling moonbeam's misty light,
> And the lantern dimly burning. '

How far is this from the hero of Minden, who

> ' Vaults o'er the plain, and in the tangled wood
> Lo ! dead Eliza weltering in her blood ! '

Wolfe's simple and exquisite requiem is the one successful English anecdote poem of the Napoleonic wars.

The hardihood of the English poets in travelling over the Continent of Europe during the Great War has hardly received due acknowledgment from their biographers. When it was difficult and even dangerous to stray outside the confines of Albion, almost every British bard took his life and his luggage in his hand, and essayed the adventure. Byron was pre-eminent among these voluntary exiles, and when, in July 1809, he landed in Lisbon, Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had just received the title of Lord Wellington, was holding Portugal against the overwhelming forces of France. In ' Childe Harold's Pilgrimage ' Byron seems to say that he was himself present at the battle of Talavera, but his language is ambiguous, and the fact is hardly credible. Byron was, however, in or near Seville at the time. We know that the infection of fighting seized him, and that, being so near to the English army, he nearly joined it, but was persuaded to push on for Greece. In these circumstances, we anticipate from Byron's pictures of the campaign more vigour and reality than we find in them. They are even ludicrously flat :

> ' The Foe, the Victim, and the fond Ally, . . .
> Are met—as if at home they could not die—
> To feed the crow on Talavera's plain,
> And fertilise the field that each pretends to gain.'

Byron happened at this time to ride across what became, two years later, the battle-field of Albuera, and this scene came back to him when he wrote ' The Curse of Minerva ' at Athens in March 1811. That poem contains a passage on the capture of Barosa by General Graham, which must have been written

immediately on the arrival of the news in Greece. Masséna had been sent ' to drive the English leopards into the sea,' and the smouldering war in the Peninsula had broken out again with renewed ferocity. The victory of Wellington was still far from decisive, and Byron in Athens, like many of his countrymen in London, thought an invasion of England imminent. The words of Byron, in ' The Curse of Minerva,' are significant :

> ' Say with what eye along the distant down
> Would flying burghers mark the blazing town ?
> How view the column of ascending flames
> Shake his red shadow o'er the startled Thames ?
> Nay, frown not, Albion ! for the torch was thine
> That lit such pyres from Tagus to the Rhine :
> Now should they burst on thy devoted coast,
> Go, ask thy bosom who deserves them most ? '

Before the manuscript reached Murray, Salamanca and Vittoria had put another face on the situation ; ' The Curse of ' Minerva,' a very petulant satire, was wisely withheld from publication. In ' Childe Harold II,' we may note that the rule of Bonaparte is described as ' one bloated Chief's ' unwholesome reign.' Byron was not fitted by his complexity of temperament to become the simple Tyrtaeus of his own or any other race.

Indeed, there was only one British writer of that thrilling age who was in any degree moved to adopt the attitude of that lame schoolmaster of Aphidna who wrote Doric war-songs in the dim dawn of Athens. In Campbell we have an authentic and almost an official battle-minstrel. He took very seriously his mission to awaken and extend patriotic feeling in his native country, and when his earliest stanzas, ' The Wounded Hussar,' were hawked about the streets of Glasgow, they exacerbated public opinion, roused, not by any deeds on shore, but by the sea-victories off Cape St. Vincent and at Camperdown. Of Campbell's old father, the Glasgow trader, we are told that ' he could sing a good naval ' song,' and the poet naturally became the recognised laureate of the fleet. In 1801 he composed, although he did not immediately publish, ' The Battle of the Baltic ' and ' Ye Mariners ' of England,' lyrics in which a fastidious taste may detect many blemishes, but which will never lose their power to stir an English pulse. Campbell saw some fighting in Bavaria towards

the close of 1800, but he was not present at Hohenlinden, although he has celebrated it in one of the most spirited of ballads. His position in Germany became very disagreeable, and when, in March 1801, war broke out between England and Denmark, Campbell made a rush from Altona to Yarmouth, hotly chased by a Danish frigate. A little later he published 'The Soldier's Dream,' beginning :

> 'Our bugles sang truce, for the night-cloud had lowered,
> And the sentinel stars set their watch in the sky ;
> And thousands had sunk on the ground overpower'd,
> The weary to sleep and the wounded to die.'

The 'Threatened Invasion' affected Campbell, as it did all the other poets, but it seems to be a subject which defies poetical treatment, and his 'Rise, fellow freemen, and stretch 'the right hand' is but a poor affair. Indeed, in the line 'Let a death-bed repentance be taught the proud foe,' Campbell's ardour approaches the ridiculous. Far better is the somewhat later song beginning 'Men of England!' Less known is 'Hallowed Ground,' which is still stirring in some of its stanzas. A bald and almost comic ancedote is told in 'Napoleon and the British Sailor.'

Critical appreciation has steadily receded from Campbell, and it is not easy now to do him justice. It may therefore be of interest to quote from an unpublished letter written (Aug. 3, 1875) by Swinburne to a friend of his who had praised the martial lyrics :

'I was very much pleased by your article on Campbell, though not quite agreeing with your high estimate of some of his minor ballads and songs ; but that is the right side on which to exceed, and with the tone of the whole I most heartily sympathise. It did one good to read it, after ——'s and other depreciations of our great (if not only) national lyric poet. Of his two master-pieces I should have spoken even more passionately than yourself ; for the simple fact is that I know nothing like them at all—*simile aut secundum*—in their own line, which is one of the very highest in the highest range of poetry. What little of national verse is as good patriotically is far inferior poetically—witness Burns and Rouget de l'Isle ; and what little in that line might satisfy us better as poetry than the "Marseillaise" or "Scots wha hae" is pitifully wanting in the nerve which thrills by contact all the blood of all their hearers, boys and men, students and soldiers, poets and dullards, with one common and divine touch of unquenchable fire.

Next to Campbell of course is Callicles, but even the old Attic song of tyrannicide is to me not quite so triumphant a proof of the worth and weight of poetry in national matters. All this and many things more I should myself have liked to say in public.'

'All this,' however, Swinburne never found an opportunity to 'say in public,' and I therefore offer no apology for here recording the opinion of so great an authority in favour of the war-poetry of Campbell.

The great surprise of the investigation on which we are now engaged is the almost complete inefficiency of Walter Scott. By the gallantry of his character and by his fondness for every species of high adventure, he might seem to be pointed out as the natural exponent in rapid and spirited verse of the martial deeds of his countrymen. But he preserved an extraordinary reserve until the middle of the Peninsular War, and even then it cannot be said that his exertions added much to the glories of the British Muse. The sorrows of the Portuguese, who were treated by Masséna's troops very much as the Belgians have recently been treated by the Germans, roused a lively indignation in England. A committee was formed for the relief of Portugal, and Walter Scott, on seeing the advertisement and without having been applied to, generously offered to write a poem and contribute the profits of its first edition to the fund. He was at the height of his popularity, and the proposal was, of course, accepted with enthusiasm. In a very brief time Scott had composed 'The 'Vision of Don Roderick,' which was published in the summer of 1811, soon after the victories of Fuentes de Oñoro and Albuera. It came, however, as a great disappointment to Scott's admirers; it had little or nothing of the buoyancy of 'The Lord of the Isles' and 'The Lady of the Lake,' while it was impossible not to see that its spirit and temper were deformed by political prejudice. The omission of the name of Sir John Moore was seized upon as an odious example of Whig bias, and is, indeed, unaccountable on any theory very creditable to Scott. 'The Vision of Don Roderick' is now little read, for the Spenserian stanza in which it is written is less attractive in Scott's hands than his easy, accustomed octosyllabics, yet the conclusion of it, where he lays the medieval legend wholly aside, and concentrates his attention on the deeds of our Peninsular forces, is often

vigorous. A single fragment will give a just impression of the whole :

> ' Four moons have heard these thunders idly roll'd,
> Have seen these wistful myriads eye their prey,
> As savage wolves survey a guarded fold—
> But in the middle path a Lion lay !
>
> At length they move, but not to battle-fray,
> Nor blaze yon fires where meets the manly fight ;
> Beacons of infamy, they light the way
> Where cowardice and cruelty unite
> To damn with double shame their ignominious flight.'

The abdication of Napoleon in April 1814 produced a great sensation in English society, and a slight flutter in the dove-cotes of the Muses. Landor, who had introduced the Corsican mysteriously into ' Gebir ' as ' a mortal man above ' all mortal praise,' now revised this verdict in a Greek epigram which remarks (as translated by Swinburne) :

> ' Thy life-long works, Napoleon, who shall write ?
> Time, in his children's blood who takes delight.'

Southey, during the negotiations which led to the abdication, composed a great Pindaric ode on the subject of Napoleon, in which he remarked :

> ' For sooner shall the Ethiop change his skin,
> Or from the Leopard shall her spots depart,
> Than this man change his old flagitious heart.
> Have ye not seen him in the balance weigh'd,
> And there found wanting ? On the stage of blood
> Foremost the resolute adventurer stood ' ;

and again, addressing France :

> ' One man hath been for ten long wretched years
> The cause of all this blood and all these tears ;
> One man in this most awful point of time
> Draws on thy danger, as he caused thy crime.'

Southey's verse is rarely agreeable ; its harmonies seem produced by a vigorous brandishing of the poker and the tongs ; but in the course of this Ode of 1814 he is inspired by a sincere and righteous wrath, and his denunciation of the crimes of Bonaparte can still be read with interest. So can, in a different way, those of Byron, written off almost impromptu, so soon

as the news of the abdication reached him. He heard, or probably saw in a newspaper, that his 'poor little pagod,' the Emperor of the French, was 'pushed off his pedestal,' and he immediately published anonymously, five days after the event in Paris, his 'Ode to Napoleon Bonaparte.' The diction of this poem has the looseness, the negligence of art, which destroys for us the charm of so much of Byron's work, but the vehemence of its rhetoric cannot be denied, nor the ingenuity of its symbolism :

'He who of old would rend the oak
Dreamed not of the rebound;
Chained by the trunk he vainly broke,—
Alone—how looked he round?
Thou, in the sternness of thy strength,
An equal deed hast done at length,
And darker fate hast found.
He fell, the forest prowlers' prey,
But thou must eat thy heart away.'

In the 'Ode on Venice,' not published until 1819, will be found certain shadowy reflections on military events in Europe between 1812 and 1814, and Byron surveys 'the three fractions 'of the groaning globe' with complacency, finding that, in a world subdued by the Tyrant, England alone 'yet rears her 'crest, unconquered and sublime.'

The victory of Waterloo was the first and the only incident of the Napoleonic wars which roused any general expression of lyrical emotion from the British Muses. It was copiously celebrated in verse, but by a singular fatality that verse was almost without exception inadequate to the occasion. Indeed, the only tribute to Waterloo which can be considered as having risen to anything like the height of its great theme was written in prose, although in a style so transcendental and elaborate as to compete with verse in its effect. It is therefore pardonable to record here the extraordinary performance of De Quincey called 'The English Mail-Coach,' the ingenious subject of which is the ecstasy carried through the length and breadth of England by the mail-coaches which 'distributed over the 'face of the land, like the opening of apocalyptic vials, the heart-'shaking news' of Waterloo. This was a subject admirably adapted to the Corinthian splendour of De Quincey's ornamented prose, and in the famous third section of this rhapsody,

'The Dream-Fugue,' he hovers over the very limit of which prose is capable in almost insupportable fulness of symbol and colour and reverberation. However severely purity of taste may cavil against the texture of this redundant richness, no one can deny that in 'The English Mail-Coach' Waterloo has inspired De Quincey to the performance of an astonishing feat.

But of the poets the record is less exhilarating. Southey was the first to hasten, with characteristic conscientiousness, to the scene of battle, picking up notes and relics on the spot, as a cockney collects shells on the sea-shore. Almost immediately on his return to Keswick he produced a volume of verse, entitled 'The Poet's Pilgrimage to Waterloo.' He also kept a full journal of his adventures in the course of this journey, but this diary was not published until 1903. It is a much more interesting document than the poem, Southey's prose being always more readable than his verse. It contains a delightful paragraph, exemplifying the seriousness with which Southey took his high Parnassian calling. He tells us that he was accompanied by his wife and his eldest daughter, and he adds:

'Being in some degree bound to celebrate the greatest victory in British history, I persuaded myself that if any person had a valid cause or pretext for visiting the field of Waterloo it was the Poet Laureate.'

The personal revelations in 'The Poet's Pilgrimage' and the descriptions of Flemish scenery are interesting, and indeed give as favourable an impression of Southey's poetical powers as any part of his writings, but the actual reconstruction of the battle itself is very poor, and we presently drift into an intolerable morass of allegory. Was it Mommsen who said that Tacitus was 'the most unmilitary of military writers'? Southey was at least as fond of battles and still less happy in describing them.

Yet Southey at Waterloo was a genius in comparison with Walter Scott, who, though not a Poet Laureate, felt obliged to visit the scene of the battle and to publish a poem on the subject. 'The Field of Waterloo' was rapidly written and appeared in October 1815; it was published as an attractive volume, and its subject, no less than the name of its illustrious

author, ensured it a great sale. Lord Erskine summed up the general criticism of it in an epigram which enjoyed a wide circulation :

> 'On Waterloo's ensanguined plain
> Lie tens of thousands of the slain ;
> But none by sabre or by shot
> Fell half so flat as Walter Scott.'

Scott was a little more felicitous in the ode entitled 'The 'Dance of Death,' also written in 1815, and beginning :

> 'Night and morning were at meeting
> Over Waterloo ;
> Cocks had sung their earliest greeting,
> Faint and low they crew.'

Two odes and several sonnets attest Wordsworth's emotion at the victory, and the earlier of the odes contains one striking passage :

> 'We laud
> And magnify Thy name, Almighty God !
> But Man is Thy most awful instrument
> In working out a pure intent ;
> Thou cloth'st the wicked in their dazzling mail,
> And for Thy righteous purpose they prevail ;
> Thine arm from peril guards the coasts
> Of them who in Thy laws delight :
> Thy presence turns the scales of doubtful fight,
> Tremendous God of battles, Lord of Hosts ! '

Unquestionably, however, Byron had been much more successful than all his brother-bards in his poetical treatment of Waterloo. He also, like Scott and Southey, explored the battle-field, but he was less precipitate in recording his impressions in verse. It is not until the third canto of 'Childe 'Harold's Pilgrimage ' that we are introduced to the 'first and 'last of fields ' :

> 'And Harold stands upon this place of skulls,
> The grave of France, the deadly Waterloo.'

The victory suggests to Byron a reflection which had not occurred to the other laureates of the victory, and had not troubled the triumphal ecstasies of De Quincey. He admits that France is chained, but for that reason is Earth more

free? Wordsworth had, in a solemn sonnet, impressed upon the Allies the duty of gratitude and justice. Byron is not hopeful of their response, and sees in the fall of Napoleon only a lessening of the despots of the world by one. He breaks off these cynical suggestions to embark on one of his finest passages of description, that famous account of how 'There was a sound of revelry by night,' which is pursued to the field of Waterloo and is followed by an address to the fallen 'Conqueror and Captive of the Earth,' who, at the moment when it was written, was being closely guarded at St. Helena. The thirty-five stanzas in which Byron deals, sometimes rather remotely, with the incidents and politics of 1815, form the best metrical record of the feelings of Englishmen at that time which has come down to us. After the battle of Waterloo, but before the publication of 'Childe 'Harold's Pilgrimage III.,' Byron printed several war-poems, presumed to be 'from the French.' These need not delay us, nor some trifles, not particularly neat, from the pen of the essentially unmartial Thomas Moore.

After the Peace there were some poetical retrospects which deserve to be mentioned. Walter Scott prefixed to one of the chapters of 'Old Mortality' a quatrain which far outweighs in value all his laborious celebrations of the war:

> 'Sound, sound the clarion, fill the fife!
> To all the sensual world proclaim,
> One crowded hour of glorious life
> Is worth an age without a name.'

It is probable that if Shelley had been born a few years earlier he would have been moved to celebrate contemporary events with the passionate intensity which marked his genius. In the last years of his brief life, when his powers had ripened and his views of humanity had widened, he showed himself an eager observer of the great world of European politics. But he was still a child when Napoleon was in the full tide of success, and his attention was not called to the Continent until after the Allies had signed the Peace of Paris. Some crude verses, entitled 'Mother and Son,' were written in 1812, and treat of the familiar terrors of the press-gang, and 'the 'woe which tyrants on their victims love to wreak.' But Shelley contributed nothing serious to the subject of our

inquiry until 1816, when he published, with 'Alastor,' his sonnet on the Fall of Bonaparte. In this he speaks of his hatred of the despot, and his joy that time has swept Napoleon's frail and bloody pomp in fragments towards oblivion. In the preface to 'The Revolt of Islam' (1816), he analyses rather closely his own attitude towards Napoleon and the results of the war, but we can trace little direct inspiration from contemporary events in the epic itself, after the opening statement:

> 'When the last hope of trampled France had failed
> Like a brief dream of unremaining glory,
> From visions of despair I rose.'

Shelley then yearned for 'Victory, Victory to the prostrate 'nations,' but his purview of their condition was still extremely vague. Three years later, in October 1819, he was writing the 'Ode to the Assertors of Liberty,' which mirrors the discontent and distress which followed the war, and in 1820 he composed the great 'Ode to Liberty,' in which he sums up the state of Europe in the preceding generation:

> 'How like Bacchanals of blood
> Round France, the ghastly vintage, stood
> Destruction's sceptred slaves, and Folly's mitred brood!
> When one, like them, but mightier far than they,
> The Anarch of thy own bewildered powers
> Rose: armies mingled in obscure array,
> Like clouds with clouds, darkening the sacred bowers
> Of serene Heaven. He, by the past pursued,
> Rests with those dead, but unforgotten hours,
> Whose ghosts scare victor kings in their ancestral towers.'

This was written about fifteen months before the death of Napoleon, the news of which roused Shelley to the composition of the vigorous lines beginning, 'What! alive and so bold, 'O Earth?' and may have had something to do with the study of contemporary events in Greece which took the form of 'Hellas.' Shelley's inclination to write at the suggestion of events of the moment, and to clothe them in lyrical magnificence, now increased, but he was approaching the end of his career. There is a temptation to examine 'The Masque 'of Anarchy' in the interests of our inquiry, but its stanzas do not refer directly to Napoleon, of whom, however, we find

a portrait preserved in the latest of all Shelley's works, the unfinished 'Triumph of Life':

> '"Who is he with chin
> Upon his breast, and hands crost on his chain?"
> The child of a fierce hour.'

But when this was written Europe was already six years past Waterloo. Still later came Byron's petulant gibes at the Duke as 'the best of cut-throats' in the eighth and ninth cantos of 'Don Juan'; and the poetical record of the Napoleonic war ends with Byron's cynical inquiry to Wellington:

> 'And I shall be delighted to learn who,
> Save you and yours, have gained by Waterloo.'

If all the historical records were to perish, it would be impossible for posterity to recover a coherent impression of the course of the war from the works of contemporary British poets. The anger and confusion caused by the press-gangs, and the occasional and rather undignified panic of invasion, greatly overshadow in their effusions the heroic and strategic features of the struggle. The English, who fought so well, sung of battle very languidly, and even when they sat down to celebrate a victory their attention was apt to be called away by the curve of a garland of hop-vines or by a recollection of Cumbrian mountains. Southey, on the field of Waterloo, expatiates on the peculiarities of Flemish tillage. Nowhere do we find any attempt to depict the wide movement of troops over the length and breadth of Europe, or to define the larger political features of the struggle. For all that the poets tell us between 1795 and 1815, Wordsworth's 'Happy Warrior' might as well be a mere aspiration as the portrait of an actual leader. We hear of battles in Portugal and Spain, but nothing of their cause or character. Bonaparte is revealed now as a godlike hero, now as a bestial tyrant, and the same poets who have lifted him to heaven to-day, will complacently revile him to-morrow. The Napoleonic War, in short, was so imperfectly recorded by the poets who lived through its tremendous shock that we may fairly represent it as not recorded by them at all. Nearly a century was to pass before there should arise a poet who, on the huge canvas of 'The 'Dynasts,' for the first time would paint for us a panorama of the struggle not unworthy of its stupendous issues.

EDMUND GOSSE.

ITALIAN EPITHALAMIA

1. The London Library Collection of Italian 'Nozze.'
2. Un Usanza letteraria in gran voga nel settecento. By F. Colagrosso. Firenze. 1908.

SINCE the first Roman walls rose from the Palatine and the foundations of the great Cloaca were laid, the arts of Italy have been interwoven with her history, endued with a vitality that is one with the life of the nation, and owing little to foreign influence save that of Greece. Throughout the dark centuries of war and internal strife that followed on the golden age of the Renaissance, and during the long years of unrest that preceded political unification, Italian culture, fostered in noble universities and widespread by a network of Academies, continuously gave forth a stream of poetry of greater volume than that of any other European country. Such an output necessarily includes the indifferent as well as the superlatively good, more especially since the period when the invention of printing gave an incalculable impetus to literature.

Half a century after the first Venetian printing-press was set up (1469), a flood of ephemeral publications—broadsheets and pamphlets of infinite variety—was being poured from the presses of Northern Italy, and a little later a new type of literary enterprise came into being, consisting of collections of verse dedicated to some special person or occasion and known under the general term of 'raccolte.' Eminent writers acted as proof-readers and editors of these poetical 'raccolte,' for whose contents the literary clubs or Academies, then in their infancy (such as the Venetian Accademia della Fama, the Accademia dei Granelleschi, and, in later days, the celebrated Arcadia), were largely responsible. In the 'raccolte,' moreover, are to be found the first sonnets of poets such as Aretino, Tasso, and Parini. But such treasures are sparsely scattered amid a vast quantity of refuse, and if the early collections deserve rescue from the literary scrap-heap it is

rather for the germs they contain of national unity of thought, the necessary precursor of political unity. The bond of a common language was recognised by the poets of Northern and Southern Italy during the stormy periods when no other link availed to bind together the rival and independent states and cities of the Peninsula. When Venetians, Lombards, and Neapolitans joined together in literary comradeship, in spite of political dissensions, the first impulse towards forming the Kingdom of Italy was given.

In course of time poetry gave way to prose in many 'raccolte,' and important historical documents and annals of illustrious families were brought to light. Biographies of men eminent in their day, but now forgotten, have thus been recovered from the recesses of libraries where they lay unheeded, interesting pictures being incidentally presented to the student of the relations existing between men of letters in different parts of Italy and throughout Europe from the fifteenth century onwards. At its inception, however, the 'raccolta' was usually an anthology of verse; the oldest specimens extant appear to be those compiled in honour of distinguished personages. In 1504 a collection of poems was published by a Bolognese named Achillini, dedicated by him to Serafino Aquitano, and a similar compilation in manuscript, of an earlier date, lamenting the death of a prominent citizen, has also been found at Bologna.

Not only Greek, Latin, and Hebrew, but German, French, Spanish, and English poems were brought together in these early 'raccolte,' as in the instance of the one presented to Joan of Aragon, the first part being printed in Venice in 1555, which was, according to the prefatory note, 'fabbricato da 'tutti i più gentili spiriti e in tutte le lingue principali del 'mondo.' Unhappily, in the long list of the collaborators there is no name which has withstood the winnowing of time.

The first Neapolitan 'raccolta,' commemorating the departure of the viceroy in the year 1696, owes its chief interest to the preface, by which the philosopher Vico initiated his literary career. Vico was then young and unknown, and his selection, due to the offices of a friend who recognised his ability, raised a storm of protest from the other contributors. The matter was finally compromised by the editor agreeing to

suppress the names of the authors both of the preface and of the poems, but Vico made worthy use of his opportunity. In the same year he contributed Latin poems to a 'raccolta' of thanksgiving for the recovery of Charles II., King of Spain, and a twelvemonth later, on the death of the viceroy's mother (in 1697), he was commissioned to write a Latin oration in her honour.

Besides contributing to these 'raccolte,' Vico assumed the task of editorship, which in his day appears to have been even less of a sinecure than in our own. Quarrels were frequent between rival poets respecting the precedence to be given to their works, and jealousy was rife. The editor, usually a literary man and occasionally anonymous, might insert poems of his own; but in some cases the choice fell upon a relative of the person in whose honour the 'raccolta' was compiled, and in others the duties of editorship were performed by the collaborators themselves or by a publisher who paid for the contributions and eventually offered them for sale. From these beginnings apparently the rôle of editor of such works came into existence, assuming eventually, in the hands of Gasparo Gozzi, a position of power and importance, and providing abundant employment as the rage for versification became general in cultivated Italian society.

Anthologies of verse—'per nozze raccolte'—printed for private circulation at the marriages of notabilities, and more or less appropriate to the occasion, came into vogue during the later years of the sixteenth century. Small editions of from fifty to one hundred copies were presented to the bridegroom, the bride, or her parents, on the eve of the wedding. To trace the origin of this custom would lead one back to the classic epithalamia and the fescennina—those ancient harvest songs of Italy which were gradually adapted to the service of Hymen—but the immediate forerunners of the modern 'nozze' were the Latin orations and poems which it was customary in the fifteenth century to recite at the marriage-feasts of patrician families. In the famous Diaries of Sanudo, the Venetian historian, there are many descriptions of these functions. He relates that at the nuptials of Vienna, niece of the Doge Gritti, the bride, clad in rose-coloured velvet, with flowing hair, was accompanied to the church by a hundred noble ladies, sumptuously arrayed. Torch-bearers, trumpeters,

and captains of the guard headed the procession; rich silks and tapestries hung from the windows; the palace chambers were ablaze with flambeaux; while on the banqueting table, amid a profusion of gold and silver plate, of costly viands and confectionery, the dowry was displayed in basins containing several thousands of ducats.

In these 'per nozze raccolte,' which, with the advent of printing, had taken the place of the poetic eulogies and orations formerly addressed to the bride and bridegroom, the literary parasites of the rich and powerful found additional opportunities for servile adulation. Even poets of the first rank did not disdain to publish their youthful efforts in this manner; but in 'the incredible dysentery of sonnets' complained of by Algarotti in later days such pearls were far to seek. The needy Humanist, moreover, stooped to every kind of dishonesty. In some instances the signature of a deceased poet was wrongfully appended to a set of indifferent verses; in others, sonnets which had been copied from former anthologies were submitted as original.

Nor were these the only pitfalls in the path of an editor. In the ardour of lyrical rhapsody the reverence due to the Church was forgotten; invocations were addressed to Greek and Roman deities, and poets, eager to outstrip one another in adulation, exceeded the bounds of licence. At first sight it appears that a certain latitude was given to the 'raccolte,' inasmuch as they rarely contain the 'imprimatur,' or licence to print, granted by the ecclesiastical authorities, probably because they were primarily intended—as in the case of the 'nozze'—for private circulation. That the editors were nevertheless by no means immune from sacerdotal penalties is proved by the insertion of a formula known as a 'protesta' at the beginning or end of each copy. The 'proteste' were originally of two kinds—which may be differentiated as the religious and the civil—but in the later eighteenth century were merged in one. The religious 'protesta' makes profession of faith and declares that the contributors are true and loyal members of the Catholic Church. The following are examples of 'proteste' common to all classes of 'raccolte':

'Se bene all' improviso sono alquanto scandalose simili parole: Divinamente, Paradiso, Eterno, Divino, Idolatra; però, a chi sanamente legge, nocumento alcuno non apportano. Sapendosi,

che gli autori come Poeti scrivono, e come Christiani Cattolicamente credono, e soggiacciono humilmente alle sacre censure Ecclesiastiche.' (1722.)

or again :

'Caso che nelle presenti Rime si osservasse qualche termine, od espressione, che non convenisse colla Religione Cristiana Cattolica, si prega il Leggitore attribuire cio solo alla Poesia, e non all' animo degli Autori di essa, i quali credono perfettamente in quanto ordina e insegna la nostra Santa Chiesa Romana, per cui volentieri spenderebbono il sangue e la vita.'

It appears improbable, however, that either formula would have exonerated the editor if there had been anything in the contents that was patently subversive of orthodox belief.

The civil 'protesta,' on the other hand, aims at the conciliation of the contributors, and is, as far as I can ascertain, peculiar to the 'nozze.' It is an ingenious device on the part of the editors, who were often at their wits' end to decide the claims of rival poets to the honour of the first place. The subjoined example may be taken as typical.

'L'ordine con cui sono stampate le poesie di questa raccolta è quell' istesso col quale si sono ricevute successivamente dagli autori, del merito di quali si protesta l'editore di esser Veneratore, e non Giudice.'

The insertion of these two 'proteste' became eventually a matter of form, and towards 1770 and afterwards the following formula was generally adopted :

'Le presenti rime null' altro ordine hanno avuto fuori di quello che loro a dato il tempo ed il caso ; e gli autori protestano in qualunque espressione di non altrimenti sentire che da Cattolici.'

The 'proteste' are inserted sometimes on the back of the title-page and sometimes on the last page of all. It is a characteristic of the 'nozze' that the term title-page is somewhat of a misnomer, since it rarely affords a clue to the text, and although the names of the bride and bridegroom are given, the honour of dedication is not infrequently reserved for a civic dignitary or the ambassador of a friendly state. Thus in 1611, on the wedding of an Austrian noble to a countess resident in Vicenza, a dedication is addressed to the Venetian ambassador. In a gracefully worded dedication of 1707, the donor informs the noble parent of the bride that he has

united in this 'raccolta' a few poetical flowers and in order that they may not be lost he now 'places them in the shelter 'of his Excellency's high patronage.' The style of these dedications, at first very simple, afterwards became elaborately ornate, as may be seen in the following example which is addressed to the bride:

'What beautiful things I could say of you and your husband on such a happy day! My silence would, perhaps, be more eloquent. But as I would not be wanting in those social duties and graces which society demands of us on such occasions, I have printed two letters in Latin verse by the celebrated Abbot Dalle Laste. The first, a long poem, has been translated by that Antonio Bevilacqua whom the Muses loved so well, who unfortunately met with an early death. Bevilacqua was a great friend of your father and of your uncles the Counts of Trissino. The shorter poem has been translated by a friend of mine and an admirer of yours, who not only suggested it but also procured it for me. I hope you will be pleased to accept the dedication of them, being by many held preferable to insipid and trifling verses, in token of sympathy and regard.'

The exclusion of poetry with a direct personal application from the 'nozze' of this period marks the beginning of a revolt from the conventions which had hitherto held sway, a revolt which culminated in what may be termed a literary crisis towards the middle of the eighteenth century. Italian society can hardly be said to have grown tired of the parasitic horde of minor poets who hung upon its skirts, but the foremost literati of the country were not only weary of being importuned to write verses, but were nauseated by the intolerable flood of doggerel, in which works of genuine inspiration were engulfed like drops in the ocean. The Accademia dei Granelleschi and others of equal standing had sunk into mere workshops for the production of 'raccolte,' which took the place to some extent of the modern weekly journal, their pages being always open to the new poet and to passages of arms such as that between Goldoni and Gozzi. It is worth recording that Parini's first sonnets were published in a 'raccolta' edited by Goldoni, but the general tendency of the system was to crowd out and obscure the men of the highest intellectual attainments.

The attack on the ranks of the poetasters, which had long been pending, came to a head about the year 1749. A leader

was found in the person of Baretti, to whom was due the innovation of substituting prose for the stereotyped collection of poems. In a letter entitled 'Counsels given unsought' in his 'Frusta letteraria' he gives, half jestingly, half in earnest, a list of proposed essays on topics more or less related to marriage and containing advice to young married couples. Not Baretti only, but Meneghino Balestrieri, Paciaudi, and Bettinelli all combined forces to ridicule and suppress the 'raccolta.' Almost simultaneously with Baretti's letters appeared the famous satirical poem by Bettinelli entitled 'Le Raccolte,' in which he sought by mingled scorn and raillery to reduce the typical poet of the 'raccolta' to silence. Recruits of lesser fame gathered to the rebel standard. Colagrosso (from whose interesting little book I have gleaned much) gives an instance of a young man who presented himself at an Academic festival in Naples to deliver a congratulatory ode on behalf of his elder brother, who was unable to attend. To his extreme mortification, he was waved aside by the president when he approached to speak. Ere long he found an opportunity for retaliation in the death of the city executioner, in whose honour, with the aid of a literary friend, he composed a dedicatory 'raccolta,' which also provided scope for unmeasured censure of the president and the members of the Academy in question, and ridiculed the custom of holding celebrations of the kind on the slightest possible excuse.

But the task of reformation was not an easy one. The vogue of the 'nozze' in particular died hard. It had become an indispensable adjunct to the marriage ceremony. We find Bettinelli himself unable to resist contributing to a 'nozze' even after his sarcastic cantos had gone forth, and when, thanks in great measure to his influence on current thought, the prose 'nozze' came into fashion, the subject-matter was still confined to love and marriage. Though the man who was not a poet born no longer made wild attempts to write verses, matrimony was still matrimony to him. But as prose did not lend itself as well either to the praise of Venus or to the adoration of the bride, the would-be donor turned aside to those by-paths of the subject where it was expedient to use a more rigid language. The friend who had leanings towards archæology, or who regarded the affections from an historical standpoint, chose 'I riti nuziali degli antichi

'Romani,' or 'Il diritto del connubio avuto riguardo all' antica 'plebe romana,' or 'Cenni storici sui matrimonj degli antichi 'Babilonesi,' or 'De' riti nuziali de' Greci (1789),' which are the earliest prose 'nozze' in the London Library collection. The theologian and the priest discussed 'L'uomo e la donna, 'ossia il primo matrimonio,' while others gave moral counsel in 'Il matrimonio, massime di antichi sapienti,' and 'Degli 'obblighi de' conjugati.'

Many who did not care to take this trouble simply printed an ordinary letter of congratulation containing little more than good wishes and pleasantly worded expressions of affection. These never became very popular, not only because they had no substance, but also because they showed a want of initiative and imagination in the donor.

Not until the close of the eighteenth century, however, did the efforts of the reformers meet with any conspicuous success, the victory being chiefly due to the influence of Morelli, the great Venetian librarian. Thanks to his initiative and encouragement, historical essays, accounts of voyages, and biographical sketches took the place of the old extravagant eulogies and fulsome tributes to the bride's perfections, and the 'nozze' henceforth assumed a position of genuine importance in Italian literature. In his preface to a 'raccolta' of the new order Canon Moreni writes:

'It is not long ago that one of the most celebrated men of letters of Europe as well as of Italy, whose loss we all mourn, introduced a new thing into our literary life. For the empty, insipid, and often lying anthologies of marriage poetry, which vanished of themselves as soon as they saw the light, he substituted the excellent custom of publishing on these auspicious occasions something worth printing, some document that had lain unedited and hidden away on the shelves of a public or private library. Abundant advantages have resulted to literature.'

To this category belongs the narrative of a journey undertaken by a merchant of Vicenza named Anton Maria Ragona. He was employed by Vicenzo dalla Scroffa to collect the inheritance bequeathed to him by his father-in-law, consisting chiefly of money deposited in various banks in the capitals of Europe. Charged with this mission, Ragona left Vicenza in the company of Filippo Pigafetta, the celebrated traveller, in 1582, and spent eighteen months in travelling through

England, Spain, and France. We may neglect that portion of his journey which touches on Spain and France, except to mention in passing that he gives the French King Henry III. the credit of being the first to introduce the 'diligence' into France as a means of conveying passengers from one place to another, adding that this king had borrowed the idea from Poland, where he had seen carriages and public coaches.

Ragona and Pigafetta embarked at Dieppe and landed near Rye. On their arrival in England they suffered extreme annoyance from the customs officials, who searched all their baggage, looking for letters, papers, books, and especially official documents, imports strictly forbidden at that time on account of the civil and religious disturbance which the Spaniards and Catholics kept up in the kingdom. Pigafetta especially was afraid lest they should discover some letters in his pocket addressed to the Spanish ambassador; but he escaped detection by showing one for Walsingham, Secretary of State, given to him by the English ambassador. This innocent ruse had the desired effect, and he and his two friends were allowed to continue their journey with all due respect.

The distance from Rye to London was covered in two days by a road which led through thick forests infested by robbers. On all sides our travellers found the churches abandoned on account of the new religion, and to add to their discouragement the plague was raging in London, while no attempts were made to take precautions against its virulence.

'Having learnt,' writes Ragona, 'that Gasparo Gatto, a merchant of Vicenza, was living in London with his sister, carrying on, besides other business, a trade in dyeing which brought him great gain, I sent to tell him that some of his own countrymen desired to speak with him. He most courteously came to visit us in our hotel, and after the usual salutations told us that his house was rather small, but he had three gardens which he kept for his amusement, in one of which, far from the plague, was a good and roomy apartment. We went to this garden and took up our abode in the house, which had one good room with a fireplace, and an excellent bed. There was even a warming-pan, which delighted Pigafetta. In that garden, which Gasparo's sister looked after, we found, to our surprise, being the month of September, ripe grapes, fresh beans, artichokes, roses, and other similar delights, marvellous for that island, where the cold is severe.'

Among many other things, Ragona mentions the swans on

the Thames, which the public fed. He gives it as his opinion that the prosperity of England and the evidences of fresh enterprises in the country are due to the new religion,' according ' to whose rites all are married.'

' On Sunday morning,' he continues, ' we presented our letters of introduction to Walsingham, Secretary of State, who, like all great men in England, speaks Italian excellently. This man is by way of being a devout Huguenot, but according to some he is really of no religion. The court of this princess is small, but select; the courtiers are noble and excellent youths, and almost all finely dressed; the ladies are beautiful and elegant, but, as I have said, few in number.'

And then follows a description of the dress of the former, of some of the rules and regulations of the little court, of the royal chapel, and of the arrangements for providing meals.

' This queen of England is called Elizabeth,' writes Ragona. ' She is thin, with a long face, and is not unpleasing in appearance; she is learned, for she understands Greek, Latin, Italian, French, and Spanish. I noticed that the Italians were well received in this court, especially if they had changed their religion.'

In the eyes of Ragona and his fellow travellers England seemed prosperous, and gave promise of greater riches and greater civilisation. But seventy years passed away and the scene changed completely. What a different story we read in the letters of Giovanni Sagredo, procurator of St. Mark, addressed to his friend Georgio Contarini in 1655 (' Lettere ' inedite di Messer Giovanni Sagredo,' Venezia 1839). Cromwell, then in the zenith of his power, resented the attitude taken up by the Venetians and threatened to send assistance to the Turks if there was any further delay in acknowledging his government. Sagredo, at that time ambassador at the French court, was accordingly sent to England with special instructions to appease Cromwell and smooth matters over. He arrived in London in October 1655, and must have written to his friend almost immediately, for his letter dated October 6, 1655, evidently contains his first general impression. The word-play in which he indulges abounds in obvious difficulties for the translator:

' Dear Friend,—I am in England. Oh, how the aspect of this country is changed! Dear ladies (*dame*) are not seen at court, but only fallow deer (*damme*) brought from the chase; the cavaliers

have gone, horse and infantry alone remain; music and ballets are no more, only the loud notes of the trumpet and the drum resound.

'There is no talk of love, but only of war; there are no comedies, only tragedies; there are no patches (*mosche*) on the faces, but only muskets (*moschetti*) on the shoulders; there are no midnight parties, but only stern ministers who are watching those of the opposing side. In a word, there is contempt and suspicion over all, and the countenances are of the vilest.

'The fifteen years of tempestuous civil war are over, during which royal authority has made shipwreck, and you know how awful, without my recapitulating the sorrow of it. King Charles was too good for the evil times. Cromwell, in driving out the Parliament, has shown ability in speech and thought and has the authority but not the name of King. His title is the Protector, but he destroys the nobility; a great army secures his power. All the pay is for the soldiers; the machine is strong, but in my opinion not lasting, because too violent. I salute you.'

Among the 'Nozze' in the London Library is a record of the adventures of another Italian voyager who was less fortunate in his experience of hospitality in England. His subsequent travels in Turkey, Egypt, and the Holy Land formed the subject of twelve letters, written 1706-7, which remained for 150 years unnoted in the library of Vicenza, save that in the history of the writers of Vicenza (Calvi, 'Biblioteca e Storia di quei 'Scrittori di Vicenza &c.,' 1782) there is a touching three-lined reference to his manuscripts with the simple addition, 'aspettano la pubblica luce.' They lay waiting from 1706 to 1854, when the first letter was printed.

The date of Giuseppe Sorio's birth is uncertain, but there is evidence of his living in Vicenza in 1663. Little is known of his parentage, but he appears to have been the child of well-to-do people, who gave him an education befitting their position. His studies included archæology, in which he made considerable progress, besides classics and mathematics. As soon as he was possessed of independent means he determined to acquire knowledge of the world at large, and set out for Paris and London. No detailed account of those early travels has come to light, but we learn incidentally that he became an object of suspicion to William III. and was imprisoned in this country. Whether this harsh treatment was due to imprudent behaviour or to his having taken part in political agitation does not transpire. He seems to have been kept in prison for several

years, and was only released through the good offices of the Venetian ambassador on the death of the King in 1702. This painful experience did not deter him from seeking fresh adventures, and he subsequently visited Turkey and the Holy Land. In a letter from Galata, dated 1706, he gives an elaborate account of Constantinople, its mosques, its situation and advantages, with many details of the manners and customs of the Turks, including the slave market :

'Of all the markets I have seen,' he writes, 'the most extraordinary is the slave market, which takes place on certain days of the week. Contrary to expectation, one only sees the worst specimens of both sexes. Accustomed as they are here to regard slaves as we do horses, they make those of the coarser quality march in procession through the fair, keeping the finer types for private sale. The more curious Europeans know the best depots of saleable youths, where, on the pretext of wishing to buy, they are able to see what would otherwise be impossible. The Turks keep slaves of both sexes. They guard them while young with the greatest jealousy, and teach them useful arts and trades suitable to their talents. It is only necessary to present oneself as a purchaser if one would see what qualities these miserable creatures possess; they are made to sing, dance, or play an instrument, or do something to please.'

From Turkey Sorio goes on to visit the Holy Places. By some means the rumour spread about that he was an Italian count, which spoils his journey, for the best way of visiting the Holy Places, he explains, is to go poorly clad. He tells his friend at home about every place connected in any way with the life of Christ; where the house of Caiaphas lay, where the cock was stationed when it crowed, the position of the ruins of the little church to which Peter is said to have retired after denying Christ, and so on. But Sorio, though obviously an enthusiastic student of biblical antiquities, did not always believe his informants, for we find him constantly expressing a doubt as to the truth of what he is told. A little later Sorio is in Cairo and makes an excursion to the Pyramids. The story of the difficulties of the road and the hindrances put in his way by the Arabs, who were not well disposed to the stranger, shows his powers of endurance. 'I would gladly 'have thrown aside all my curiosity if it had not been that I 'should have felt ashamed of abandoning a project simply 'through fear, and one for which I had already undergone many 'troubles and disasters.' Had it not been for the faithfulness

of his Janissaries, on whom he depended entirely for safety, Sorio would probably not have proceeded.

In this long letter, when speaking of the caravans to and from Mecca, Sorio incidentally alludes to the effect of the opening of the Cape of Good Hope route on trade in the East :

'One may say that all Oriental goods come through Mecca to the west. The opening of the Cape of Good Hope has, however, decreased the business a good deal, but it must still remain enormous, as this means of transit is always the most convenient. Why the caravans are protected by the Sultans at such an enormous cost is just because the trade is so lucrative.'

Sorio also discusses the causes of the overflowing of the Nile and its source. For further details, well worthy of perusal, we must refer the reader to the 'nozze' itself.

Among other 'nozze' which deal with travels and trade we may mention 'Sopra il commercio e la navigazione de' Veneziani 'dal principio di quella republica sino alla metà del sec. 16,' Padua, 1823 ; and also Jacopo Morelli's 'Dissertazione intorno 'ad alcuni viaggiatori eruditi Veneziani poco noti pubbl. nelle 'faustissime nozze del Conte Leonardo Manino con Contessa 'Foscarina Giovanelli,' Venezia, 1803. The latter volume has a preface by Morelli, in which he recalls the history of the deeds of the ancestors of the two families. There is a note of uncertainty as to whether this dissertation is really fitting as a wedding gift.

'Ecco pertanto, nobilissimo signore, resa soddisfazione, se male non mi avviso, anche a quelli che per severità, o per troppa delicatezza di gusto, riguardata avrebbero quest' operetta mia come non adattata a pubblicarsi nell' occasione lietissima delle nozze vostre.'

Biography, no less than travel, figures largely in nineteenth-century 'nozze,' which thus serve the dual aim of honouring the living while extolling the dead. In the collection of the London Library are many such lives in brief of scientists, statesmen, artists, and men of letters whose abilities and public services are commemorated by their fellow-citizens and descendants. For example, the citizens of Florence present a physician who is about to be married with a 'Con-'siglio medico di Ugolino de Montecatini ad Averardo de' 'Medici.' This fifteenth-century advice on the practice of medicine is of interest not only as concerning the person to whom it is addressed, but also because it illustrates the ideas and the scientific theories held by the physicians of that day.

Again, an abbot of Padua presents his noble friend Count Emo-Capodilista with an hitherto unpublished life of Pietro Abano ('Notizie sulla vita e sulle opere di Pietro Abano, scritte dal prof. Francesco Maria Colle,' Padua, 1823), read at a meeting of the Academy of Padua. Students, whether of art or medicine, are probably familiar with the name of Abano. They will remember that it was Abano who inspired Giotto to draw the signs of the zodiac and other celestial constellations on the walls of the Great Hall in Padua. Abano is known as one of the first martyrs of science, and in this life by Professor Colle is related the manner in which the Inquisition persecuted him, brought him to trial, and, when their vengeance was thwarted by his death in prison, gratified their hatred by ordering his body to be burnt and his ashes to be scattered to the winds. Abano is said to have claimed 100 golden florins a day while in attendance upon the Pope Honorius IV., but the author does not vouch for this fact. Entitled by the Parisians 'the Great Lombard,' his influence in his day was great, and he well deserved the honour which the Paduans did him by placing his bust in their Great Hall. His philosophical works, which the modern student finds long-winded and tiresome, are designed to explain the causes and effects of maladies and to adjust them to his system of philosophy. He contended that philosophy and medicine were sister sciences, and that three sciences were above all necessary to the doctor, namely, 'logic, which is to science what salt is to food; natural 'philosophy, which teaches principles; and astrology, which 'directs his judgment.' Has not the modern physician perhaps neglected logic to the detriment of his profession?

A priest of Verona publishes some unique letters addressed by Antonio Magliabechi to Francesco Sparavieri. Magliabechi was an Italian scholar who was born in 1633 and died in Florence in 1714. Starting life as a jeweller, he obtained by private study a familiarity with ancient languages. A few years later he was discovered by Michael Ermini, librarian to Cardinal Leopold of Medici, and eventually occupied a similar position under Cosimo III. Bibliophile and lover of literature, Magliabechi deserves lasting fame and gratitude for the great collection of books which he founded and bequeathed to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and which ultimately came into the possession of the Italian National Library. Sparavieri, to whom the letters were written, was a scion of

one of the ruling families of Verona, and the chief ornament of the College of Lawyers in that city. Maffei says of him that he was a scholar of profound erudition and probably the ablest man of his day.

The character of the correspondence on contemporary literature of which these letters form a part may be exemplified by the following:

'I have received,' writes Magliabechi, 'ten copies of your most elegant and learned Apologia. I write to let you know of their safe arrival and to thank you most sincerely for them. I have read them, or rather devoured them, and have sent two copies to Maestro Noris. One copy I have presented to my illustrious patron; one I have placed in the library of Prince Francis, who is at present in Pisa. Of the six remaining copies I have despatched one to Gronovius at Deventer, another to Graevius at Utrecht, another to Arnold at Nuremberg, and another to Wagenseil at Altorf. The last two copies, if your most excellent friend does not rule otherwise, I shall keep for myself, as I desire to have one in my own little library among the books I value most, and the other I propose to lend to such friends as may wish to read it. I am very busy and have hardly time to take breath, but still I want to tell you about some literary novelties. In Holland some letters of Cromwell, Protector of England, have appeared, written in most elegant Latin according to the wont of Milton. They resemble those of the Grand Duke Ferdinand II. As I hear, they are more to be read for their latinity than for their subject-matter. A new Greek edition of Aratus has come out in England. The scholar who is publishing it has made a few annotations. He promises also to print all the mathematical works, both Greek and Arabic, in eighteen volumes. The undertaking is a great one, and God grant that it may be carried out.'

Among the numerous 'nozze' which relate to the past history of Vicenza is an account of the foundation of a medical college in that city in 1562, owing to the serious inconveniences and irregularities attending the dispensation of medical remedies, and in particular because many ignorant persons practised the profession of medicine. The doctors of Vicenza therefore formed themselves into a body to regulate medical matters and to prevent those who were not duly qualified from continuing to practise as physicians, and by common consent a medical college was founded on Sunday, March 1, 1562. A solemn mass was held in the cathedral, after which a physician named Dr. Alessandro made an oration in praise of medicine in the palace of the Signoria before the magistrates and a large concourse of people. The monks of S. Lorenzo gave

them hospitality, assigning to them some rooms in the convent, and it was decreed that there should be henceforth an annual celebration in the church of S. Lorenzo. In return for the generosity of the monks it was decided to attend them gratuitously. The names of the head officials and the mode of election are also set forth. Two-thirds of the votes were necessary to the ratification of any proposal; if less than that proportion were forthcoming the matter could be brought forward again, but not more than three times. Candidates were required to submit themselves to a private examination in philosophy and medicine, at which the curious custom prevailed of writing out the questions upon slips of paper, which were put into a box and extracted at random. Every third year in the winter session the Prior of the College had to procure the body of a man who had been hanged and of one who had been drowned, under penalty of ten ducats. A doctor was chosen by lot to give a lecture on anatomy, while dissection was performed by a surgeon. To the latter the College paid three ducats, besides what he received from spectators.

The foregoing examples will suffice to show the process of evolution followed by the 'nozze' from the time when it was the mouthpiece of the rising poet to the present day, when it has become a means of which the scholar and the dilettante avail themselves to reproduce a document concerned with local history or to publish a newly discovered medieval manuscript. Sometimes the 'nozze' consists merely of a synopsis of a forthcoming work, or gives a list of chapter-headings, yet poetry is not entirely banished. Among the 'nozze' in the possession of the London Library some forty or fifty are the sole works of the gifted Zanella, placed by many in the front rank of Italian poets of the nineteenth century. But the poetic 'nozze' are now the exception, and the output of all kinds of 'raccolte' has been subject to a marked diminution since the middle period of the nineteenth century. The custom of presenting 'nozze' on ceremonial occasions survives chiefly in literary circles. Among the latest 'nozze' received at the London Library is one of an edition of fifty copies, celebrating the wedding of the daughter of Professor Giuseppe Fumagalli, and dedicated to him by his friend Professor Albano Sorbelli, who has contributed an interesting introduction. The title of the work is 'La historia di Bologna di

'frate Cherubino Ghirardacci (1420) e le nozze di Sante 'Bentivoglio con Ginevra Sforza.'

Another is 'Il Montenegro da relazioni dei provveditori 'veneti (1687–1735),' a sumptuously printed collection of documents issued by F. Ongania to celebrate the marriage of the Crown Prince of Italy (now King Victor Emmanuel) with Princess Helen of Montenegro. The editor in his introduction traces the friendly relations between Venice and Montenegro, relations which were strengthened by the deadly hatred of both States against the Turks. The documents begin at the time of Montenegro's heroic struggle, in spite of which Cettigne was taken by the Turks. The latter, however, failed to subdue the mountaineers and were forced to retire. Particular attention is directed to the letter from the Bishop of Cettigne dated Dec. 10, 1687, which records the defeat of the Pasha of Albania and his army. The work is illustrated with facsimiles of documents and early plans of Montenegro.

In addition to those already mentioned, there are a score of rare 'nozze' relating exclusively to the Medici family. These include documents and letters from the pen of G. G. Trissino, papal legate to Venice and Vienna in the sixteenth century, and a notable figure in Italian literature as the author of the tragedy 'Sofonisba.' There are also a number of poetical pieces of some rarity, by Fogazzaro, Zanella, and Cabianca.

The London Library collection, of which these form part, is probably the best in England, consisting of over 2500 'nozze.' The study of these Italian epithalamia has been singularly neglected, seldom receiving more than brief and contemptuous notice from English writers. Colagrosso even, though he set himself to trace the history of the 'raccolta' in general and its offshoot the 'nozze,' has not treated them on the broad lines which they demand. Attention has here been called to the material available, in the hope of arousing the interest of those best fitted to deal with a subject which is peculiarly Italian. It is this national character which has sustained life in the 'nozze' from the remote date of its origin to the present period of its decline, and which unites it to that splendid growth of culture whose roots lie deep in classic antiquity.

C. Hagberg Wright.

THE CONCEPTION OF ANOTHER LIFE

1. Jewish and Christian Apocalypses. The Schweich Lectures. By Professor F. C. Burkitt. Oxford University Press. 1914.
2. Die Hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen. By R. Reitzenstein. Teubner. 1910.
3. Apocrypha I, Reste des Petrusevangeliums, der Petrusapokalypse und des Kerugma Petri. By Erich Klostermann. Bonn. 1908.
4. Primitive Secret Societies. By Hutton Webster. New York. 1908.
5. Altersklassen und Männerbünde. By Heinrich Schurtz. Berlin. 1902.
6. Nekyia. By Albert Dieterich. Teubner. 1898.

ALL we gregarious beings are swept along in the great stream of obvious social life. We are caught in the wheels of an enormous engine, pushed and carried by the half-conscious drift of the herd. And no doubt, as a rule, while things go entirely well with us, this is all the life we need. Yet constantly, in a man's ordinary experience, there is an undercurrent of discontent or homesickness; a feeling that this is not our complete or ultimate life; that there is somewhere another life which is more our own and which matters more. The commonest view places it after death, but mystics and contemplatives have believed it to exist now in our own souls. In any case it is described as something peculiarly real and transcendently important. Indeed the language used about it, and about the rewards and punishments which it carries with it, is usually so strong as to excite suspicion in the plain man. The offer of such enormous interest seems calculated to compensate for some exceptionally large element of uncertainty.

The object of the present article is to suggest some thoughts about the history of this widespread conception of Another Life, and then to make some comments on its validity.

This conception, it will be seen at once, is not the same as the

immortality of the soul. Either might exist without the other. Suppose, in the words of the Fourth Book of Esdras, '*The 'Most High hath created not one world but two,*' it does not necessarily follow that one of them lasts for ever. Man might be mortal and yet have an inner life more important than his outward life. And again one might have an immortality which was shadowy and unimportant.

For example, in what we may call the classic tradition of Greek poetry there are conceptions of immortality which for our present purpose can be disregarded. In Homer as a rule there is some life beyond the grave, but it is a feebler life. The psychology is of course confused. At one time the man's soul still lives in his other home, but the man himself is dead on the earth, torn by dogs and birds. At another time the man himself is in Hades, but he is only part of himself. There is breath ; there is a phantom shape ; but something is lacking which the primitive psychologist finds it hard to describe. There are no *φρένες* in him—literally no midriff ; or again there is no life-blood. And the dead without life-blood are flitting shadows.

Even in a document like Aeschylus' 'Choephori,' where the whole plot turns on the awakening of the dead, it is a very dim awakening. Agamemnon lies motionless in his grave ; he can just, after due ritual, be stirred to hear the cry of his children and to drink their drink-offerings. He is stung to life for a moment by the memory of a great anger, and then sinks back into the old sleep.

These Homeric conceptions, when analysed, have been shown to correspond to two separate strata of funeral customs, burning and burial. The shadowy ghost, the thing of air, is that *θυμός* or Animus which has passed away in the smoke of the funeral pyre ; the more solid earth-folk, *χθόνιοι*, or *ἔνεροι*, to whom libations are poured through holes in the ground, are the dead lying in their graves. Both worlds, of course, are influenced by dreams and memories. The dead man is conceived as still performing his characteristic actions or bearing the death-wounds which we cannot forget. Hector appears *raptatus bigis ut quondam*.

Of course, this kind of life beyond the grave can be idealised. We find it set in an ancient garden beyond all seas, at the 'springs of night and openings of Heaven'; in some region

not shaken by wind or storm, far away, to be reached only by making the great leap over the Rock of Leucas and passing the ocean river to the Δῆμον Ὀνείρων, the old Land of Dreams.* But it is only a land of dreams; it is not a reality that reduces this present world to a dream. And it is this that we are looking for.

To find this kind of Other Life in Greek literature we must go to a different stream of tradition, a stream interrupted by gaps, known to us chiefly by allusions and not by positive statements, hard to trace to a definite authentic source, yet all the same clear and constant. In the Homeric Hymn to Demeter (l. 480) we hear of certain people who are for ever blessed, and others who are for ever deprived of their portion. If we ask who they are respectively, the answer is simple: the Initiated of Eleusis and the Uninitiated. The same conception occurs frequently in Pindar. In the Second Olympian, in practically all the θρῆνοι or Dirges—a natural place—we hear of the infinite consequences which a man's 'holiness' or 'unholiness' brings him in the Other Life. Indeed the body, in which our present life centres, is nothing permanent; it must die. There is something else which is greater, which lives on, which is indeed the only part of man that comes really from God. It is by our ordinary standards a thing infinitely frail, αἰῶνος εἴδωλον, 'the reflection of a 'breath'; it sleeps while the limbs are in action, but when the noisy, restless body is once hushed it sees, or perhaps reveals, things beyond mortal sight. And hereafter, in the world beyond death, there is long peace and joy for the Blessed Heroes, for the Innocent, for those who 'have endured even 'thrice'—let us observe the phrase—and kept their hands free from sin. And there are others suffering . . . what? Ah, Pindar is a writer of the high classic style; he will not soil his page with the description of torments. It is only 'toil that eyes dare not look upon.'

Again and again in Plato we find this same thought; in the 'Phaedo,' in the 'Phaedrus,' several times in the 'Republic.' It is expounded at some length in Book X. It is parodied in Aristophanes' 'Frogs,' parodied in detail after detail, with

* Odyssey vi. 43; iv. 563: Sophocles fr. 870; Odyssey xxiv. 11 ff.

a freedom of allusion which indicates it as a doctrine widely familiar. It must clearly have been so, apart from the literary evidence, because it was exhibited to all Greece at Delphi in the famous painting of Polygnotus, which portrayed the joys of Heaven and the pains of Hell almost in the style of the Campo Santo at Pisa. References to the same conception are scattered about freely in classical literature, in Euripides, in the Speech against Aristogeiton, in the fragments of Empedocles, in the gold tablets discovered in graves at Petelia and elsewhere,* in quite a number of funeral inscriptions. Most of the passages are collected in Professor Dieterich's book, 'Nekyia.' It is needless to examine the evidence in detail, but there is a highly significant point to be observed: wherever we meet this particular conception of an immensely important future life, involving rewards and punishments, which in modern language we could describe as Heaven and Hell, it is in every case connected with Mysteries and Initiations. Sometimes it is the Eleusinian Mysteries; often the Orphic or Pythagorean; sometimes again the allusions are simply to Dionysus or Osiris or the Satyrs, or to other initiations such as were abundant in the Greek world.

He who believes and is initiated shall be saved; he who is not initiated shall be cast out. That is the normal rule of all exclusive religions, a rule which tends to seem natural and right to those inside and obviously preposterous to those outside. We hear of a famous jibe of Diogenes the Cynic at the idea that one Pataikion, an initiated burglar, should go to everlasting bliss while the great Epaminondas is cast into torment.† Of course Timon is right; we all agree with him But we should realise that to the pious Orphic it probably did not seem conceivable that a man could really be initiated, and receive his initiation properly, and hold firmly all the true doctrine and perform the blessed rites, and still be a bad man. He might perhaps err or slip, fall into sin, in extreme cases even into a burglary—but his heart must after all be in the right place. Orpheus or Osiris or the Mother can purify him of his accidental errors. In any case he is

* These Orphic tablets are most conveniently accessible in the Appendix to Miss J. E. Harrison's 'Prolegomena to Greek Religion.'

† Plutarch, 'de audiendis poetis,' p. 21 E.

far preferable to those whited sepulchres who pass as good citizens, who commit no positive crimes perhaps, but have never had the inner filth cleansed from their souls, and never given their hearts to the true God. For all practical purposes the Amuêtos is Anosios, the Uninitiated is Unholy.

And what were the Mysteries? Twenty years ago, or even ten, the question would have raised a sigh of weariness. It had too often been asked fruitlessly, and sensible men had simply set it aside. Any scholar who wrote about the Mysteries was supposed to need a truss of hay on his horns. And now the question is solved and the answer known. It came partly through Mannhardt and Frazer and Spencer and Gillen. It is specially made clear by the writings of Webster and Schurtz, whose results again are well criticised in Van Gennep's 'Rites de Passage.' The Mysteries are simply Initiation Ceremonies, and initiation ceremonies are a normal feature of primitive society over the greater part of the globe. The age appointed for a boy's initiation varies, and sometimes there are many successive initiations; but as a normal type we may say that initiation is a ceremony emphasising the vital moment when a boy, *παῖς*, becomes a man, *ἀνήρ*. The novice puts away childish things and takes upon him manly things. His *ἀνδρεία*—his manhood—is put to the ordeal; he is instructed in the full knowledge of his elders and ancestors; he is admitted to the three great duties of a full man of the tribe—to slay the tribe's enemies, to beget the tribe's children, and last but not least to speak with full knowledge in the tribal council.

In studying these tribal initiations in detail any imaginative student will be struck by two sides of them. There is a grotesque and ugly side, proper to the low level of culture from which they spring; and a sublime side, proper to the permanent spirit of man struggling to find its way. The initiations are in essence an emphasis, an over-emphasis, of something that in itself is true and fine. To the boy it is the dedication of himself to his life's work. He wants to be a man, a warrior, a counsellor. For that he is ready to bear ordeals of privation, pain, and terror, to face the most terrific arcana of his religion—ready even to die. For in the more complete initiations the novices are regularly supposed to

be killed, to move for a time among the dead, to see gods and daemons and their own great ancestors, and afterwards, completely changed, with a new name, and a new personality, to be born again to this world.

We have seen that these conceptions of Another Life consisting of bliss and torment are, in ancient literature, always connected with the Mysteries. The writer wishes now to point out, or at least to suggest, that the mental pictures of Heaven and Hell which were current in ancient times and are still to a certain extent traditional among us, are based upon the actual ritual of the Mysteries. The scenery and arrangements, so to speak, of the other world are, in the first instance, projections of the initiation ceremonies.

The full mustering of the historical evidence on this point would need a large volume. But the point at issue can be illustrated by taking one good typical description of Heaven and Hell and showing how many of its details correspond with what we know of modern and ancient initiation rites. For instance, there is an early Christian document, which is also, as Dieterich has proved, quite in the pagan tradition, the so-called 'Apocalypse of Peter.' It was found on a papyrus at Achmîn and belongs to the second century. The following passages may be quoted :

'The Lord said : Let us go away to the Mountain.'

This is normal in initiations. The initiands are taken away from human society, often to a mountain, sometimes to a forest. Compare the Cretan and Dionysiac Oreibasiai or Mountain-Rites.

'We begged him to show us one of our brethren, the righteous who have departed out of the world, that we might see what they are like in form and so bring comfort to men who hear us.'

This is the normal aim or end of initiation ceremonies : cf. the accounts given in Schurtz, the Hermetic documents, and especially the account given by Appuleius, Book XI, of his own initiation.

'Two men appeared to whom we were not able to raise our eyes. Radiance came from their faces like the light of the sun, and their raiment was shining, such as the eye of man has never seen.'

In the Eleusinia we have definite statements that the initiands were kept in darkness, and then dazzled and half-blinded by the appearance of divine beings in a blaze of light. A similar use of darkness followed by light is attested for savage mysteries. But let us note the next point.

'The bodies of these two beings were whiter than any snow and redder than any rose. I simply cannot express their beauty. Their hair was curly and bright coloured. It glowed over their faces and shoulders, like one crown woven of spikenard and flowers of all hues, or like a rainbow in the air.'

Let us realise this description. Bodies snow-white and brilliant red, and hair all the colours of the rainbow standing out like a halo. A curiously exact counterpart to these blessed beings is to be found in the divine ministers, or προπολοι, who accompanied the God in initiations and represented the blessed ancestors. They were painted all over with white chalk and vermilion, while their hair was made to stick out in a halo, and was interwoven with ribbons and dyed grasses and brilliant objects of every colour. The evidence for the white and red is clear both for ancient and modern times. The hair is to be seen in any good collection of Papuan, Australian, or Polynesian photographs.

It is explained to Peter that these are the Righteous Departed; he asks where they live, and is shown 'a great place outside 'this world, shining with light, the soil of it blooming with 'immortal blossoms, and full of perfumes and sweet-smelling 'flowers . . . The fragrance was so great that it was borne 'across even to this world.'

This heaven seems like the region of light in which the divine beings appeared at the Eleusinia and in Appuleius's initiation. We may notice also the emphasis laid upon the sweet smells. Novices in initiations regularly pass through evil regions of darkness and foul smells and emerge into a heaven of light and fragrance. For the hierophant or stage-manager, if we may use such a word, the perfumes formed a comparatively easy and safe side of the revelation; easier certainly than the light and darkness.

And how were these blessed beings employed? The pseudo-Peter does not dwell on the point so long as some other Apocalyptists, but he speaks no less clearly. Just like the ministers of Dionysus or Isis or Mithras, or the Australian Durramulun,

they were with one voice singing hymns to the glory of their god. The point, though so familiar, is instructive. This eternal hymn-singing has often been the subject of jokes: it strikes the outsider as odd and monotonous, but if we refer it to the ceremony from which it arose it is natural enough. Our savage stage-manager, who has to produce a brief and dazzling vision of the Blessed surrounding the Mystery God, naturally accompanies his blaze of light and perfume with a blaze of song. The awkwardness, if it is one, only arises when the song is made everlasting, when the outburst of one dazzling moment is transformed into a normal employment for the whole of life.

After this the pseudo-Peter passes to the description of hell. The first note struck is that of filth, the second darkness; then come tormenting angels in dark raiment. Especially prominent is the lake of mud, of mud and fire, of indescribable filth and blood and putrefaction, which recurs in slightly different forms again and again. The wicked are plunged in it, to varying depths, head first or otherwise.

The mire and filth of Hades are emphasised by Plato and Aristophanes and others, and the source of the conception is clear. Mud and filth were used in ancient initiation ordeals and purifications; and 'immersion in dust and filth' is given by Webster as one of the commonest ordeals in savage initiation ceremonies. There is no need to prove this point in detail. But it is worth remembering that a pious savage's feeling about dirt is probably very different from ours. To us dirt is no doubt a highly disagreeable thing, but it is purely temporary and superficial, to be removed by a wash or a rinse. To the savage any dirt really worthy of the name is a thing of religious horror, polluting to the soul and unpurgeable. Mr. Edwyn Bevan has published an interesting story of the unspeakable horror produced in the mind of a pious Brahman by the English habit of using a toothbrush; to put every day into one's mouth—actually one's mouth!—the bone of a dog covered with the bristles of a pig—his imagination reeled at the wanton loathsomeness.

So much for the mire. It is naturally in a pit or depression of some kind. In many initiations the novices have to go down into a pit or chasm. In Crete and elsewhere they descended into a cave; in the rites of Trophonius into an artificial chasm, where they presently lost consciousness.

Some of Peter's sufferers were in a pit full of snakes. There were snakes in the pit of Trophonius, and snakes were largely used in the Bacchic rites. They naturally bit the wicked and caressed the initiated. The evidence on this point is abundant for ancient times, and we may compare the well-known snake dances of the Hopi and other Indians.

Other sufferers are scourged by daemons. Scourging is normal in ancient hells and ancient initiation ceremonies; we think of the celebrated ordeal at the altar of Artemis Orthia. The scourging in Australasian and African rites is apt to be performed by disguised daemons or spirits of the dead.

Others of Peter's victims scourge one another. One remembers the battles of youths which form a well-known ritual in ancient times, but it is not easy to find this particular variety of ordeal in an actual ancient initiation ceremony. The present writer, however, has heard of a case where two Navajos, who wished to expiate their sins by scourging, found it more satisfactory to hit one another than for each to hit himself.

Others are tormented in various ways with fire and firebrands. Ordeals of fire are, of course, common. In Australasian initiations great use is made of burning sticks to terrify or torment the novices. The Erinyes habitually carried firebrands. Dionysus in one of his mystic epiphanies came as fire, and so did divers other gods. This fire, as we might expect, followed the example of the snakes: it burnt the wicked and spared the initiated, as Euripides has described in the 'Bacchae.'

Other offenders are thrown over precipices, picked up at the bottom and thrown over again, and so on for ever. This form of torment is a little puzzling. To make a guilty man leap over a rock into the sea was a fairly common ritual in Greece for expiating a crime or purifying a community. Normally the leaper had his chance of swimming, and one does not hear of his being thrown over again. Precipitation was also a regular form of ritual execution; we think at once of the Barathron and the Tarpeian Rock, and especially of the Rock of Leucas, which became a mystical synonym for death. It is beyond that rock that Homer's world of the dead begins. And it may be that this form of torment was taken not from

an initiation rite, but simply from a form of legal punishment. In initiations you could not, unless in very exceptional circumstances, afford to throw your novices over a real precipice. Yet a question arises in one's mind whether the tragic hoax played on Gloucester in 'King Lear' has perhaps some ritual tradition behind it. Was it possibly an ordeal in some initiations to set the novice, blindfold or in the dark, on the top of some harmless little bank, tell him that he was on the edge of an awful precipice and order him to throw himself over? From all one reads of the dazed and half-insane condition in which the novices emerge from their ordeals, it would probably be easier to play this trick on them than it was on Gloucester.

The Apocalypse of Peter is fragmentary, and perhaps that is the reason why it lacks many of the regular characteristics of apocalyptic hells and heavens. There is no tremendous Voice such as we find in other apocalypses, in Bacchic initiations and all the mysteries, ancient and modern, in which a part is played by the bull-roarer.* There is no mention of that Cup of Cold Water which alleviates the anguish of parching souls in many Orphic and Osirian prayers, or that 'light place with a fountain of water in the midst of it' which figures, for instance, in the Book of Enoch (cap. xxii). Neither is there any torment by poison. Generally there are furies or similar beings holding cups of torment or of maddening philtres, or at least of Lethe. Such drugs are a regular feature of savage initiations. 'They give them 'pellitory bark and several intoxicating plants,' says Lawson of the Tuscarora Indians,† 'which make them go raving 'mad as ever were any people in the world; and you 'may hear them make the most dismal and hellish cries and 'howlings that ever human creature expressed.'

It is hardly necessary to press the detailed evidence further. A student who compares the ancient conceptions of Hell and Heaven, at any rate as expressed in all the Graeco-Christian tradition—the Jewish apocalypses are greatly influenced by other historical considerations—can hardly fail to see that

* See 'Themis,' by J. E. Harrison, pp. 61–66.

† History of Carolina, pp. 380–382, quoted by Webster, p. 33; cf. ibid. p. 57, on the drinking of *wysoccan* = λήθη.

they are intimately modelled on the Initiation Ritual—the Ordeal, the Vision, and the Re-birth. That is to say, Heaven is not primarily modelled on the palace, nor Hell on the torture chamber. In later times this statement would need qualification. As the early Christians were persecuted they naturally began to hate their persecutors, and sometimes re-shaped their conceptions of the future so as to satisfy that hatred. Some hells did become, in all probability, mainly projections of the torture chamber, mere orgies of unsatisfied passion. There is much of this in the pseudo-Peter. There grew to be more passion in both the hells and the heavens, a passion of frantic hatred against the persecutor, a passion of pity and revenge for the oppressed innocent. But, apart from such disturbing elements, the normal conception of Another Life after death has in pagan and Christian tradition been modelled on the experience of the novice or devotee in the initiation ceremony.

Let us now think again of these initiations as they presented themselves to the mind of a believer. Let us forget the chalk and vermilion, the bull-roarers and the patent frauds, the cruelties and absurdities. Let us take for guidance the dozen or so expressions of enthusiastic faith and gratitude towards the Mysteries that have come down to us from Greek times, and the fairly abundant evidence from Australia and North America which shows that the same enthusiasm and devotion are still evoked in our own day. What does the novice feel? He is faced with the great moment of his life, the ordeal which is to decide whether or no he is to become that greatest of things, a Man. (We omit for simplicity's sake all reference to female initiations, which were on the whole less prominent.) There is almost no bait of pleasure held out to the boy—nothing but service and duty and self-respect. Everything that he has learned to admire is summed up in the achievement of manhood. A man must have perfect courage, true knowledge, and—in the sense in which he understands it—complete purity. All our modern witnesses express amazement at the endurance with which the Red Indian boys, without uttering a cry or moving a muscle, submit to be flogged almost to death, burned, mutilated, swung on hooks till the flesh breaks, and the like; and not only Red Indians, who are always brave, but

Polynesians and Negroes and Australians. These physical ordeals are enough to stagger us; but one must suspect that ordeals of hunger and thirst, of the madness produced by strange drugs, of the ineffable terrors of the supernatural which they are compelled to face, are probably even a greater strain on the young men's constancy.

And we can see the meaning of it. It too is over-emphasis. The important thing in life for each of these boys is to become a man and all that a man should be. Now, as a matter of fact, becoming a man is a gradual process; in the full sense of the words it is a process which is being achieved, or not achieved, during the whole of life. This length, slowness, uncertainty, is just what puzzles and exasperates the natural human being in us. We want to get it over. 'Give it us now,' we cry: 'pile on all the ordeals, all the terrors and temptations, in one 'mass, and let us face them now, now: and either be men once 'for all, or else be consumed with fire or left rotting in the 'pit.' The experience of initiation thus acquires an enormous, a practically eternal, significance.

In another way also this significance is deepened. All initiation ceremonies seem, if they last on, to pass through two stages. First, they are universally practised through the whole of a homogeneous tribe; next, after migrations, invasions, mixtures of races and the like, they become the mark and property of a special society, a Church, as it were—usually more or less secret.

Initiations are only for the faithful; the higher initiation is only for those who have passed through the lower. We hear of three grades: we hear of seven. Now, let us think of an early Christian, or, better perhaps, of a faithful adherent of any of the ancient Mystery Religions. They all lived in a wicked or hostile world. 'Zion hath been taken from us: 'we have nothing now save the Mighty One and His Law.' The Jews themselves were rather averse from mysteries; but these words of Baruch express the feeling of many ruined and bewildered nations.* Greek or Egyptian or Syrian or Anatolian, the mystery devotee was living in a great callous world of foreign soldiers and traders and governors and *publicani*,

* Apocalypse of Baruch, 85, 3: quoted by Professor Burkitt in his fine treatise.

a world in which he seemed to be born an exile and hardly understood the language in which he was plundered or governed. Would he not feel that his true life, the life that mattered and enabled him to feel that he truly lived, was that which he passed among his fellow-believers? Out in the market-place he could not speak of the things for which he cared most. Neighbours might be civil or uncivil, magistrates and soldiers honest or dishonest; they could only touch the outside of him. At night, in his own θίασος, he could meet those who felt with him and had the same needs as he. He spoke their language. He was rapt with them into the same ecstasies. He could read in their eyes a history like his own. They had laboured under the same burden of sin, had conceived the same hope and attained the same deliverance. Here and there, doubtless, would be one who had achieved the human soul's ultimate adventure and been for some single infinite instant united to the living God. This, it is easy to see, would be to such a man the true life; and this is the life that would be projected by his imagination into eternity: an eternity in which every experience would be intensified; an eternity in which these tyrannous outsiders, these Roman magistrates and hard men of the world and committers of impurity, would be put to the ordeals and fail. How they would fail! Miserably, inevitably; from their bestial ignorance, their manifold defilements, their lack of any true Helper and Saviour, as well as their obvious deficiency in all finer qualities. Doubtless they would get through in time: after a thousand years, perhaps, or ten thousand or thirty thousand—at least all except the really bad ones. Hell proper is generally reserved, as Peter's Apocalypse vividly shows us, for those who have committed sins against the Church itself—apostates, betrayers, persecutors, and hostile witnesses.

Thus the initiated have a true life of their own in this world, which is further strengthened by being projected into an imagined eternity.

Suppose now a man of more critical temper, a Jew, for instance, who is content to wrap himself in the Law, or—more instructive for our purpose—a Greek philosopher: one who does not believe the fables of the underworld nor yet the half-mad doctrines of the mystery-mongers. He does not yield himself up to 'projections.' He is severely anxious to

keep to the seen and proven fact. Yet he will not go without his Other Life. Where is he to find it ?

Stoic and Epicurean, the two poles of Greek philosophy, agree. The true life of man, the life that matters, is within. It is the life of the soul. The outer worldly life is real enough—the philosopher does not pretend that it is a mere dream or Maya—but it is of no consequence. The Stoic doctrine is quite clear on this point. Life is like a play acted or a game played with counters. All that matters is that the play should be acted well, the game played as it should be played. God, the eternal dramatist, has cast you for some part, and hands you the *rôle* to play. It may be that you are cast for a triumphant king, it may be for a slave who dies of torture. What does that matter to the good actor ? He can play either part ; his only business is to accept the *rôle* given him and perform it well. Similarly, life is a game of counters ; your business is to play it the right way. He who set the board may have given you many counters, He may have given you few. He may have arranged that at a particular point in the game most of your men shall be swept accidentally off the board. You will lose the game ; but why should you mind that ? It is your play that matters, not the score you happen to make. He is not a fool, to judge you by your mere success. Success or failure is a thing He can determine without stirring a hand. It hardly interests Him. What interests Him is the one thing which He cannot determine, the action of your free will.

It is quite simple. Act one way and you are a good thing ; another, and you are a bad thing ; and to be good or bad is heaven or hell. In this region of the free will lies the life that is your own, your true heaven, quite other than the obvious life, independent of it, untouched by it. For even Epicurus himself has confessed that the Good Man will be happy on the rack. Even the average unregenerate man confesses it in his heart. Give him the choice in his calm moments, while his nerves are still firm, to be either the martyr or the tyrant who tortures him ; he will choose the martyr.

Fascinating, triumphant, almost irresistible, this great Stoic gospel seems at first sight to have rejected all mythology,

all bribes and threats and dreams, and to have opened up a vision of the meaning of life as true as it is noble. But it is not so. This imaginary blessedness of the Wise Man, blessedness impervious to the shocks of fortune, to the pain of oneself or others, to the praise or blame, the love or hate, of all one's associates and fellow-creatures, is almost as deep a dream, almost as violent an over-emphasis, as the Elysium or Tartarus of the vulgar. The Stoics could see that the furies with their burning torches were only metaphors to denote a tormented mind. They tried hard to face the facts of life, to invent no fancied eternal recompense for the good or punishment for the evil, but to leave virtue strictly its own reward. They made the attempt with wonderful self-restraint, but the effort was too great for them. They cared so intensely about the matters at issue that they could not help over-emphasising what they considered most important. And the passion of their over-emphasis created for itself almost a new mythology.

But apart from that, apart from the mere element of exaggeration in the Stoic conception of this inward untroubled life which belongs for ever to the righteous and the innocent, we may raise the question whether it was in its main direction a good ideal. Is it a good thing that we should accustom ourselves to feel, when we are cast down or disgusted by ordinary realities, that there is in our possession Another Life, more or less independent of the great stream, which matters infinitely more?

A strong case can be made against it, especially in these days when social duties are so much more valued than private virtues. Man is born a member of some society; his whole being is a network of intimate relations, of attractions and repulsions, helpings and hinderings, from which it is neither possible nor desirable that he should cut himself free. His relations to his fellow-men form, in normal circumstances, far the greater part of his happiness or unhappiness, even of his self-respect or his despair. For the most personal of all things, a man's own conscience, is mostly formed for him by other people. Any one who tries first fully to realise the biological fact that man is a gregarious animal, and then, by an effort of introspection, to realise the infinitely complex stream of aims and impulses and affections on which

he moves, must, it would seem, answer the Stoic claim with a definite rejection: Here or nowhere is man's true life; not in any imagined heaven, not in the rituals or dreams of any exclusive society; not even in the supposed calm of that treacherous fortress, a man's own soul.

And yet, on the other side, the voices of nearly all the saints and sages call to us in warning that this present obvious life cannot be all in all. For one thing the judgments of the herd are almost always wrong in value. If they do not often call bad things directly good and good bad, they constantly think cheap things precious and fine things unimportant. Everyone who cares at all for truth needs some court of appeal from the mere judgment of the world. The appeal will take various shapes and directions; but in the last analysis, when stripped of all its disguises, it will generally be an appeal exactly like that of the Stoics or of the seventeenth-century Quakers, from the world to oneself, from the now and here outwardly prevailing judgment to the judgment of one's inmost mind. One need not say that it is only that, much less that it is consciously that. In practice, for one thing, a man is hardly ever quite alone. He has his friends, his fellow-workers, his church. They, in so far as they really support him, help to build up that Other Life whose canons are greater than the canons of the world. And even when a man is quite alone, he generally feels himself to be appealing to some unknown friend, to the judgment of posterity, or to a righteous God. He projects another society to counterbalance the society which he has rejected; for a gregarious animal cannot be alone in heaven. But always he himself is the centre and pivot of this higher society of his own creating. It never really gives its verdict against him. If it did, it would have gone over to the enemy and would cease to be heaven. Its function is to fortify the man's own soul and enable him to defy his environment. The Stoic was so far right. There is another tribunal; and it is, ultimately, the tribunal of a man's own soul.

And not only a tribunal but also a refuge. The Stoic saw that too. Man must retire to that same inner region when he is strained and buffeted by the outer life, and needs peace or strengthening. For experience seems to show that those who have loved their kind most effectively have needed

some refuge in which to be free from them. In order to help men you must be able to defy them. In order to give them the best you can, you must needs have within you something better, or at least more intimate, which you cannot give them. For how can you help and understand a man unless you are a separate and different person from him, standing on your own feet? And this is true not only of the selected Wise Man, described by Plato in words which at every turn are borrowed from the Mysteries, who deliberately descends into the cave to help his weaker brethren. It is true, in some degree, of every human being. We are, after all, individuals as well as members of a community. We are all, when a certain limit is passed, strangers one to another. There is a region in each of us where no other can penetrate; and every man is alone in his highest thoughts as every man is alone when he dies.

We are accustomed to treat this fact as something hard or piteous, a kind of horror in the background of life. Yet perhaps such a judgment is wrong. It is not a horror. It is only a necessary condition of social living, that we are individuals as well as members of a social whole. And it seems to be this nucleus of fact which lies at the root of most of the wide-spreading dreams that we have been dealing with. It is this truth, that the whole of our life cannot be contained by any human society but some part of the soul must be always alone—this truth so austere, so frail, a thing which we can so easily forget and which must never be forgotten—that has caused so much passionate dreaming and equally passionate denial. It has been over-emphasised in divers ways in different ages of history; set up as an ideal in contemplative societies; more enthusiastically glorified and concentrated in world-wide mysteries and initiations; projected beyond the bounds of the physical world in dreams of some ultimate perfect acceptance or utter rejection, some everlasting home or eternal exile. The truth itself, if properly understood, ought of course to be sufficient motive for good action; but man is slow, and likes his motives for good over-emphasised and made tremendous before he will stir.

There is, then, Another Tribunal to which we can appeal from the world's judgment; there is another life in which

we can find some refuge. And doubtless, if we must have one of the tribunals against us, it is better that it should be the loud and violent outside tribunal with all its harsh sanctions, not the intimate and silent one which exercises no sanctions but permits of no escape. But the advocates of this Other Life must not promise too much. They must not speak to us of regions of light and truth made perfect, nor of fields unshaken by snow and tempest where joy grows like a tree. Our tribunal is not perfect; it only tries to see and to do right. Our refuge promises no eternal bliss. It gives only a rallying point, a spell of peace in which to breathe and to think, a sense not exactly of happiness, but of that patience and courage which form at least a good working substitute for happiness. For real full-blooded happiness, as for any satisfaction of our complete natures, we are thrown for good and evil on the realities of the outer social life and the turbid mercies of our fellow-men.

GILBERT MURRAY.

SUBMARINES AND AIRCRAFT

1. **Aircraft in War.** By J. M. Spaight. Macmillan. 1914.
2. **War and the Empire.** By Col. Hubert Foster, R.E. Williams and Norgate. 1914.
3. **Naval Annual.** Edited by Viscount Hythe. William Clowes and Son. 1914.

THE submarine is generally considered to be a modern invention; but the idea of the submarine is about as modern as the phalanx or the elephants of Pyrrhus, King of Epirus. It is inadvisable to labour history too much, but we know that Alexander the Great experimented with a diving-bell. This interesting invention is remote from submarines as we understand them to-day, but according to Aristotle diving-bells were effectively used by Alexander during the siege of Tyre in B.C. 332.

After a long gap we find that in 1620 Cornelius van Drebel, Court physician to our King James I., made a submarine capable of travelling under water and persuaded his royal master to take a trip down the Thames. Van Drebel may be considered the father of the modern submarine. His boats were built of wood and covered all over with greased leather to render them water-tight. Oarsmen supplied his motive power—the oars working through water-tight row-locks. He is said to have kept under water for 'several hours.' This probably is an exaggeration; but without question he did keep well under water for considerable periods, and he must certainly have arrived at a high efficiency before he could have induced King James I. to trust his life to him.

The first recorded attempt to use the submarine as a war machine was in 1773, during the War of American Independence. The boat in question was the invention of one David Bushnell, and was a turtle-shaped, one-man affair, propelled by a pair of oars on a system similar to that of Drebel. Submersion was obtained by the admission of water, which could be pumped out as required—precisely the same idea as the

modern 'ballast tank.' There was further a leaden keel which could be dropped on emergency—a feature of all the earlier French submarines of our own era. For military purposes Bushnell carried a bomb filled with a charge of gunpowder. The idea was to affix the bomb from under water to the hull of some British ship, and to allow it to explode by time fuse. Sergeant Ezra Lee was trained to manipulate the boat, and in 1776 he made an attack on the British warship 'Eagle' of sixty-four guns. But the 'Eagle' proved to be copper-bottomed, and it was impossible to fix the torpedo, which eventually got away down stream and exploded.

The next landmark was the boat of the famous Fulton, built in 1801. This was placed at the disposal of the French Government, and with it a hulk was actually blown up. Fulton's boat was more strictly analogous to a floating mine than to the modern conception of a submarine, and the French Government refused to make use of the invention on the grounds of 'humanity'—a curious and interesting commentary on recent German procedure.

In the Crimean War there were various projects for submarines, and some experimental boats were produced, but it was not until the American Civil War that the submarine came into being as an 'arm.' These boats were known under the generic name of 'Davids.' Submarines in the sense that we understand them they were not, as they were never absolutely submerged, there being a couple of manholes to communicate with the surface. They were armed with spar torpedoes, with which they charged the enemy. On the few occasions on which they succeeded in scoring a hit they perished as a result of their endeavours.

In 1886 the Greek Government purchased a Nordenfelt submarine which carried a torpedo tube and also a gun. About the same time the Turkish navy also acquired a couple of these boats, and both France and Russia began to make serious studies in the direction of war submarines. But it was not until the commencing years of the present century that the submarine achieved any importance or attracted much attention.

The man who did most to further submarine work in modern times was the late American inventor Holland, who in New York harbour performed a series of what were then 'startling

'evolutions' in a one-man craft of his own design. From this boat the modern submarine was evolved. But for some time after it had been proved to possess effective qualities, if rightly handled, the submarine was regarded with disfavour by most navies; and the situation was not changed until the British Admiralty announced that it had secretly acquired five submarines which were just about to be put into commission. Even then the German Admiralty refused to believe that the submarine had any valuable potentialities, and much good ink was wasted in official reports of its uselessness for the German navy. To this conservatism we owe the fortunate fact that the Germans are so numerically inferior to us in these craft to-day.

To go into technical details of the improvements of the last few years would be tedious. It may be said that developments have mainly been along the lines of increased size. There is a good deal of secrecy observed about submarines in every navy, but there is absolutely nothing secret about the general principles. Such secrecy as is rigidly enforced is concerned with quite minor details. As an analogy to submarines we may think of racing motor-cars, all embodying the same general principle, but endeavouring to hide the exact design of the carburetter. We can quite safely assume that, so far as relative efficiency is concerned, British, French, German, and Austrian submarines are much of a muchness. In addition, all the Powers have for some time had at their disposal submarines of the Laurenti type constructed by the Italian Fiat–San Giorgio Company, which are alleged to represent the last word in submarine design. But the same claim has been made for the Holland, Krupp, Labœuf, Lake, and various other types. Whatever may be alleged, we may take it that one submarine of any date is about equal in efficiency to any other submarine of the same date. The difference between the very best and the very worst of them all is a trivial and tiny fleabite compared to the human element concerned in the control of the delicate mechanism which has been created.

It is in this human element that we come to the crux of the matter. So far as big ships are concerned we have done no better than the Germans in the matter of adjusting the human element to modern conditions. The general attitude

between officers and men in the big ships of either navy has mainly been along the old lines of 'the devils believe and 'tremble.' Where big ships are concerned this may or may not be desirable. All discipline is merely a means to an end, and in every big ship lost in this war the discipline has proved admirable. The French, the Japanese, and the Russians (in their reorganised navy) have, however, evolved a somewhat different and what is to them a Twentieth Century ideal—a sort of general 'comradeship'—or shall we describe it as an adaptation of the Boy Scout ideal as advanced in dreams by Baden-Powell? We have no data as yet as to whether this 'modern discipline,' desirable though it looks on paper, will stand the test of modern war so well as the old style has done.

In the Russian navy an officer goes forward every morning and calls out to the crew 'Good morning, my children. The 'captain and officers hope that we shall have a pleasant day 'together working for our beloved country'—or words to that effect. The spokesman of the crew replies in kind. This, of course, is utterly different from the 'old navy' spirit, of which the essential feature is the creation of a vast gulf between officers and men—something only to be paralleled by the difference between the white man and the black which exists in the southern States of America, where expediency dictated it as the best policy.

In matters of such supreme importance as discipline there is no room for admirable sentiment. The new ideal must prove itself before we accept it. There is no place for sentiment in naval warfare—there is only expediency. That is why both the British and German navies cling to the old methods, of which the integral idea is *forcing* men to fight at all costs. We had the extreme example of this in the Heligoland affair, where German officers were seen shooting their own men in the water. They had driven the men to stick to their guns; they had probably shot every man who shrank from facing certain death; even when drowning in the water they continued to try to force their men to go on fighting. Very likely they never realised that they were drowning; they were driving men on to fight, and that was all that they could envisage.

Such methods of securing naval efficiency may be good, bad, or indifferent in the case of big ships. That is a point which

we need not here discuss. The point here to be emphasised is that such methods are absolutely impossible in the submarine service. There is no room in a submarine for 'quarter-deck' and 'lower deck,' with a great gulf fixed between. All live 'hugger-mugger' together in peace as in war, and life is primitive and full of hardships. The conditions of life are admirably illustrated by the case of a certain submarine officer of the British navy, who is spoken of as 'a most extraordinary 'chap—all right otherwise—but he will insist on a tablecloth 'under his grub when at sea.'

In a submarine, in life or death, officers and men are all together. In a big ship it is possible to say 'Some of both 'will be scuppered and some of both get through.' In a submarine, except in very rare cases, there are no wounded. All die or else all live.

This is sufficient to indicate that in the submarine service all the old contrasts between officers and men have to go by the board. There is no alternative, and success depends upon which of the rival navies can best accommodate itself to the new conditions, and yet maintain a fighting discipline. The exact requirements for efficiency under these novel conditions are difficult to put into words. They are perhaps best expressed in the favourite remark of submarine bluejackets about their commanding officers. It runs as follows:—'*On duty he's a blanky officer; off duty he's a blanky good 'shipmate.*'

This puts the matter in a nutshell. It is the only way in which certain death in case of failure can be faced by officers and men who, on account of the nature of their service, should be without home ties, but who, on account of the extra pay they receive, are invariably married or about to be married.

Submarine efficiency, therefore, depends mainly upon how far this state of feeling can be assimilated without the men taking advantage of their officers—that is to say, on the officer being able to maintain his authority on purely personal grounds in which neither age, birth, nor rank has any status whatever. In the British submarine service the requisite conditions obtain almost invariably. The normal temperament of the British gentleman leads him that way. The normal tempera-

ment of the German gentleman is somewhat otherwise—and herein lies the secret of the general failure of German submarine attacks against us.

We have, it is true, lost some ships by submarine attack. But in each and every one of these cases the loss has been accomplished by surface aid—a trawler or yacht under a neutral flag. Though opportunities have been many, every German submarine attack in the real sense of the word has been a failure. We, on the other hand, have been very nearly devoid of opportunity, yet we have managed to score three purely submarine successes. The submarine cannot be assessed as a machine. It is worth everything or nothing according to the men inside it.

The first difficulty is to find the enemy. Where submarines are blockading or scouting outside an enemy harbour, or attacking ships which have previously been definitely located, the enemy may be assumed to have been found. Success or failure then depends upon the aiming of the torpedoes and upon the estimation of the speed and course of the enemy. Both matters are much more difficult in a submarine than in a destroyer.

In the battle of Heligoland, Admiral Beatty, when needed to assist our light vessels, did not hesitate to run the gauntlet of a number of German submarines with his battle cruisers, calculating that, by maintaining a very high speed, he would secure immunity for his squadron. It was a bold decision based entirely on theory, and only to be paralleled by Nelson's action at the battle of Cape St. Vincent. But whereas Nelson faced a known danger, Beatty had to face a danger of unknown dimensions. Whether his decision was due to sheer daring, or to a correct estimation of the enemy's submarine personnel, remains to be proved. It is certainly conceivable that the democratic or 'Boy Scout' factor, which is characteristic of the British submarine service, might have entirely altered the situation had the positions been reversed. Generally speaking, Germany's heel of Achilles in the submarine part of this war will prove to be the inability of her submarine officers to conform to the new and ultra-democratic conditions which are the first essential for successful submarine warfare. For one success they have had at least nine failures, and the value

of the submarine as an arm has been unduly depreciated accordingly.

So far as defence against submarines is concerned, there is for the big ship no defence whatever against a properly conducted attack except high speed. The submarine is slow and purblind. Consequently, when speed comes into play, she is somewhat in the position of an amateur on his first attempt to shoot snipe. The amateur's gun will kill the snipe right enough *if he hits*; but his chances of hitting are very small, even though he has no defence to consider. Passive defence against submarines is non-existent. Against ordinary torpedo craft the torpedo net is probably still effective, for they are rarely in a position to effect direct impact when they attack. But the torpedo net which can keep out a direct hit from a modern torpedo fired from a submarine has yet to be designed.

The submarine is able to fire direct because she is invisible. From a big ship it is almost impossible to see a periscope until the white line of a discharged torpedo gives an indication of where to look. Consequently the submarine is able to select her exact position, and defensive nets, since they very heavily reduce speed, are more of a hindrance than a help. A big ship tracked down by an invisible submarine is as absolutely helpless as a stalked deer.

Theoretically, aircraft encircling a big ship should be able to detect and destroy any submarine danger, but in practice they have failed to do so. This may be put down to lack of experience, and ultimately aircraft may become the chief instruments of defence against submarines. For the time being we have to fall back on destroyers, and the destroyer is at present no bad substitute for the ideal aeroplane. It is able to cruise round the big ship. It is able to detect periscopes, and, having detected them, to ram and destroy or else drag mines over the submarine. Given enough destroyers, the submarine ceases to be a material danger to the big ship—at any rate at present. In the future, conditions will alter; but all the indications are that the submarine and the big ship will coalesce. The big ship will become a monstrous submarine Dreadnought. There never has been and there never will be a time when the little can, except occasionally, defeat

the big. Success in naval warfare has ever been a matter of 'keeping the sea,' and keeping the sea has ever been a matter of size.

We are yet in a state of uncertainty as to whether aircraft are the complement of the submarine or the antidote. Nothing has been proved either way, but it is safe to say that pre-war expectations as to the value of aircraft at sea have not yet been fulfilled. On land both aeroplanes and dirigibles have done a certain amount of damage, but much less than the Germans, at any rate, anticipated before the war. For scouting work, on the other hand, aircraft have proved themselves invaluable, and have, indeed, exceeded anticipations; for it was generally supposed that things possible in peace manœuvres would not prove to be practicable in actual war under fire.

So far as sea work is concerned, we may attribute the relative failure of aircraft to the fact that even the North Sea is a big space, and the chances of aircraft and submarines coinciding at any particular spot are very small indeed. In the first affair off the Bight of Heligoland, the Germans are said to have received information of our advent from a seaplane, but the evidence is not conclusive. For one thing there was considerable fog; for another, the German light cruisers assuredly blundered into our battle cruiser squadron, which aerial information of value would have enabled them to avoid. Heligoland, be it remembered, is an aerial station. The German aircraft do not seem to have detected our submarines, or, if they did, were as powerless to deal with our boats as we appear to have been to deal with theirs.

As regards bomb-dropping, we have the exploits of our airmen at Düsseldorf, Friedrichshafen, and Cuxhaven; the Germans are able to place to their credit (or discredit) damage done to a certain number of buildings, including Notre Dame, and the killing of a good many civilians, including old men, women, and children. Scientific bomb-dropping machines exist, and there is (except for war conditions) much less blind chance about bomb-dropping than the public supposes.

Let us first take the case of aeroplanes. These, being small craft, can only carry small and relatively feeble bombs. Given

the most effective mechanism for adjusting the aim to the speed, there remains the factor of the wind blowing at different speeds at different altitudes. It is impossible to allow for this windage, and that is the main reason why aeroplane bomb-dropping from any considerable height has been of the nature of what on land would be called ' wild-shooting.' The aviator is in the position of one who has to shoot with ammunition too small for his bore. To secure accuracy it is necessary to descend very considerably, as was done at Düsseldorf.

Here, however, the aeroplane becomes more affected by the enemy's fire. Not only is the risk of being hit greatly increased, but the misses are nearer the target and the aerial concussions from bursting shells make the aeroplane a very unstable platform, so that bombs are likely to be deviated accordingly. An important psychological consideration also arises. ' If I delay any longer I shall be killed before I have dropped anything ' says the aviator to himself, and this consideration is very liable to lead to premature bomb-dropping. For all these reasons it is clear that accurate bomb-dropping from aeroplanes must always have a considerable element of chance about it, but not blind chance.

Bomb-dropping from dirigibles is a simpler matter—in theory at any rate—because the airship, being lighter than air, can hover over the object aimed at and take her time. Also her bombs, being far heavier, suffer less chance of deflection by air currents. On the other hand, a dirigible offers a very considerable target to gunfire and must maintain a considerable height if the certainty of being hit is to be avoided. Furthermore, the probability of being hit is always so great that work must be done in twilight. So far as one can gather, all attempts to use dirigibles in broad daylight have resulted in the elimination of the dirigible. The combination of great height and indifferent light makes the object aimed at very difficult to detect—hence the poor results which the Germans have secured from their Zeppelins.

It is early days yet to speak with certainty, but the indications are that the airship as a weapon of war is an overrated machine. The means of destroying her are numerous and likely to increase ; whereas the chances of effective improvement in accuracy of bomb-dropping seem to be very small.

A missile from a vertical direction can never have the same efficiency as one from a horizontal direction; there must necessarily be the difference which exists between a dot and a dash.

All warfare and the value of all war machines are necessarily based on £ *s. d.* It costs something like £20,000 to build a Zeppelin; but when her essential shed, upkeep, crew, ammunition, fuel, and so forth are taken into consideration she can hardly be capitalised at less than £50,000. It is an open question whether, even by using incendiary bombs against private property, ten Zeppelins could achieve £500,000 worth of damage before they were all destroyed. Even supposing a gross result enormously in excess of that figure to have been obtained, there is the certain result of reprisals in kind. To spend two pounds in order to do one pound's worth of damage to the enemy is an expensive way of making warfare, and to do so against a financially stronger enemy is certainly suggestive of 'frenzied finance.' There is much airy talk in Germany of the destruction of London by Zeppelins. In this war of surprises all things are possible, and if London were so destroyed the financial loss would be enormous. History, however, shows that ordinary bombardments in the past have never achieved anything like the expected results, and have rarely, if ever, given value for the ammunition expended. The area of a town is too large.

The war has so far clearly proved that the best defence against aerial attack is to meet it in the air. In this way a good many aeroplanes have been destroyed—the conflict being as a rule armed aeroplane against armed aeroplane. This is unquestionably the best defence, so far at any rate as aeroplanes are concerned, for it has to be remembered that everything fired from the ground has to come down again somewhere, and is just as likely to descend on friend as on foe.

In the matter of dirigibles, it is not so easy to lay down any general proposition. We have as yet no records of airships fighting airships, and can only assume that two such vast and 'impossible to miss' targets dislike, and will continue to dislike, a process of mutual destruction. On the other hand, an aeroplane engaging an aeroplane has a chance of victory and survival, albeit an utter disregard of his own fate

is the best asset of every pilot. We have many records of aeroplanes fighting aeroplanes in this war, and the man determined to kill at all costs has invariably defeated the man whose anxiety to kill is tempered by reluctance to risk his own skin. Such reluctance is often sound enough on land; it is quite useless in the air.

Airships, and especially Zeppelins, should, by every known theory, be at the mercy of aeroplanes if found; but it is not always easy to find them. The sea is a vast place, but its dimensions are trivial as compared to those of the air. Therefore the airship can sail forth with heavy odds that she will not be detected. This is where her chance of success comes in, and on this account we must expect airships to continue to exist as an instrument of war in spite of their many inherent weaknesses.

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TRADE AND INDUSTRY IN THE WAR

1. Reports of the Intelligence Officer to the Birmingham Citizens' Executive Committee. October–November 1914.
2. The Statesman's Year Book. Macmillan and Co. 1914.
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ALIKE in every aspect—military, political, social, and economic—this war is one huge experiment in human effort. It involves conditions so new and forces so vast that neither its course nor its effects can be gauged by the measure of previous experience. In no sphere is the novel and experimental element so pronounced as in the economic. It is the widest of all, and it has undergone most change since the occurrence of any shock even approximately comparable to the present one. The previous wars most nearly comparable were those of Napoleon a century ago and the Franco-German War of 1870. The former comes nearest in extent, the latter in economic conditions; but neither furnishes any real analogy. A century ago the combined population of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom was no more than that of Germany alone to-day. Their combined wealth and trade stood in a far lower ratio and bore no comparison at all. The conditions were entirely different. Agriculture was still everywhere the main industry, and every country was self-supporting—or could be at a pinch. The United Kingdom was the most dependent on foreign trade. It had begun to import food towards the end of the eighteenth century, and was advancing in that direction during the Napoleonic Wars; but the amount of foreign corn required, which fluctuated with the character of the home harvest, was still very small on the average. The total amount of foreign trade then carried on and liable to be interrupted by war cannot be exactly compared with the present because it is expressed in values which vary indefinitely, and also because of the war conditions prevailing

a century ago. But a rough comparison can be made of 1802, which was a year of peace, with 1912. The aggregate value (official) of the foreign trade of the United Kingdom—including imports, exports, and re-exports—was about 68 millions in 1802 compared with 1344 millions in 1912. That is to say, while the population has increased three-fold, the value of foreign trade has increased twenty-fold. If bulk be taken, the difference is much greater. The aggregate tonnage of vessels entering and clearing British ports was about 3½ millions in 1802 and 139 millions in 1911, representing a forty-fold increase. In the other States involved in the Napoleonic and the present wars the change is greater even than this, and particularly in Germany and Belgium, where the manufacturing and mining industries have undergone such a rapid development in the last half-century.

In 1870 the economic conditions in the belligerent countries much more nearly resembled those of to-day; but that war was a local and a land affair of relatively insignificant proportions. Only two countries were engaged in it, with an aggregate population of about 76 millions. Their population to-day is about 105 millions, and they merely form the centre round which a whole ring of combatants is ranged. The aggregate European population now brought within the sphere of conflict is close upon 400 millions. All the chief industrial and commercial nations of Europe are included, with the sole exception of Italy, and also the greatest corn-growing regions in Europe. Napoleon's campaigns covered a wider area, but affected far fewer people and those not all at once. The greatest novelty, however, presented by this war and the condition which differentiates it from all others is its world-wide scope. To the European millions just mentioned must be added the populations of Japan and of the extra-European dominions owning allegiance to one or other belligerent. They more than double the numbers and bring the total up to nearly 900 millions. These are figures which the mind cannot grasp; but what the mind can grasp is that besides the land campaigns carried on over an enormous area in Europe, there is serious fighting in Asia and in Africa; while, in addition, there are acts of war in every sea.

These conditions are not only in themselves unprecedented, but they are accompanied by others which greatly affect the

economic results of war. One is the interdependence of all parts of the globe, developed gradually, but with increasing rapidity and multiplicity, by the progress of transport, commercial enterprise, and the division of labour. We are all entangled in a network of infinite complexity, which binds each of us by invisible threads to millions of persons scattered about the globe, of whom we know nothing, but who play some part in creating and bringing to us the things we use every day. And into this all-pervading, inconceivably intricate net-work, by which we live and move from day to day, war crashes with sudden violence, tearing huge rents and snapping off at one blow threads which would number millions of millions if they could be counted.

A second condition is the rapid transmission of news through the modern facility of communication by electricity. This, too, has undergone a vast development in recent years; and of all the novel appliances brought into use in the war none has exercised so wide an influence as wireless telegraphy. It shares with the aeroplane the honour of having effectually modified the conduct of war, thereby differentiating the present from all preceding wars; but, unlike the aeroplane, its influence is not confined to military purposes. It extends also to the political and commercial spheres. It casts news abroad which, whether true or false, may move men to action in all relations of life and in the most distant regions. The universal and instantaneous transmission of news greatly affects the economic situation, which is determined by subjective influences, by hopes and fears, not less but rather more than by material conditions.

And there is yet another condition which still further enhances the importance of the economic factor. It is the superior wealth of modern communities and the raised standard of living. The higher the scale of material prosperity the greater the shock caused by interruption of the machine that maintains it; and the scale to-day for the principal nations engaged in war is so much higher than in previous war periods that the difference is more than one of degree. If we take the prime necessary, which is food, the difference between the present and the Napoleonic period is not merely that food is more plentiful, more varied and cheaper, but that the supply is constant. It never fails. A century ago bread was

liable to become unprocurable by the poor, solely through the effects of bad harvests. In those days war had less influence on the general conditions of life among the mass of the people than the weather.

This question of the standard of living has a particular bearing on the present war in regard to Germany. No country has undergone so great an economic change or such a rapid advance in material prosperity since the last war with France in consequence of the industrial and commercial expansion. The standard of living in all classes has risen in such measure as to have transformed the habits of the German people. All classes alike are far less prepared to stand privation than they were in 1870. The significance of this is increased by the fact that on entering the war they did not expect to be subjected to any privation. Thus they were prepared neither by their ordinary habits nor by forethought for the possibility of having to suffer material hardships through economic pressure ; and the shock of such an experience would be great.

It is clear from these considerations that an examination of the economic position is no mere theoretical exercise ; it possesses the highest practical interest, because the economic effects of war react on the war itself. If a complete survey could be made it would probably tell us not only who will win but approximately how long the struggle will last ; but the field is too vast, the conditions too confused, and the information available too defective to permit of anything approaching completeness. We must be content with a study of the more salient features.

The first point to note is that the original shock caused by the outbreak of war was surmounted with surprising ease in all quarters. That shock was financial, which means that it was of a subjective character. It was a shock to credit and confidence. A declaration of war, no matter on what scale, does not immediately alter anything except men's minds ; but it alters them instantaneously. It arouses fears and apprehensions and destroys credit ; and since credit is the invisible current of commercial electricity which circulates throughout the world and keeps the whole machine running, its breakdown at any important point is a very serious matter. Happily the effects can be avoided when the occurrence is foreseen. In the present case one country at least was fully prepared. In

Germany financial measures, being part of the campaign, had been as long, carefully, and completely arranged beforehand as the military and all other details. When Germans boast of the success with which they met the financial crisis induced by the war, it must be remembered that their Government and their financiers knew what was coming. They had indeed been unloading securities on the London market for months beforehand and had calculated every financial contingency. The war inflicted no shock on public confidence in Germany, where it was greeted with joyful anticipations of speedy victory and immense gain. The nominal avoidance of a moratorium, of which the Germans are particularly proud as a proof of their superior financial strength, had a different explanation. It would have been incompatible with the collection of the 50 million war loan. But the Germans did not dispense with the assistance of a virtual moratorium. It was put in a permissive form. Debtors might apply for leave to postpone payment for three months.

On the other hand the States attacked had only a brief interval, between the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia and the actual crash, to consider the situation and prepare to meet the threatened emergency. For the world at large the position of Great Britain was the important point, because London is the centre of international trade and finance. The problem and the steps taken to solve it were described and explained by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the House of Commons on the 27th of November. To enter into them would be outside the scope of this article, and it will suffice to name the three principal measures—a moratorium, the issue of currency notes, and a guarantee for the payment of foreign exchange bills. The steps taken in other countries appear to have been similar. They were sufficient. There was a shock, much confusion, some alarm, and some cessation of commercial activity, but there was no general collapse of credit and no serious panic. The bank rate, which rose to 10 per cent. on the outbreak of war, fell again to 5 per cent. within a week. Thus the initial danger was averted, and recovery from the shock began in a very short time.

The subsequent course of events was ruled by actual conditions, of which the most important for the international commerce

of the world was the command of the sea held by Great Britain and her Allies. If that had been seriously challenged and the issue had been doubtful there could have been no such revival of confidence and continuance or resumption of activity as actually occurred. The fate of every cargo afloat would have been more or less uncertain, shippers would have been in constant fear, insurance would have been impossible or at prohibitive rates, and Government could have given no guarantee. That would have affected all shipping alike because it would have been impossible to tell into whose hands any vessel might fall or what would happen to it. If the enemy had held command of the sea, the uncertainty would have been less, but the risk to the great bulk of ocean trade would have been greater since it is carried in British bottoms. For that reason the interference with international trade would have been more extensive than it was in proportion to the greatly superior dimensions of the merchant shipping of one side over that of the other. What actually happened was that German shipping was swept from the seas within a few weeks of the beginning of war. The Board of Trade return, published on November 27, showed that of 5 million tons of German shipping 4½ millions, or 89·3 per cent. had disappeared, being either captured, detained in enemy ports, or locked up for safety in neutral and German ports. Out of 20½ million tons of British shipping only about half a million, or 2·9 per cent., was similarly withdrawn, leaving 20 millions in active trade, to which about 2 millions of French and a like amount of Japanese tonnage must be added. If the naval situation had been reversed, the shipping withdrawn from international commerce would have been at least five times greater than it was, and neutral countries depending on sea-borne traffic would have suffered in proportion. It seems a fair inference that since the great bulk of the world's freightage is borne in British bottoms, it is to the interest not only of Great Britain but of the world at large that she should have control of the sea. If she had not, doubtless some British shipping might collusively be transferred to neutral flags to avoid capture, and so continue its activity. But the break-down of attempts to transfer German vessels in the present case indicates that the process is more difficult than it appears to be on the surface.

As Admiral Mahan has pointed out, sea-power goes with merchant shipping, and the propriety of Great Britain's command of the sea rests on wider grounds than mere possession or her own interests. To it must be attributed the general maintenance of the world's commerce and industry in spite of the war. It has maintained them by excluding them from the operations of the war, and has succeeded in the former in proportion as it has effected the latter. Of course the control is not absolute. The term has never meant that; and when Germans declare that Great Britain has lost the command of the sea because they have captured forty-nine ships out of 12,213, laid mines in the North Sea, and sent a flying squadron to bombard English coast towns, they are asserting that she has lost what she never possessed or pretended to possess. The term only means a working superiority which cannot be effectually challenged, and that has been maintained. The German navy has challenged British control so far as it could, with the result stated. The damage done to our shipping is insignificant and far less than was anticipated by the scheme of insurance which came into operation at the beginning of war. The premiums originally fixed under this scheme were rapidly reduced during the first weeks of war. The rate for cargoes, which started at five guineas per cent. on the 5th of August, was reduced to four guineas on the 8th, to three guineas on the 18th, to two guineas at the end of the month, and to one guinea at the end of the year. Corresponding reductions were made for the insurance of hulls, which was organised on a somewhat different plan. The fact that the minimum limit of one guinea was not reached until December testifies to the existence of a challenge; the actual rates show how unsuccessful it has been. That part of it which consisted in strewing mines in open commercial seaways (in direct violation of the Hague Convention) has inflicted more damage on neutral than on British shipping. The fact shows how injurious to the world's commerce a more effective challenge on Germany's part would have been and how beneficial has been the exercise of general control by the chief carrying power. The only dangerous seas to neutrals have been those which have come within the scope of Germany's challenge, and in them the danger has been proportionately diminished by the degree of control exercised by Great Britain. In effect the interest of neutrals in general

is more or less bound up with that of the chief carrying Power.

The German cruisers had a certain effect in hampering oceanic trade outside the mine-laying area. The exploits of the 'Emden' in Indian waters deterred shippers to and from the East, and the defeat of Admiral Cradock's squadron on the 1st of November, off the coast of Chili, checked South American trade. But these were local and temporary influences. No general cessation or even interruption of trade took place, and after the destruction of Admiral von Spee's squadron on the 8th of December, trade was free everywhere outside the North Sea, the Baltic, and the Black Sea. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this fact in influencing the general economic situation created by the war. To it more than to anything else is due the non-fulfilment of gloomy forebodings aroused at the outset by a vague feeling that such a war must entail ruin more or less complete all round. It has entailed some ruin and will entail more before it is finished, but that is due mainly to the actual operations of war on land. That is to say, its range is limited.

To sum up the general effect so far of the greatest war in history on the complex organism of modern international economy, it may be said that the initial shock to confidence has been successfully met ; that the great mass of the world's business has neither been stopped nor seriously damaged, but has suffered much disorganisation, which is gradually being made good by readjustment ; that the destructive effects are limited in range. A closer examination can best be made by following two lines of inquiry : (1) the particular and direct effects of (*a*) the state of war, (*b*) the military operations ; (2) the actual condition of trade and industry in particular countries.

The state of war practically puts an end to all direct trading between enemy States. If any is carried on at all it is clandestine, unlawful, and subject to severe penalties. British subjects were thus prohibited from trading with persons in the German Empire by a Royal Proclamation on the 5th of August, the day following the declaration of war ; and the prohibition was extended to the Austrian Empire on the 12th of August. These proclamations have been subsequently revised at different dates, and they include

various points, some of which are obscure and controversial. It is not the purpose of this article to criticise them or to enter into minor details. We are only concerned with the broad fact that a state of war involves an abrupt cessation of commercial transactions and traffic between the belligerents. The object is to inflict as much economic injury as possible. The prohibition is expressly directed against the 'enemy 'country,' and applies to all persons, of whatever nationality, resident or carrying on business there. It does not apply to persons of enemy nationality who are neither resident nor carrying on business in the enemy country. No doubt the order is not water-tight, but its broad effect is to put an end to the exchange of goods between the countries involved and all their outlying dominions. Since similar steps have been taken by all the belligerent States. We get the result that the previous trade carried on between Germany-Austria-Turkey on the one hand, and allied States on the other, is destroyed. It is not possible to say exactly what this amounts to in the aggregate; but in 1912 Germany alone carried on 'special 'trade'—which does not cover the whole of her commercial transactions—with the enemy countries to the value of about £420,000,000. Equally full details are not available for Austria and still less for Turkey; but the total trade of Austria with the principal enemy countries in 1912 approximated to £60,000,000, and that of Turkey with France and Great Britain amounted to about £22,000,000. On a broad estimate, therefore, trade to the value of £500,000,000 has been suddenly shut off by the state of war. It is a large hole in the fabric of international commerce, though not so large as it looks. The aggregate foreign trade of the nations (with insignificant exceptions) was valued by the official statisticians of Germany at nearly 7700 millions in 1911. The 500 millions involved in the war represents 6·5 per cent. of this sum, and the real proportion should be somewhat less because the total volume has increased since 1911 and there is, no doubt, some leakage. Such estimates can only be approximate; and if we put the international trade withdrawn by the state of war at one-sixteenth of the whole, that is probably as near as we can get.

The incidence of this dislocation varies, of course, very greatly in different countries and among different classes of traders. It falls most heavily on Germany, and represents

not less than 42 per cent. of her foreign trade. The British Empire is by far her best customer, supplying 18·5 per cent. of her imports and taking nearly 17 per cent. of her exports. Russia comes third, with the United States in the second place, and France and Belgium also stand high on the list. Germany is, in fact, at war with all her best customers, except Austria and the United States. The list of commodities which she exchanges with them is instructive. The chief items in her trade with Great Britain are (imports) coal, cotton and woollen yarns, dried herrings, woollen cloth, combed wool and other textile materials, offals and fish; (exports) beet sugar, iron and steel products, silk stuffs, dress materials, furs, dyes, toys, boot-uppers, and a great variety of other manufactured goods. With British India the chief items are (imports) jute, raw cotton, rice, barley, peas, rape-seed, linseed, copra, hides; (exports) rods and sheets, dress materials, dyes, cotton goods. The principal goods exchanged with Russia are (imports) barley, wheat, timber, eggs, flax, butter, hay, ore, skins, poultry, rye, oil-cake, maize, peas; (exports) rye, coal, furs, boot-uppers, merino wool, hides, combed yarn, motor cars. With France they are (imports) combed wool, pelts, wine, raw silk, iron ore, hides, wool; (exports) pelts, coke, coal, wheat, iron, machine tools. These are only the items highest in value, but they show the great dependence of Germany on enemy countries for food stuffs and materials for manufacture.

Of the belligerent countries opposed to Germany and Austria the heaviest loser in amount is Great Britain because she is the most dependent on foreign trade; but her trade with Germany and Austria, large as it is, represents less than 10 per cent. of the whole. In 1913 it was about 133 millions out of a total of 1427 millions. Russia is naturally Germany's largest customer, and her trade with Germany and Austria combined amounts to nearly 40 per cent. of the whole trade. Thus, Russia's relative loss is not much below Germany's; but since she is much less dependent on foreign trade the economic effect is quite different. The loss incurred by France is about 12 per cent. of her total trade, which is a slightly higher percentage than in the case of Great Britain; but the total at stake is smaller, and the actual amount lost by France is less than half Great Britain's loss. It is unnecessary to go

into further detail regarding the relative incidence of the cessation of trade automatically due to the state of war. Enough has been said to show that of all the countries concerned Germany is by far the greatest loser on this account.

But belligerency involves further interference with trade, which is of a different character. The mutual cessation of trade between countries at war with each other may be regarded as negative interference ; they simply drop their usual transactions. But there is a positive interference which affects the trade of neutral countries, and is very complicated. It consists of various measures taken at will by belligerents to protect their own interests or to injure the enemy, and by neutral countries to protect themselves. These include the restriction of exportation and importation and the prohibition of contraband of war.

The object of restricting exportation is both to prevent things useful to the enemy from reaching him and to retain them for home consumption. The articles comprise, in the first instance, arms, ammunition, naval and military stores of all kinds, and materials capable of being converted into such stores. A Royal Proclamation issued on the 3rd of August enumerated thirty-four classes of prohibited exports, consisting of arms and ammunition, military animals, military machines, chemicals, metals, fibres, oils, spirit and the like, capable of being applied to military purposes. The list was subsequently extended and revised by successive orders, and in the month of November it included some 200 heads, divided into three categories: (1) prohibited to all destinations; (2) prohibited to all foreign ports in Europe and the Mediterranean except those of allies; (3) prohibited to all destinations except British Dominions. The classification makes the whole subject extremely complicated, especially when articles are shifted about from one class to another. The lists are of the most varied character, and they comprise many items of great commercial importance. In addition to military material and a large number of drugs and chemicals the following deserve notice: (class i) coal-tar products and dyes, extracts for tanning, hides, indigo, lead, leather, nickel ore and nickel, oils, petroleum oil and spirit, zinc ; (class ii) aluminium, copper ore and copper, herrings, iron ore and iron, jute, railway material, rubber, ship-building materials, steam vessels, tea,

various tools, motor tyres ; (class iii) food stuffs, raw wool and woollen products, sugar. The raw materials enumerated are particularly important.

Equally full details are not available for other belligerents, but broadly speaking joint action has been taken by the Allies in regard to prohibited exports ; and in regard to some items the order applies also to their oversea Dominions. Similar measures, with modifications, have been adopted by the enemy States. Neutral countries in Europe have also prohibited the exportation of a number of commodities. At the beginning of the war Italy prohibited cereals, coffee, sugar, horses, meat, clothing, vehicles, motors, coal, certain metals, and medicines. Norway prohibited corn, flour, potatoes, coal, coke, and mineral oil ; and later made extensive additions to the list. Portugal, which was then neutral, prohibited live stock, fuel, and food ; and Turkey prohibited grain. More recently Sweden has prohibited woollen yarn, rubber, tinned or leaded iron plates, tin plates, copper, copper wire, and several other things ; Holland began with a few articles, but they have now increased to more than a hundred ; and Denmark has adopted a prohibited list including malt, materials for margarine, iron ore, iron, nickel ore, and materials for gunpowder.

The object of these prohibitions is to retain stocks for consumption at home or to avoid having supplies cut off by belligerents in order to prevent their reaching the enemy. The state of neutrality does not, under the Hague Convention, entail an obligation to prevent the exportation or transit of commodities useful to the enemy or even munitions of war, though a neutral Power is bound not to supply the latter or ships of war to a belligerent. Consequently the interferences enumerated above must be regarded as secondary or indirect results of the state of war. They are part of the general process of throwing States back upon themselves, and are the corollary of a compulsorily restricted importation. To add to the latter by deliberately interfering with importation is obviously undesirable and to be avoided if possible. The only case of specifically prohibited importation due to the war appears to be that of sugar in this country. By a proclamation dated the 30th of September, the importation of enemy sugar into any part of the British Empire and all dealing in such sugar were prohibited. The object was to close more effectually

a profitable market to the enemy ; both Germany and Austria sell an enormous quantity of sugar, and this country is one of their best customers. The order was withdrawn on the 26th of October, and the importation of all sugar into the United Kingdom was prohibited, except cargoes already cleared from the port of shipment and those imported under contract made prior to the war. The reason for the new order seems to have been the fact that the Government had previously bought up all the available stocks of sugar they could secure in order to prevent the price from being forced up by panic or market manœuvring, and then found themselves faced by the competition of cheaper sugar subsequently brought into the market. This interference with trade is, therefore, not so much the result of war as of a dubious Government speculation ; it can only be temporary.

It is obviously impossible to estimate the cumulative effect of the measures just enumerated on trade in general, more especially since they are liable to an indefinite amount of relaxation through the issue of 'licences'; but they certainly constitute in the mass a large interference. A still more indefinite and uncertain amount of interference must be added to the foregoing through the working of contraband of war. It represents the attempt of belligerents to prevent materials which may be useful to the enemy from reaching him through the hands of a neutral without making war on the latter, and it is naturally a very delicate and complicated matter. In spite of many efforts to fix common international rules important points are still open, and actual procedure depends on circumstances and the will of the belligerents. In effect belligerents say to neutrals 'If you carry certain things 'to the enemy I shall take the liberty of preventing you by 'force and shall seize the goods.' The amount of the interference with trade so caused obviously depends on the number and character of the goods declared contraband and on the ability of the belligerent to make good his embargo. He evidently has no control of traffic from a neutral to a contiguous enemy by land—as from Holland into Germany or from Switzerland into Germany or into France, as the case may be, in the present war. And since land frontiers must be either those of neutrals or of enemies, with whom there is no trade at all, it follows that contraband actually applies only

to sea traffic. Hence the enormous importance of the control of the sea in relation to neutral trade. The result of effective control is that neutral shipping does not in general attempt to carry goods declared contraband by the belligerent exercising control, but pays no attention to a belligerent not exercising control. Thus when Germany recently declared timber contraband of war the only neutral State seriously affected was Sweden, because Germany can enforce her will in the Baltic and has done so. But Sweden did not cease to export timber to Great Britain or other enemy countries. She sent it overland to be shipped from Norwegian ports where it would be practically safe from German interference.

It follows from this that the only seas in which enemy declarations of contraband take real effect in this war are the Baltic and the Black Sea. In all others the declaration that matters is that of Great Britain and her Allies. In accordance with the established usage, they recognise the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband and have adopted lists of both. The distinction turns on the nature of the articles, which involves a question of destination. Absolute contraband is supposed to consist of materials directly applicable to military purposes; conditional contraband consists of materials which may be applied to military purposes, but may also be intended for other purposes. Consequently more rigorous proof of destination is required for conditional contraband. Absolute contraband is thus liable to capture if destined for enemy territory or territory occupied by the enemy. The presumption is that if it is going there at all it is going to be used for military purposes. Conditional contraband is only liable to capture if it is destined for the armed forces or for a Government department of the enemy State, because there is then an equal or sufficient presumption that it is going to be used for military purposes. Proof of destination is a matter of evidence under international law.

The lists of contraband issued at the beginning of the war were practically identical with those embodied in the Declaration of London, except that the item of airships, aeroplanes, etc., was transferred from the conditional to the absolute schedule. Of course aeroplanes and accessories may be used for other than military purposes, but this distinction has never been rigidly maintained. For instance, horses and other

draught animals are absolute contraband. The original lists have subsequently been extended by successive additions until they have come to include forty-two instead of twenty-six headings. The additions are mainly to the schedule of absolute contraband. Barbed wire has been transferred from the conditional schedule, as well as air-machines; but the important additions are motor vehicles, rubber, mineral oils and motor spirit, sulphuric acid, and a number of minerals including iron ore, pig-iron, nickel ore and nickel, ferrochrome and chrome ore, copper, lead, and aluminium.

Now when these things are made absolute contraband in addition to all war munitions, arms, implements, and various military stores; and when conditional contraband includes, as it does, food-stuffs, forage, clothing, vehicles of all kinds, vessels, railway material, fuel, sulphur, glycerine, and hides—among other things—then it is evident that this field of war procedure involves another large addition to the volume of trade estimated above to have been stopped by the cessation of commerce between the belligerents. The economic effect, however, is rather to injure the States cut off than to diminish the volume of the world's trade, because the goods are diverted to other markets. This is, in fact, the object of contraband as an accessory to war; it aims at injuring the enemy with as little loss as possible to trade at large. But the process of examining cargoes entails much delay, inconvenience, and expense to neutral traders.

Passing on to the direct effect of the operations of war in themselves, we have to deal with a totally different set of conditions. Hitherto we have been concerned with interruptions of trade, which react no doubt on industry but do not directly interfere with it. The position is reversed in regard to the operations of war. Their principal effect in this connexion falls directly on industry, with secondary consequences to trade; and they are of a most remarkable character. The industrial havoc caused by this war is one of its most distinguishing features and second only to the loss of life. Nothing comparable to it has ever occurred before: partly because of the modern conditions of industry, partly because of the magnitude of the struggle and the enormous forces involved, partly because of the destructiveness of modern weapons and the ruthless use made of them, and partly because of a

malignant fate which has led the tide of war over an extraordinary number of highly developed industrial districts. The last point is of great importance, but is very imperfectly realised. It is well known in a general way that Belgium was a busy manufacturing country and that there are large factory towns in the north of France, some of which have been frequently mentioned in the war news ; but these places are little known to the public, and the full extent to which seats of industry have been delivered up to destruction by a strange perversity cannot be appreciated without a personal acquaintance with the localities. Both in the eastern and the western theatre of war, but especially in the latter, the German invading armies have swept, as though by preference, over some of the busiest industrial districts in Europe and have tried to sweep over others. This is chiefly due to the plan of campaign for attacking France through Belgium, and it no doubt entered into the calculations of the German authorities. The route to Paris chosen for the main German forces not only passed along the great manufacturing and mining belt of Belgium—through Verviers, Liége, Namur, Charleroi, and the Borinage—but it quite unnecessarily embraced in its sweep the greatest mining and manufacturing area in France to the south of the Belgian frontier. The departments of the Nord and the Pas de Calais along this frontier contain a succession of manufacturing towns and coal-mines. The central ganglion is the Lille-Croix-Roubaix-Tourcoing cluster of towns which form an almost continuous stretch of factories and working-class dwellings right up to the Belgian frontier. This region forms the nearest approach to the English type of industrial area that is to be found in the whole of the Continent. There is no such concentration of factory towns anywhere in Germany—not even in Saxony—and its temporary possession by the Germans is an asset of much economic importance. The whole region round about Lille is dotted with manufacturing towns of varying size, some modern, some ancient. The latter are known to fame of old through products to which they have given their names. Such are Valenciennes (lace), Cambrai (cambric), and Arras (tapestry). Others are St. Quentin, Douai, Armentières, and Hazebrouck. The mining centre here is Lens. On the Belgian side of the frontier are Courtrai, Tournai, and many smaller places. All these names have been unhappily frequent in the war news.

The tide of battle has rolled forwards and backwards over the whole region for months and some of the towns have been taken and retaken many times over.

Further east in France is Reims, another industrial centre, and beyond that Lorraine and Alsace present a succession of manufacturing and mining districts right away down to Belfort and the Swiss frontier. Nancy is one important centre, Épinal another, and Belfort a third. This part, however, has suffered far less damage because the Germans have been kept at bay and have been rather engaged in defending their own towns, of which Mülhausen is the most important, than in destroying the French, though Pont-à-Mousson, which is the seat of large iron-works right on the frontier, has been repeatedly shelled. Even in those places, however, which have escaped destructive violence, industrial activity must have been greatly impeded by the operations of war, the movements and dispositions of troops, and the other measures of defence. Some idea of what the western theatre of war as a whole means to industrial life may be gained by imagining a line of battle stretching from London to Glasgow and passing through the Midlands, the West Riding, and Lancashire, with agricultural areas in between ; all ordinary traffic stopped along the whole of it, scores of towns in ruins, hundreds of factories and mines idle ; the havoc extending to a background covering hundreds of square miles and reaching Liverpool, which must be thought of as a dead port. Every branch of industry is involved in this havoc. The world has never seen anything like it, and its economic effect defies calculation. M. Henri Masson, a Belgian barrister, has made a careful estimate of the damage done in Belgium alone and he puts it at 212 millions ; but this was some time ago and did not include the loss of employment through destruction. In France the damage is equally great, if not greater.

The eastern battle front is even longer, and though it passes for the most part through much more sparsely populated and less industrially developed regions than the western, the most violent operations of war in Poland have swept over similar manufacturing towns ; and, in particular, Lodz, which is the centre of them and the chief manufacturing town in Poland, has been subjected to the same ordeal as towns in Belgium and France, with similar results. In Galicia, which is

yet another battle-field, mining industries are more important than manufactures ; but Lemberg and Cracow must be added to the list of commercial centres which have undergone bombardment, and Belgrade is yet another. If we add to all this the damage to the countryside by the mere passage of millions of men over vast areas and the obliteration of villages, farms, and country houses practised by the German armies in every country invaded by them, we get a total sum of destruction which baffles the imagination.

The damage done by operations of war at sea is comparatively small. A number of merchant ships have been sunk by German raiders and mines, and a few places have been bombarded, but not any of great commercial importance. The economic influence exercised by sea warfare has for the most part been of a different character and has not been destructive.

When we survey the whole field and note the interference with normal trade and the mass of positive destruction, we cannot but feel surprised that the visible effects should be so small outside the area of violence. One would have expected—and most people did expect—large and perceptible changes almost everywhere in the outward aspect of life, and, if not general ruin, at least a general lessening of activity accompanied by a vast amount of privation. Those expectations have not been fulfilled in this country, and so far as can be gathered from the fragments of information available they have not been fulfilled anywhere, with the exception just mentioned. There is some change everywhere ; neutral, as well as belligerent, countries have been affected, and probably none have altogether escaped. But the change varies indefinitely in extent and character, and little information is available for a great part of the field.

The two countries of which most is known are Belgium and the United Kingdom. They represent the extremes among the belligerents. The one has suffered most from the war, the other least, among European States. Belgium has been, for the time being, wiped out of economic existence. In so far as the Belgian people are occupied at all, they are working for the Germans who, having seized their country, are there illustrating that supreme genius for organisation which is one of their numerous claims to superiority over the rest of mankind.

The form that German destruction takes can be best displayed by summarising the results of M. Henri Masson's inquiry, published in the 'Globe' newspaper.

'Verviers.—No damage.

'Verviers to Liége.—A region covered with factories employing more than 150,000 workmen. All this part of the country a heap of ruins—115 factories utterly destroyed and in many others the machinery and boilers smashed. At the Cockerill works Germans are compelling workmen to manufacture ammunition for them.

'Liége.—Ten important factories and thirty minor ones destroyed.

'Tirlemont.—Ten important sugar factories and thirty others all destroyed.

'Louvain.—Chemical factories, tanneries, iron works, bell foundries, and breweries all demolished.

'Aerschot.—Fifteen factories and breweries destroyed.

'Malines.—Furniture factories and others destroyed.

'Namur.—Fifteen large factories partially destroyed—rolling mills, engineering works, leather works.

'Charleroi.—More than 300 works sacked or burnt—foundries, iron works, saw mills, electricity works, glass works, employing 200,000 workmen. Concerns in which German capital was invested systematically spared.

'Mons.—Coal-mines not much damaged.

'Alost.—Factories not greatly suffered, except three or four utterly ruined.

'Ghent.—Mills not damaged.

'Antwerp.—Five large works burnt down, thirty smaller ones partly destroyed.

'Rural districts.—Crops all taken or destroyed; three-fourths of animals seized.'

These are the chief industrial items of German handiwork in M. Masson's list, without including the destruction of houses, public buildings, railway stations, bridges, and so on. Ghent seems to be the only large manufacturing town which has been spared from violence. It is the chief seat of textile industries in Belgium and the original home of the famous co-operative movement into which Belgian Socialists have chiefly directed their energies. Its condition was described towards the end of November by M. Anseele, the well-known and highly respected labour leader. 'Goods are accumulating since no exports can 'be made. Many factories are closed, others are working only 'a part of the week. Other trades have come to a full stop.' Hundreds of thousands of Belgians have taken refuge in Holland, France, and England; but the bulk of the population have been

unable to do so. They have been stripped of everything, and would be starving but for the food sent into the country. The American Consul-General at Antwerp was compelled in December to appeal for food for himself and staff. As it is, many must perish from exposure and inanition. The busiest country with the greatest port in all Europe is a cemetery ; its factories in ruins, its fields deserted, its ports dead.

That is the one extreme—complete and absolute ruin. At the other end of the scale is Great Britain. It has suffered less than the other chief belligerents partly because it has escaped violence at home, which differentiates it from its Allies, and partly because it has been able to carry on the bulk of its trade, which differentiates it from Germany and Austria. Fairly full information of the state of trade and industry is available.

The following tables show the movement of imports and exports and their relation to those in the same months of the previous year.

Imports into the United Kingdom.

Month.	Value in 1914.	Decrease on 1913.	Decrease per cent.
July . .	£59,384,000	£2,400,000	3·9
August . .	£42,362,000	£13,614,000	24·3
September .	£45,052,000	£16,304,000	26·6
October .	£51,559,000	£20,171,000	28·1
November .	£55,987,000	£12,480,000	18·2

Exports of British Produce.

Month.	Value in 1914.	Decrease on 1913.	Decrease per cent.
July . .	£44,405,000	£2,759,000	5·8
August . .	£24,211,000	£19,900,000	45·1
September .	£26,674,000	£15,751,000	37·1
October .	£28,602,000	£18,021,000	38·6
November .	£24,602,000	£20,154,000	45·0

The average monthly decrease of imports and exports combined is 33·3 per cent. or exactly one-third. The whole of this, however, cannot be ascribed to the war because trade was already falling, as shown by the figure for July given above. The combined fall in July was 4·8 per cent., and since it was

increasing we may fairly allow 5 per cent. on that account for the whole period. This leaves 28·3 per cent. as the average rate of decrease. We found above that the state of war in itself involved a loss of about 9 per cent. of foreign trade. The remainder must be ascribed to the several conditions enumerated and described above. We may call it 20 per cent., which gives us a measure of the interference with foreign trade caused by prohibition of exportation, contraband, and the operations of war. The incidence is naturally much heavier on exports than on imports. The former dropped far less at the initial shock and rose again steadily after August, so that the position in November showed a substantial improvement. Exports, on the contrary, made but a slight recovery in September and October and then fell back again. There are three causes for this: (1) the enlarged scope of prohibited exportation; (2) the huge demand of the home market for purposes of war, and for commodities cut off from outside; (3) the stream of 'invisible' exports for war material supplied to our Allies. These constitute a large and general change in industrial economy produced by war. The interference with foreign trade has a converse side in an increased demand for many things at home, and this applies to all belligerents. There is a great diversion of industrial effort. In our own case it is heightened by our ability to manufacture for our Allies and their need of help because of invasion. Together with the call to arms, which relieves the labour market, this accounts for the discrepancy between the movement of foreign trade and that of employment. The following official statistics show the latter:—

PERCENTAGE OF UNEMPLOYED.

Month.	Trade Union Returns.	Insured Trades.
July . . .	2·8	3·6
August . . .	7·1	6·2
September . .	5·6	5·4
October . .	4·4	4·2
November . .	2·9	3·7

We see the shock in August and the steady recovery to a level of employment, which is higher after four months of

war than in a time of ordinary depression. The principal cause is extreme activity in the production of war material, which includes not only ships, arms, ammunition, equipment, and supplies, but innumerable other things. There is hardly any useful thing that an army in the field does not require—from needles to grindstones. The abnormal activity thus developed among large sections of producers increases consumption and reacts on other trades, which do not share it directly. A gradual readjustment takes place. But different industries and different localities are very differently affected. The chief incidence of war depression has been upon the cotton industry, the Baltic trade, and articles of luxury or superfluity. The first is the largest and most important. It was depressed, before the war, in all countries; and restriction of spinning had been generally adopted in July, to the extent of 50 per cent. in some countries. It was in no position to stand a shock or the burden of war risks and high freightage. So the Liverpool Cotton Exchange was closed, unemployment went up to 17·7 per cent., and short time was general in addition. But a gradual improvement set in, reflected in the monthly unemployment returns, which were: August, 17·7; September, 14·5; October, 9·2; November, 6·3. On the 16th of November, the Cotton Exchange was reopened and a scheme for financing traders arranged with the assistance of the Government. In view of the prospect of mills returning to full time, a provisional working agreement for the settlement of trade disputes was concluded between the unions and the employers on the 10th of December.

The same process of recovery is still more marked in other trades. Reassuring reports are received from all quarters. That of Professor Ashley to the Birmingham Citizens' Executive Committee at the end of November may be taken as representative, because Birmingham is remarkable for the variety of its manufactures.

'The state of employment in Birmingham has continued to improve since my report of the 29th of October; and this has been due not only to Government orders, but also to a slow but steady revival of trade in several directions.'

Even the luxury and superfluity trades are beginning to pick up. In short, the whole situation is highly encouraging;

and with new markets opening out, as they are beginning to do, further improvement is certain. The decrease of exports is temporary and need cause no uneasiness. The great thing in present circumstances is the import trade, which is safe and rising. Food is abundant and coming in freely. The only articles which have undergone a really large increase of price are sugar—which had risen 86 per cent. at the end of September, but has since fallen considerably—and eggs. These two, together with fish, brought the average increase of food prices up to 17 per cent. in large towns and 15 per cent. in others, at the beginning of December. Raw materials are also coming in freely and in rising quantities. The financial strength of the country is demonstrated by the ease with which the War Loan of £350,000,000 was raised.

Turning to France, we may say that her position lies between those of Belgium and Great Britain. She has suffered a limited invasion and partial suppression of industry, but her ports are open to the world's trade and the great bulk of her resources are untouched. Agriculture is of far greater relative importance in France than in Great Britain or even in Germany; and in spite of the havoc systematically inflicted on factories and mines in the north, the manufacturing industries, which are very widely distributed throughout the country, are for the most part beyond the reach of injury. Unfortunately, an unusually large proportion of the most profitable trade of France is in articles of luxury, and the dislocation must be great: how great we do not know, but the same readjustment by intensified production for war purposes and home consumption is going on there. It was noted in 1805, the year of Trafalgar, that the cessation of foreign trade stimulated domestic production, and that the manufactures were flourishing. The financial position is sound and the resources of the people—the most thrifty as well as the most industrious in Europe—are unfathomable. Backed by the intense and all-pervading spirit of national unity, determination, and devotion, the economic position of France is very strong.

The most crucial question, however, is the position of Germany. It is obviously less favourable than that of the Allies, but its weakness is more apparent than its strength, and the latter may easily be underestimated. As we saw above, Germany suffers a heavier loss through the state of war than

any other belligerent. She starts with over 40 per cent. of her foreign trade (44 per cent. of imports) wiped out by that alone. Financially, this may be an initial advantage, for she is a heavy debtor to enemy countries, and escapes payment. It is calculated that the German woollen trade owes £2,000,000 to Bradford manufacturers and dealers alone. But, industrially, the dislocation must be very great, because her trade with enemy countries consists pre-eminently in the importation of raw or half-manufactured materials, and the exportation of finished products. War did, in fact, cause an enormous increase of unemployment in spite of the withdrawal of vast numbers of men from the labour market by mobilisation. The following official figures, giving the number of applications per 100 vacancies at the labour exchanges of five great cities, in July and September, show the initial displacement :—

—	July.	September
Berlin	121	239
Frankfurt	115	299
Chemnitz	118	326
Hamburg	160	361
Dresden	232	621
Mean	150	370

The increase is at the rate of 146 per cent. The British labour exchanges show a rise of 77 per cent. in the average applications during the same months. The comparison is rough, but of some value ; and its significance is increased by the very much larger number of men called to the colours in Germany. The disorganisation of industry was partly due to interruption of traffic caused by military movements, and a recovery took place later. The same influences began to operate there as here. The continued withdrawal of men from civil life relieved the congestion, and the demand for war material kept many trades increasingly busy. This movement was methodically developed in a characteristic manner, and manufacturers changed not only their market but their wares, and substituted military goods for their usual products. Thus unemployment declined again after an enormous initial rise.

The percentage, returned by trade unions in successive months, was :—

July.	August.	September.	October.
2·9	22·4	15·7	10·9

The movement shown is much more violent than that indicated by our own statistics given above, and the return towards a normal level far less complete. In fact the German average shows a greater disturbance than our most depressed industry. In the face of this massive evidence, which is confirmed by many other facts, accounts by journalists and letter-writers of life going on just as usual may be dismissed as the result of superficial observation. Life is everywhere affected in the belligerent countries in some measure, and to contend that in Germany it is not affected by the suppression of her mercantile fleet and the paralysis of her great ports is to argue that they are of no consequence. There has indeed been a great deal of distress, necessitating large measures of relief, both public and private, and it has been enhanced by a progressive rise in the price of food.

Nevertheless, Germany still possesses great resources, and it would be a mistake to assume that they are near exhaustion. The most important question is the supply of food and of raw materials. With regard to food Germany was said at the beginning of the war to possess a year's supply, and this may have been true in a sense. The harvest was good, and additional stocks had probably been laid in; so that although she normally imports a great deal more food than she exports there may have been, upon a strict calculation and by keeping all for home use, enough of a sort—but not of the sort or in the abundance to which the people are accustomed. The need of economy soon made itself felt, especially in the use of wheat, of which Germany usually imports some two million tons. It is attested by the issue of regulations for the composition, the baking, the sale, and the consumption of bread, and by urgent exhortations to economy. 'War' bread, made up with potatoes and other things, may be quite good, but it is not the regular diet of the Germans; it resembles siege rations. And the pressure is clearly increasing. Prices in

Berlin are known down to the end of October. Meat had then increased very little and milk not at all; but wheat had risen about 27 per cent., rye 30 per cent., and barley 48 per cent. The mean rise of twenty articles was 16·4 per cent. against 13 per cent. in London at the same time. The average price of wheat in London in November was 40*s.* 4*d.* (British) and 42*s.* 11*d.* (imported); in Berlin at the beginning of that month it was 56*s.* 6*d.* Germany depends for food on Russia, Argentina, the United States, Roumania, Canada, and India. Of these, three are cut off, and the supply from two others at least greatly curtailed. The calculations of sufficiency were based on the expectation of a short campaign and of exactions from the enemy, which has not been fulfilled. If the people are prepared to endure real privation they may hold out till next harvest, but not otherwise.

With regard to the supply of raw materials, this is vital on the military as well as on the economic side. Germany must have minerals, textile fibres, oils, rubber, and other things, and the question is whether she can obtain them. Of iron there is probably enough for the present from home resources and from Sweden, who supplies the largest amount of ore; but copper, nickel, and lead are running short, and must be imported. Copper comes chiefly from the United States, nickel from Canada through the United States and England; lead from Australasia and Spain. Of the fibres, cotton comes from the United States, Egypt, and India; wool from Australia, South Africa, and South America; jute from India; flax from Russia; silk from Italy and France. The most important of the oils is petroleum, which comes from the United States, Galicia, and Russia. The chief sources of rubber are South America, British possessions, and the Cameroons; of hides, they are South America and India. It will be seen that some of these sources are cut off; others come under the operation of contraband. The most important contraband articles are the metals, mineral oils, and rubber. The textiles are not contraband, but they are affected by it because of attempts to smuggle contraband under cover of other goods. Wool is the most important, and the only large source open is South America. Probably Germany is now working on the immense stocks kept at the great wool-combing mills in the north of France. Large quantities of other things have been seized at

Antwerp, but such hauls cannot be repeated; and without a steady flow of imports exhaustion must ensue. Everything, therefore, depends on the effective enforcement of contraband and the other restrictive measures. Some trade is being done, no doubt, through Holland, both in food and raw materials, and some, perhaps, through Denmark and Italy; but it cannot be very great. If the whole neutral shipping afloat were devoted to the service of Germany it would not replace her own lost fleet; and of course it is not. All the belligerent States are living, so to speak, on themselves to a greater or less extent—that is to say, they are maintaining their industries by war loans and taxation, which represent their own accumulations. Germany is doing so most of all, and exhaustion is only a matter of time.

A. SHADWELL.

WAR AND ILLUSION

1. **The Great Illusion.** By NORMAN ANGELL. Heinemann. 1910.
2. **The Foundations of International Polity.** By NORMAN ANGELL. Heinemann. 1914.
3. **The Arbiter in Council.** Macmillan. 1906.
4. **Germany and England.** By Professor CRAMB. Murray. 1913.
5. **Germany and the Next War.** By General VON BERNHARDI. Arnold. 1911.
6. **Pan-Germanism.** By Professor ROLAND B. USHER. Constable. 1913.
7. **The German Panic.** By J. A. HOBSON. Cassell. 1913.

IN all ages there have been minds which revolted against the idea of war. The inspiring motives were various. Lack of physical courage, love of ease, fear of consequences, self-interest have all contributed to the creation of the pacific temperament. With the growth of civilisation moral ideas acquired force, and conscientious scruples began to influence thought and to bring other than material considerations to bear upon the avoidance or the abolition of war. The dawn of Christianity seemed to hold out the promise of universal peace to be attained in the days when its purest doctrine should have spread throughout the world.

'The early Christians of the Roman Empire'—wrote Gibbon—refused to take any active part in the civil administration or the military defence of the Empire. . . . It was impossible that the Christians, without renouncing a more sacred duty, could assume the character of soldiers, of magistrates, or of princes.'

When reproached by the Pagans,

'who very frequently asked, what would be the fate of the Empire, attacked on every side by the barbarians, if all mankind should adopt the pusillanimous sentiments of the new sect . . . the Christian apologists returned obscure and ambiguous answers as they were unwilling to reveal the secret cause of their security: the expectation that, before the conversion of mankind was accomplished, war, government, the Roman Empire and the world itself would be no more.'

The arguments of Tertullian, Celsus, and Origen may still be heard among us ; but the fair dream of a world united in the bonds of universal brotherhood, of the triumph of the doctrine of love, seems sadly far from realisation. The spread of Christianity has not operated as a check to the warring instincts of mankind, and has even proved a contributory cause of international hostility. The vision of Isaiah that 'nation 'shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they 'learn war any more,' remains unfulfilled, and Professor Lecky could trace 'the gradual fusion of the military spirit with 'Christianity.' Nevertheless, it is true that the doctrines of the New Testament, foreshadowed by the greatest of the Hebrew prophets, have profoundly modified the attitude of men's minds towards war, and have tended to mitigate its worst severities. And although the Christian Churches have not pronounced against the sinfulness of war in all circumstances, individuals and special communities have, since the days of the Roman Empire, consistently upheld this interpretation of Christian principles and have thrown the weight of their influence against the profession of arms and the growth of armaments. In our own day, the most uncompromising opponent of war on religious grounds was Tolstoi, of whom it has been justly said that 'he would abolish war by abolishing 'Governments,' *—a conjunction of ideas which inevitably weakened the practical effect of his teaching. John Bright, both by hereditary bias and by temperament, was a powerful peace advocate ; but he does not appear to have laid down that war in all circumstances was an evil that could be avoided. Writing to him after his retirement from the Cabinet in 1882 as a consequence of the action of the fleet at Alexandria, Mr. Gladstone significantly said :

'I address you as one whom I suppose not to believe all use whatever of military force to be unlawful ; as one who detests wars in general and believes most wars to have been sad errors (in which I greatly agree with you), but who in regard to any particular use of force would look upon it for a justifying cause, and after it would endeavour to appreciate its actual effect.'

Mr. Gladstone's attitude of mind, thus defined, represents that of large numbers of men in Christian times, and indicates

* The Arbiter in Council.

the limits within which the argument from religion has generally appealed to the conscience of Christians. The essential weakness of this argument in its bearing upon practical politics is that wide differences of opinion as to the lawfulness of any particular act of war must inevitably arise, and that, if it be once admitted that just occasions for fighting may occur, measures of preparation cannot be abandoned, and the nations dare not cease to 'learn war any more.' Universal peace cannot be brought about by conscience until the whole world professes and is ruled by a creed which embodies Tolstoi's command 'Fight not at all.'

Cobden, the life-long friend of Bright, founded his hopes upon the growth of a true perception of the economic relations in which trading nations stand to each other, and of the injury to their mutual interests which is inseparable from war. In days when political economy was an unborn science, William Penn, 'arguing that the only reason why God chastises us 'with war is to acquaint us with the blessings of peace,' * had forcibly described the economic evils of war. Adam Smith, Turgot and Necker had carried the question far into the region of finance, and the growth of international exchange enabled their views to be strongly re-enforced. In 1842 Cobden stated his firm belief that Free Trade is 'the best 'human means for securing universal and permanent peace.' Some years later, in one of his best known pamphlets,† he analysed the causes of three successive waves of military expenditure and pronounced them unjustified by national needs and inspired by unreasonable suspicions. Cobden, however, perfectly understood what the loss of the command of the sea would entail upon Great Britain. Speaking at Rochdale, he laid down a principle of naval policy :

'There has always been between England and France, by a sort of tacit agreement, a certain proportion or relation in the amounts expended on their respective armaments. If you take the navies of the two countries for the last half century, you will find that, in a normal state of peace, the French have had a navy little more than half the size of that of England. . . . I have said it in the House of Commons, and I repeat it to you, if the French Government showed a sinister design to increase their navy to an equality with ours, then, after every explanation to prevent such an absurd waste,

* The Arbiter in Council. † The Three Panics.

I should vote one hundred millions sterling rather than allow that navy to be increased to a level with ours.'

While, therefore, Cobden was a consistent advocate of peace and a firm believer in the inutility of most wars, he was under no illusions as to the risks which loss of naval supremacy would entail upon a country which had already begun to depend for existence upon sea-borne commerce. Universal Free Trade for which he strove, not only on the grounds of economic advantage, but as a guarantee for peace, has not been realised, and its first principles have even been threatened in this country; but recent fiscal changes, in the United States especially, have tended to justify his beliefs.

Since Cobden died in 1865, the volume of international trade has risen to huge dimensions, and the industrialisation of the world has advanced by leaps and bounds. The interlacement of commercial interests has become infinitely more complex, and the economic advantages of peace are consequently more real and more obvious. International finance, by reason of the immense development of the means of communication, is now so closely entangled that neutrality is no protection against the stress of war. This aspect of political economy is discussed in 'The Arbiter in Council,' where the effect of war on national finance and, consequently, upon the individual citizen is ably analysed. 'The idea that one commercial 'nation may gain by ruining another,' which 'used to be a 'maxim of high policy,' is vigorously attacked. The contention that trade may be made to thrive by war is met by the reminder 'that exports depend upon imports, and that 'it is impossible for one nation to be ruined by the commercial 'success of another.' The question of the provision of armaments by one State to add to the military strength of another, and the use of diplomacy in obtaining orders, suggest an appeal for a ruling to the 'German moralists.' The significant answer of one of the Councillors is:

'The German philosophers no longer speak out on these subjects. From the time when Hegelianism became the Court philosophy, it has been a maxim of foreign policy that morality does not count. Might is right. Individual gain is national advantage.'

The whole chapter on the 'Political Economy of War' is a moderate and reasoned exposition of the effect of war

upon national prosperity, and of modern international commerce and finance as agencies for securing the peace of the world.

Several years later Mr. Norman Angell appeared upon the scene as the apostle of a new doctrine, and in 'The Great 'Illusion,' followed by 'The Foundations of International 'Polity,' he proceeded to lay down in dogmatic fashion a series of crude propositions which have attracted attention and raised expectations already disappointed. There is little that is new in these effusions; but bold generalisations, expressed with certitude and easily remembered, may capture opinions too lightly formed, and the necessary qualifications may be ignored. The half truth is always dangerous, and it is in half truths that Mr. Angell mainly deals.

The basis upon which his entire edifice rests is that on which many predecessors, to whose work he does not refer, have built less pretentious structures. The mutual interests of commercial nations, he maintains, are now so closely intertwined that war or preparation for war has become futile. No nation can gain any economic advantage by war even if successful, and all injury inflicted by a belligerent recoils with equal or greater effect upon himself. It follows that 'military and political power can in reality do nothing for 'trade,' and 'the idea that the addition of territory adds to a 'nation's wealth is an optical illusion.' The 'total collapse 'of the Empire, our trade and the means of feeding forty 'millions in these islands,' which Mr. Frederic Harrison and other writers have foreshadowed 'as the result of the conquest 'of Great Britain by another nation, is a physical impossi-'bility.' The sacking of the Bank of England by a 'German 'General' would cause a loss to Germany 'immensely greater 'than the value of the loot obtained . . . For every pound 'taken from the Bank of England, German trade would pay a 'thousand.'

> 'It is not to be presumed, therefore, that any European nation would attempt the desperately expensive business of the conquest of England for the purpose of making an experiment which all Colonial history shows to be doomed to failure.'

And those who believe that such an attempt, if successful, would imply national ruin, are the victims of 'a gross and

'desperately dangerous misconception.' Preparation for war in any form is useless, because 'the more a nation's wealth 'is protected, the less secure does it become.' Or, stating the case in more general terms, if a 'nation remains military, 'it decays; if it prospers and takes its share of the work of 'the world, it ceases to be military. There is no other reading 'of history.'

Such are the main propositions which Mr. Angell endeavours to establish, and clearly, if they are universally accepted by mankind, we might expect that considerations of self-interest would suffice to relieve the world from all risks of war, and therefore to secure general disarmament. With equal force, it may be claimed that, if the conscience of mankind at large revolted against war on the higher grounds of religion and morality, the same result would be attained. Tolstoi argued that 'the moral plea should occupy the first rank,' and that 'the moral plea is the most effective.' Mr. Angell, on the contrary, has convinced himself that 'the plane of the whole 'discussion has to be shifted to that of policy and self-interest,' and he has no doubt of the result.

'Let me illustrate. I have succeeded, in an hour's talk, in giving an intelligent boy of twelve a clearer grasp of the real meaning of money and the mechanism of credit and exchange than is possessed by many a man of my acquaintance running large businesses. Now if every boy in America, England and Germany could have as clear an idea of the real nature of wealth and money, it would, in two years' time, be an utter impossibility to organise a war scare. . . . Is there any enormous difficulty in ensuring that our youth should get such simple lessons in finance?'

Either the subject of this experiment must have possessed faculties far transcending those of Lord Macaulay's gifted school-boy, or Mr. Angell, in his 'hour's talk,' must have employed arguments far more convincing than those he has made public. Nothing is so simple as it appears to him, and the nemesis of uncompromising facts has cruelly overtaken his most plausible theories. The elaborate structure cleverly put together has already been wrecked, and while the opinions of more careful thinkers are being confirmed, the doctrine that economic considerations provide a valid protection against war has been rudely shattered. With no Power in the modern world might Mr. Angell's considerations

of ' policy and self-interest ' be expected to weigh so heavily as with Germany.*

If the propositions which I have quoted are examined, they will be found to be full of flaws. Some of them may be true in special cases ; but they are worthless and dangerous as generalisations. That war in modern financial conditions *must* cause economic loss to the victor, to the vanquished, and to neutrals is obvious. That war *may* bring no balance of economic advantage to the victor ; that annexation *may* be profitless ; that ' military and political power ' *may* do nothing for trade ; that colonies *may* be no source of strength ; that a nation which becomes military *may* ' decay '—so much could not escape the most shallow student of history. If ever the whole world is parcelled out among civilised and progressive States, diligently employed in developing all its available resources and closely linked by mutual commercial interchange, the argument for universal peace on the grounds of ' policy and self-interest ' will undoubtedly be strengthened. Such conditions are still far from being fulfilled, and while territory remains which, if brought under control of a vigorous Power, could be made more productive, the possibility of profitable annexation by force cannot be excluded. Operations of war, in such a case, may afford a balance of economic advantage, though this would depend upon the measure of loss which the war entailed ; or, in other words, upon the strength of the resistance to be overcome. The Indian and Colonial Empire of Great Britain has not all been attained by direct conquest ; but we owe that Empire, and it owes its wonderful advancement and its present prosperity, to successful war—in other words to naval, military and political power. Mr. Angell, who has allowed his mind to become obsessed with cash considerations, is at pains to prove that our over-sea possessions are of no value. With wearisome re-iteration he asserts that we do not ' own ' colonies and that ' the notion that in some way our security and prosperity ' would be threatened by a foreign nation taking our colonies ' from us ' is ' childish.' †

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* During six months prior to the war, German imports reached £269,314,000 and exports £249,248,000.

† As Germans may not understand the economic worthlessness of British Colonies, Mr. Angell thoughtfully incorporated ' a good ' deal of additional matter ' in the German edition of his book.

'For the British Colonies are, in fact, independent nations in alliance with the Mother Country, to whom they are no source of tribute or economic profit (except in the way that foreign nations are). . . . Economically England would gain by their formal separation; since she would be relieved of the cost of their defence etc.'

We may agree that the conquest of our great Dominions, if practicable, would be of no real benefit to a 'foreign nation'; but the opinions here quoted and others scattered throughout Mr. Angell's publications will serve to illustrate his incapacity for understanding the higher attributes of nationhood, or the promptings of what he describes as the 'blind dogma of 'patriotism.' Will he or any of his disciples maintain to-day that Great Britain would be—even 'economically'—in a more favourable position if she had shed these 'independent nations,' or if they had never grown up under the aegis of British sea-power to become the inheritors of British traditions and of British liberty?

The proposition that the security of national wealth is diminished in proportion to the protection afforded to it, is supported by amazing arguments:

'The 3 per cents of powerless Belgium are quoted at 96 . . . the 3½ per cents of the Russian Empire, with its hundred and twenty millions of souls and its four million army,* are quoted at 81. . . . Industrial undertakings in a country like Switzerland, defended by a comic opera army of a few thousand men, are preferable in point of security to enterprise backed by three millions of the most perfectly trained soldiers in the world.'

This we are told is

'one of the most remarkable of economic-sociological phenomena in Europe, which might be made the text of this book.'

The 'comic opera army of Switzerland'—a national force capable of producing about 300,000 organised men, extremely formidable in their own mountainous country—is a phrase which anyone except Mr. Angell would characterise in his own words as a 'desperately dangerous misconception.' The reasoning from the preference of investors, into which many factors, habits, and fashions enter, is fallacious. It would be

* The Armies of both Germany and France exceeded four millions at the outbreak of war.

almost as rational to assume that, in choosing a residence, one which was likely to be best protected against burglars would necessarily be selected. Is the ' wealth ' of Russia ' less secure ' than that of Belgium,* and what is the value to-day of Mexican securities, which Mr. Angell elsewhere commends ?

In support of the theory that ' if a nation becomes ' military it decays,' we are presented with a graded list of peoples, which is a travesty of militarism. France is more military than Germany, Russia than France, Turkey than Russia ; while the most military people in the eastern hemisphere are those of Morocco. That Germany is peculiarly unmilitary is certain, because :

' the men who really give a tone to the German nation, to German life and conduct—that is to say, the majority of adult Germans—have never seen a battle and *never will.*' †

Mr. Angell's claim to be accepted as a leader of new thought can be gauged by this one sentence. The deadly risks of the written word could not be more strikingly illustrated.

In a chapter entitled the ' Indemnity Futility,' Mr. Angell argues at length that a large indemnity, such as that extorted from France in 1871, or the far larger sum on which Germany securely counted as the result of a short and sharp campaign this year, would, if imposed by Germany on Great Britain, cause the former more suffering than the latter. This is ' the ' economic doctrine now most in favour in Germany,' where, however, the extraction by force of exorbitant indemnities from any town occupied is regarded as in full accordance with the highest form of civilisation. It is possible to conceive conditions in which the robbery of another nation's wealth might bring little profit to the robber nation. A man whose income is mainly derived from investments in a factory will not gain any direct advantage by destroying the factory. On the other hand, his resources might be so distributed that by a sacrifice in one direction he could secure economic advantage in another.

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* Belgium according to Mr. Angell was ' powerless,' and yet her gallant Army was able to give most important assistance in shattering a plan of campaign worked out to the last detail in the study of years.

† The italics are mine.

Mr. Angell draws a distinction, which is not justified in modern conditions, between the government of a nation and the nation itself, and he traces the financial depression in Germany after 1871 to the acquisition of the French milliards. This interesting question has been ably analysed by Mr. O'Farrell, who effectively disposes of

'the idea that there is any specific *virus* in an indemnity, which renders it, like the fabled shirt of Nessus, a source of injury to the country which receives it. . . . The increased taxation to which the nation paying the indemnity has to resort, in order not merely to cover the actual amount of the exaction itself, but as an isunrance against such exactions in the future, is an addition to the national expenses of production in the country victimised.' *

Many causes, some of them of a general character, contributed to produce depression which has been much exaggerated, and Germany after 1880 entered upon a period of astonishing industrial expansion. The welding of the German people into a powerful State directly resulted from successful war, and one effect was to stimulate new activities of many kinds which quickly brought Germany into the front rank of great commercial Powers. The war of 1870–71 did not lessen 'the capacity for industry' of the German people, and subsequently their militarism and their marked capacity for the arts of peace advanced side by side. Mr. Angell pertinently asks :

'Of what use is domination unless there is individual capacity, social training, industrial resources, to profit thereby?'

The answer is plain ; but Great Britain as well as Germany has proved that 'domination' is not incompatible with—may even be the result of—such qualities and resources, and both have profited thereby. That conquest and consequent domination may be economically worthless is certain. The history of Spanish conquests in America and of Mahommedan conquests generally is conclusive on this point ; but no universal law can be established. Nor does the complexity of interests arising from modern commerce exclude the possibility of economic gain as the result of successful war.

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* 'The Franco-German War Indemnity and its Economic Results.' By H. H. O'Farrell.

In 'The Foundations of International Polity,' Mr. Angell presents some of his theories in a less aggressive and therefore more attractive form. The statement, that 'military force' is more and more failing of effect, and must finally become '. . . economically futile,' is at least carefully guarded. We cannot say what will 'finally' issue from the tumultuous surges of ideas and aims which are straining the sanity of modern thought. In his earlier work, it was 'physical force' that we were bidden to regard as 'a constantly diminishing 'factor in the affairs of the world,' and the reasoning by which this law of evolution was supported is of the shallowest. The dervish, we are informed, is

'manly, sturdy, hardy, with a courage and warlike qualities generally which no European can equal. But the frail and spectacled Englishman is his master, and a few score of such will make themselves the masters of teeming thousands of Sudanese; the relatively unwarlike Englishman is doing the same thing all over Asia by the simple virtue of superior brain and character, more thought, more rationalism, more steady and controlled hard work.'

A more misleading generalisation can hardly be imagined. 'Warlike qualities' are of many kinds, and the wild rush of the dervish, inspired by hopes of paradise, is not comparable to the sustained bravery, the triumph of endurance under appalling stress, which is being exhibited on stricken fields to-day. The 'European' and 'the relatively unwarlike Englishman' have for weeks sustained fierce trials which the dervish would not have stood for half an hour, and have been ready to attack again and again with valour unquenchable. In military constancy and in physical endurance, the dervish is far inferior to the trained soldier of modern Europe. The 'frail and 'spectacled Englishman' is not a common object in the Sudan or on the Indian Frontier, and if he holds sway, it is because there is military force as well as 'brain and character' behind his spectacles. Over large portions of the world, military force is the only guarantee of peace and order. It may not be in evidence; it is certainly not employed in giving exhibitions of 'frightfulness,' but its unseen presence is understood. Even in the domestic sphere, bodies of police more highly organised and far more costly than any forms of protection maintained in the past are found to be necessary in order that adequate

physical force may stand behind the law. Mr. Angell strangely forgets that the mob is generally ready to resort to physical force on slight provocation, and may, as experience has proved, employ itself in the destruction of the means of its own economic support. Even educated women have organised violence as a means to attain their objects. We can only say with certainty that physical force is less in evidence, and is less frequently brought into play than formerly, because it is better organised, and because its existence and its readiness to act are better understood.

Mr. Angell sees in visions a tendency towards a future age in which the self-interest of the individual will dominate all other considerations. We may readily admit that if, in such an age, by a consensus of opinion, mankind adopts his view that self-interest cannot be secured by force in any form, arms and armaments will disappear, and wars will cease. With equal confidence it may be asserted that if individuals were guided by the simple rule that 'Honesty is the best policy,' police forces would become superfluous. The one prospect seems as hopeful as the other.

In discussing the tendencies on which his theories are founded, Mr. Angell deals copiously with history, which he ruthlessly misinterprets. 'Religious wars,' he reiterates, have passed away; so has the duel. It may be expected, therefore, that the same forces which have abolished both will secure the permanent elimination of all war. The least study of the causes of war in ancient and modern times would have shown that this expectation is baseless. Religion has been the pretext for war and has embittered war; but rarely if ever has it been the real determining cause. As I have argued elsewhere, even the Crusades on which Mr. Angell lays stress were not wholly religious in character:

'As Hume points out, the "enthusiastic ardour" quickly cooled, and "the frenzy was chiefly supported by the military genius and love of glory in the monarchs." When England was preparing to resist the Armada, "every artifice, as well as reason, was employed to animate the people to a vigorous defence of their religion," but no student of history would pretend that the cause of the Spanish Wars of Elizabeth was mainly religious.' *

* Article in 'War and Peace,' April 1914.

A *Jehád* is not primarily a religious war, but a war in which religion is invoked as an incentive to fighting. The mullah who can set the North-West Frontier of India aflame calls fanaticism to the aid of economic tribal necessity, and religion is not a cause but an exciting agent. The 'Holy War,' announced by the Kaiser in a telegram to the Crown Prince, is the product of German intrigues, falsehoods, and gold.

Modern wars have arisen from a complexity of causes. They are the resultants of many forces, great and small, working throughout the racial, social, economic, moral and political structure of nations, appealing to or resented by individuals or sections of the community for different reasons and in different degrees. As Mr. Kinglake explained at length, the Crimean War was not waged because 'a crowd of monks 'with base foreheads stood quarrelling for a key at the sunny 'gates of a church in Palestine.' Such men as Lee and Jackson would never have fought, and never thought they did fight, for the maintenance of slavery as an institution. Replying to an address after the die had been cast, the former said :

'Trusting to Almighty God, an approving conscience, and the aid of my fellow citizens, I will devote myself to the defence and service of my native State,* on whose behalf alone would I have ever drawn the sword.'

European wars since the Peace of 1815 have shown a marked tendency towards relative shortness of duration, which is due to the quick development of means of transportation, and also to the growing intensity of economic stress arising from the number of troops employed, and the heavy cost of their equipment.† A seven years' war has become an impossibility. The Crimean War lasted little over two years, although it preceded the immense advances in the use of steam and in the power of armaments, as well as the general adoption of the principle of National Service on the continent of Europe. On the other hand, no tendency towards a diminished frequency of wars is apparent. The nineteenth century and the begin-

* Virginia.

† The total additional cost to Great Britain of the Crimean War was about £69,250,000, spread over 25 months. That of the present war will exceed one and a half million per day, and the economic loss not included in these figures will be vastly greater in 1914–15 than in any previous war.

ning of the twentieth compare unfavourably in this respect with the age of Augustus.

In a chapter devoted to ' The State as a Person,' Mr. Angell shows the extent to which obsession by the ' economic factor ' can create oblivion of the forces other than self-interest which still sway mankind. The theory is briefly that society tends to stratification extending across the frontiers of States, that the ' complex heterogeneity of the modern State ' involves the ' lessening of the reciprocal sentiment of collective responsi- ' bility ' upon which ' international hostilities are largely ' based,' and that ' the formation of States has disregarded ' national divisions altogether.' The tendency, therefore, is for the ' economic unit ' to replace the ' political unit,' and for ' activities ' (commercial and industrial) to become ' inter- ' national.' It follows that when Admiral Mahan wrote that :

' Sentiment, imagination, aspiration, the satisfaction of the rational and moral faculties in some object better than bread alone, all must find a part in a worthy motive. Like individuals, nations and Empires have souls as well as bodies,'

he indulged in ' moonshine, and very mischievous moonshine.'

It is true that some great States are racially heterogeneous, that the citizens of one State may stand nearer in economic interests, in intellectual development, and in sentiment, to those of another State than to their fellow citizens. We know that some socialists profess allegiance to their creed rather than to their State ; that ' Labour ' endeavours to organise itself on international lines ; and that capital—in peace time—knows no frontiers. Nevertheless allegiance to the State remains the dominant factor. A few years ago, Mr. Blatchford pointed out that :

' The German nation is homogeneous, organised. Their imperial policy is continuous ; their rulers work strenuously, sleeplessly, silently. Their principle is the theory of blood and iron.'

In Mr. Angell's view, ' it would be difficult to pack a more ' dangerous untruth into so few lines,' and he complacently regards the following opinions of ' a particularly competent ' German ' as a triumphant refutation of Mr. Blatchford's errors :

' There is no one German people, no single Germany. There are more abrupt contrasts between Germans and Germans than

between Germans and Indians. . . . It might be possible to make efforts to promote good understanding between Germans and Englishmen, Germans and Frenchmen. . . . But it will be for ever impossible to set on foot any such efforts at an understanding between German Social Democrats and Prussian Junkers.'

In one sense the Editor of 'Die Friedenswarte' is right and Mr. Blatchford is wrong. The German nation is not, strictly speaking, 'homogeneous,' though far more so than some other States; but inexorable facts have proved that, from the point of view of practical politics, the one writer showed true insight and the other indulged in worthless speculation. The Prussian Junker and the German Social Democrat enthusiastically joined in waging a war of unprovoked aggression, and if the latter is now beginning to feel misgivings, it is too late to avert from mankind the most appalling misery and devastation. The German nation behaved exactly as Mr. Blatchford anticipated, and Mr. Angell's fine-spun dialectics have been torn to tatters.

That he should pour scorn upon the 'wiseacres,' who believe that deep down among the primordial instincts of men there lurk ways of thought which may now, as in tribal days, bring about war, is natural; for no sane thinker would assert that human nature is unchangeable, or that it has not shown signs of change in some degree. In the evolution 'From 'Cannibalism to Herbert Spencer,' nature has effected stupendous changes. The most remarkable phenomenon, however, is the small advance, if any, in intellectual power, between the days of Plato, Aristotle, and Isaiah, and those in which we live. Knowledge has come in rich abundance; but 'wisdom 'lingers.' Our philosophers, poets, and preachers, like our sculptors and architects, depend largely upon the borrowed thought of the Ancients, which they clothe with modern garments and often rob of its direct simplicity. Our politicians and political movements closely follow those of Greece. A satirical play of Aristophanes perfectly applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to modern democracies. It must be remembered too that more than half of the world is living in conditions scarcely differing from those of two thousand years ago. Life in an Indian village a few miles from a great trunk railway closely resembles that in what has been called the Golden Age of Hinduism. British law, with force behind it,

has restrained the operations of some venerable customs; but where, as in some parts of Bengal in the past few years, force has been inadequate, life and property have probably been less secure than in the reign of Chandragupta II. If education has given us 'John Smith, of Surbiton, 'attending church, passing laws, using the telephone and 'so on,' it has also bestowed upon society the militant suffragist who has resorted to methods which the Roman women, who strenuously opposed the Oppian law in the days of Cato, would have scorned as barbaric. In an interesting passage, Hume contrasts the proceedings of the Danes with those of the Goths and Vandals who invaded the Roman Empire. These latter 'barbarians,' he wrote, 'found an 'interest in protecting the property and industry of the people 'whom they subdued.' The highly cultured barbarians of the twentieth century have shown less intelligence than their ancestors, and the recent sudden outburst of insane rage against this country on the part of the German upper and middle classes—like that of 1899—has no parallel in less 'civilised times.' As Professor Cramb most wisely said, 'In human nature as a whole, there are 'always elements 'and forces, there are always motives and ideals which defy 'the analysis of reason—mysterious and dark forces.'

Among modern forces which Mr. Angell ignores, or regards as in process of dissipation under economic pressure, is the ideal of nationhood. The sense of power and of dignity, even more than the material advantage that may result from the impulse given by a strong central government, possesses increasing attractions. Citizenship of the German Empire is more inspiring than that of Baden or Bavaria, and Saxons and Hanoverians quickly forgot their defeat in 1866 in the larger outlook which resulted from their absorption by Prussia. Germany, united by war, is now giving the strongest proofs of national patriotism. When the Congress of Berlin, in 1878, tore up the Treaty of San Stefano and created the two new States of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, an experiment was attempted which was foredoomed to failure, because the principle of nationality was violated. The Serbian War of 1885 instantly brought the two States together, and the idea of Bulgarian nationality helped to bring about the first Balkan War, while the second showed the two young Slav nations in

violent conflict in spite of racial affinity. The growth of nationalist ideas in Ireland has proceeded in absolute disregard of economic considerations; for the present prosperity of the Irish people is due entirely to the closeness of the British connexion which the Nationalists seek to weaken or to dissolve. In India, of which Mr. Angell writes with evident ignorance, we have seen in recent years the uprising of the national ideal in spite of a far greater incongruity of race, religion, language, and sentiment than exists in any other country. It is an ideal that we should not discourage; but it can never be realised except under British Government. The whole prosperity of India must continue for many years to depend upon British credit and British guidance. In the present war, the national factor is exerting a powerful influence, and in any European settlement in the days to come, the principle of nationality must be carefully safeguarded in the interests of a lasting peace. It is this principle, far more than Mr. Angell's economic self-interest, that appears likely to mould the destinies of mankind.

Mr. Angell is anxious to guard himself against the charge of being an advocate of disarmament. He tells us that:

> 'Because I do not believe in force, I do believe in defence—that is to say, I do not believe in allowing another man's force to settle any matters in dispute; and for this reason I have taken the ground that in performing this function at least—in preventing force being used, the soldier's work is useful.'

The 'work' of the sailor is at least equally necessary, and, if he is included, the action of the Allies in the present war is exactly what Mr. Angell upholds in the sentence quoted. They were compelled to take up arms in order to prevent German 'force' from controlling Europe, and to defend their existence, their rights, and their possessions against deliberately planned aggression.

Mr. Angell's effusions, however, abound in statements which bear a totally different interpretation. A sane pacifist might have been expected to admit that, if the necessity arose, it would be 'worth while' to expend 'blood and treasure for the defence of Burma or the Deccan.' He has imprudently failed to confine himself to abstract propositions. Pointed allusions to German policy and tendencies occur and recur throughout his publications. Writing at a time when Germany

was engaged in establishing a vast spy system in our midst, was organising rebellion in South Africa, was tampering with Turkey, had already elaborated to the last detail a plan for destroying France by violating a solemn international pledge, and was drinking to 'The Day' when she would strike at the liberties of Europe, Mr. Angell poured scorn on those who ventured to express doubt of German intentions.

'The Great Illusion' found many admirers who discovered in its crude reasoning support for their preconceptions. In 'The German Panic,' Mr. J. A. Hobson carries the views of Mr. Angell a step further. His observations have led him to the conclusion that:

'A notion prevails that Germany has ambitions and plans which involve danger to the British Empire and require us to maintain an attitude of watchful hostility.'

But, just as Mr. Angell convinced himself that 'the bulk 'of the German people . . . have stood, from the first, reso- 'lutely against' any intention of attacking this country, so Mr. Hobson is certain that, in Great Britain:

'the organised portion of the working classes sees in the German scare nothing but a familiar move in the high game of politics, by which the employing and possessing classes endeavour to divert the force of popular demand for drastic social reforms.'

In a preface to this remarkable pamphlet, published only last year, Lord Loreburn proclaimed *urbi et orbi*:

'That any British Government would be so guilty towards our own country as to take up arms in a foreign quarrel is more than I can believe.'

And in a prophetic peroration his Lordship assured us that:

'Time will show that the Germans have no aggressive designs against us, nor we against them; and then foolish people will cease to talk of a future war between us which will never take place.'

The complete misunderstanding of British sentiment, fostered by certain publicists and speakers in this country, has inevitably produced dangerous illusions in the minds of the responsible German authors of the great catastrophe. In the modern world, where false impressions circulate with lightning speed and where public opinion can be moulded by secret agencies for sinister ends, the converse of the old adage

may be asserted, *Si vis bellum para pacem.* Out of the strange compound of cynicism, cunning, and stupidity which the White Papers dealing with German diplomacy have revealed, one fact stands out plainly. The German Emperor and his advisers were convinced that Great Britain would in no case intervene in the first war which they decided to bring about. The emotion shown by the Chancellor in his memorable interview with Sir E. Goschen on August 4 was not simulated. He was taken aback by the prospect suddenly opened out, and with a flash of inspiration, he declared that it was 'terrible to a 'degree.' The warning of Sir E. Grey, in grave diplomatic language, five days earlier had not sufficed to ward off the ultimatum, because the German strategists were confident that the life could be crushed out of France in three weeks and that the annexation of her colonies would follow victory in the field. But who can tell what would have happened if it had been certain that a war of aggression would have involved Great Britain? And who can estimate the extent to which foolish utterances in this country helped to induce Germany to disregard this contingency? In the light of our present knowledge, it may be said that the war was forced upon the British Empire at a fortunate time; but the circumstances point a moral which the pacifists may well take to heart.

In the striking lectures delivered by the late Professor Cramb at Queen's College, Harley Street, in February and March 1913, and made public too late, the train of causation which rendered war inevitable is traced with an unerring hand by a careful student of German history, literature, and psychology. We find in them a brilliant analysis of the great forces which, for good or for evil, determine the destinies of nations—the forces which the pacifists ignore. 'It is in the past of Germany,' said Professor Cramb, 'that we must seek the real springs of 'the future action of Germany.' There was once a German Empire 'centuries before France and England fought.' The instinct for Empire is as ancient and as deeply rooted in the German people 'as it is in the English race.' Germany is conscious of ever-growing energy and internal resources. What hinders that she should not again tread the path leading to Empire? This is the question that historians like Treitschke have forced upon 'the mind of every thinking German.' 'Novelists, poets, publicists, and politicians' of every degree

have agreed upon the answer, and it is this :—'Germany has 'one enemy. One nation blocks the way. That nation is 'England.' This conclusion being reached, it naturally followed that the decadence of England should be strenuously preached before the youth of Germany, and the alleged proofs of this decadence could be discovered in the speeches and writings of Englishmen. Such a proof is visible to German eyes in the pacifism which 'is a growing force in English thought and 'English literature,' in proposals for a 'naval holiday,' and in the apparent loss of national courage shown by the increasing demand for the reduction of armaments while we retain possession of 'one-fifth of the globe' in our already palsied hands. England has failed in India, she will fail in Egypt ; 'her political power is as hollow as her moral virtues'—the one arrogance, the other hypocrisy. Reviewing our past, the Prussian historian does not scruple to tamper with history ; he is even able to ignore the events of last century, and sees in England only 'the great robber State' which may indeed have shown signs of valour in the past, but which owes her Empire mainly to 'opportunity, treachery, and violence.' In Treitschke's words :

'A thing that is wholly a sham cannot, in this universe of ours, last for ever. It may endure for a day, but its doom is certain ; there is no room for it in a world governed by valour, by the Will to Power.'

Teaching of this kind widely diffused has led the German mind to the second conclusion that upon Germany lay the duty—almost the religious duty—of destroying a colossal sham, and of building upon its ruins an Empire far greater than that of Charlemagne, an Empire through whose benign agency German art, culture, intellect, and spiritual energy would dominate the world. Among a people quickly responsive to what Professor Cramb calls 'the force of literary 'and academic ideas,' such teaching was exactly calculated to produce the most dangerous illusions.*

* As Professor Cramb points out, floods of such irritant and inflammatory declarations preceded the rising against Napoleon and the wars against Austria in 1866 and France in 1870, which, like the present conflict, may be regarded as, in part at least, the work of professors and historians.

General von Bernhardi rendered the vaulting aspirations of the Prussian professors in terms of naval and military strategy. He is convinced that the justice of the German cause in 'The Next War' will commend itself to the universal sympathy of mankind.

'In such a contest, we should not stand spiritually alone, but all on this vast globe whose feelings and thoughts are proud and free will join us in this campaign against one nation, which in spite of all her pretence of a liberal and philanthropic policy has never sought any other object than personal advantage, and the unscrupulous suppression of her rivals.'

The book—a curious mixture of candour, astuteness, and ignorance—was too lightly regarded in this country as the outpouring of a military Chauvinist. Professor Cramb's estimate was far wiser.

'It is a fair and a just book—according to the writer's insight, soldier-like in its simplicity, soldier-like in its misdirected literary admirations. . . . It has the merit of entire sincerity.'

Read in the light of the teachings of the Prussian professors and historians, it might well have served as a grave warning of closely impending peril to the British nation. In Germany it was calculated to give definite form to the most dangerous illusions. In his latest work—'Our Future: a Word of Warning to the German Nation' *—General von Bernhardi's insensate hatred of Great Britain shows further advance. He blames the German Emperor and his Chancellor for their supposed policy of peace, urges an immediate attack upon the Powers of the Entente, for which purpose the Balkan conflict could conveniently be utilised, and lays down the preposterous conditions on which England might purchase immunity until Germany was ready to efface her national existence.

Professor Usher's exhaustive study of modern Pan-Germanism is peculiarly interesting as a complete corroboration of the views of Professor Cramb by an independent authority. Without concerning himself with causes stretching far back into the past, the American writer lucidly describes the present situation as it appears to German eyes, and like Professor Cramb he strives to make plain the coming world convulsion.

* Translated by J. Ellis Barker. Dawson and Son.

'The most vital fact for the Anglo-Saxon race to grasp at present is the German view of European history, of European life and ideals, their estimation of the comparative strength of political, economic and ethical forces.'

Thus alone, he tells us,

'can we hope to understand the apparently inexplicable and inconsistent ideas upon which has been based the most audacious attempt yet made consciously to direct through a long term of years the evolution and the fate of the world.'

These 'ideas' are not only based upon conquest rendered easy by the supposed naval, military, and political weakness of other Powers, but upon economic calculations. Germany has developed her resources with borrowed money and with design:

'Supposing now that she should repudiate the whole debt which she owes to foreign nations, should seize the capital out of which her economic development was created, what then? Would she not actually possess her economic development for nothing? . . . If she is defeated, she will merely be compelled to pay what she was already obligated to pay. If victorious, she need never pay interest or principal.'

Professor Usher rightly regards the advantages—to Germany—of the execution of this economic programme as 'enormously exaggerated'; but the fact that it should have commended itself to Germans enables us to realise the futility of hopes of peace based upon the mutual interests created by international commerce and finance.*

Writing with the comparative detachment possible to a citizen of the United States before Germany had forced war upon Europe, and the temper of the German Army had been displayed in Belgium, France, and Poland, Professor Usher finds justification for Pan-Germanism:

'Its basis is greed from one point of view, ambition from another, but its effective cause is the expansion of nationality. . . . To a greater or less degree, all (European nations †) are actuated by the

* In 1912 the imports for home consumption into Germany from the British Empire were valued at about £99,895,000, and the exports of domestic produce of Germany to the British Empire at £75,170,000. The prospective loss of this valuable trade exercised no sobering influence upon Pan-Germanism.

† It is not easy to understand why the United States are not included.

motives which influence Germany. . . . If Germany is wrong, others too have been wrong. . . . If, thus, we regard the truth as a concept which becomes gradually visible as we study the record of the past . . . we shall be forced to admit that the Triple Alliance is not morally worse than the Triple Entente.'

Professor Usher here ignores the limits which moral considerations might have been expected to impose upon 'the 'expression of nationality'; yet he plainly sees 'that the 'present situation is literally without precedent in the history 'of the world.' Alike in the methods adopted to secure success, and in the actual conduct of the war, the appalling results of the acceptance of the gospel of force and of the degradation of lofty ideals stand recorded. In no war has there been such a wholesale exhibition of organised mendacity. The maxims which Frederick the Great bequeathed to his countrymen have been literally translated into action.

'If possible, the Powers of Europe should be made envious against one another in order to give occasion for a *coup* when opportunity offers. . . . When he is about to conclude a Treaty with some foreign Power, if a Sovereign remembers that he is a Christian, he is lost. . . . War is a business in which the slightest scruple spoils the whole matter. Where can an honest man be found willing to carry on a war, if he had not the right to make regulations justifying pillage, incendiarism and carnage?'

Such are the principles by which Pan-Germanism has been guided to disaster, and they are in full accordance with the doctrines of the professors. The worship of force has destroyed, for the time at least, the chivalry of Germany, and made it impossible for Germans to understand that a nation can be actuated by higher ideals than greed.

It is a mistake to assume that the present war is the result only of militarism as the term is generally understood. The instructors of youth and the military caste, in dangerous co-operation though with motives differing in some aspects, have acted and re-acted upon each other; but the causes lie deeper than the militarism which Prussia, since 1871, was able to impose upon the German States. Inherited characteristics, centuries of history, economic wants, and dynastic ambitions have all combined to produce nationalism in the extreme form which Germany has come to represent. As Professor Usher points out, the vast schemes of aggression

which she has been taught to cherish are ' merely the expression ' of an ' intensification of national feeling ' that could have been attained only in modern conditions. ' The telegraph, the ' printing press, and the newspaper,' to which may be added a system of national education capable of receiving inspiration from a central source, have given to the world alike a portent and a warning. The obsession of a great and powerful people under the specious guise of patriotism has created the Frankenstein monster of to-day.

War is the supreme dissolvent of illusion, and already the German people are beginning to realise that they have been led to the brink of an abyss. Even the calculations of a great General Staff, held up to the admiration of the armies of the world, have proved worthless; and the reason is plain. Cool thinking is not possible when the imagination is blinded by the hatred inculcated by prophets like Treitschke and von Bernhardi. The German generals made pictures which corresponded to their own desires, and trusted to estimates of the strength of their opponents which had been framed to suit the exigencies of Pan-German aspirations. Every effort that cunning could devise and gold could support has been made to deceive the German people and neutral nations; but the time of disillusionment is at hand, and the effect will be far-reaching. Our own pacifists, who have laboured to assure us that the German menace was imaginary, and to delude us into the reduction of our naval and military preparations, or the abandonment of the weapon of sea-power, have proved to be dangerous guides.

Mr. Norman Angell, on the very eve of war, hastened to explain that ' the occupation of Belgium, Holland, and possibly ' the North of France ' would be a disadvantage to Germany, that we could serve France best by leaving her to be crushed, and that these were the firm convictions of ' the overwhelming ' majority of the English people.' Will he or his disciples now allege that he spoke for England, and that it would have been better for little Belgium, devastated and bleeding, to have preferred the dictates of ' policy and self-interest ' to those of national honour and of fidelity to a solemn international engagement ?

The principal effect of ' The Great Illusion ' and its *sequelae* has been to encourage the belief cherished in Germany that

Great Britain was dominated by commercial considerations, could safely be trusted to ignore a ' scrap of paper,' and would wait, in growing decadence, until the final blow, which would give to Germany the dominion of the sea, and therefore of the world, could be struck. The ' infamous proposal '—a striking proof of moral depravity—which was intended to prepare the way for this consummation of Pan-Germanism, was scornfully rejected, and with one voice the whole British Empire proclaimed that it would fight to the last in defence of the national honour. The economic pacifists in the future will not be able to assert that the idea of the soul of a nation is ' very mischievous moonshine,' or that sentiment, political morality, and the sense of duty have been obliterated by the law of ' self-interest.' Mr. Angell's conception of ' The State ' has been destroyed by the fiery breath of War.

To forecast all the results of the tremendous conflict now in progress is impossible. It is certain only that the heavy sacrifice of men and treasure will severely strain the resources of the belligerents, that neutrals also must suffer in greater or less degree, and that for tens of millions life will be made harder for many years to come. Stress arising from the destruction of capital on a vast scale will impose some reduction of armaments as a necessary means of restoring financial stability. A period of peace may be expected. More should be possible. In the re-settlement of Europe, there will be opportunities for removing some potential sources of future conflict by territorial adjustments based on the principle of nationality. The war will change the outlook of the European peoples and will provide warnings which cannot be disregarded. The Triple Alliance, which affected to keep the peace until the dominant partner had matured his arrangements for war, has already passed away, and Austria, stricken almost to death and threatened with disruption, will never again be the facile tool of Prussian ambitions. The tragic disillusionment of the German people will have profound consequences, and it may well be that a healthier spirit will arise out of the ruins of Pan-Germanism, and that internal forces will complete the destruction of militarism which the sword of the Allies has begun.

It has been argued that the deadliness of modern weapons would render war impossible. This theory is no longer tenable, since the soldier of to-day has proved capable of endurance

in conditions of far greater nerve stress than those which his predecessors encountered, and has borne losses formerly regarded as decisive. On the other hand, the imagination of mankind has been staggered by the swift and appalling destructiveness of the latest engines of war, and by the revival of the methods of Tilly and Wallenstein by their successors of the twentieth century. The naked realities of war have been brought home to vast numbers of men and women with force and directness unapproached in the past. Never before have six countries learned simultaneously the meaning of invasion. Never before has the violent clashing of war with all the ideals and aspirations of civilisation been so powerfully demonstrated. And when the star of peace returns, the dreams of Erasmus, Henry IV. of France and Sully, William Penn, the Abbé de Saint Pierre, Kant, and Tennyson may be recalled, and the consciousness of mankind will turn with earnest longing to the prevention of international strife. But as world conditions now stand, I do not believe that all causes of war can be eliminated, and I am not sure that the total abolition of war would benefit mankind. There is an element of truth in the words of Aristotle :

'War compels men to be just and moderate ; but peaceful ease tends to make men insolent.'

National and personal self-sacrifice is still an ennobling force, and amidst the enormous evils of the present war we can discern redeeming features. In this time of supreme trial, much that is small and mean has disappeared from our public life. The imagination of all classes has been profoundly touched by the devoted gallantry and endurance of our splendid sailors and soldiers and by the sufferings of Belgium. The sense of shared duty in face of a common danger has united the whole Empire, and sympathy with the bereaved and the suffering has inspired all hearts. We cannot estimate the moral and spiritual effects of these impulses upon the life of our nation. And yet the historian of the future may decide that this war ought to have been impossible, though he will surely trace its real causes to the deep-seated and artificially stimulated illusions of a great people—illusions which threatened the liberties of the world and which war alone could dispel.

SYDENHAM OF COMBE.

MILITARISMUS: ABROAD AND AT HOME

1. **Britain's Case against Germany.** By Professor RAMSAY MUIR. Manchester University Press. 1914.
2. **Why We are at War.** By Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History. Clarendon Press. 1914.
3. **The Case of Belgium.** Published for the Belgian Delegates to the U.S.A. The Macmillan Company. 1914.
4. **Fighting in Flanders.** By E. ALEXANDER POWELL. Heinemann. 1914.
5. **Parliamentary Papers.**

IN one of the best of the many recruiting speeches that have been made up and down the country, Mr. Balfour, speaking at Bristol, pointed out that the greatest crime of the war was the desire of Germany to dominate the world:

> 'Unhappily for herself, unhappily for mankind, Germany has apparently felt that it was not enough to be great, honoured, wealthy and secure, but that no nation worthy of the name, having domination within its grasp, should fail by all means, fair or foul, to pursue domination until it was secured.'—'Observer,' Dec. 13, 1914.

This, as Mr. Balfour rightly said, is the root crime of the war, and the crimes committed in Belgium and in France are but episodes in this greatest crime. Frank avowal of this ambition of Germany is made in the pre-war German literature which has since the war become so familiar to English readers. The same desire is expressed in more restrained, but sufficiently explicit, language by the Imperial Chancellor himself in his defence of the war made in the Reichstag on December 2nd. After reviewing the main diplomatic events since 1911, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg said: 'England was willing to come to an understanding 'with us in individual questions, but the first principle always 'was that Germany's free development of strength must be 'checked by the balance of power.' ('Times,' Dec. 4, 1914.) In other words, England objected to the German desire to

dominate Europe. Therefore it was necessary, in Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's words, to 'warn the British Govern-'ment' of the 'serious danger that British policy meant for 'the peace of the world.' The alternative was plainly put to us; we must either assent to the unbalanced supremacy of Germany on the Continent or take the risk of a world-wide war. In fairness to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, and to the German nation, it must be added that they also impute to us the desire to dominate. To quote again the Imperial Chancellor's words: 'For decades the British insular in-'tellect has been evolving the dogma that the arbitrament 'of the world is due to England, which she can only maintain 'by undisputed supremacy on sea and by the much-quoted 'balance of power on the Continent.' How far this charge in certain circumstances might be justified will be discussed presently. For the moment it is sufficient to insist that Germany, through her most responsible minister, frankly confesses that she regarded war as inevitable when she found that England was resolute in maintaining the balance of power as an obstacle to 'the free development of Germany's 'strength.'

This desire to dominate, to which Germany confesses, and which she also imputes to us, is intimately connected with the spirit which the Germans call 'Militarismus.' Of the many splendid features of the soldier's character grateful civilians are even more conscious to-day than at any previous period. But soldiers, like all the rest of us, have the defects of their qualities. It is essential for the soldier's success that he should learn to obey without question, or to command without hesitation, according to the position he occupies, and often he has to do both simultaneously. He therefore acquires the habit of regarding men as creatures made to take, or to give, orders. The desire to dominate becomes as natural to him when he has reached the higher ranks as it was easy to him to practise obedience when learning his profession. That so many English soldiers resist this natural temptation is due to the non-military complexion of our people and the liberty-loving character of our race. In the same way the French as a nation, though they have often been inspired with a desire for military glory, have never been infected with a sheer brutal lust for military domination. A nation that

at the greatest crisis in its history could take for its motto 'Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité' is constitutionally incapable of adopting the ideals of the drill sergeant. The militarismus of Germany is a combination of national temperament with universal military discipline. It must be remembered that in Germany there has never been a general and successful revolution of the people against their oppressors, like the revolution in England against the Stuarts and the French revolution against the Bourbons. The conception of individual liberty never seems to have taken hold of the German people as it has of the other peoples of Western Europe. Instead we find German professors and writers devoting themselves persistently to the glorification of the power of the State and to the task of persuading the German people that their main duty is to devote their lives to the expansion of the German Empire. When to these national and intellectual influences is added the influence of a rigid military discipline, enfolding the whole people, it is not surprising that the German nation should be infected with the worst form of militarismus, the mere desire to dominate.

It is hardly less surprising that Germans should come to believe that any methods of diplomacy or warfare which contribute to the attainment of German ambitions are legitimate. Men who have been accustomed to the brutal discipline of the German army are not likely to shrink from acts of brutality when stirred by the passion of war. Here is a description of German methods of enforcing discipline taken from Mr. Powell's 'Fighting in Flanders'—a book which happily evaded the British censorship and has enabled English readers in both hemispheres to catch a glimpse of the realities of war:

> 'Only once did I see a man ill-treated. A sentry on duty in front of the general headquarters failed to salute an officer with sufficient promptness, whereupon the officer lashed him again and again across the face with a riding-whip. Though welts rose at every blow, the soldier stood rigidly at attention and never quivered. It was not a pleasant thing to witness. Had it been a British or an American soldier who was thus treated there would have been an officer's funeral the next day.'

To Mr. Powell's piquant comment may be added the reflection that it is only in a country where military service is compulsory that such an incident could occur. Where enlistment is

voluntary no self-respecting man could be found to enter a service where he was liable to be slashed across the face by any officer who chose to think himself aggrieved. Nor is a man who has humbly suffered such an outrage, or seen his comrades so suffer, likely to make an effort to preserve defenceless non-combatants from needless injury in war. He is more likely to try to get level with the world by passing on to others the brutality he has himself endured.

This brutalising character of German military discipline helps to explain the disregard which the Germans have shown for the rules of warfare definitely accepted by them at the Hague Conference of 1907. Article 50 of the Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land says:

'No collective penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which it cannot be regarded as collectively responsible.'

That is sufficiently explicit, and it was assented to by the representatives of 'His Majesty the German Emperor, King 'of Prussia; the President of the United States of America,' and all the rest of the sovereigns of the world. Yet the German troops have repeatedly taken hostages for the good behaviour of all the inhabitants of a town, and have declared that the hostages would be shot if any single inhabitant of the town should offend. This would be a sufficiently monstrous violation of every principle of justice, as well as of the rules of the Hague Convention, even if the hostages were left at liberty and instructed to use their influence in keeping order. But in many cases the hostages were themselves in custody, so that they were powerless to prevent individual offences for which they were to be punished with death as representatives of the town. Proof of these statements is contained in the proclamations posted up in Belgian towns by the German military authorities. Many of these proclamations have been collected by the Belgian Commission of Inquiry. A considerable number were published *in extenso* in the 'Morning Post' of the 9th of December 1914. For example, on the 25th of August a proclamation signed 'Von Bülow' was posted up in Namur. Clause 3 reads as follows:

'Every street will be occupied by a German guard, who will take ten hostages from each street, whom they will keep under

surveillance. If there is any rising in the street the ten hostages will be shot.'

With the same disregard for the Hague Conventions, General von Bülow, on the 22nd of August, imposed on the town of Wavre a war levy of 3,000,000 francs to punish the people of the town for 'making a surprise attack on the German troops.' Lieutenant-General von Nieber, in a letter demanding payment of the fine, wrote:

'The town of Wavre will be set on fire and destroyed if the payment is not made when due; without distinction of persons, the innocent will suffer with the guilty.'

The German military conscience appears indeed to be more than reconciled to the idea of punishing the innocent with the guilty. On the 5th of October a notice signed by Field-Marshal Baron von der Goltz, Governor-General of Belgium, was posted in Brussels, calling attention to damage that had been done to a railway line and telegraph wires. The proclamation continues:

'In future the localities nearest to the place where similar acts take place will be punished without pity; it matters little if they are accomplices or not. For this purpose hostages have been taken from all localities near the railway line thus menaced, and at the first attempt to destroy the railway line, or the telephone or telegraph wires, they will be immediately shot.'

No further evidence is needed to prove the deliberate disregard by the German army of one of the most emphatic of the Hague Conventions. Incidentally these proclamations, which the Belgian Commission of Inquiry has collected and published, contain striking evidence of the colossal arrogance which German militarismus begets. At the Château des Bruyères on the 6th of September Commandant-Major Dieckmann drew up a series of regulations which were posted in the Commune of Grivegnée two days later. Among them was the following:

'I insist that all civilians who move about in my district, particularly those of Beyne-Heusay, Fléron, Bois-de-Breux, and Grivegnée, show their respect to the German officers by taking off their hats, or lifting their hands to their heads in military salute. In case of doubt every German soldier must be saluted. Anyone who disregards this must expect the military to make themselves respected by every means.'

In this case there is not even any question of military exigencies; it is a piece of sheer insolence. The cruelty of it can be appreciated when we remember that the people who were thus required to doff their hats to German soldiers were the inhabitants of a country that Germany had invaded and overrun without any shadow of moral justification and in defiance of her own pledges.

Of the effect of militarismus upon the conduct of the individual soldier horrible stories have already reached the British public. Many of these stories are so horrible that the public, quite wisely, has been cautious in accepting them at their face value. The Commission of Inquiry appointed by the Belgian Government to investigate the conduct of the German troops has published a series of reports giving details of cases examined, and the gist of these reports has been re-published in the English press. The earlier facts investigated were embodied in a formal statement which was presented to the President of the United States by a special mission despatched for that purpose by the King of the Belgians. This statement, with the text of President Wilson's non-committal reply, has been published in convenient book form by the Macmillan Company under the title 'The Case of Belgium.' Necessarily such a statement presents only one side of the case, and Englishmen have a very sound objection to passing judgment upon the strength of an *ex parte* statement. The British Government has therefore appointed a Commission to inquire into the allegations made against the German troops and to present a report, after examining the evidence with, as far as possible, the same care that an English judge would exercise in trying a criminal charge. It is too soon yet to speak of the work of this Commission, except to say that a large mass of information has been collected and has already been sifted by experienced barristers.

For neutral evidence of the conduct of the Germans in Belgium the reader may again be recommended to consult the extremely interesting book of Mr. Powell, above referred to. Here, for example, is Mr. Powell's description of Aerschot:

'In many parts of the world I have seen many terrible and revolting things, but nothing so ghastly, so horrifying, as Aerschot. Quite two-thirds of the houses had been burned, and showed unmistakable signs of having been sacked by a maddened soldiery

before they were burned. Everywhere were the ghastly evidences. Doors had been smashed in with rifle-butts and boot-heels; windows had been broken; furniture had been wantonly destroyed; pictures had been torn from the walls; mattresses had been ripped open with bayonets in search of valuables; drawers had been emptied upon the floors; the outer walls of the houses were spattered with blood and pock-marked with bullets; the sidewalks were slippery with broken wine-bottles; the streets were strewn with women's clothing. . . . This was no accidental conflagration, mind you, for scattered here and there were houses which stood undamaged, and in every such case there was scrawled with chalk upon their doors: "Gute Leute. Nicht zu plündern."'

The facts here detailed are not denied by the Germans. Their defence is that the German Chief of Staff was shot by the burgomaster's son while peaceably dining at the burgomaster's table. The Belgians reply that the burgomaster's son fired to defend his sister's honour. But even if we assume that the act of this youth was entirely unprovoked it still furnishes no excuse for the pitiless massacre that followed and for the burning and looting that accompanied it. Article XXVIII. of the Hague Convention, concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, declares that: 'The giving over 'to pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, 'is forbidden.' A fortiori, it is contrary to the customs of war to burn and pillage a whole town because one of the inhabitants has committed a crime. But the spirit of German militarismus overrides all principles of equity. It sets up the dogma that the army is sacrosanct, and that any attack upon it may be avenged by measures of brutality sufficient to strike terror into the heart of a whole nation.

In our own country, happily, there is no danger of militarismus taking on these extreme forms; but we have our own dangers, and some of them are already being realised. The proclamation of martial law and the establishment of military control over the liberties of the people, including the liberty of the Press, have already produced changes of very grave importance in our system of government.

Hitherto, one of the most dearly cherished rights of an Englishman has been the liberty to criticise the government of his country—a government that he helps to pay for and helps to appoint. That right is being surreptitiously impaired by the power which the Government wields through the Press censorship.

The military case for the creation of some censorship is unanswerable. If any person in contact with our army were free to communicate to the Press of the world any piece of information that he was able to collect, it is certain that the enemy would learn facts which might be of enormous military importance. Therefore it was necessary that the military authorities should control at any rate the cables, so that nothing could go over the wire which might benefit the enemy. Further, it was necessary to have some control over the publication of news conveyed by letter or by word of mouth, for this also might in many cases travel fast enough to help the enemy. These are the true functions of a Press censorship in time of war, and at the outset of the war these were the only functions claimed. But the moment any organisation obtains uncontrolled power the desire for domination grows. The first Press censor was principally distinguished for his complete inability to understand the work entrusted to him and for his lack of courage and candour in allowing others to take blame for his faults; the second censor has set himself to establish a Prussian bureaucracy in Whitehall which has been used to suppress news and comments of which he and his ministerial colleagues disapprove. Incidentally the Press censorship has conducted its more or less routine work with a sustained stupidity which almost passes belief.

This last point is one of which the general public naturally knows nothing; it is familiar enough to all journalists. Many of the stupid things done affect only what may be called the machinery of journalism, and though they cause infinite irritation and waste of time and money their silliness can be appreciated only by those engaged inside newspaper offices. Other achievements of the Press censorship, though not known to the general public, are of public interest, for they prove that the censorship is in practice used for other purposes than the withholding of news from the enemy. A few examples may be given:

1. The news of the landing of British troops in France was not allowed to be published in newspapers in the United Kingdom till more than a week after the news, officially announced by the French Government, had appeared in the Paris newspapers, and was consequently known all over Europe.

2. Mr. Asquith's speech, announcing the arrival of Indian troops at Marseilles, was not allowed to be telegraphed to America, though it had appeared in most of the newspapers of the United Kingdom. The news was also suppressed in some of the later editions of the London papers.

3. The news of the capture of Brussels by the Germans was held back from this country for many hours.

4. Quotations from official or authoritative statements that have already been published are frequently suppressed. For example, in an article commenting on the capture of Antwerp, two quotations were made from the official statement issued by the Admiralty and published on the previous day. These quotations were cut out from the proof submitted to the Censor; no other alteration was made in the article.

Again, in an article published in December, reviewing the earlier phases of war, a quotation was made from a statement by an eminent French general which had appeared in a Paris newspaper. This quotation—which was merely a speculative expression of opinion upon contingencies long gone by—was cut out by the Censor.

5. Gibraltar is subject to the rigid control of the Censor; but Spanish journalists are free to visit Gibraltar, to use their eyes, and send dispatches from Algeciras to Madrid, whence the news quickly passes to Germany. The result is that the arrival of British squadrons at Gibraltar, the reception given to passing territorial battalions, and other news of general interest, is made public in Germany but concealed from the British Empire.

6. It is a matter of constant occurrence that news which has appeared in the Dutch papers, and therefore must obviously be known in Germany, is not permitted to appear in English or Scottish papers.

7. Frequently a piece of news is shut out from London papers, but allowed to appear in provincial papers.

8. Occasionally, one London agency will be allowed to receive a cable message in full, and the same message sent to another address will be heavily censored.

The above examples are intended merely to illustrate what may be called the honest stupidity of the censorship. Let us pass to achievements which are at least equally stupid, but hardly merit the epithet honest. One of the worst occurred

while Mr. F. E. Smith was censor. The story is now an open secret, and there is no harm in telling it. The 'Times' received from their correspondent in France a very sensational account of the retreat from Mons. It was submitted to the Censor. Mr. F. E. Smith read it, touched it up, and returned it to the editor with a letter urging him to print it as amended. It was so printed; there was a cry of indignation from the public, and attention was called to the matter in the House of Commons; but, instead of acknowledging the part he had played, Mr. Smith allowed Parliament and the country to believe that the 'Times' had published the article on its own responsibility, solely to make a journalistic sensation. This lack of candour was all the more regrettable, for the article, though sensational in style, was not in substance far from the truth, and the Censor's desire that it should be published was presumably due to a belief that it would stimulate recruiting, which it certainly did.

Under Sir Stanley Buckmaster there has been no sensationalism. The present Solicitor-General is a man with a deservedly high reputation in Parliament, and in the country, for straightforwardness of character and honesty of political conviction. *Corruptio optimi pessima.* The power to suppress free speech is a dangerous power to entrust to any man; and so serious has been the influence of his new duties upon Sir Stanley Buckmaster that we find him on the 12th of November in the House of Commons claiming the right to suppress news which might 'unduly depress the people,' and to suppress criticism that 'might destroy public confidence in the Government' or 'cause distress or alarm to the people by leading them to 'think that affairs were really in a very serious state.' Subsequently, under parliamentary pressure, the Solicitor-General to some extent modified this statement; but there is no proof that his office does not continue to act upon these principles. On the contrary, there is clear evidence that, under his control, the Press Bureau has been used to keep the British public in ignorance of facts with which our enemies have long been familiar. The most striking illustration is the case of the sinking of H.M.S. 'Audacious' off the coast of Ireland in October. This incident was witnessed by such a large number of people on board the liner 'Olympic' that permanent secrecy was impossible. After a very brief delay

the news appeared in Swedish, German, and Italian papers. Full accounts, with numerous photographs, appeared in due course in the American press. Early in December the 'Quarterly Review' first broke the long silence of the Press and dealt fully with the incident; yet still the official pretence was maintained that the 'Audacious' had not been sunk, and the daily papers only indulged in covert references to the disaster. In fairness to Sir Stanley Buckmaster it must be added that the responsibility for this colossal mistake rests not with him, but with Mr. Winston Churchill. The effect has been to discredit all Admiralty statements. Nobody can now feel sure that the Admiralty is not concealing other disasters. For the failure to announce the loss of the 'Audacious' was aggravated by the subsequent publication of a list of naval losses which purported to be a complete statement of all losses up to date; so that positive mis-statement was added to negative concealment.

Unfortunately, this is not the only instance in which the Press Bureau has acted as an instrument for the deception of the public. When the German raid on Hartlepool, Whitby, and Scarborough took place various unofficial telegrams were sent to London from the coast stating that two or more of the raiding vessels had been sunk. These telegrams were submitted to the Press Bureau and were 'passed for publication,' although the Bureau knew from the Admiralty that all the German ships had got away. Happily, London newspaper editors with one accord declined to avail themselves of this official permission to publish statements known to be inaccurate. The defence of the Bureau in this case would doubtless be that it takes no responsibility for the accuracy or inaccuracy of news; but this surely was a case where the censorship might fairly have used its powers to prevent the dissemination of false news. In practice, if news is unfavourable to our cause it is liable to be suppressed on the alleged ground of inaccuracy, often when it is in fact accurate; but any highly coloured piece of fiction is allowed to go forward if it represents England winning victories. The Prussianised officials at Whitehall act invariably on the assumption that the British public consists of a parcel of children to be kept in good temper by a succession of pretty fairy tales.

Incidentally, they use their power to suppress news that has

no direct connexion with the war, but that might prove politically embarrassing to members of the Government. Two instances may be given. In November the Government decided to send Sir Henry Howard on a mission to the Vatican. The decision in itself was probably quite wise, but the Government were afraid that their extreme Protestant supporters might possibly object, and therefore strict injunctions were issued to the Press to say nothing about the matter. This was an absolutely unwarrantable abuse of the powers of the Press Bureau. It was also—like most acts taken in defiance of well-established principles of government—extremely foolish; for the incident was immediately surrounded with an air of mystery and underhand dealing, which stimulated that very suspicion on the part of Protestants which the Government were anxious to avoid.

The other instance is equally instructive. On the 19th of September, 1914, Mr. Lloyd George delivered a recruiting speech at the Queen's Hall, London. It is officially described as a 'Great War Speech,' and was doubtless excellent for its purpose. But in the course of his very effective rhetorical attacks upon the German Emperor, Mr. Lloyd George made a most unfortunate reference to the Prophet of Islam. He had been quoting the arrogant boast of the German Emperor that the spirit of God had descended on him, and that he was God's vicegerent. 'There has been nothing like it,' added Mr. Lloyd George, 'since the days of Mahomet.' Of course the Chancellor of the Exchequer had no deliberate intention of insulting Mahommedans. He simply spoke without realising the effect of his words, though he might have realised how Mahommedans must feel, had he paused to think what Christians would have felt if instead of 'Mahomet' he had said 'Christ.' Unfortunately, this reflection did not come to him even when he was revising his speech for the press; for the passage above quoted is taken from the pamphlet reissue of the speech 'specially authorised and revised by 'the Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.'*' All this, however, might be allowed to pass. Every man, and especially so busy a man as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, is liable to make a slip of the tongue or of the pen. It is the sequel that is

* Published by C. Arthur Pearson.

important. Early in October there was a meeting of Indians resident in London, summoned to hear an address from H.H. the Aga Khan, in connexion with the organisation of an Indian Hospital Corps for the front. Most of the Indians present were Mahommedans. It was notorious that their feelings had been deeply wounded by Mr. Lloyd George's speech, and the Aga Khan very properly took advantage of the opportunity to deal with the incident and to explain that no offence was meant. It was known that he would do this, and special arrangements had been made by the Press to secure an accurate verbatim report of this portion of his speech. This is what he said :

'I may speak of one matter of special interest to Mussulmans, for it is one in which I am confident we shall have the most cordial sympathy of our Hindu and Parsee brethren. Representations made to me from many quarters, as well as my own reading of the speech, showed that Moslem sensibilities have been deeply wounded by an observation Mr. Lloyd George let fall in the otherwise inspired and splendid recruiting speech he delivered in London on the 19th of September. The just scorn and ridicule that he poured upon the blasphemous claim of the Kaiser to be the weapon and the sword of the Almighty, was followed by an unhappy and an unfortunate comparison that there has been nothing like it since the days of Mahomet. It is most unfortunate that at the time when the Mussulman subjects of the King-Emperor, constituting nearly a quarter of the population within His Majesty's Dominions, are eagerly responding to the call of the hour, a leading Minister of the Crown, whom we all respect, should have likened, or should have appeared to liken, the arch-enemy of this Empire, who has wantonly plunged Europe and the world into unexampled suffering, with the Prophet of Islam. Gentlemen, the Chancellor of the Exchequer may not be able to reciprocate the veneration for the Founder of our faith which we are taught from childhood to give to the Founder of the Christian faith, but he might at least show towards him the respect and reverence we all accord to the memories of the great sons of Christendom who do not belong to our religion as the Founder of Christianity does. It is, however, my personal belief and conviction that the observation, coming from one who has never lived outside this country, or in contact with Moslem people, was, so to speak, an unconscious sort of passing reference not really meant towards the Prophet of Islam personally, but towards the name. I am sure it was not meant to be offensive, and it was unpremeditated ; but I venture to urge that leading statesmen, and also publicists, should be careful not to play thus thoughtlessly and gratuitously into the hands of the enemies of the Empire.'

Within a couple of hours after the delivery of the speech an order was issued by the Press Bureau directing the news-

papers to omit from their reports of the Aga Khan's speech all references to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The only excuse that could be put forward was the possibility that the speech might direct the attention of Mahommedans in India to an incident which would otherwise conceivably have been unknown to them. But this possible defence for the Press Censor's high-handed act fails utterly, for the simple reason that the Aga Khan's speech was only suppressed in the United Kingdom and not in India. It is, indeed, from an Indian paper that the above report is taken. The whole truth is that the Press Censorship was used to prevent English people from reading the very dignified and measured terms in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had been rebuked for his foolish blunder. When the Aga Khan appeals to Mahommedans to set their loyalty to the British Crown above their regard for the Khalifate held by the Sultan of Turkey, his words are telegraphed all over the world at the expense of the Foreign Office; when he ventures to rebuke a member of the Cabinet for a piece of stupidity the extinguisher of the Press Bureau is placed upon him.

When these things are done in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry? Ministers are so puffed up by the arbitrary powers conferred upon them by various statutes hurried through Parliament, and by the cessation of ordinary political criticism, that they act as if they believed that a Cabinet minister can do no wrong.

If the danger here indicated were merely domestic, there would be no need to feel much anxiety. The English people have successfully resisted a good many tyrannies in the past, and are not likely to succumb to the newer forms of tyranny now being tried upon them. The real danger is that the people themselves may become infected with the desire to dominate, even as their ministers have been. Earlier in the present article it was pointed out that the Germans accuse us of the same desire to rule the world which they confess themselves to feel. Nor is the accusation a new one. There have been periods in history when practically the whole of Europe agreed in denouncing the insolent arrogance of John Bull. If such sentiments have not recently been expressed it is because European countries have realised that, however strong England might be upon the sea, on land she was weak in comparison

with the great military States, and therefore could not possibly aspire to universal domination. But even as regards our sea power it is worth while for a moment to try to realise how that aspect of our national policy must look to other countries. It amounts to a demand that, over the greater part of the physical surface of the globe, the power of England is to be supreme. Other countries with extensive sea-boards and scattered colonial possessions may excusably feel irritated that we should so resolutely insist upon this world-embracing supremacy. Insist upon it we must. On no other condition would our island home be safe or our overseas dominions secure. The sea is all one, and if we are to have—as we must have—sufficient balance of sea power to defeat any naval force that might attack our coasts, or our commerce, or our colonies, we must, by the nature of sea warfare, be potentially supreme in every ocean. This is no new doctrine. It has been the consistent policy of our country for centuries, and when it ceases to be our policy England will cease to count among the great nations of the earth. But if we compel other great Powers to submit to our supremacy at sea, we cannot also in fairness ask them to concede to us even equality on land. For were England not only the unquestioned mistress of the seas, but also the equal on land of any of the great military Powers, it would be possible for her to become, what Germany has aspired to be, the bully of the world. In our own interest, not less than from a sense of fair play, we have to keep that possibility from our grasp. We may be convinced in our own minds that we should use the power well—there are no limits to a nation's capacity for self-approbation—but we cannot expect that other nations would consent to entrust their liberties to our forbearance. For the sake of their own preservation they would be compelled to combine against our militarismus, exactly in the same way that France and Russia and England formed an *entente* to resist the militarismus of Germany.

But it may fairly be asked, Can we afford to be relatively weak on land? In considering this crucial question we have to take into account not only the necessity of defending our own territory but also the obligations we may have incurred to other Powers. Until the present war broke out the advocates

of compulsory military service for Great Britain invariably based their plea upon the specious pretext of home defence. Since the war less has been heard of this plea. Indeed the very people who used to be among the keenest supporters either of compulsory service for home defence, or of Lord Haldane's territorial scheme (which again is based upon the pretext of home defence), are now complaining because the men to whom they preached this doctrine are acting upon it. For example, Lord Esher, under date Dec. 19th, 1914 (see 'Morning Post' Dec. 21st, 1914), writes to a correspondent:

'It is perfectly incomprehensible to me that any man serving in the Territorial Force should fail at a moment like this to take the obligation of Imperial service. . . . I have, unfortunately, lists of Territorial units which show a larger proportion of what are called "Home Service Men" than of what are called "Imperial Service Men." In every one of these cases I fear that the fault lies with the commanding officers, and not with the men themselves.'

Lord Esher is wrong. The ultimate fault lies with men like himself and Lord Haldane, and with the members of the National Service League, for elaborating and defending the proposition that this country requires a mass of inadequately trained men to serve for home defence only. When military experts continue for years to preach this doctrine, with incidental suggestions that men who object to being compelled to serve as soldiers 'for home defence' are guilty of moral turpitude, it is not surprising that the lesson has sunk deeply into the mind of the nation. The mischief done is considerable. Lord Esher's regret that men are enlisting for home defence only has long been shared by the recruiting authorities at the War Office. In an interview published in the 'Daily Graphic' of Nov. 24th, 1914, a 'prominent official in White-hall' said:

'Last week three times as many men enlisted in London and the home counties for home defence as there were for general service. Over and over again they stipulate that they shall not be sent abroad. They join the Territorials so as to get a girl and make her believe they are going to the front. We shall not do anything until we stop enlistment for the Territorials.'

The suggestion contained in the last sentence is alone sufficient to condemn the absurd principle on which the

Territorial Army and the National Service Campaign * are equally based. Happily a large part of the nation has grasped the essential truth that for the defence of these islands British soldiers are now wanted in France or Belgium, not in Suffolk or Yorkshire. The men themselves who have honourably taken on full responsibility express their sense of the realities of the situation by genially chanting 'Home, Sweet Home' as they pass groups of recruits enlisted for home defence only. Happily, too, many of the older Territorial regiments have had the patriotism to volunteer *en masse* for foreign service, and even zealous advocates of the old programme of the National Service League have had the courage to repudiate the most important argument that the League used to employ—the fear of invasion. For example, the 'Morning Post,' on Nov. 4th, 1914, in a leading article; says: 'No bogey of invasion should divert 'the authorities from the prime duty of supplying Sir John 'French with abundant reinforcements.' Yet less than a year ago, on Feb. 27th, 1914, a deputation of the National Service League, headed by Lord Roberts, waited upon the Prime Minister to press upon him the danger of invasion, and to urge that it could only be met by compulsory training for home defence.

The present is not the occasion for pointing out the relative efficiency of military as compared with naval defence against either an invasion or a raid; but it is worth while to note that the country has recently had experience of a type of raid against which soldiers would be literally worse than useless. If there had been a hundred thousand soldiers in Scarborough they could have done nothing whatever against the guns of the German ships, while their presence would have given the Germans complete legal and moral justification for bombarding the town. Doubtless, if Scarborough had been furnished with well-mounted batteries of 12-inch guns, a land defence of the town might have been made effective; but it is clearly impossible to provide such a defence for every harbour and watering-

* The proposals of the National Service League are, or were, that men between the ages of 18 and 30 should be compulsorily trained for brief periods and should 'be liable to be called out for service in the Territorial Force for Home Defence only in a time of grave emergency.'

place upon our long coast-line. The only practicable defence is a naval defence, provided either by an increased number of battleships or cruisers, or by conveniently distributed nests of submarines, or by sunken mines. It is hardly necessary to add that, if we so strengthen our naval defences as to render even one hour's bombardment of our seaport towns almost an impossibility, we can sleep comfortably on the certainty that the lengthy and difficult business of landing troops will be absolutely impossible.

We come back then to the point from which all British military calculations ought to start—the question of how many soldiers we require for oversea service.

Since the war began there has been a tendency in some quarters to argue that our military preparations for the great struggle in which we are now engaged were insufficient. Letters, purporting to be written from France, have even appeared in Swiss newspapers (see 'Morning Post,' Dec. 29th, 1914) arguing that Great Britain has failed in her duty because a large part of France is still in the enemy's hands. This suggestion, though professing to be a criticism of England, is really an insult to France. The duty of defending French soil is a French, not a British, obligation. To argue that England is responsible for preserving France from invasion is to imply that France confesses herself incapable of self-defence and is willing to sink to the position of a British protectorate. Even the suggestion that it was our business to make good French deficiencies will not bear examination. Imagine the boot on the other leg! Imagine that we had so neglected our navy that it could no longer guard our shores from invasion! Is there any Englishman worth his salt who in such circumstances would venture to blame France for not being prepared with a sufficiently powerful navy to defend us? In the same way we may be certain that no true Frenchman blames England because the French army was not ready on the outbreak of the war to resist the German advance. France knew before the war that our army was a small one; she also knew that we were not even pledged to send any land force at all to help her. The army we have actually sent is very much larger than anyone anticipated we could send, and in proportion to its size it has certainly played as important a part in the campaign as any other body of troops.

Similar considerations apply to the case of Belgium. Until a very few years ago the Belgians themselves were so confident of their immunity from attack that they made hardly any preparation for their national defence. When the war broke out only a minority of the Belgian male population had received any military training. Is it seriously suggested that we ought to have established universal military service in this country to defend Belgium when the Belgians thought no such measure necessary for themselves? As a matter of fact, the particular scheme of military organisation so zealously advocated by the National Service League could have had no value whatever for the defence of Belgium. The proposed Territorial Force was only to be liable to be called out for Home Defence, and even if the members composing it had volunteered for foreign service they would only have had behind them four months' recruit training, followed in three successive years by a fortnight's musketry practice. To have sent such men on the outbreak of war to defend the Belgian frontiers against trained German troops would have been sheer massacre. Every Englishman regrets that we could not save Belgium from the hideous wrongs she has suffered, but even if we had possessed a logically complete system of compulsory service, such as that of France, it is by no means certain that the Germans would not still have succeeded in overrunning the greater part of Belgium. France had every motive for defending Belgium; she had, on paper, the men to do it. She failed because her preparations were inadequate and her mobilisation slow. We are not justified in assuming that, if we had professed to maintain an army equal to that of France, our preparations would not have proved equally defective and our mobilisation equally slow. It is certain that the attempt to create a compulsory service army on a Continental scale, in addition to the costly professional army which we must maintain for the peculiar needs of our Empire, would have involved such enormous expense that dangerous cheese-paring would have been practised in one or other of the two armies, or, worse still, in the navy. In addition, there would have been a grave danger, as indicated earlier in this article, that the fears of all Europe would have been aroused by our claim to military power as well as to naval supremacy, and we should have found ourselves face to face with a coalition of States sinking their

differences with one another in order to crush us and divide the plunder.

With a wise instinct we have avoided these dangers and concentrated our preparations on the things essential to our national and imperial defence—a supremely powerful navy and a small but highly efficient army. These have enabled us to preserve our whole Empire from invasion, to maintain our sea commerce practically unimpaired, to drive our enemy's mercantile marine from the seas, and largely to diminish his supplies of the munitions of war and the necessaries of industrial life; they have further enabled us to render from the very outset of the war military assistance of the highest importance to our Allies, and to prepare ourselves to render even greater assistance in the crucial days that are yet to come. As a nation we have good reason to be satisfied both with the sound principle on which our system of national and imperial defence has been based and with the actual results achieved. That improvements are possible no one is likely to deny, but whatever changes may be advocated there is little danger now that any considerable party or group will attempt to persuade this country to adopt the German military system. As the 'Morning Post' wrote on Dec. 12th, 1914, in a well-weighed article dealing with the whole question of our military organisation:

> 'The German military system is in many respects magnificent; but the German soldier, although laborious and brave, does not seem to have the fighting initiative and talent to be expected after three years' training. Perhaps this is due to plunging young men all at once into an iron military system, which must often break their spirits and kill their initiative.'

The article goes on to advocate the introduction of military drill and military exercises into all schools in the United Kingdom, and to urge that if this were followed by 'a course of at 'most twice as many months as the Germans give years it 'would produce a second line of defence quite sufficient for the 'needs of a nation which has no ambitions of military conquest.' So far as military tuition in schools is concerned, there is no reason why the believers in voluntary service should not join hands with the National Service League. Boys are already compelled to go to school and there to follow the curriculum laid down by the State. Slowly the nation is awakening to the fact that the curriculum in our elementary schools has long been

too exclusively based on the conception that education consists of book-learning. That we could build up a better race of men if less time were devoted in schools to the study of books, and more to the development of the body and the training of the hand and the eye, is certain. Nor is there any reason why this part of a boy's schooling should not be based upon military experience and partly directed to military ends. Such military training is itself an excellent form of physical training; but, beyond that, the State is justified in framing its educational curriculum on the assumption that many schoolboys will in after-life wish to become soldiers, and that it is therefore an advantage to them and to the nation that they should learn at school the preliminaries of a soldier's profession. Nor is it a disadvantage to any boy to learn military drill and to practise military exercises. On the contrary, military training in schools tends not only to improve the physique of boys but also to develop that social force which is equally valuable to the individual and to the State, the feeling of *esprit de corps*.

The question of establishing a new form of compulsion in later life raises entirely different issues. It was discussed in this Review in April 1913, and there is no necessity to repeat here the arguments there used. It is sufficent to note that the present war has furnished a magnificent demonstration of the value of our voluntary system, even from a purely military point of view. Still more has this war demonstrated that the military point of view is not the only factor that has to be considered in the supreme problem of national defence. That is the great blunder that Germany has made. Her statesmen assumed that it was only necessary to have the army strong and ready and they could sweep all before them. But scarcely had they begun the war, cynically, wantonly, and without provocation, before they woke up to the fact that moral as well as military forces still count in the world. They then set to work with frenzied haste to try to persuade neutral countries, and their own people, that Germany was fighting in a righteous cause and defending herself against the unprovoked aggression of her neighbours. This implicit confession by the German apostles of militarismus that their creed breaks down in practice is perhaps the most important lesson of the war.

EDITOR.

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THE NEUTRALITY OF SWEDEN

APART from the actual belligerents, there was no country of Europe which was more painfully startled by the outbreak of war last August than Sweden. The first instinctive impulse of the Swedes was to protest in anger against so uncalled-for an interruption of their comfort. A prominent Swedish publicist exclaimed 'The lightning has struck the 'powder-barrel which all the nations have been so busy filling, 'and the whole world is one flame.' For reasons which will presently be defined, the susceptibilities of Sweden, after several years of nervous strain, had calmed down, and the country was looking forward to tranquillity at home and abroad. After some delicate pilotage, the ship of Swedish state had seemed to be in harbour at last, when suddenly, on every side of her, broke out the yapping of guns. Her government did not hesitate for a moment. Whatever might eventually be the necessary action, Sweden's first instinctive duty was to affirm her old policy of neutrality, the strictest neutrality maintained towards all the belligerents in exact equality. No offers—if such were made—could tempt her to forsake the position she had taken up, nor persuade her to join one side or the other. First of all, laying aside all local jealousies, Sweden took the outstretched hand of Norway and the two countries registered a mutual vow under no

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circumstances to let the great war drive either of them into acts hostile to the other.

To understand the position we must realise the political conditions of Sweden last August. The first Liberal government of modern Swedish history was formed by Hr. Karl Staaff in 1905. This was short-lived and was succeeded by a new Conservative era, which lasted until 1911, when Hr. Staaff came into power again. He resigned in February 1914 on account of the constitutional crisis arising out of the defence question. Then a Conservative statesman—as Conservatives count in Sweden—succeeded in forming a cabinet. This was Hr. Hammarskjöld, a politician of weight and honour, and one of the greatest living experts on International Law. He was lucky enough to secure, as his Foreign Minister, Hr. Knut Wallenberg, to whom is due the main direction of Swedish external politics since the war broke out. It is not too much to say that Hr. Wallenberg is the most commanding figure in Sweden to-day, and it is greatly in consequence of his firmness and consistency that no mistakes of importance have been made in the conduct of affairs. He rules the storm with a strong hand, and he has never, from the first moment, wavered in his determination to preserve intact the neutrality of his country. Hr. Wallenberg is a patriot of the purest water, and the welfare, the safety, and the independence of Sweden have been his unique care. That he held out a hand to Denmark at an early stage is a matter of rumour and of probability; what is certain is that he arranged the momentous meeting of the three Scandinavian Kings at Malmö.

In its determination to maintain a position severely aloof, the government of which Hr. Hammarskjöld is the head was faced by not a few difficulties which required patience and tact to overcome. It is useless to deny that there existed a clique, almost a party, in Stockholm, whose sympathies were so strongly with Germany at the very outset as to create an element of anxiety for the Swedish Government. What this clique consisted of, and why it possessed a certain importance, may presently be made clear. For the moment, it is enough to say that its action was based upon the old dread of Russian aggression, which has been for a century past the bugbear of Sweden. The Government never wavered, but it is vain to deny that a certain disquietude reigned as to what would be

the consequences to Sweden if the Allies were victorious and Germany were crushed. Would any power on earth, it was anxiously asked, be able to stem the advance of Russia on her way to the high seas ?

In their policy of neutrality, the Swedish Ministers were supported by their natural opponents, the Liberals and the Social-Democrats. Working-class sentiment, from the first, has been steadily adverse to any participation in the fighting. But there is a military element in the country which, although not numerically strong, is able to make itself loudly heard. The psychology of a professional war-class is simple enough. Those who have been trained to warfare wish to fight, and nothing can be more natural than that they should. They hold fighting to be in itself a good thing, and they see no reason why diplomacy and legislation should prevent it when the cause is just. They resent the interference of politicians ; *silent leges inter arma*, they say, as they did in the days of Cicero. The soldier-caste in Sweden was tired of being inactive, and it looked upon Germany as the typical military country. Swedish officers had long been flattered and cajoled in Prussian military circles, and the society in which they shone at home was openly pro-German.

At the first moment of the crisis, nothing could have been more adroit than the conduct of Germany, or have given clearer evidence of her wide scheme of preparedness. Nothing had been left to chance ; all was arranged beforehand on a perfect plan. Germany knew that a little seed of flame, a spark of anti-neutral prejudice, lay at the heart of the military and aristocratic society of her northern neighbour. That Germany did everything she possibly could to fan this flame into a big fire is a well-known fact, and the means she took are patent. She had formed close and long-standing connexions with the Swedish press, connexions that were of quite an honourable nature, but much more intimate than any which England had dreamed of. German newspapers reached Sweden as abundantly and regularly as usual, and the more or less official German news agencies poured in a constant flow of highly coloured information. Sweden was immediately overrun with emissaries of all sorts and conditions, from the professor, with his Nobel Prize diploma as his passport, to the Social-Democratic deputy waving the red rag of

'Tsardom is the danger of European democracy' in front of his Swedish *Genossen*. Tons of German pamphlets were dumped in Sweden; the German White Book was immediately ready in a Swedish translation; while the thousand and one things which Germany considered necessary to impress Sweden, not with the frightfulness but with the rightfulness of the German cause, were pulled out from their pigeon-holes in Wilhelms-strasse, and were hurried to their Swedish destination under the charge of the egregious Herr von Kühlmann.

Thus Germany acted, and what did the Allies do to counteract her blow? What, in particular, did England do? It is distressing to our national vanity to be obliged to answer—Worse than nothing! Much excuse may be made for the disturbance last August of the ordinary arrangements for the transmission of news by telegraph. There was an universal entanglement which could but result in temporary dislocation. But it is only proper to add that the inexperience and the want of imagination of the new official authorities added immensely and needlessly to the trouble. Private newspaper correspondents attached to friendly countries found their messages delayed until it was no longer worth their while to attempt to push them through. The Censorship, in its playful infancy, laid its little hands on almost every newspaper message sent to a neutral country, and tore it into scraps. For instance—and this was an act of officialdom so stupid that posterity will hesitate to credit it—the verbatim report of Sir Edward Grey's momentous speech in the House of Commons on the 3rd of August, a document which the British Government should have strained every nerve to get quickly transmitted to every country of the world, was held up by the Military Censor for three days! English newspapers which, by an amazing arrangement, were supplied through an agent at Liège, were not able to reach Sweden until the war had been proceeding for three full weeks. The Belgian agent's office and his papers were blown to pieces by the German siege guns. Our English authorities are not to be blamed for this!

Of course things righted themselves by-and-by, but in the meantime the Germans had had the field to themselves, and they certainly had not wasted their opportunity. Yet, with all their well-laid plans, with all their elaborate preparations,

they did not reap any rich harvest. Professor Wilhelm Ostwald, the famous thermo-chemist, was sent from Berlin on an 'absolutely unofficial' visit to tempt Sweden with a future Baltic Empire in which Sweden should be the leading state. He was bluntly told that Sweden did not want Finland back. When further asked what it was proposed that the official language of this future empire should be, he indiscreetly replied 'German, of course.' He then hurriedly returned to Germany, not a little perturbed, moreover, that his Swedish friends should have been so far wanting in tact as to raise the question of the future of Schleswig.

Albert Südekum, the Social-Democratic deputy, who preceded Ostwald, had enjoyed, if possible, still less success with his mission. The Swedish Social-Democratic party has the good fortune to possess in its leader, Hr. Hjalmar Branting, one of the strongest men of his opinions in the whole of Europe. Besides being one of the foremost politicians in Sweden, he is also one of her most eminent journalists. Without hiding his traditional fear of 'tsaristic' Russia, he has shown from the beginning of the war a most decided sympathy for the Allies. The lucidity of Branting's intellect made him comprehend the essential justice of the cause of the Allies, long before their case was presented to the neutral countries, and while other Swedish editors were still undecided. The crime against Belgium justified Hr. Branting in the eyes of his own country. As he says in his weighty contribution to 'King 'Albert's Book': 'But then came the crime against inter-'national law, the violation of Belgian neutrality. For us, 'who intend to defend to the very utmost our neutrality, it 'was like a thrust directed against our own heart.' In spite of these views Hr. Branting maintained an attitude of strict impartiality, and when 'comrade' Südekum arrived to plead the justice of Germany's cause, Branting allowed him to address the party and consented to publish his arguments in the *Social-Demokraten*, the leading party-organ. But he himself replied so effectively to the German missionary, and pulled all his argument so ruthlessly to pieces, that Südekum went back crest-fallen to Germany without having fulfilled the aim of his mission.

Sweden had at first nothing to read but the German pamphlets and the German newspapers. But after some time she

got access to news from the other side as well. The German White Book was followed by the English Blue Book, the French Yellow Book, the Russian Orange Book, and the Belgian Grey Book. Not that Government publications in all the colours of the rainbow could alter Sweden's decision to remain neutral, but she had, at last, an opportunity of judging matters on the evidence of the opposing parties. The result was a marked change in the general tone of the Swedish press, and Wolff's Bureau was no longer looked upon as an immaculate purveyor of nothing but the truth. The largest and most influential of the journals of Sweden, *Dagens Nyheter*, a paper which is admirably conducted and which boasts of a daily circulation of over 90,000, has been eminently fair to the Allies throughout; it has given all the news, from London, Paris, and Petrograd as well as from Berlin, and it is impossible to detect in its opinions any bias for Germany. At the other extremity of journalism, the *Svenska Dagbladet* was at the beginning of the war an outspoken defender of the Prussian cause, but even this paper has never advocated a participation in the struggle, while every month there is apparent a cooling in its zeal for Germany.

The blowing-up of Swedish ships by German mines instantly lowered the temperature of the pro-Germans, and when the attacks on English non-combatants began Swedish sympathy was still further alienated. Such deeds are not in the tradition of the eminently humane and gracious people of Sweden, who have an instinctive and traditional horror of *kultur* of this sort. After the last Norfolk raid the Swedish press did not mince matters. It was unanimous in disapproval, and *Dagens Nyheter* plainly told its German friends that if they persisted in the murder of babies Swedish sympathy would 'turn away in disgust.'

On the other hand, Sweden was made sore by our prohibition of the export of iron ore, but pacified when we rescinded it. Germany also gave deep offence by putting wood on her prohibited list, and this embargo she has not removed. The closure of the North Sea greatly hampered Swedish trade, and produced a considerable exasperation in commercial circles; but the blockade of February last set Swedish opinion still more violently against Germany. In all these balancings of natural and national interest there is no real element of attack

upon the solid principles of neutrality. The aggressive military party has shown itself to be helpless, and its voice is scarcely heard. The majority of Swedish citizens has no wish that Germany should preponderate in the whole world, while the Government, too discreet to take a side, continues with honesty and adroitness to steer the ship of state through the shoals of diplomatic intrigue, which are often hardly less dangerous than the multitudinous reefs of its own intricate coast-line.

For many years Germany has done everything in her power not only to foster sympathetic relations with Sweden and Norway but also to develop in a thousand ingenious ways material and intellectual intercourse between herself and them. As far as Norway is concerned, it is needless to do more than remind ourselves of the Kaiser's annual summer trips to the Norwegian fjords, where his 'Hohenzollern' in its white shining armour became a phenomenon as unavoidable as the Midnight Sun; his lavish contributions to the restoration fund of Trondhjem Cathedral, the Westminster Abbey of Norway; his instantaneous and dramatic despatch of a German liner as a relief ship with foodstuffs and other necessaries to Aalesund when that Norwegian coast-town was devastated by fire; not to speak of his slightly less-appreciated gift to Norway of a hideous giant statue of "Frithiof the Viking.'

In Sweden the Teutonic methods have been somewhat different, and, perhaps, a little more subtle. The Kaiser himself has not been so much in evidence there. His visits to Sweden have been limited to ordinary state appearances, such as are prescribed by international etiquette. The apparition of the phantom hull of the 'Hohenzollern' in Swedish waters has not been entirely neglected, but it has been less frequent than in the fjords of Norway. Sweden has no cathedral restoration fund, and she has been spared the terrible 'high art' of the Kaiser. But intellectual and commercial Germany, hurrying at the heels of military Germany, has taken up the work of its Lord and Master. Quick and comfortable transit of passengers and goods between the two countries has been established by means of the steam ferries between Trelleborg in Sweden and Sassnitz in Germany, a route offering such facilities that the international traffic has increased enormously within a few years. And no wonder,

for a steam ferry as large as a liner and supplied with every luxury takes on board a complete railway train, sleeping and dining cars and all, in such a way that the traveller, having entered his compartment in Stockholm, needs not leave it, unless he wishes to do so, until he arrives in Berlin. There are two daily services in each direction, and they compete irresistibly with the boats which cross the unruly waters of the North Sea from Sweden to England only twice a week.

It is idle to disregard the material advantages gained to Germany by the Trelleborg-Sassnitz route. It has had a great influence on the relations of the two countries as a whole. On the other hand, while energetic attempts have been sporadically made to establish better, quicker, and more modern direct communications between Sweden and England, nothing substantial has been achieved, and the facilities in this respect remain to-day nearly the same as they were twenty-five years ago. Nor is it to the credit of English enterprise that all such attempts as have been made to establish a better state of things have had their origin, not among our own traders, but among Swedes residing in this country. But hitherto they have met with no response whatever.

Let us turn to the intellectual intercourse between the two countries. Any Swedish man of science who has anything of importance to impart—and there are many of them who have—is almost sure to see his essay or treatise immediately translated into German, and discussed in German scientific circles nearly as fully as in his own country. The same is the case with Swedish novelists and playwrights. No Swedish writer of repute has had to wait long for a German publisher, and very often the royalties resulting from the German editions exceed those of his native country. For instance, August Strindberg, whom the Swedes regard as their greatest modern genius, was more highly appreciated in Germany than in any other country, perhaps his own not excepted. It was not until a short time before Strindberg's death that his name was known to a dozen persons in England. It is not a matter of indifference to the Swedes to see their works become standard in Germany almost as soon as, and sometimes even sooner than, in their own country. How many people in England outside a very small circle of specialists could name half a dozen world-famous Swedish

scientists and writers after Linnæus and Swedenborg? In Germany such names are familiar to all educated persons.

Nor is English literature at all a prominent part of the equipment of Swedish intellectual life. There is a fair acquaintance with some of our classics, and no finer translation of Shakespeare exists than that sent forth from the University of Upsala as the life-work of Professor Hagberg. The Shakespearean masterpieces are constantly found on the répertoire both of the State theatre and privately owned stages. The work of several modern English playwrights has been produced with success in each of the Scandinavian countries. Mr. Kipling received the Nobel Prize from the Swedish Academy, and there is a market for a good deal of popular English fiction. But the names of Meredith, Hardy, and Conrad are scarcely known.

When, however, we pass outside the domain of 'belles-lettres,' and enter that of science, politics, and philosophy, that the advantages enjoyed by Germany are seen to be overwhelming. No English works are easily obtainable, while German books of all kinds are found in profusion in every bookshop. This must not be attributed to conscious unwillingness on the part of the Swedish student to avail himself of what English literature has to offer him, but simply to the difficulty which the bookseller has in obtaining English books on reasonable terms. While German publishers flood the Swedish book-market with everything they publish and send out their books '*à condition*' (that is to say, on terms of sale or return), the English publishers sit in their offices waiting for firm orders—and cash. But in a country of a little over five million inhabitants there do not exist many booksellers who can afford to buy outright works that cost from half a guinea to three, while depending on the off chance of selling them. It is a pity that the English publishing trade cannot discover some means of opening to English authors the valuable Scandinavian market. At present they abandon it without a struggle to German enterprise.

The Swedish newspaper press is remarkably active, and, for such a small country, reasonably 'up to date,' but the complexion of a press must to a certain extent depend upon its food. The Swedish press is as independent as the British, and no 'reptile' organs like those created by Bismarck would ever thrive in the Swedish climate, but if a newspaper cannot

get the news it wants it is bound to take what it can get. Quite up to the declaration of war, all telegraphic news sent from this country to Sweden by Reuters had to pass through Wolff's Bureau in Berlin, where it was edited and cooked. Every attempt on the Swedish side—and such attempts have been frequently made—to change this absurd state of things, and avoid the censorship of the branch office in Wilhelmsstrasse by getting into direct communication with London, has failed in consequence of British apathy on the subject.*

Turning from the commercial and intellectual life of Sweden to that of the working classes, the preponderance of German enterprise is no less remarkable. The Swedish workers are Social-Democrats almost to a man and woman. In no other European country has the growth of that party been so rapid, and to-day the Labour Party is numerically the strongest in the Riksdag. Wonders have been accomplished towards improving the lot of the worker, and at the outbreak of the war there were being started other and wider schemes of social betterment.

But, as Hr. H. Branting, the leader of the Swedish Labour Party, has lately said :

> ' Our Labour Movement grew as a German plant before it took root in and was reshaped for the Swedish soil. And when the Swedish workers fought their great defensive battle in the general strike of 1909, their German brethren gave them a powerful support.'

Is it to be wondered at if the Swedish worker has had his eyes directed towards the native land of Marx and Lassalle ?

These favourable conditions for a general Germanophil sentiment throughout the Swedish nation have not, however, met with the success which might have been anticipated. In spite of all the obstacles which have blocked the way for a proper comprehension of English life, English thought, and English institutions, the Swede, who can boast that his nation was the first self-governing people in Europe, has always had a weak spot in his heart for the home of democratic institutions, the land of Dickens, Darwin, Mill, and Gladstone.

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* The economical character of Swedish neutrality is forcibly defined in the February 1915 number of *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift*, by the eminent statistician, Dr. Pontus Fahlbeck, of Lund.

While duly appreciating the energy and the methodical work of the German, he has never been able to pump up any great enthusiasm for him as an individual. To take an instance from business life, an English commercial traveller would always, circumstances and conditions being equal, have preference over a German rival.

It would be an error—and it is an error into which various English residents of Sweden have fallen—to exaggerate the international character of much that has been said in the Swedish press about the situation. In particular, the series of articles which have been published in *Aftonbladet* by Captain Ernst Liljedahl, so lately as February last, have been much discussed and have been construed in a sense dangerously unfriendly to the Allies. We cannot regard them in this light. The writer is a captain in the Swedish army, an ardent democrat, and a prominent member of the Riksdag. It is admitted that his personal sympathies are more with Germany than with Russia. But we are unable to discover, in a close study of Captain Liljedahl's remarkable articles, any expression of a hope that Germany will conquer, and he specifically condemns the treatment of Belgium. His aim is to put clearly before the Swedish public the danger which lurks for Sweden behind the Russification of Finland. His articles, however, carefully read, betray no anti-British feeling, and, like almost all other Swedish democrats, he looks upon England as the home of democratic ideas.

The visit of King Edward VII. to Stockholm in the spring of 1908 was almost immediately followed by a similar visit from the Kaiser. No one witnessing both of these events could avoid observing the enormous difference in the attitude of the inhabitants of the city on these two occasions. The reception of the Kaiser was friendly and even respectful ; the conventional cheers always granted to a visiting monarch were not lacking. But the welcome awarded to King Edward and Queen Alexandra was on a different plane altogether. Here it was obvious that the people had their hearts in the business. The cheers from the enormous crowds of working-class people were deafening, and the air was white with fluttering handkerchiefs. It was a spontaneous outburst on the part of the population, not the ordinary politeness of the inquisitive sightseer. It was democratic Sweden welcoming the representative

of democratic England. It is not only possible but almost certain that in the heartiness of this greeting, quite unusual in Sweden, there lay an expression of gratitude and acknowledgement to the English monarch for the friendly part that England, its Government and its press had played in the recent settlement of the Åland Islands affair.

These islands, situated in the Baltic, quite close to the Swedish coast, were ceded by Sweden to Russia, as an appanage of Finland, in the peace of Åbo after the war of 1809. It is known that this was done through an error or an oversight on the part of the Swedish negotiator, as they were not demanded by Russia. However, ceded they were, and in due time, in spite of repeated promises to England, the largest of them became strongly fortified. During the Crimean war, the British fleet under Napier went into the Baltic, bombarded the Åland fortress of Bomarsund, and razed it to the ground. In the Treaty of Paris 1856, which concluded the Crimean war, the Emperor of all the Russias undertook, as a condition of peace with Great Britain and France, not to fortify the Åland Islands again.

This state of things remained unaltered until 1907, when the Anglo-Russian *entente* was arranged. Very soon M. Isvolsky, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, approached the British and French Governments with the proposition that the Paris Treaty, in so far as it concerned the non-fortification of the Åland Islands, should be considered abrogated. Not that Russia really wanted to fortify the Åland Islands, not that she had any sinister designs on Sweden, but it was a slur on the sovereignty of a Great Power that she was not allowed to do what she liked on her own territory. The susceptibilities of the Swedes are delicate, and the country was dangerously excited by this unexpected occurrence, for a glance at the map shows that the re-fortification of Bomarsund would practically have meant the bottling up of the whole Gulf of Bothnia, and the consequent cutting off of the northern part of Sweden with regard to naval defence. To meet such a danger to the integrity and independence of the country an enormous expense in armaments would have been necessary, an expense which would have crippled the finances of even such a prosperous and economically sound country as Sweden. But quite apart from this, a fortified Åland would have had a most deplorable

moral effect. It would have been a pistol constantly levelled at the heart of Sweden ; it would have meant, as a politician at the time expressed it, ' that the wishes of a Russian minister ' at Stockholm would be turned into commands.'

That the proud and independent Swedes, who do not wish for anything but to live in peace and on the friendliest terms with all their neighbours, should submit to a permanent position of ' hands up,' was not to be supposed for a moment. Directly the facts became known the whole nation was united. Party feeling—and it was running pretty high at that time—disappeared ; the whole press spoke with one voice, and in the then-assembled Riksdag Conservatives combined with Liberals and Socialists in a unanimous protest against any attempt to weaken the defensive position of Sweden.

The further development and settlement of this affair is too recent history to be entered upon here in detail, but it is an open secret that it was the firm attitude of the British Government, backed by almost the entire English press, in insisting upon the *status quo* in the Baltic, that averted the threatening danger from the shores of Sweden. In this crisis, although Germany did nothing to help, her sympathy and even her compassion were expressed with the unctuous effusion of a Codlin.

In the whole of this delicate question, and in the broader and essentially less delicate question of Finland, we shall form no accurate idea of the present position of Sweden unless we glance at her historic character, and try to realise what may be called her historic experience. Sweden possesses the natural dignity of those who have striven for glory, and have won the laurels only to see them wither and turn to dust. She has exercised in years long past the Thucydidean virtues of determination, prudence, and discipline, but she has come in the ripeness of age to accept the summing-up of our divine poet :

> ' Oh heart ! oh blood that freezes, blood that burns !
> Earth's returns
> For whole centuries of folly, noise, and sin !
> Shut them in,
> With their triumphs and their glories and the rest !
> Love is best.'

We shall understand the present attitude of Sweden most

clearly by glancing for a moment at the glories and deceptions of her past.

According to the most ancient legends of the Swedes, it was Odin who founded the Empire of the Svea. He brought his pontiffs out of the Greater Scythia, Svithjód, and marshalled them around the mystic altar which he raised at Sigtuna, on Lake Mælar, where then and there he created Sweden, the Lesser Scythia. The gay little town of Sigtuna, now a mere summer-village on the way from Stockholm to Upsala, is proud of the ruins of the four great minsters which the Esthonians shattered in 1187, but it is imposing to the traveller only when he reflects upon its high antiquity, and on the sacred flame which lighted on its altar the earliest beacon of Swedish nationality. The primal history of the country, and of its gods and pontiff-kings and invading Finnish giants, are they not written in the fabulous chronicles of the Svea, and enshrined for our wonder in 'Ynglingasaga' and in 'Heimskringla'? They are mentioned here because of their beautiful remoteness, and because they give the Swede of to-day a basis for his proper hereditary pride. His nation is no new-comer among the peoples of the earth; on the contrary, though its peaks are shrouded in the thick mist of fable, the solid rock of Swedish history rises up far beyond the Christian era. But as little as Sigtuna desires to-day to rebuild its pagan fanes and renew the worship of Odin, so little does the Sweden of our age nourish an ambition for territorial aggrandisement. To represent the Swedes as anxious to secure something out of the eventual hurly-burly, or as tainted by the land-grabbing fever, is wholly to misjudge the temper of every class in Sweden. Towards the close of the seventeenth century, after the romantic wars of Charles X., which permanently impressed the imagination of Europe, Sweden rose from the negotiations at Copenhagen and at Stolbova in the position of a Great Power. She had not merely an immense and unparalleled prestige, but her territory was twice as extensive as it is to-day. She held the whole of the interior of the Baltic, the mouths of the great German rivers, half the lakes of Northern Russia, and an influence which made itself felt as far off as the Black Sea. But in order to gain this immense territory she had been obliged to bleed herself almost to exhaustion of men and money, and she had acquired the bitter detestation of

all her neighbours. In five years, from having been the champion of Protestantism in Europe, she had earned the detestation of every Protestant power. Sweden had her fill of supremacy, and, like the child set loose in the confectioner's shop, her taste for it was sickened in perpetuity.

It has been observed by an acute Swedish historian, Dr. Oskar Dumrath, that the sources of the prodigious calamities of Sweden after the battles of 1676 and 1677 were 'anti-'ethnographical.' Charles X. was the great example of the conqueror who seeks to enlarge his dominions by a cynical disregard of the elements which he is forcing into the national conglomeration. Pomeranians and Poles, Russians and Prussians, Holsteiners and Danes, all were dragooned by the policy of Magnus de la Gardie into a confederacy, the parts of which remained mutually hateful to one another as well as inherently hostile to the common tyrant. The extraordinarily exciting and picturesque history of Sweden, from the proclamation of Charles IX. in 1600 to the Peace of Nystad in 1721, is an object-lesson in the limits and principles of national ambition. Through indulgence in an appetite for the mere trappings of glory, Sweden sank to the position of a second-rate power, stripped of all her unrighteous conquests, and saved from disaster only by the unity of her own native states. There could not be a wholesomer example of the danger of territorial 'frightfulness,' or of the folly of burdening the fortunes of a people with the weight of unwilling Alsaces and trampled Posens.

But there is an aspect of this historic experience which is little understood by those who look at Swedish affairs from a distance and without special knowledge. The result of her bitter disappointments in the eighteenth century has been to disillusion Sweden completely and for ever as to the colour of the fruits of conquest. At Pultawa and at Fredrikshald those fruits turned to ashen dust between her lips, and if Sweden looks back with romantic pride to the prowess of Charles XII., it is also with a steady determination never again to risk the nation's happiness at the call of military ambition. From the end of the seventeenth century the Swedes gradually withdrew from all their conquests. They abandoned Pomerania and Holstein in 1720, in 1721 they yielded Esthonia and Livonia, in 1809 they made the grievous sacrifice of Finland.

Long before this they had peacefully relinquished to the Dutch the American territories held by the New Sweden Company in the State of Delaware, and finally the island of St. Bartholomew in the West Indies, the last of all the foreign or colonial possessions of Sweden, was peacefully ceded to France. When, in 1877, the Swedish flag was lowered over the court-house of Gustavia, it was a sign that Sweden finally withdrew from all competition with other foreign powers.

Yet there may have been many who have regretted the self-abnegnation of Sweden. The memory of Swedish rule lives pleasantly in the recollection of her former provinces of Pomerania and Esthonia. Her aim never was to subdue, but to educate and raise her subjects, while even in Delaware the Minquas Indians lamented the departure of those whom they called 'Our White Brothers.' Dr. Gustaf Sundbärg claims not too much when he says:

> 'History has not many—perhaps indeed no—instances to present that bear comparison with Sweden's treatment of conquered Finland; how the former moulded the latter into a sister people with the grant of a full share in the civilisation to which she had herself attained; how the superior race literally *educated* the inferior, in just the same manner as in private life the elders educate their juniors, but in a manner which is not by any means regularly adopted between nations.'

It would be easy to multiply instances of this placable and easy attitude of the Swedes, which may involve a weakness as well as a strength, but which at all events is inconsistent with any such desire for territorial aggrandisement as has been absurdly attributed to Sweden by some impatient pressmen. Nor is there in this reserved attitude of the nation anything which responds to the braggart lust of domination which has made Germany so hateful. Left to herself, there is no question that Sweden would repudiate the Devil of Potsdam and all his ways, with the maximum of pacific horror. But she has not been left to herself, and it is necessary, if we are to understand the attitude of Sweden, to give careful attention to what she has persuaded herself to think is the attitude of her neighbour, Russia.

Apart altogether from the instinctive feeling of sympathy with the Finnish nation, whose culture was originally, as we have seen, built up by Sweden, the nation west of the Gulf of

Bothnia has watched the Russification of the east of that gulf with an alarm which may be baseless but must be admitted to be natural. It is not merely the existence of social and racial ties with Finland which makes the treatment of that Duchy a matter of anxiety in Stockholm, but geographical conditions also. We have but to look in the map to perceive that the most elementary sense of self-preservation has made Sweden feel the necessity of putting her house in order with regard to her national defence. But it is imperative on us to admit that as far as Sweden is concerned not the wildest stretch of imagination could put any other construction upon the reorganisation of her defensive forces than the necessity of being prepared, as far as her resources would allow her, to meet any attempt to violate her neutrality and her independence.

The Swedes are a peaceful nation at heart. The old viking spirit that made them go roving over Western Europe, and even as far as Byzantium, is dead. The love of adventure has found other expressions. They may still go down to the sea in their ships, but now it is not for raiding English, German, French or Levantine coasts, but to unravel the secrets of the icebound Arctic and Antarctic regions or to unearth the marvels of the long-forgotten buried cities in the South American jungle. The Swede loves his own country, but he hates no other. His only desire is to live in peace and on good terms with all his neighbours and to be allowed to go on with the development of his own natural resources in forest, mine, and waterfall. He does not want to interfere with any other country, but neither does he want any other country to interfere with him.

The great upheaval that took place in Russia after the Russo-Japanese war brought the Russification of the Grand Duchy to a standstill, and even caused a return to former more liberal methods. But this was only temporary. The revolution suppressed and the danger averted gave new vigour to the work of Russian bureaucracy. It was a case of *reculer pour mieux sauter*. The statesmen watching affairs from Stockholm were alarmed to see the Finnish constitution again violated, time after time, and Finnish citizens and officials imprisoned in Russian fortresses or sent to Siberia. In the name of Russian unification, the ancient liberties of Finland were swallowed morsel by morsel. Strategic railways, of the

ultimate purpose of which there scarcely could be any doubt, were being planned and built at a great pace, thus connecting the railway system of Russia with many points on the Finnish coast. If there had been any doubt left in Swedish minds of the intentions of the militarist clique in Russia, it was swept away by the sensational espionage disclosures which occurred during 1913, and are a matter of public knowledge. Russian military spies were found in great numbers all over the country, and the most disquieting part of this unpalatable business was that the Russian military attaché in Stockholm was so deeply implicated that he had to leave the country. Was it surprising that Sweden should feel alarmed? It is quite possible that her fears were exaggerated, but she can hardly be blamed if she looked upon the machinations of her neighbour with a certain distrust. All measures taken by Russia seemed to her to have only one possible aim. She received ample assurances that there were no evil designs behind what was going on, but her fears were not at rest. The fate of Finland was before her eyes, and she was determined not to share it if she could possibly avoid it. If the hour of her destiny should strike, she would certainly do her utmost to defend her integrity and independence, but she knew that she could scarcely hope to hold out for a long period against the overwhelming numbers that might be hurled against her unless she could count upon the assistance of some powerful friend, whose interest it might be not to let her be crushed between the paws of the Great Bear. This was Germany's chance, and no pains were spared in Berlin to assure the Swedes that, if Russia attacked them, Germany would put her mailed fist between them and the advancing monster. With these cautiously 'unofficial' assurances were mingled solemn warnings not to trust to England or to France. Germany, and Germany alone, would come to Sweden's help in the hour of need. It was again the old story, 'Codlin's your friend—'not Short.'

Nevertheless, it was still natural for Sweden to look for support towards the Western powers, who had guaranteed her integrity in 1855. Republican France and democratic England surely could not stand by and see such a civilised nation as the Swedish reduced to the condition of Poland and Finland? Could England permit a rival Great Power to

establish a naval base on the Atlantic seaboard almost facing her own Northern naval stations ?

But the situation in Europe changed. The Franco-Russian alliance was concluded. Sweden regarded it as a promising sign of better things to come that the 'Marseillaise' was played and applauded at Tsarskoje Selo, but she grew serious once more when this was followed by even louder applause of the 'All for the Tsar' at the Élysée. Yet she lulled her apprehensions. The French squadron that went on the first alliance-visit to Kronstadt had called at Stockholm on its way, and enjoyed there a reception that stands alone in the records of enthusiasm.

Then came 1907 with the Anglo-Russian *entente*, and the shadow of suspicion fell once more darkly over Scandinavia. To be sure, the position taken up by Great Britain over the Åland Islands question raised new hopes, but as the years went on these became fainter. Sweden began to question whether the sympathy and sentiment of the English would take the form of practical and active support. In the perturbed state of public opinion a good many people in Sweden began speculating about what other Great Power could possibly be appealed to, to avert the dangers that seemed looming in the distance. The answer was ready : it was to the other side of the Baltic that she must look. For, if Sweden were crushed, Russia would be almost omnipotent in the Baltic, and Germany would be left in a perilous position. Nor had Sweden any reason to fear Germany. She was on the most friendly political terms with that great central European empire, and their commercial and intellectual intercourse was of the most intimate and profitable kind.

If in circumstances like these Sweden had gone to the length of thinking of an alliance, no one could have been surprised. Even France, with her powerful army, had found it necessary for her own safety to enter into close relations with Russia, while England had in effect relinquished her traditional isolation. What wonder, then, if a nation of some five million souls scattered over a large country should follow such examples ?

But Sweden was not to be tempted into any kind of alliance. Certain voices, it is true, began to cry out that the only sane policy for Sweden was an alliance with Germany, but they cried

in the wilderness. The Government persisted in the long-established policy of absolute neutrality, and showed on several occasions its sincere intention to live on good and friendly terms with all her neighbours. To the wheedling German intriguers Sweden suavely replied that, while ready to guard and defend her vital interests, she was not to be enticed into any European combination. This was the will of the nation as a whole, and succeeding governments have given unbroken expression to it. It is a continuation of this policy which has actuated that which Hr. Hammarskjöld has pursued since August last. The Swedish people themselves have shown their strong feelings of sympathy with the Russian nation by their hospitable and friendly treatment of the tens of thousands of Russian refugees who passed through Sweden on their way back to their own country. The Swedes did this in such a way and on such a scale that both the refugees themselves and the Russian Government scarcely could find words adequately to express their admiration and gratitude.

On one matter, about which there has been misunderstanding or confusion, it is desirable to make some final explanation. This is the question of railway communication across the northern provinces of Scandinavia. We read sometimes in the English press of a 'Russian intrigue' to get a railway from Finland to the Atlantic. Here is a confusion of ideas, excusable from the great imperfection of the maps which are in general English use. Two separate projects are here mixed together, and they must be distinguished. For a long time past, Swedish pessimists have been saying that Russia might find it to her advantage to attack Sweden and Norway simultaneously, because she would thereby acquire the northern provinces of the peninsula, and so control the railway which was opened in 1903, and which runs from Luleå on the Gulf of Bothnia, through Gellivara, to Narvik (Viktoriahavn) on the Ofoten Fjord. The importance of Narvik is that, though it is well within the Arctic Circle, it is completely and invariably ice-free. By linking up this railway, which is the northernmost in the world, with the system of Finnish railways which comes up on the eastern side of the Swedish frontier—and in fact these railways have quite recently been completed on the Russian side right up to the last Finnish

outpost, Torneå—Russia would get a clear run from the Pacific to the Atlantic.

This is one thing; quite another is no 'intrigue' at all, but the openly expressed desire of the Russian Government that Sweden should prolong her railway system—which used to end at Morjärv, but has recently been extended to Karungi—quite up to the Finnish-Russian frontier, so that this linking-up should take place now, and facilitate immediately and in the friendliest way the railway traffic between the two countries, which the war has enormously increased. The only possible route in winter from Western Europe to Russia is through Newcastle, Bergen, Christiania, and Karungi. At present, when traffic reaches Karungi, the final station on the Swedish side, it has to be connected with the Russian end-station by a laborious system of sledges and motors. There may be military objections which are not patent to a foreigner, and of course nothing could be done without the deliberate consent of the Riksdag. From the point of view of the convenience of the Allies, the completion of this railway route is much to be desired.

To sum up, the main cause of any want of sympathy with England and France which is to be detected to-day in the attitude of Sweden is due to her ancient haunting fear of the aggressiveness of Russia. This is a matter which it behoves us to approach with the greatest delicacy, but it is obvious that no appreciation of Scandinavian opinion can be formed if it is ignored. The happy conclusion of the Åland Islands scare in 1908 greatly relieved the tension, and Sweden remains grateful to us for our share in that relief. But it is idle to deny that there remained other causes for a certain apprehension. The Bobrikoff *régime* in Finland, and the efforts to nullify that Finnish constitution which every Czar since 1809 had sworn to uphold, cannot be pleasant for the Swedes, whose language is spoken and written by the educated classes of Finland, and who have close intellectual and moral relationship with the Finns. Sweden may misjudge the intentions of Russia, but she is agitated to see her gigantic neighbour pushing closer and closer to that ice-free port on the Atlantic which Peter the Great emphasised in his celebrated will as one of the essentials of Russian domination.

The probability is that the fears of Sweden are unfounded,

and that the dread of Russia which warps all her political judgment is a mere bugbear. But would it not be in the interest of Russia herself to remove the cause of that fear and mistrust? A stroke of the pen by the all-powerful Tsar, giving back to Finland at the conclusion of the war her constitutional liberties, would not only make that country once more the most loyal part of the great Russian Empire, and unify her with Russia far more than could be done by any ukase of restrictions and suppressions, but it would be hailed by Sweden with enthusiasm as the most perfect proof that Russia harbours no designs on her neighbour across the Baltic. It would inaugurate an era of sincere friendship between the two countries, and it would increase the commercial, industrial, and intellectual intercourse between them, to the immediate benefit of both.

And why not improve upon the occasion? Why not say to Sweden: 'These Åland Islands, which have worried you so 'much, take them back. We got them by a diplomatic accident, 'without having asked for them; we do not want them. Let 'them lie there, unfortified, of course, and permanently neutral, 'as a signal proof of our trust in each other.'

It would be a *grande geste* of a *grand seigneur*, and Russia, the great, the powerful, the generous Russia, could well afford it. What would the world say? Its answer would be 'This is, 'indeed, the doing of the Tsar of Hague fame; it may not be 'war, but it is certainly magnificent!'

MAGNA CARTA

1. **Magna Carta.** A Commentary on the Great Charter of King John, with an Historical Introduction by WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE. Glasgow: MacLehose. 1914.
2. **The Origin of the English Constitution.** By GEORGE BURTON ADAMS. New Haven. 1912.
3. **Studies and Notes supplementary to Stubbs' 'Constitutional History' down to the Great Charter.** By CHARLES PETIT-DUTAILLIS. Manchester: University Press. 1908.
4. **The Magna Carta of the English and Hungarian Constitution.** By ELEMÉR HANTOS. London. 1904.
5. **The History of English Law before the time of Edward I.** By Sir FREDERICK POLLOCK and FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND. 2nd edition. Cambridge. 1898.

BY a coincidence which may well appeal to the popular imagination, the 700th anniversary of the signing of Magna Carta will fall in the course of a mighty conflict in which, as the British public clearly perceives, the principles of constitutional liberty symbolised by, if not embodied in, the clauses of that famous instrument have been brought into extreme and imminent danger. For the triumph of Prussian militarism would mean the long eclipse of political liberty as Englishmen have understood it from ancient times. Seven centuries are but a fraction in the record of time as the geologist or even the anthropologist reckons, yet in the story of civilised Europe they form a long chapter. The years indeed are but an inadequate measure of the distance which separates the thirteenth century from the twentieth, but they indicate for the constitutional system of England a pedigree more ancient than that which any other Christianly civilised people can claim.

It has been the peculiar glory of the English people to fashion a political system which has won its way to the admiration of the modern world, and has been imitated with varying measures of success by every free nation in Europe and America. A common belief has fastened on Magna Carta as the starting-point of that process of political development which led, in the course of time, to the amazing system of legal fictions and

working compromises which we understand so well, and define so ill, as the British Constitution, 'British' in name, but in genius and history essentially English. Professor Adams, of Yale, begins his brilliant monograph on 'The Origin of the 'English Constitution' with a paragraph which, if perhaps not wholly free from Transatlantic exaggeration, is yet substantially true :

'The importance of the English Constitution in the political history of mankind is so great that the question of its origin is of unusual interest. The unanimous judgment of the world at the beginning of the twentieth century is that this is the best system of government yet devised. All monarchies which have adopted a constitution have derived their forms from it, and the same is true of most republics. Local necessities, or local prejudices, have made the adoption in individual cases more or less complete, or have led to variations from the typical forms, but these are hardly sufficient, even in the most extreme case, to conceal the indebtedness. The English Constitution has made the circuit of the globe and become the common possession of civilised man. After so many centuries of experiment, practical action, whatever be the opinion of the theorist, unites to declare this the best result of all experience.'

For many generations Magna Carta has been the accepted symbol of British liberties. Pitt called it 'the Bible of the 'Constitution,' and it is noteworthy that it acquired this character from the first. The older symbols of popular liberty and good government, the 'Laws of the Confessor,' or those of Henry I., were replaced at once and for all by the Charter, so that for the most part of a century, until the genesis of the Parliament of the later medieval period, every constitutional conflict took the form of a demand for a re-issue of the Great Charter. Coke says that it 'has been confirmed, established, and com-'manded to be put in execution by thirty-two several Acts 'of Parliament in all.' During the autocracy of the Tudors it seems to have fallen out of remembrance. Shakespeare could write his 'King John' without so much as alluding to the supreme political event of the reign. But, with the resurrection of liberty under the Stuarts, Magna Carta came again into prominence, and took that position of a 'fundamental law' which has ever since been unchallenged. As recently as last February Lord Parmoor prefaced the speech with which he introduced the second reading of a Bill to amend the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, by an elaborate reference to

the provisions of Magna Carta. Burke, assuredly the greatest of our political thinkers, saw in it the supreme illustration of the gradual and, so to speak, natural method of the English Constitution, which parted it so sharply from the revolutionary violences of the French constitution-makers, whom he denounced :

'All the reformations we have hitherto made have proceeded upon the principle of reference to antiquity ; and I hope, nay, I am persuaded, that all those which possibly may be made hereafter will be carefully formed upon analogical precedent, authority, and example.

'Our oldest reformation is that of Magna Carta. You will see that Sir Edward Coke, that great oracle of our law, and indeed all the great men who follow him, to Blackstone, are industrious to prove the pedigree of our liberties. They endeavour to prove that the ancient charter, the Magna Carta of King John, was connected with another positive charter from Henry the First, and that both the one and the other were nothing more than a reaffirmance of the still more ancient standing law of the kingdom. In the matter of fact, for the greater part, these authors appear to be in the right ; perhaps not always : but if the lawyers mistake in some particulars, it proves my position still the more strongly ; because it demonstrates the powerful prepossession towards antiquity with which the minds of all our lawyers and legislators, and of all the people whom they wish to influence, have been always filled and the stationary policy of this kingdom in considering their most sacred rights and franchises as an *inheritance*.'

After illustrating his argument from the Petition of Right and the Declaration of Right, he proceeds :

You will observe that, from Magna Carta to the Declaration of Right, it has been the uniform policy of our Constitution to claim and assert our liberties as an *entailed inheritance* derived to us from our forefathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity—as an estate specially belonging to the people of this kingdom, without any reference whatever to any other more general or prior right. By this means our Constitution preserves an unity in so great a diversity of its parts. We have an inheritable crown, an inheritable peerage, and a House of Commons and a people inheriting privileges, franchises, and liberties from a long line of ancestors. . . . Always acting as if in the presence of canonised forefathers, the spirit of freedom, leading in itself to misrule and excess, is tempered with an awful gravity.'

'Canonised forefathers,' whether in the invisible register of family tradition or in the formal calendars of public reverence,

present a sublime and benignant aspect which is rarely true to historic fact, and sometimes almost grotesquely wide of it. The historical students of the last generation have turned the search-light of scientific inquiry upon Magna Carta, and the spectacle which they present is certainly far different from that which the tradition of our lawyers and historians suggests. The subsequent fame of Magna Carta is based on but a small portion of its contents, perhaps six clauses out of the sixty-three. These are thus translated by Mr. McKechnie :

I. 'In the first place we have granted to God, and by this our present charter confirmed for us and our heirs for ever, that the English Church shall be free, and shall have her rights entire, and her liberties inviolate. . . .'

XII. 'No scutage nor aid shall be imposed on our kingdom, unless by common counsel of our kingdom, except for ransoming our person, for making our eldest son a knight, and for once marrying our eldest daughter; and for these there shall not be levied more than a reasonable aid. In like manner it shall be done concerning aids from the city of London.'

XIV. 'And for obtaining the common counsel of the kingdom anent the assessing of an aid (except in the three cases aforesaid) or of a scutage, we will cause to be summoned the archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls, and greater barons, severally by our letters: and we will moreover cause to be summoned generally, through our sheriffs and bailiffs, all others who hold of us in chief, for a fixed date, namely, after the expiry of at least forty days, and at a fixed place; and in all letters of such summons we will specify the reason of the summons. And when the summons has thus been made, the business shall proceed on the day appointed, according to the counsel of such as are present, although not all who were summoned have come.'

XXXVI. 'Nothing in future shall be given or taken for a writ of inquisition of life or limbs, but freely it shall be granted, and never denied.'

XXXIX. 'No freeman shall be taken or (and) imprisoned or disseised, or exiled, or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or (and) by the law of the land.'

XL. 'To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice.'

In the transfiguring view of later patriotism these clauses have been made to carry the whole fabric of English liberties. Thus in clause I. men have found the charter of the National Church; clauses XII. and XIV. have been thought to outline the constitution of Parliament, and to secure its right to

control the national purse-strings; on the same view clause XXXVI. contains the principle of 'Habeas Corpus'; clause XXXIX. secures the priceless boon of Trial by Jury, and clause XL. guarantees to every Englishman a justice which is prompt, cheap, and equal. A Magyar scholar, Mr. Elemér Hantos, in a very interesting comparison between Magna Carta and the contemporary 'Bulla Aurea' of Hungary, shows that the same fortune has belonged to the Hungarian Charter, and he appears to justify the popular view:

'It has been lately the fashion to depreciate the value of our Charters, and to think that the patriotic estimate of Englishmen and Hungarians has attached undue value to Magna Carta and Bulla Aurea. Yet if we compare these documents with the corresponding documents of the thirteenth century in Avignon, Catalonia, Valencia, Poland, Bohemia, or even the much-admired Magna Carta of Aragon, we shall soon find that we were far in advance of other nations.'

It is to be remembered, however, that the question really concerns, not the comparative merits, but the correct understanding of these ancient documents. Two schools of historians may be distinguished. For the one the uniqueness of English institutions and their persistence through the crisis of conquest are primary assumptions; for the other, the comparative feebleness of the pre-Norman polity and the completeness of the change effected by the Conquest are axiomatic. The one turns to the Anglo-Saxon invasion as the true starting-point of our constitutional history, and reads the 'Germania' of Tacitus as an English text-book; the other seeks rather in Normandy the sources of the medieval system of England, and tends to minimize the Teutonic character of the English race. Not the immemorial liberties of the tribes, which in the sixth and seventh centuries seized and colonised southern Britain, constitute the salient factor in the evolution of the Constitution, but the extraordinary strength of the Anglo-Norman monarchy; and this, it is held, is not so much traceable to the union of the national kingship of the English with the feudal lordship of the Norman duke as to the extension over a considerable kingdom of the close-knit feudalism peculiar to the Norman duchy. While the earlier school postulates an England in which the feudal system is awkwardly superimposed upon a free society, the later maintains, with

Professor Adams, that England at the beginning of the thirteenth century was 'the most perfectly logical feudal king-'dom to be found in Christendom.' The difference between the two schools comes into vivid prominence when Magna Carta is discussed. While to Bishop Stubbs 'the Great Charter 'is the act of the united nation, the Church, the Barons, and the 'Commons, for the first time thoroughly at one,' to M. Petit-Dutaillis (whose luminous 'Studies supplementary to Stubbs' Constitutional History' have been translated and published by the University Press of Manchester) 'it is essentially a 'conservative or even reactionary document,' of which the 'most salient characteristic is the restoration of the old feudal 'law.' Mr. Edward Jenks does not scruple to speak of 'The 'Myth of Magna Carta.'

The truth lies, perhaps, between the opposed contentions. Magna Carta may justly be regarded as 'a sacred text, the 'nearest approach to an irrepealable "fundamental statute" 'that England has ever had,' but its title to this character will be based, less on its actual provisions, than on the dramatic circumstances in which it was granted, and on the place it immediately gained in the regard of the English people. It is in the view of lawyers 'the first chapter of the enacted law,' and it deserves this description, in spite of the fact that it is not properly a statute at all. From one point of view, that which fastens attention on the specific concessions contained in its sixty-three clauses, it is excessive to say with Bishop Stubbs that 'the whole of the constitutional history of England 'is little more than a commentary on Magna Carta'; but from another point of view, that which perceives in the long process of our constitutional development the assertion and universal application of the grand principle of the supremacy of law, the words are not ill chosen. For 'in brief Magna 'Carta means this, that the King is and shall be below the 'law,' and if the King, then *a fortiori* every inferior official. The valuable fiction of a later age that 'the King can do no wrong,' a fiction which enabled the assertion of the right of Parliament to hold the King's ministers responsible to itself for the advice they tendered the Sovereign, and the manner in which they discharged his orders, is implicit in the famous instrument which for the first time compelled the King to recognize a legal limit to his authority. There is an element

of truth in Sir Walter Raleigh's gibe, 'The Great Charter had 'first an obscure birth by usurpation, and was secondly 'fostered and shewed to the world by rebellion,' but this is no more than to acknowledge that constitutional liberty emerged from the womb of tyranny with severe and protracted labour.

The student who for the first time reads the text of Magna Carta will certainly not escape a sensation of disappointment. Instead of broad principles, he finds a mass of technical rules of feudal usage. Instead of the simple eloquence with which a free people affirms its inherent rights, he is confronted by a crabbed and often obscure text, better fitted to sharpen the wits of lawyers than to move the enthusiasm of patriots. 'A detailed knowledge of feudal obligations,' observes Mr. McKechnie gravely, 'forms a necessary preliminary to the 'study of Magna Carta.' A glance at the document is sufficient to show that this is indeed the case. Without a knowledge of feudal law the student will be entrapped into anachronisms at every point. Take for example the crucial question, on the answer to which the whole view of the Charter must turn. What is its proper reference? For whom were its provisions designed? It is addressed by the King 'omnibus liberis 'hominibus regni nostri,' which seems clear enough; and the final chapter is couched in ample terms, which might seem to leave no section of Englishmen outside its range:

'Quare volumus et firmiter precipimus quod Anglicana ecclesia libera sit et quod homines in regno nostro habeant et teneant omnes prefatas libertates, jura, et concessiones, bene et in pace, libere et quiete, plene et integre, sibi et heredibus suis, de nobis et heredibus nostris, in omnibus rebus et locis, in perpetuum sicut predictum est.'

'This opens the question—who were *freemen* in 1215,' observes Mr. McKechnie, and thus he makes answer:

'An enthusiasm that seeks to enhance the merits of Magna Carta by extending its provisions as widely as possible, has led commentators to stretch the meaning of "freeman" to embrace the entire population of England, including not only churchmen, merchants, and yeomen, but even villeins. Now, *homo* in medieval law Latin was originally synonymous with *baro*—all feudal vassals being described as "men" or "barons." Magna Carta is a feudal grant, and the presumption is in favour of the technical feudal meaning. The word, indeed, occasionally bore a looser, wider sense; but any room for ambiguity seems to be precluded by the

use of the qualifying word "free." No villein was fully a "*liber homo*." In chapter 34, for example, the "*liber homo*" is assumed to be a landowner with a manorial court. Even a burgess might not be reckoned for all purposes as "free"; for the *Dialogus de Scaccario* discusses how far a *miles* or other *liber homo* might lose his status by engaging in commerce in order to make money. The word "freeman," it would appear, as used in the Charter, is synonymous with "freeholder"; and therefore only a limited class could, as grantees or the heirs of such, make good a legal claim to share in the liberties secured by it.'

Contrast this with the glowing language of Bishop Stubbs, and the full extent of the change in opinion to which we have adverted becomes apparent. Magna Carta was the achievement not of a united nation, for nationality was yet embryonic, but of an organised and unanimous class, supported by the general sympathy of the non-feudal sections of the people. 'It was the body of knights, direct and indirect vassals of the 'King, who had risen against him to obtain "liberties"; it 'was to them that the barons had made their appeal. It was 'for them as well as for the barons that the Great Charter was 'drafted. The Great Charter was essentially a document of 'feudal law.' In a word, we must interpret the Charter in the light of the past which it affirmed, rather than in that of the future which it made possible. There is a measure of justice in the contention that it was even retrograde, as affirming a system which was already obsolescent. An acute critic, Mr. Edward Jenks, has even argued that, from its reactionary character and its consecration of the past, it proved 'a positive 'stumbling-block in the path of progress'; but this is the language of paradox, not of sober judgment.

The significant thing is the unanimity of popular feeling which lay behind the action of the baronage, and gave it not merely increased power, but a moral impressiveness which has no parallel in our history. As against the King, the Church and the Towns were at one with the landowners; and even the unfree classes, perhaps a majority of the people, felt dimly that they too were concerned in restraining a despot whom they mainly knew as the master of mercenaries who wasted the land, and the impious persecutor who had drawn on the nation the malediction of the Pope. The isolation of John was indeed amazingly complete. His predecessors, violent and tyrannous rulers for the most part, had never stood thus alone in their

domestic conflicts. Even the worst of them, Rufus, had been able to count on the support of the hierarchy and the English against Odo of Bayeux and the Norman nobles. Henry I. and his grandson, Henry II., had aroused against themselves the unrelenting resentment of the baronage whose power and dignity were curtailed by their far-reaching administrative reforms, but they could always count on a general loyalty which was too strong for sectional opposition. Neither his grievous defects as a man and as a ruler, nor his protracted absence from the realm, nor even his long imprisonment in Germany, was able to alienate from Richard the loyalty of the nation; but John, when the crisis of his fortunes came upon him, found himself absolutely friendless. When he confronted the revolting barons, he had none but a handful of mercenaries by his side. It is true that the barons at Runnymede presented a list of their own grievances, and secured a re-affirmation of their own privileges, but this was partly because no other grievances could be so easily formulated, and because no larger franchises could at that time be easily conceived. They were, perhaps, as truly the representatives of the people as if they had been officially designated as such, and the significance of their victory over the tyrant lay precisely in its completeness, and in the conditions under which it had been achieved.

John's character has been drawn by the skilful pen of our greatest master of historical portraiture, Bishop Stubbs, in the preface to the edition of 'The Historical Collections of 'Walter of Coventry' in the Rolls Series. It may be set beside the picture of Henry VIII. which the same subtle artist has drawn. There is something more than a superficial resemblance between the two men, though the contrast between them and their fortunes is hardly less arresting than the likeness. Both were monstrously sensual, shocking even the low standards of their time. Both were conspicuously cruel and impious; but, while their cruelty was equal, in impiety the Plantagenet left the more hypocritical Tudor in the shade. Both were subject to sudden fits of acute superstition. Both oppressed the Church, and wasted her treasure; but while the earlier despot made his peace with the Pope at the cost of the nation, the latter reversed the process, and, by triumphing over the Pope, seemed to condone his offences against the

nation. The Plantagenet became the very symbol of national humiliation; the Tudor, remembered only as 'the majestic 'lord who broke the bonds of Rome,' embodied the national pride. Both tyrants served well the liberties of England. John, by conceding Magna Carta, determined the course of our constitutional development; Henry, by his breach with Rome, secured our ecclesiastical independence. Both left their crowns to children, and thus involuntarily strengthened the opposition to personal rule which their own vices had aroused. It may be added that both sovereigns owed such posthumous popularity as they have possessed to their conflict with the Papacy. 'How was our king John,' writes Tyndale, 'forsaken of his own lords, when he would have put a good and 'godly reformation in his own land.' It was the general belief of the Reformers, adopting a scandal of early date, that the resentment of the clergy had expressed itself in the poisoning of the king. Even Bishop Jewel, too grave a writer to invent such fables, reverses the history so completely as to credit the Pope, not only with rousing the barons against their sovereign, but also with 'bereaving the same king, not only of his kingdom, 'but also of his life.' The boundless credulity of religious prejudice, and its strange lack of humour, could hardly be better shown than in the transformation of a brutal tyrant into a patriot king and spiritual reformer, martyred by the ambition and corruption of the Papacy. In point of fact, it would appear that the notion of surrendering his kingdom into the Pope's hands, and receiving it back as a fief of the Holy See, originated, not in the ambition of the Pontiff, but in the cunning of the monarch. The transaction itself, so repugnant to later opinion, did not outrage so violently the self-respect of feudal England, and was probably regarded by the barons less as a loss of dignity than as a clever stroke of policy. In addressing the Pope, their envoys even ventured to claim for them the credit of the surrender. National feeling was then hardly developed, and such relations of feudal dependence were too familiar to be invidious. Just as the seventeenth century read its own constitutional beliefs into the text of Magna Carta, so the sixteenth century saw the episode of John's surrender of the kingdom in the light of its own proud nationalism. The modern historian, while frankly recognising the anachronism implied in both procedures,

yet perceives that the anachronism has enshrined the important fact that the events, civil and ecclesiastical, of 1215 did stand in generic relation both to the vigorous nationalism which effected the religious revolution of the sixteenth century, and to the constitutional vitality which achieved the civil triumphs of the seventeenth.

When we inquire why this genuinely feudal production, not differing essentially from many other instruments designed to protect feudal rights against monarchical aggression, has obtained so splendid a renown in later times, and led to such considerable consequences, we may, perhaps, distinguish five principal reasons. In the first place, *Magna Carta is pre-eminent in its own class.* So much is frankly conceded by M. Petit-Dutaillis, who is a protagonist of what may be described as the minimising school of historians :

' The importance of the Great Charter is in reality due to its fulness, its comprehensiveness, to the variety of the problems which it attempts to solve. It does not differ fundamentally from the charters of liberties which preceded it in the twelfth century, but it is much more explicit. It is five times longer than that of Henry I., it regulates a much greater number of questions, and, being posterior to the capital reforms of Henry II., it is more adapted to the conditions of life and to the state of Law. In passing, and accessorily, it enunciates in favour of chartered towns, the merchants and the seignorial villeins, certain promises of which there is no question in the documents conceded at their accession by Henry I., Stephen, and Henry II. ; although we must reduce the scope of these clauses to its just proportions, the share here assigned to civic liberties is evidently a new and striking fact.'

In the most literal sense of the word it was a ' Great ' Charter which was granted by John at Runnymede, greater in bulk, in range, and in substance than any other. Coke prefers to emphasise ' the great importance and weightiness of the ' matter,' rather than its actual length, but this also is notable.

' King Alexander was called Alexander Magnus, not in respect of the largeness of his body, for he was a little man, but in respect of the greatness of his heroical spirit, of whom it might be truly said " *Mens tamen in parvo corpore magna fuit* " ; so of this Great Charter it may be truly said that it is *Magnum in parvo.*'

But Coke, in speaking thus, had in his mind rather the verbose instruments of the age, which he illumined with his pedantic

learning, than the feudal age to which Magna Carta belonged. Its length and comprehensiveness would always make it conspicuous among charters. Inevitably men thought and spoke of it as the norm of good government, just as they had up to the time of its emergence thought and spoken of the 'laws' of Edward the Confessor, or of Henry I., not meaning any specific enactments, which indeed they would have had difficulty in finding, but rather an earlier system of government which, by comparison with that under which they were actually groaning, had the aspect of mildness and justice. Magna Carta succeeded to the vague prestige and practical uses of these older symbols. Its provisions covered so wide a range that no section of the community seemed to lie outside its reference; and so rapid was the decay of the older feudalism, of which it was in some sense the final formulation, that its language was almost at once clothed with a larger significance than properly belonged to it. In a word, the thirteenth century, so rich in ideas and so courageous in experiments, found in Magna Carta an instrument at once convenient and elastic.

In the next place, *we cannot be mistaken in attaching considerable importance to the solemn and often-repeated ecclesiastical censures which were publicly pronounced on those who should dare to violate the provisions of Magna Carta.* The grave blunder which Innocent III. perpetrated when he condemned the Charter, and ranged himself with his liegeman John, was partially retrieved by the wisdom of the Legates who presided over the early years of Henry III. The Charter was accepted by the young King, and solemnly confirmed when he came of age. Copies were deposited in the cathedral churches, and a permanent fundamental character was thus attached to the contract between the sovereign and his subjects. The Church in fact took Magna Carta under its protection, and assisted the cause of constitutional government by the free use of its spiritual weapons. Ecclesiastical action carried far and went deep. Confessors could hardly avoid considering the spiritual situation thus created for their penitents; and they would be the more disposed to do this since the hearing of confessions was passing largely into the hands of the active and popular Friars, whose sympathies were generally with the constitutional movement. In a very interesting note in his excellent monograph on the Charters, M. Bémont has collected

some evidence that this was the case. In the popular casuistic manual of the fourteenth century known as 'Pupilla Oculi,' the author treats 'de sententia lata super Magnam Cartam 'et Cartam de Foresta Angliae,' reproduces the text of Archbishop Boniface's sentence pronounced in 1253, and concludes significantly: 'Hos articulos ignorare non debent quibus 'incumbit confessiones audire infra provinciam Cantuariensem.' 'L'importance historique de cet avertissement,' observes M. Bémont, 'n'échappera à personne.'

The direct interest of the Church in the provisions of the Charter was comparatively little, for the specific matter of freedom of canonical election had been already separately guaranteed, and the famous phrase—'Quod Anglicana ecclesia 'libera sit'—was too vague to have much practical significance. Mr. McKechnie has an interesting comment on the expression used:

> 'It is interesting to note that, where the charters of Henry II. and earlier kings spoke of "holy church," Magna Carta speaks of "*ecclesia Anglicana.*" When English churchmen found that the tyrant, against whom they made common cause with English barons and townsmen, received sympathy and support from Rome, the conception of an English church that was something more than a mere branch of the church universal began to take a clearer shape. The use of the words *ecclesia Anglicana* may indicate, perhaps, that under the influence of Stephen Langton, English churchmen were beginning to regard themselves as members of a separate community, that looked for guidance to Canterbury rather than to Rome, John was now the feudal dependent of the Holy See, and the "liberty of the English church" had to be vindicated against the King and his lord paramount; the phrase had thus an anti-papal as well as an anti-monarchical bearing.'

The anachronistic habit of mind which Mr. McKechnie has so effectively corrected, so far as the bulk of Magna Carta is concerned, may perhaps be thought to have overtaken him in these observations. No medieval churchman, we may be certain, would ever have framed the notion of dispossessing Rome of its spiritual headship. The 'ecclesia' meant no more than the 'clerus,' an that was essentially international, organised in a hierarchy which found its indispensable centre in the Pope. It is not surprising that the famous phrase of Magna Carta has been often used as the fighting formula of modern Anglicans when they would resist the spiritual

claim of the Papacy, or the legal supremacy of the Crown. On the handsome stone pulpit which the English Bishops presented to the new and as yet mostly unbuilt cathedral of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Washington there are inscribed the words in a delusively lucid English rendering, 'Let the Church of England be free.' 'Why don't you 'translate the Latin more accurately?' inquired a carping visitor of the clergyman who acted as a guide; and when he was asked to suggest a more satisfactory rendering, replied with the somewhat disconcerting version, 'Let the English 'clergy have unimpeded access to the Roman See.' He was mistaken in thinking that freedom of intercourse with Rome was the clerical privilege which at the moment was most in question, but he was right in pointing out that the 'freedom' which Magna Carta promised was concerned with the privileges of the clerical order, not with the rights of a national Church. Coke observes that 'libera' is 'here taken for "liberata"' because 'this Charter is declaratory of the ancient Law and 'Liberty of England, and therefore no new freedom is hereby 'granted.' The most that we can properly find in the phrase is an indication of a national feeling, which, having gathered strength in the course of time, and become intense under the pressure of circumstances, would facilitate and finally compel a breach with the international system which had its seat in Rome. Archbishop Whitgift, when he pressed on Queen Elizabeth the pledges of Magna Carta, and reminded her of the curses by which their observance was secured, in order to dissuade her from certain predatory designs on the ecclesiastical property, was reverting to the true medieval intention of the Charter. He was, however, more bold than politic when he proceeded to instance the Queen's father as both an example of the potency of those curses and a striking proof of the futility of trying to grow wealthy by robbing churches:

'And, though I shall forbear to speak reproachfully of your father, yet I beg you to take notice that a part of the Church's rights, added to the vast treasure left him by his father, hath been conceived to bring an unavoidable consumption upon both, notwithstanding all his diligence to preserve them. And consider that, after the violation of those laws to which he had sworn in Magna Carta, God did so far deny him His restraining grace that, as King Saul after he was forsaken of God fell from one sin to another, so he, till at last he fell into greater sins than I am willing to mention.'

We may conjecture that Walton has elaborated the more cautious language of the Archbishop, but in any case the reference is interesting. The champions of the Welsh Church might have pleaded the most venerable of English statutes in defence of the endowments. As providing the solemn guarantee of their title to their property and privileges, the English clergy had a permanent interest in magnifying Magna Carta.

In the third place, *much must be ascribed to the historical circumstances in which Magna Carta was framed, conceded, and finally established.* John was no weakling, albeit a coward and a criminal. He had exercised the vast powers of the monarchy with rigour and with success for years before the chalice of his evil-doing overflowed, and the revolt of the barons placed a term to his tyranny. His quarrel with the Church had alienated an important ally, but at least it had enabled him to enrich his treasury without unduly taxing the baronage. The distress of the bishops and clergy did not by itself arouse much resentment, for then, as in later times, the mass of the people was curiously indifferent to the financial straits of spiritual men. Following the examples of his father and brother, he had gathered about him a formidable host of mercenaries, whose service was free from the disadvantages attaching to that of the feudal tenants, and whose military efficiency was superior to that of amateur or occasional soldiers. The loss of his Continental possessions damaged his reputation, but probably increased his power, for his resources were no longer distributed so widely. Nor were his abilities so contemptible as his uniform failure abroad, and his intense unpopularity at home, might naturally suggest. It argued no mean capacity to brave the censures of Rome for years together. To speak of him as 'the ablest of the Plantagenets' is to use the language of paradox, but it is the case that his contemporaries hated and loathed rather than despised him. The author of the 'Histoire des Ducs de Normandie et des Rois d'Angleterre,' whom Mr. Davis describes as an 'unprejudiced contemporary,' declares that 'all men bore witness that never since the time 'of Arthur was there a king who was so greatly feared in 'England, in Wales, in Scotland, or in Ireland.' That such a monarch should have been successfully defied by his barons, and forced to yield to their conditions, enriched the national

history with a precedent which could not but have far-reaching consequences, and added a special significance to the famous instrument which registered the tyrant's defeat. 'The right 'of deposition, and not that of electing the king, was the 'essential one upon which the security of the Constitution 'depended,' observes Professor Adams acutely, and nothing less than the right of deposition was embodied in that clause of the Great Charter which provided for its enforcement against the sovereign's will. It was a cumbrous, and indeed unworkable, arrangement which the barons devised, but it enshrined a principle which received fruitful application in later times. The conception of contingent loyalty was in some sense inherent in feudalism, which proceeded always on the assumption of contract or reciprocal obligation. On feudal principles the barons were perfectly justified in formally renouncing their fealty to an over-lord who had failed to fulfil his duty, but there was something in kingship older than the feudal relation and superior, which laid a spell on men's minds and paralysed their arms. Magna Carta disclosed a still higher authority—that of the Law—and symbolised its vindication against the Monarchy itself.

In clause 61 Magna Carta included a provision for its own enforcement. This circumstance indicates that the barons designed something more than the mere removal of grievances, and looked forward to securing a better system of government in the future. They aspired to effect in their own way the transition from an absolute to a limited monarchy. The procedure suggested in clause 61 was undoubtedly crude, and it was speedily found to be unworkable. Had it been the best in the world, it could not have succeeded against the mutual suspicion and distrust of the contracting parties. The conditions of success were altogether absent. Scarcely had the Charter been granted before the barons were demanding fresh securities from the King, who in his turn urged vainly that the barons should set down in writing the terms of their homage. Behind the King was the Pope, who had both the power and the will to dispense him from his oaths. Thus the settlement was stricken with failure from the start. There was no honest purpose at any point. Clause 61 perforce remained a dead letter. Mr. McKechnie thinks that the

failure was on the whole serviceable to our constitutional development :

'If the scheme of the barons seems ill suited to the needs of the hour of its conception, it was fraught with even greater dangers to the future development of the English Constitution. The problem it sought to solve was one of no transient or unimportant nature: the barons sought the best method of turning royal promises into laws which succeeding Kings must obey. In attempting this, Magna Carta moved along lines that were radically wrong ; which, if not departed from in time, would have rendered any enduring progress impossible. The statesmanship which, while leaving one king on the throne, subjected him to the dictation of " five-and-twenty over-kings " was crude and ill-advised. It is true that the party of reform, throughout the long reign of Henry III., clung to the same erroneous solution ; but they met with no success. After half a century of unrest, a settlement seemed as far distant as before. The dangers of schemes like those of 1215, 1244, and 1258 are clearly seen in contrast with the more tactful efforts of Edward I. towards a true solution, along lines leading in due time to complete success.

'The true policy for the barons was to use the King's own administrative machinery and the King's own servants to control the King. The principle was slowly established that the sovereign could perform no single act of prerogative except through the agency of a particular officer or organ of the royal household ; while very gradually the doctrine of ministerial responsibility grew up, compelling each officer of the Crown to obey not only the law of the land but also the *Commune Concilium*, fast changing into the modern Parliament. The credit of starting the Constitution on its right line of development is in great measure due to Edward I.'

We may fairly add that Edward I.'s attitude towards constitutional development, and his actual achievement, would have been impossible if he had not thought and worked in the atmosphere of a tradition coloured by the doctrine of monarchical subjection to the Law, which, albeit crudely, Magna Carta expressed. The long minority, feeble character, and troubled fortunes of Henry III. had confirmed that doctrine in the public mind, and clothed the famous document which gave it formulation with an august and venerable character.

In the fourth place, *Magna Carta was a seed cast into prepared and fertile soil. It received from the thirteenth century more than it gave.* That wonderful age was almost infinitely creative. It was the springtime of the modern world following upon a long winter. In literature and the arts, even in science,

there was sudden and rapid advance. 'The thirteenth 'century,' wrote Bishop Stubbs, 'is the golden age of English 'churchmanship.' It was an age of great men and great experiments. Especially is this true of the political movements. It was the age of lawgivers and constitution-makers, of canonists and schoolmen, of universities and communes. The anarchy of feudalism had given way before the growth of strong monarchies. With the new security had come a notable increase of commerce, and of the wealth which commerce creates. Society was becoming more complex and more exacting in its demands on government; hence the cost of government increased rapidly, and statesmen were driven to adventure many new experiments in finance in order to overtake the waxing expenditure. The growth of the cities was bringing on the political scene a new factor of vast potential importance, at once wealthy, ambitious, and democratic. The necessity of increasing the revenue lay behind the whole constitutional movement of the century. As Professor Adams writes:

'What had started the whole revolutionary movement at the beginning of the thirteenth century was indeed the breakdown of the feudal system as a source of government supply. In addition to the economic revolution, the increasing amount and complexity of business had to be reckoned with. This showed itself on one side in the rapid development of the royal courts, and on another in the increasing expenses of the government, which it was no longer possible to meet with the ordinary sources of revenue. To the men of the time the efforts of the kings to raise money were signs and proofs of their complete depravity, and there is no doubt but that the difficulties of the case were complicated through more than half the century by bad government; but the best king that ever reigned, had his lines fallen in England in the thirteenth century, would have been forced to resort to much the same expedients. The French monarchy had to face this difficulty later and less suddenly than the English, but it made use of practically the same means to meet it, and experienced practically the same opposition, though this was for special reasons less united and less intelligent. The expedients to which the Papacy was obliged to resort during the reign of Henry III. in order to obtain an adequate revenue were due to the operation of the same general causes.'

In the circumstances of the thirteenth century the feudal terms of Magna Carta were capable of bearing more generous senses than the barons of Runnymede could have understood, or

perhaps would have approved. With the spur of financial need always urging them forward, the statesmen of the thirteenth century were more considerable innovators than they realised. The 'Commune Concilium' of 1215, a purely feudal body, passed insensibly into the 'Parliament' of 1295, a genuinely representative assembly of estates. The right of a 'narrow' baronial assembly' to assess an aid or a scutage grew by degrees into the right of a representative national parliament to control all taxation. The 'judicium parium,' an essentially feudal arrangement, by no means obviously reconcilable with that equality before the law which is the grand principle of democratic justice, underwent a similar transformation, until it emerged in the popular belief as identical with 'trial by jury,' the palladium of democratic liberty. The constitutional struggle with which the thirteenth century ended inevitably took the form of a solemn 'Confirmatio cartarum.' Magna Carta had become what it has ever since remained, the pledge of constitutional government, the symbol of ordered liberty.

Finally, *we must remember that much has turned on the fact that our constitutional progress, though truly continuous in principle, was largely affected by a series of critical episodes.* Neither the pace nor the direction of the historical movement has been uniform. There have been stationary intervals in which the spirit of liberty seemed to slumber, and autocratic tendencies gathered formidable strength. These have been followed by episodes of storm, during which rapid advance has been made. The lawyers of the Long Parliament and the Whigs of the Revolution were really engaged in transforming the government of the country, but it was vital to their success, and not less natural to their habits of mind, that the revolutionary character of their action should have been concealed even from themselves. Lawyers have ever played a great part in the history of Parliament, and on the whole the fact has been salutary. But no profession is so conservative as that of the Law, and ancient precedent is the first essential of legal innovation. Accordingly, the constitutional movement has owed much to bad history, and been amazingly prolific in anachronisms and working fictions. Magna Carta is the most conspicuous illustration of this antiquarian bias of our constitutionalists. Its venerable age and public fame constituted it a priceless weapon for the warfare in which the opponents of Charles and Laud were

engaged. It redeemed their case from the disconcerting aspect of novelty, and made it possible to confront the Crown with a right as imposing as its own prerogative. 'Take we heed 'what we yield unto,' cried old Coke in the debate on the Petition of Right; 'Magna Carta is such a fellow that he will 'have no sovereign.' Rudyerd, in the course of the same debate, declared that he would be glad 'to see that good old 'decrepit law of Magna Carta which hath been so long kept in 'and bedrid, as it were,' walking abroad again with new vigour and lustre, attended by the other statutes. Wentworth, not yet a deserter from the popular cause, argued for a fresh legal confirmation of Magna Carta. It is not less suggestive that Laud resented this incessant harping on the famous document which perpetuated the memory of a defeat of monarchy. Among the State Papers there is preserved a copy of the propositions introduced as a compromise in the House of Lords, endorsed by Laud as 'penned by Dr. Harsnett, Bishop of Norwich.' Amongst other notes in Laud's hand is one referring to the confirmation of Magna Carta: 'Yes, but *salvo jure coronae* '*nostrae* is intended in all oaths and promises exacted from a 'sovereign.' That was no doubt the belief of John; and it compelled the barons to insert in Magna Carta the revolutionary clause 61. Unhappily for Charles I., it continued to be his belief after four centuries of constitutional growth. It explains both his unfailing good conscience, and his inveterate insincerity. Laud might conceivably have opened his sovereign's eyes, and corrected the moral anachronism in which he was so fatally immersed. But Laud, without Charles's excuses, shared his error, and must needs carry a large measure of the responsibility for his failure and his fate.

In the appeal to legal antiquity the Stuarts could make out a strong case. Charles I.'s defence before his judges in Westminster Hall lacked neither cogency nor eloquence. But in the order of history personal rule has preceded constitutional government, and liberty has been gained by a series of successful innovations on established systems. If, therefore, a breach with the past is to be avoided, it can only be by some artifice which shall read such meanings into old documents as shall fit them for the uses of a freer society than that which originally fashioned them.

Magna Carta has been compared to the Bible, and the com-

parison is not less suggestive than complimentary. Sacred texts can only retain their authority by surrendering their individuality. They must admit interpretations which their authors never suspected, and may even have disapproved. They must be the patient subjects of the largest liberty of handling. Every generation of believers must be free to read its own beliefs and hopes in the Scripture, and thus be able to hand on the ancient treasure with fresh titles to devout regard. It has been so with the Bible of the Christian Church; in its measure it was so with the Bible of the British Constitution. Just as the violence of allegorical interpretation was necessary in order to fit the literature of the ancient Hebrews for the uses of the early Church, and the less arbitrary violence of 'Biblical Criticism' has been necessary to repeat the same service for the Church of modern times, so there has been need of the mingled ingenuity and anachronisms of constitutional lawyers to impose on the feudal language of Magna Carta those larger senses which should qualify it to become a potent weapon in the great conflicts for liberty, and a valuable influence on our national life. 'And yet,' conclude Messrs. Pollock and Maitland,

'with all its faults, this document becomes and rightly becomes a sacred text, the nearest approach to an irrepealable "fundamental statute" that England has ever had. In age after age a confirmation of it will be demanded and granted as a remedy for those oppressions from which the realm is suffering, and this when some of its clauses, at least in their original meaning, have become hopelessly antiquated. For in brief it means this, that the King is and shall be below the law.'

H. Hensley Henson.

ENGLAND'S TRADITION OF SEA POWER

1. **Sailing Ships.** By E. Keble Chatterton. Sidgwick and Jackson. 1914.
2. **New Light on Drake.** By Zelia Nuttall. Hakluyt Society. 1914.
3. **The British Navy.** By Ernest Protheroe. Routledge and Sons.
4. **Maritime Enterprise, 1485–1558.** By J. A. Williamson. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1913.
5. **The Sovereignty of the Sea.** By T. W. Fulton. Blackwood. 1911.
6. **Les Projets de descente en Angleterre d'après les archives des affaires étrangères.** By P. Coquelle. Paris: Plon Nourrit. 1902.

'UNDER his command, Britain, destined in a future 'age to obtain the empire of the sea, already assumed 'its natural and respectable station of a maritime power.' In this sentence of his thirteenth chapter, Gibbon may have thrown an ill-deserved mantle of dignity on the shoulders of the rebel and mutineer Carausius. The 'crafty Menapian' of the third century had other aims than to make Britain a maritime power. But the historian found the right adjective when he used the word 'natural.' It is not equally certain that everybody will agree as to what is implied when our 'natural station' is said to be that of a maritime power. For just about four centuries our ancestors have shown by their acts that they understood well what follows from a frank acceptance of that place in the world. But there have been times when they were not content to limit themselves to this domain, wide as it is, and at all times some have wanted more. To-day it is by no means unnecessary to turn aside for a space from contemporary events, and try to obtain a conception of what is the true character of a maritime power, and what is the policy dictated by that 'station.'

When we look back on our own history for illustrations or instruction, it is not necessary, it is even very misleading,

to go beyond the month of January 1558. Then it was that England lost Calais, the gateway through which 'our Henries' and Edwards' had marched, or had wished to be able to march, to the conquest of France. The possession of a fleet, even a generally superior fleet, does not constitute a maritime power. We can, and indeed we must, leave aside the many centuries during which Britain was the prey of Franks and Saxons, Angles, Jutes, Vikings, and Scandinavian kings, who came as they pleased, and commonly came to stay. There was no maritime power in England when Harold Hardrada of Norway and William of Normandy could invade it in one year, nor yet when Sweyn of Denmark could remain for months on the coast unmolested by the Conqueror himself. The Britain of those ages was what most parts of America, North and South, are now, fermenting vats in which various races are going through the tumultuous process by which a people is slowly formed.

A maritime power presupposes a people and a State with resources equal to the maintenance of a constant armed force at sea. When State and people were formed under the Angevin kings, there was for generations no treasury equal to the support of a permanent fleet, and there was no sea-keeping ship, only open or half-open boats into which fighting men were crowded for transport or for a raid. If there was no true maritime power, neither was there the conscious policy of a real maritime State. The oversea trade of England was deliberately left in great measure to the German Hanse and the 'Venetian galleys.' The King of England had a fighting force at sea consisting of, first, his own vessels which were personal property, and in the case of Henry V. were even sold to pay his debts after his death, and by the provisions of his will; second, the feudal service of the Cinque Ports; and, thirdly, the general levy of the ships and shipmen of the realm. John could see well enough that the best way to prevent an invasion by Philip Augustus was to send William Longsword to burn the French ships. Hubert de Burgh and the Cinque Ports ruined the fleet which Eustace the Monk was bringing to the help of Prince Louis and the Barons. The author of the 'Libel of Policie' saw the necessity for keeping the seas round about. At all times, even in the reign of Edward II., Englishmen could understand clearly that when

they had a war with an enemy oversea, the wisest course was to hit him first. But all that does not constitute a maritime power, nor a maritime policy. Except when English kings were in actual possession of the French coast their own was constantly invaded and their ports burnt. The use they made of their fleets was to carry out wars of aggression and conquest in France. If they had succeeded they would probably have transferred themselves to the continent and England would have become a mere dependency. They failed, and the country was impoverished. A mob of men who had lived by violence and plunder, and by trading in the ransoms of captives, was thrown back on England and then came the barbarism of the Wars of the Roses.

'Monsieur,' says one of the characters of Anatole France, when he is told that Napoleon cost the country very dear, 'glory 'is never paid too dear.' Our fathers were much of the same opinion, and they dwelt joyfully on the memories of Crecy, of Poitiers, and of Agincourt. The loss of Calais was bitter to them, and they played for long with schemes to regain it. Now and again a ruler of England tried to obtain another Calais; Cromwell, for instance, when he took Dunkirk as the reward of help given to France against Spain; and Charles II. when he entered into a treaty for the partition of the Low Countries with his cousin Louis XIV. The mass of Englishmen cared but little either for the acquisition or for the sale of Dunkirk. If they abused Clarendon for taking the money of the French king as the price of Cromwell's conquest, the reason was less that they regretted it than that they hated him. The policy of Charles II.—the policy, that is to say, of the treaty of Dover—was detested for more reasons than one, and was quashed by the determined opposition of Parliament and people. The fear of Popery and of arbitrary government was what was most present to their minds, but at the back of the noisy controversies of the day was a solid and a permanent conviction. Englishmen are but little in the habit of laying down principles and elaborating theories. Nevertheless, at the end of the seventeenth century they felt, and they acted on, a quite definite doctrine, which had been steadily taking possession of the mind of the country since the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth. It was that this island was naturally the seat of a maritime power, and

that this proposition dictated a certain consistent line of policy. We talk commonly enough of our country as having blundered her way along. Since it was inhabited by men born of women, who err as the sparks fly upwards, there have been blunderers, and blunders they have made. But no nation in the ancient or the modern world has ever followed an intelligent policy based on a just estimate of realities for a longer space of time, or with a more steady determination, to a fuller measure of achievement than our own.

The great rules of policy, which the English people have acted on better than they have expounded them in words, have been deduced with practical sagacity from the one principle, that England must neither do nor suffer a rival to do anything incompatible with the full development of her power along natural and, therefore, profitable lines on her proper field —the sea. The rules arising out of this principle can be formulated easily and briefly. Shipping and oversea commerce form the basis of a maritime power. Therefore they were to be encouraged. The measures taken to give that encouragement may not always have been wise. It is, to say the least, a very open question whether the much belauded and much abused Navigation Laws did not hinder more than they helped. There did certainly come a time when they grew to be a mere obstruction and had to be swept away. But the purpose was sound and was achieved. We may have blundered as to the means from time to time, but never as to the end. Sea-borne commerce must be protected on its own field and in its own kind. Therefore the country was very much in earnest about its navy. Its care may not have been uniformly according to knowledge. The press gang was a barbarous and essentially both a wasteful and a stupid method of manning the fleet. The storms of rage provoked by naval miscarriages were often brutal. But here, too, if the head was wrong, the heart was right. Sir Charles Pasley, in his interesting treatise on 'The Military Policy and Institutions of the British Empire,' comments with absolute truth on the impressive contrast between the seriousness of the nation in the face of a naval disaster, and the contemptuous indifference it showed over military mismanagement. The indifference was little to its credit, but the country knew what was vital to it, and what was not. The army might fail, more particularly in wars in Europe,

and yet the safety and power of Great Britain might be little affected. The failure of the navy would mean ruin.

Again, the army stood for much which was dreaded. The memory of Cromwell's Red Coats, and his Majors General, and later memories of the army of James II. accounted for a long-lived distrust of the soldier. But beyond these traditional fears, there was a dislike of what the soldier might be made to stand for—of the conquering policy of our Henries and Edwards, of great campaigns on the continent, and their inevitable consequences : crushing taxation, a drain of the national wealth, and final exhaustion. The country knew that it could not always dispense with the soldier. The maritime power had need of him in two ways. It was a standing rule that the Low Countries must never be allowed to fall into the hands of a Power which could use them as a basis for an attack on Great Britain. Therefore they must be protected by naval support and money, and also by small bodies of highly drilled, hard-fighting men who were to be the head of the lance of which the shaft was composed of allies and foreign mercenaries. British soldiers formed a minor part in so far as numbers were concerned in the armies of Marlborough or of Ferdinand of Brunswick. They were what the country thought it could afford without drawing too deeply on its resources.

In the eighteenth century the soldier was needed far afield in remote American and Asiatic lands, where the maritime power had created interests which must be safeguarded on land. He was valued and praised, but (though this is not to the honour of the nation) he was rather endured than honoured. He was a costly necessity to be used as little as might be, and to be dispensed with on the first opportunity. A few to help to keep down American Indians, or stiffen the native levies in India, there must needs be, but the fewer the better, for armies were costly and were a terrible drain on the revenue. It is no exaggeration to say that the country looked upon the navy as permanent and on the army as a force which it would be both wise and profitable to make temporary and transient if only that were possible. It was not possible, and therefore the practice of managing the army from hand to mouth, of hiding it away lest the jealousy of Parliament should suppress it altogether, of leaving it to routine and court influence, of treating it, as Sir Charles Pasley puts the case, as more or less

a plaything, was bad. But a people can no more jump off its own shadow than an individual. Great Britain was wise to accept her natural place as a maritime power, even if she did occasionally fall on the side she leaned to. By submitting to limit herself she won a vast Empire at a lesser cost than any other Empire was ever created. It was opulent and it was free, because it was content to be maritime.

Whatever errors or sins England may have committed, her policy can stand to be judged by its fruits. We have been accused of selfishness and ambition by peoples who never kept their hands from anything they thought they could take. We have been derided with much more justice for our hypocrisy, for we have sometimes fairly earned that derision by our absurd habit of talking of our acquisitions as painful duties. Perhaps out best answer is to say that we have taken what came to us naturally, and it all came because we have not allowed ourselves to be drawn away from what was our real interest. We have been told that our success has been far less due to any merit of our own than to our insular position. To that we must candidly reply that it has its element of truth. It does not follow that we have been better men than our rivals simply because we have been more successful. The formation and long retention of the Spanish colonial empire was a wonderful feat, dismal as the end has been. It could not have been done by pusillanimous or merely foolish men. The Dutch did a great thing when they created their power in the Indian Ocean. The colonial history of France has not been all it might have been expected to be. It has not been worthy of the ingenuity, the energy, the audacity of the French people. Yet it has its passages of greatness. Spanish viceroys, Dutch governors general, French colonial officials have often been man for man fully the equals of our best. It is also manifestly true that if this country had not been an island, its people could not have taken advantage of their insularity. Neither nation nor man can profit by luck if none comes their way. The British people may possibly have had more than their share of luck, yet it remains true that they have succeeded in the world because they have known how to profit by their good fortune, and have proved their knowledge—not only by what they have done but by what they have firmly abstained from trying to do.

We can subdivide the history of British expansion into the struggle with Spain, the rivalry with Holland, and the long conflict with France. This subdivision is useful for mere convenience' sake; none the less the subject is one whole, so much so that there is no essential difference whatever between the policy of Elizabeth in face of Philip II. and the revolt of the Low Countries, and the conduct of Pitt and his successors in the face of the French Revolution and Napoleon. The differences were all in persons and in details. The policy was identical from her day to his. It was to oppose a European enemy on land by supporting his opponents, and to advance the fortunes of England on the sea.

It would have been easy for Elizabeth to make the most of the offer of sovereignty sent to her from the Low Countries. If she had reasoned as many of her subjects wished her to do, as her enemy Philip would most certainly have done, as Louis XIV. and Napoleon were to do, that is the course she would have followed. What looked more plausible, or more tempting than the argument that if she wished to prevent the Netherlands from being used to the hurt of her kingdom the most effectual of all ways was to take possession of them for herself? She was invited to become their sovereign, and urged on by many of her own subjects. There was a moment when she seemed to yield. But she was only obeying impulses which came from the ever-shifting surface of her mind. Then she stopped. She would go far enough to help Philip's enemies. She would not go so far as to entangle England in another, and perhaps a worse, version of the adventure of Henry V. That she acted with a superficial appearance of mere whim and temper, that she was false in word, is as true as that she was an elderly flirt, and a malicious feminine *tease* with a heart as hard as her intellect. She drove the men who served her best nearly to desperation. But she put England on the road to power and prosperity, and she kept it there. That she was aided by fortune is not to be denied. It was not her merit that, after the murder of Henry III. of France in August 1589, Philip II. neglected the war both with the insurgent Netherlanders and with England, to throw all his treasures and his armies into a frantic attempt to lay hands on France in order that he might keep the Huguenot King of Navarre off the throne. Neither was

it the merit of the British ministers of 1805–15 that Napoleon was not content to rule Spain through Ferdinand VII., as he well might have done, but must needs make a grab at the Peninsula in a passion of arrogance. Nor did British ministers create the quarrel between Napoleon and Russia. The merit of the great queen and of the much-abused ministers of 1805–15 was that they took full advantage of their enemy's blunders—each according to the conditions of his time.

The age of Elizabeth was one of endings and of beginnings. The dream of continental conquest ended, and so did the privileges of the merchants of the German Hanse. England was free to expand. The formation of the Levant Company marked a great step forward. English merchants took hold of the trade to the Mediterranean, and English ships sailed into the place of the Venetian galleys. From the Levant Company, or Turkey Company, came the first East India Company of ' merchants of London trading to the East,' the parent of the ' United Company of the merchants of England ' of the eighteenth century. The voyage of Lancaster to the East Indies is inglorious in history beside the circumnavigation of Drake, but it was incomparably richer in results. The ventures of Drake, of Hawkins, of Sir Humphrey Gilbert, of Raleigh, of the Earl of Cumberland, of a whole generation of sea rovers seemed to have but little immediate consequence. The plunder they won did not even finally enrich themselves, and the colonies they tried to plant withered. But they took seizin of the sea. They showed that there was no region which English ships could not reach oversea, and no enemy on the seas who had the strength to bar their way.

The work that Elizabeth began went on like the work of Peter the Great, in spite of the faults of her successors. Mr. Spedding and Mr. Gardiner have sufficiently shown the world that James I. was not a merely absurd person, even if he was a pedantic one and a mean. In substance he continued the policy of Elizabeth. He made peace when no real interest remained to justify war. Like the great queen herself he did the right thing in the wrong way. The right thing to do was to keep out of costly continental wars, to turn resolutely from treasure-hunting ventures in Eldorado to the trade and the colonisation which were to make the national greatness. The

two generations which came after the death of the queen seem dim beside the glories of her reign. But in reality no period in our history had more of the future in it, or was more profitable for the true interests of the nation.

The tragedy of Raleigh makes a romantic story. It appeals to the world's love for drama, to its interest in a showy personality, and a mystery. But it was as a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury and signifying nothing, when compared with the contemporary work of the generals and captains of the East India Company. They are all forgotten. The world which can be deeply moved by the *cause célèbre* of Raleigh, and has inquired and probably will go on inquiring whether and when and how and why he lied, cares as good as nothing for the achievements of Lancaster, the Middletons, Keeling, Best, Saris, and Downton. Yet while Sir Walter set an example to the Buccaneers, these men were laying the foundation of the British Empire in India. The true clue of the time lies in the letters of the Company's servants which have been made accessible by Sir George Birdwood, Mr. Danvers, and Mr. Foster. The typical heroic scene of the age is to be read in that letter in which Nicholas Downton tells how he fought the viceroy of Goa at Swally with the guns on one side of his ship, while he was loading the Company's goods on the other. Mr. Secretary Winwood would have rejoiced to trap his master into a war with Spain, and other gentlemen would have rejoiced to see English armies marching to the help of that hopeless person the Elector Palatine. These were all dreams of magnificence. The solid work was being done in the roadstead at Swally, and by the Virginia Company in America. Mr. Secretary Winwood and his like would have condemned the nation to pour all its wealth and energy on to battle-fields in Flanders or Germany. The Company's 'generals' secured that modest and businesslike factory at Surat which was the foundation-stone of the British Empire in India. It was not Clive who began the building, nor were Arcot and Plassey the places where the first stones were laid. The honour belongs to the merchants and factors, the 'generals' (i.e. admirals) and sea captains of the first half of the seventeenth century. They were not romantic persons. They did not practise 'virtú.' The last of the breed, Governor Pitt of Madras, had a very distinct touch in him of the ruffian. But without them Clive would never have had his chance.

The beginning is always the most important, and they were the beginners.

The Company's servants formed only one of several bodies all engaged in doing the same work in East or West. Nobody can need to be reminded of the Virginia Company, or of the Puritan Colonies of New England, and there were enterprises going on beside them which were not less significant because they had less success. The Old Providence Company, composed of the future leaders of the Parliamentary cause in the Civil War—Warwick, Pym, Brooke, Rudyerd, St. John, and others—failed to plant their colony on the islands off the coast of Honduras. Nought remains of their labours but their letter-books, and papers in the Spanish archives of the Indies. None the less no body of patriotic men of that time showed more completely what was the process by which the sea power of the country was created. There were a score or so of gentlemen, tolerated but not encouraged by the government of Charles I., who set about founding a colony, and enforcing the right of Englishmen to trade and settle in all those parts of the New World not actually in possession of the Spaniards. They made the mistakes of inexperience in their choice of place and means. They did not understand that an English agricultural colony could not flourish in the tropics. Some of them were persons of whom it is impossible to approve without reserve. The jovial Earl of Warwick, the Parliamentary Admiral of the Civil War, speculated largely in what he was pleased to call privateering, but was in fact piracy. The colonists who were sent out to set an example of industry and piety showed a deplorable alacrity in sinking into armed smuggling and buccaneering. We cannot blame the Spanish colonial authorities for driving them out of Old Providence. Yet the Company stands as a typical example of the expansive energy of the English people on the sea. They and their like wrought the immense change which came between the age of Elizabeth and the middle of the seventeenth century.

When the Queen's ministers called upon the outports to say what help they could give to resist the coming Spanish Armada, the answers very commonly took the form of complaints of poverty. The loss of the Spanish trade had not been compensated by the profits of privateering. We can see the failure of the Armada and are told of the successful 'island

' voyages ' and other plundering enterprises. But the failures passed unrecorded. Yet we are told by Sir William Monson that they were numerous. Failure for the privateer did not necessarily mean defeat or capture. Bad luck in not meeting prizes was quite enough. The adventurer in the Elizabethan sense —that is the capitalist who fitted out the ship—lost his investment. The crew lost the hoped-for prize money. When they sailed, as they often did, on the rule of ' no pay no purchase ' —that is to say, ' no prize no wages '—the crew were paupers at the end of the voyage, and that was one reason why privateering always had the tendency, noted by Nelson, to sink into mere piracy. The real compensation which the English trader found for the suspension of the lawful trade with Spain was the contraband trade carried on under the Scotch flag. Sir William Monson is explicit and illuminative on that point. The peace of 1603 was most welcome to English merchants, and when it was made the Earl of Salisbury told them that they must form a company and make a fund to pay for their own consuls and protection, for they could not expect the King to bear the burden.

By the middle of the seventeenth century the spontaneous enterprise of the people had changed all that. The nation had first and foremost provided itself with a seafaring population, organised, armed, self-reliant. It had not indeed organised any single corporate body so well shaped, so amply provided with authority, so completely armed in all parts, as the Dutch East India Company. As compared with this rival in the Indian Ocean the English were ill-organised, and therefore they were locally beaten in Java and the Spice Islands. But there was life everywhere, and the capacity for growth. English maritime enterprise, not only ill supported by the State, but fleeced and obstructed by the Crown, had endowed the nation with sources of supply and markets in Asia and America independent of the will of any foreign Power. Therefore England could face a war with more confidence and with less loss than in the days of Elizabeth, who was the very poor sovereign of an undeveloped kingdom. And they were justly confident not only that they could bear the financial burden, but that they could manage, could fight, could rule for themselves. The very spirit and capacity for self-government which made Parliamentary rule possible were largely developed

during those two fruitful generations on the sea, and in lands oversea to which maritime enterprise opened the way, and where merchants, factors, and colonists were doing imperial work. They were not all beautiful persons, nor all wise or heroic, but with all their limitations they were creating and ruling. It was a stupid insult to tell such men that they must shut their eyes and open their mouths and swallow what their Lord the King was pleased to feed them with. The imperial spirit was hardened on the sea and came back from the sea to be master.

The naval wars with the Dutch are abundantly interesting to the naval historian. But what concerns us most in them now is their cause and their effect. From the day that the Seven United Provinces combined their many competing 'companies for trade afar' into the mighty and national 'United East India Company of the Netherlands'—one year after Elizabeth gave her charter to the merchants of London—the Dutch acted on a definite principle. It was stated with business-like precision by their first governor-general Pieter Both. Where they were settled no other European people were to trade. When the Long Parliament began the series of Navigation Laws it was simply turning the policy of the Dutch against themselves. That, of course, is not the whole history of those laws, but it is a great part. The Dutch acting in a combined body triumphed in the Indian archipelago at the cost of committing themselves to a life and death struggle with England. That conflict was the great training school of the British Navy. Indeed we may say that the Navy in the modern sense, the maritime force designed for war only, was born in the course of the Dutch wars. In the first of them the Commonwealth had done as Charles I. had done when he sent his unhappy expedition against Cadiz, and his father before him when he sent a fleet against the Barbary pirates, and Elizabeth before him, and all the kings of England. It had formed its fleet partly out of its own vessels, partly of ships pressed or hired with their skippers and crews. In the Dutch Wars such vessels were shown to be inadequate, and such officers and men ill-amenable to discipline. They disappeared as an essential part of the Navy, though the hired or armed ship commanded by naval officers has always had, and has to-day, a subordinate place.

When those wars were over, the Sea Power of England was formed in all essentials. Very much remained to be done, but it was of the nature of development and not of creation. There was the navy of the State with its corps of officers, and its men, who did not indeed form a corps, but who, while they composed the crews of commissioned ships, belonged to the Navy only. There was the other navy for trade and fishery, for which, and by which, the fighting maritime force existed. And there was the national sentiment, the national policy which knew what use was to be made of both.

The conflict between the two sea powers might have come in any case, even if the monopolising policy of the Dutch had not bred enmity between them. Given the resources and respective geographical positions of the two States it could end only in one way. The exact manner of its ending was dictated by the intervention of France. England was again served by what her hostile critics endeavour to dismiss as her fortune, but what was in fact the miscalculation of her enemies. When the Netherlands failed to maintain the Pacification of Ghent they made it certain that they could never be the seat of a maritime power capable of balancing England. The Sea Power of the Dutch Republic, the lesser half of the Netherlands, was of necessity a transient thing, due to circumstances which could not last—like the military power of Sweden. When Louis XIV. fell upon the Republic he made it inevitable that the Dutch should be subordinated to England. But he did a great deal more.

He also made it certain that France and England—or, when we speak of the times after 1707, Great Britain—would come into collision in the worst way for himself. If he had directed his ambition to the southern shores of the Mediterranean, and to the ocean, the day of conflict would not have been averted. But it would have come in very different conditions—far better for France, far worse for us. What he did do was to provide that the unavoidable rivalry with Great Britain should be ruinously complicated for France by the enormous burden of a struggle with all her neighbours on the continent of Europe. And he not only did this for himself, but left his policy as an inheritance to his dynasty, from whom it passed to the revolutionary government and to Napoleon.

This great dominating French error was the true 'fortune

' of England ' during the long struggle with France, which, in so far as the English people had a say in the matter, began in 1672, and which did not end till the second Peace of Paris in 1815. But how easy would it have been for them to throw their advantage away. Charles II. relied on the hostility of his subjects to the Dutch to make them favourable to his alliance with Louis XIV. Were they not to destroy the old enemy and to get something for themselves—something far better than Calais or Dunkirk? His subjects saw the trap. They first compelled him to withdraw from his league with France, and then drove him to the very verge of war with his late ally. It was their good fortune that fear of arbitrary power, ' Popery and Wooden Shoes,' helped to keep them steady to a true national policy. But for the fund of sound political instinct which has been the saving quality of the English people, they would have lost sight of everything else in joy at the prospect of taking a full revenge for wrongs, real and imaginary, suffered at the hands of the Dutch. They would have been tempted by visions of grandeur. They refused to hear of either one or the other folly, and that refusal was to the honour of their political sagacity. They would not let France annex the Netherlands, but neither would they hang a millstone round their necks by taking any part of the Low Countries for themselves. To do that would have been to inflict upon England the danger of a land frontier open to attack by great military powers, and not defensible on the sea. Englishmen were not incapable of acting on the motto of the Border riever—' Thou shalt want ere I want.' Mr. Gardiner, no drum and trumpet historian, nor yet a ' militarist,' was of opinion that every people must be capable of acting on this same rule—now and then. But it must want what is really for its good. Now what the English people thought good to take, because it was good to keep, was what lay where no great military power could make an attack except oversea. And on the sea the English people meant to be too strong for all comers.

This natural maritime policy guided England when she entered into the War of the Spanish Succession. Among the summary statements made for the misguiding of mankind in short histories and stock controversies, none is more inaccurate than the common assertion that England declared

war because Louis XIV. allowed his grandson, the Duke of Anjou, to accept the vast and very much burdened legacy left him by Charles II. of Spain. That mere statement shows how easy it is to convey a whole falsehood by putting together two bits of disconnected truth. Charles II. of Spain died in November 1700. The Duke of Anjou was recognised as King of Spain and the Indies by England and Holland. War was not declared till May 1702. When it was declared, the real reason for it lay in events which happened during 1701. They were the attempt of Louis XIV. to seize the southern Low Countries under pretence of looking after the interests of his grandson, and the treaty he made with Spain to secure the right of direct trade with the Spanish colonies as a privilege for France. To these substantial acts he added a most gratuitous insult by recognising the son of the exiled James II. as King of England. The insult was fiercely resented because the country was already alarmed by the French king's aggressions. The war was made on the two standard rules of British policy—that the Low Countries must never fall into hands which could make a dangerous use of them, and that the scope of our activity on the sea was not to be limited. On that quarrel we fought Louis XIV., and we only made peace with him when he had been beaten out of his most dangerous ambitions.

With the eighteenth century this maritime policy, which had been adopted at least as much by instinct as by reasoning, became an avowed creed. We cannot, or at any rate we ought not, to be proud of all the acts it inspired. The country had consented to allow the Low Country possessions of the Spanish branch of the House of Habsburg to pass to the German line. The Spanish Netherlands became the Austrian Netherlands, and the transfer was accepted as the best way of keeping them out of the hands of France. So far the policy of the British government was correct. The southern Roman Catholic Netherlands had chosen to reject the chance of an independent national existence given them in 1576, and had preferred to remain a possession of the House of Austria. They had no ground to complain, and did not complain, when they were transferred to the surviving line of that 'illustrious' house. But when Great Britain joined the Dutch in enforcing the closure of the Scheldt, it was

guilty of a shabby action. That it was only following a Dutch example, and had the good diplomatic excuse that the Emperor Charles VI. took the country with all the servitudes to which it was subject, are undeniable facts. But all examples are not good to follow, and it was not dignified on our part to take advantage of a technical plea to cover a piece of petty selfishness. It is easy to understand, and it is not possible to blame, the burning anger of the Emperor Charles VI. and his daughter Maria Teresa when they found themselves forbidden to consult the interests of their subjects and of their revenue, simply because Great Britain and Holland were resolved not to endure the competition of Antwerp in the East Indian or any other trade. The Austrian Netherlands were depressed and Antwerp was kept in stagnation from pure greed. Very shabby, too, was such a proceeding as the passing of a bill to forbid British underwriters to insure foreign ships trading to the East Indies. It was passed avowedly in order to ruin the East India Company founded at Emden by Friedrich of Prussia. Actions of this character gave some edge to the taunt that we were the 'tyrants of the sea.' The worst of all the manifestations of this meanness was the notorious Asiento Treaty. We supported Spain in refusing to relax her laws of trade with the Indies, on condition that she gave us the monopoly of the slave trade with her colonies and the privilege of sending one ship with the Spanish trading convoy to Central America laden with British goods. This by itself would have been nothing to boast of. But the Asiento Treaty was valued because it was intended to be used as the cloak for a large contraband trade. The scheme was avowed by the ambassador who negotiated the treaty in Spain, Lord Lexington.

We need not wear a white sheet at this time of day for old sins. Others would have done as much if they could. But none the less we did wrong, and our power at sea enabled us to do it with effect. The Navigation Laws were another part of the same greedy policy. We lost more than we gained from our supposed cleverness. It is highly probable that the New England colonies would have been provoked into rebellion by those laws long before 1774 if their evasion had not been to a considerable extent tolerated by the British government. The mistake of foreign critics has been to suppose that it is this grasping of ours which explains our

prosperity. It is no such matter. We have flourished because we have done sound trade, sold better goods than others, and kept to our engagements ; and also because we have wrought unceasingly on the sea, and have not allowed ourselves to be diverted from our natural policy. All we did in the eighteenth century we should have done, and more, without the grimy Asiento Treaty and its attendant frauds, and even without the Navigation Laws.

There is no better proof of our consistency than the constant attitude of the nation to the Hanoverian connexion. An instructive comparison might be made between the attitude of Great Britain to Hanover and of Spain to the Low Countries. In both cases the union was brought about by the fact that the same gentleman was sovereign in each dominion. But Spain was persuaded that what belonged to its king belonged to it. Spaniards made it a point of honour not to allow the inheritance of Mary of Burgundy to be lost by the king who ruled them by right of his descent from Joan of Castile. They spent their substance and their lives, and they ruined their country in an unreasoning attempt to hold what was of no value to them. Englishmen took the Elector of Hanover as King because he was the nearest approach to a Stuart who could be trusted not to sacrifice them to France and the Papacy. But if they accepted him and served him, they hated Hanover, because it was a perpetual temptation to the sacrifice of true British interests to a dynastic policy. If the Parliamentary franchise of the eighteenth century had been only somewhat wider than it was, there is excellent reason to believe that not one guinea nor the life of a single soldier would have been spent in the defence of the Electorate. Yet Great Britain did fight for Hanover. She did, but as little as she could, and there never was a time when it was not necessary for politicians to profess that only by fighting for Hanover could we beat France, and that it was only by beating France in Europe that we could secure our colonies in America. Hence arose the specious pretext which Chatham himself, once the most savage assailant of the Hanoverian connexion, could stoop to use, that America was to be conquered in Germany.

As this mere controversial phrase and piece of ' parliamen-
' tary truth' has misled not a few even in our time, it deserves

to be examined in all its quintessential dishonesty. It supplies an admirable touchstone. Let anyone who wishes to find what measure of sense there is in it ask himself three questions: (i) If all our efforts had been made in Germany and none in America and India, would the victories of Ferdinand of Brunswick have forced France to surrender what she held oversea?—(ii) If not a man had been sent to Germany, and all our resources had been poured into America and Asia, would we not have won more rapidly, more completely than we did?—(iii) If Louis XV. had never made the alliance with Austria nor joined in the attack on Friedrich, but had turned all his forces against Great Britain, could he have averted the loss of Canada and the downfall of French ambitions in India?

There is only one rational answer to be made to each of the three questions. The victories of Ferdinand of Brunswick were certainly not even nearly sufficient to force France to surrender her possessions in America and Asia. The conquest of Canada and the West Indian Islands, together with the defeat of Lally in India, would have given us all the prizes of the war if no battle of Minden had ever been fought. And they would have had that consequence because the British fleet would have made it impossible for the French king to provide forces for the defence of possessions on the other side of wide oceans. There was one way only in which France could have averted defeat in the New World and in Asia. If from the reign of Louis XIV. downwards she had turned from the prosecution of her ambitions on the Rhine and in Italy, she not only might, but she certainly would, have at least balanced the maritime and colonial power of Great Britain. But then France would not have been the France we knew, the past must have been other than it was, and the House of Bourbon would have been a very different stock of men.

If military or militarist critics would free themselves from self-imposed blinkers the truth would become obvious to them at once. France secured the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle at the end of the War of the Austrian Succession by renouncing all the fruits of the victories of Maurice of Saxony, because she could no longer bear the distress caused by the ruin brought on her commerce by the blockade of her ports. Peace because of the immediate relief it gave was at first popular; because

of the price paid for it, it became odious. *Bête comme la paix* was the public comment when the pinch was no longer felt. It was not the peace which was *bête*, but the policy which doomed France to make such settlements.

If the lesson of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War needs to be further enforced, then the history of the War of American Independence will serve the purpose. In that struggle the country was blinded by passion, and, anger being ever a bad counsellor, turned from her true naval policy. Englishmen fixed their attention on the land war in America and the retention of a fortress. The navy was reduced to the poor part of a mere adjunct to an army in the field and a garrison. Throughout the whole fight the fleets were misused save on the two occasions when Kempenfeldt broke up the convoy of the Comte de Guichen in the Channel, and Rodney won the battle of Dominica. Kempenfeldt stopped the French reinforcements meant for America before they had left European waters, which was the proper function of the navy, as was Rodney's rout of the force sent against Jamaica. And because we deserted our true maritime policy we were beaten in what we did attempt to do, and were forced to make a humiliating peace. If the British fleet had been where it ought to have been, outside Brest, Rochambeau would not have taken French troops to America, and there would have been none to help Washington to enforce the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown.

The moral of the long fight with Revolutionary France and Napoleon is the same. We may think that there was too much scattering of effort. There is a temptation to believe that, if all the military forces we employed in half a dozen places at once to buy local successes had been concentrated and used in France, the wars need not have lasted for over twenty years. There was one interval—the first three or four years after 1793—when a concentration of effort in France itself could hardly have failed to win a decisive result. But the opportunity passed when Revolutionary France became solidified. Henceforward any attempt on the part of Great Britain to act as principal in a continental war would have entailed the use of huge armies such as could not have been raised without conscription. We are not to assume that they would have been so completely victorious as to be able to dictate terms to France. They might have won victories, as at Malplaquet, which gain

a field of battle and nothing else at an enormous price ; or, however shocking the thought may be to a tender patriotism, they might have been beaten. The excellence of the British armies was inseparable from their peculiar character. They were small bodies of volunteers of naturally pugnacious disposition, very highly drilled, who played the part Napoleon assigned to his Guard, the men who gave the deciding blow on the field of battle. It is a conceited patriotism which supposes that a British conscript army of all sorts would necessarily have defeated a French force of similar composition and size commanded by, say, Masséna.

There is but little to be gained by discussing might-have-beens. What we know is that from the reign of Elizabeth one steady line of policy has been followed—to look to the sea, to seek for what can be protected on the sea—be it colony in America or Australasia, Empire in India, or just some fortress harbour—Gibraltar, Mahon, Malta, or what not—which is held for the sake of commerce and the fleet. The weapons of the State have been first the fleet itself, and then what the fleet guards, that is to say, the trade and the colony which produce wealth. The wealth is a mighty weapon. Because Great Britain held the purse she decided the terms of the treaties of Paris. After the fleet and the wealth came the small armies of professional fighting men, of long service and high drill, who may have been, as the Duke of Wellington declared in one of his many *boutades*, detestable everywhere else, but who, as he allowed, were admirable on the field of battle. All the parts were essential and none of them could have been altered without spoiling the whole. To say that this policy had its limitations, its weaknesses, is only to say that it was human. But for a period of nearly four centuries it has allowed the nation to grow not in wealth alone, but in character and in freedom. On the day that Great Britain alters the relations of the parts of her policy—when, if ever, she begins to look to great armies as the permanent, necessary, and most important elements of her armed strength—she will have introduced a novelty of enormous and disastrous consequence.

Whatever measures may be imposed on us by present necessity, the fact remains that the use by this country of armies numbered by the million as a regular policy must bring an entire change into our whole national economy. Such

armies are not to be raised in peace by voluntary enlistment. If they are to be constantly used we cannot wait till war has begun before we think of raising them. We shall find ourselves committed to compulsory universal service with all that it entails. The consequences are too numerous to be considered here, and are not all connected with our immediate theme. What does concern us is the effect which the promotion of our army to the position of the first in importance of our armed forces must have on our position as a sea power. It will immediately come to this, that we shall be able to give to the fleet only what remains after the army is provided for. Now a universal compulsory service army (and if we propose to rival the great military Powers on their own field we can be content with no less) is a monster of insatiable appetite. It was said not very long ago, and with much appearance of truth, that the desire of Germany to provide herself with the navy which has done her such poor service led to a temporary sacrifice of the army. With us the navy would be the victim. And let anyone consider what the result must be.

Suppose that at the beginning of August last there had been in existence a British army capable of putting two million of men on the continent at once, and a British fleet just about equal to the German, how would the case have stood with us then? It may safely be said that not a single British soldier would have been landed in France till a naval campaign had been fought. Months might have passed before the sea was safe for the transport of an army. And the time when it would have been safe might not have come at all. In the only action of the naval war so far in which equal forces have met—the single ship action between the British 'Carmania' and the German 'Cap Trafalgar'—the victory was ours. But we have it on the testimony of the 'Carmania's' gallant captain that his ship was in no condition to fight another opponent. What happened in this encounter might equally well take place in a battle of fleets. Nelson said that if Villeneuve did defeat Calder off Ferrol, his fleet would be unable to put to sea for the next six months. Would a British fleet which came back from a hard-fought victory so battered, with such loss of ships and injury to those not lost as to need months of refit, be able to guarantee the safe passage of an army? It certainly would not. And we have no right to say that any degree of victory would be the

result of a meeting of equal forces. Except in the one case of the 'Carmania' and the 'Cap Trafalgar,' which came within measurable distance of being a mutual destruction, our successes have been won by greatly superior numbers or weight. Where the advantage has been with the Germans, as in the affair off Coronel, their victory was instantaneous and complete. The machine has been developed to the point where it does not indeed dispense with the need of skill and nerve, but where the trained skill of a few is enough. Those few all peoples can obtain, and they can make equally good use of the highly developed machine. If that be so, then numbers alone can give victory.

Now the question which every sane man in this country ought to put to himself is whether the policy of maintaining a very numerous army is compatible with the maintenance of a very numerous fleet. It never has been, and there is no reason to believe that it ever will be. The obligation to think first of the army was one cause of the decay of the maritime power of Venice. It precipitated the decline of Holland. It was the reason why Louis XIV. was compelled to sacrifice his fleet, and why successive rulers of France have been unable to meet Great Britain with equal forces on the sea. And in all these cases—Venice, Holland, France—maritime power had the excuse that it stood on a continent and was cursed with a land frontier. If ever we make a great army our chief weapon and contend with the military States on their own field, we shall bring upon ourselves, by our own act, the very evil which destroyed our predecessors and rivals among maritime Powers.

DAVID HANNAY.

NATIONAL IDEALS: ENGLISH AND GERMAN

Imperial Germany. By Prince Bernhard von Bülow. Cassell and Co. 1914.

SINCE the first breathless shock of war has passed and we have found time to take stock of the situation in which we find ourselves, we have all of us been not a little surprised at the presentation of the case against our country revealed in the German press and in sundry less ephemeral writings of which we have suddenly become aware. However unexpected the charges and unfamiliar the ground on which the argument is conducted, we must recognise that the indictment requires an answer, and the following pages represent the attempt of at least one Englishman to define his position and satisfy himself that he, too, has a national ideal to set against the German.

In a general way the Englishman is one of the least self-conscious of men; in his affairs he pursues his way without introspection or any question of the appearance he presents to the outsider. But however personally modest and void of desire to give offence the individual may be, Englishmen always form coteries, of which the English nation itself is only the largest, and so develop a collective arrogance all the more exasperating because it appears to be unconscious and without malice. Among the nations our self-complacency and lack of insight into the feelings of others have led us into danger over and over again, danger that has been the greater because we have never given credence to the hatred we have generated. We have contrived to ignore the feelings of Ireland and South Africa, the animosity in the United States we could never be brought to credit; but now our easy indifference to the opinion of the outside world has been rudely shaken, and we are astonished to find ourselves revealed as the object of a reasoned dislike and contempt on the part of the whole German nation. Prior to the war there were many reports of the existence of this bitter undercurrent; yet we in England attached just the same measure of importance to these manifestations as to

the anti-German crusade conducted by one or two publicists in England, i.e. as so much chatter which could get itself paid for because it appealed to the baser side of national prejudice, but which in no degree influenced the opinion or conduct of the sensible mass of the people. We were aware of too many relationships and friendships between Englishmen and Germans to allow us to believe that the rest of the people were radically different from those with whom we had intercourse. But now we begin to realise that the immense pride of the German citizen in the achievement represented by the German Empire, his devotion to the conception of Germany as a world-power and not merely a European State, are only matched by the bitterness with which he sees the British Dominions sprawling over the best of the earth.

England's mere existence athwart the highway of destiny is one count in the German indictment; another which always bewilders the Englishman is the accusation of hypocrisy. That seems to him a quality singularly foreign to the English character, if by hypocrisy be meant the conscious assumption of virtue in order to conceal some selfish purpose he would not dare to avow. In this respect indeed the Englishman is but little of the hypocrite; he is a bad hand at scheming and adopting a disguise either in private life or in national affairs, and whenever he does humbug he begins by humbugging himself. Yet when the English leader-writer pompously takes, or did take (for the disease was more rife in Victorian times), this or that continental nation to task for its shortcomings and warns it of the dangers of a forward policy or deplores its dealings with subject races, he may be genuinely enough oblivious of the motes in the English eye, but one cannot wonder that the German critic sees rank hypocrisy in his blindness to beams. The British Empire has been not unfairly won and held in a rough-and-tumble world, but we have on occasion a smug way of talking as though it had been awarded as a sort of Sunday-school prize, which is nauseous enough to the reasonably informed Englishman, while it goads the critical foreigner to fury. The true inwardness of the accusation of hypocrisy lies even deeper than this, in the incurable intellectual levity of the Englishman, and his refusal to consider facts or even to admit their existence until they have to be acted upon. It is not merely that the ordinary Englishman is mealy-mouthed and even pretends

to be mealy-minded by a continental standard, but that his unintellectualism never daunts him from expressing a ready-made opinion on any subject whatever. Think of the shibboleths that pass current for reasonings in our public life, think of the historical and economic ineptitudes our politicians permit themselves in their speeches, consider the bewilderment induced by this talk among the men of a nation that has been drilled to some respect for logic and philosophical thought, when they afterwards find such childish-minded Britons acting without reference to their expressed opinions upon unexpectedly shrewd instincts and intuitions.

Just as the individual Englishman in his business evades questions of principle, so our politics are essentially opportunist, wavering in appearance between one view and another, at bottom determined by certain unexpressed instincts common to all parties. Hence our reputation for undependability and incalculability in high politics; hence, too, the resentment the German public feel at our 'treachery,' our 'stab in the back,' in making the violation of the neutrality of Belgium our plea for taking sides in this war. 'Of course you knew,' argues the German, 'that the next war would be fought in 'Belgium; that knowledge has been a commonplace in diplo-'matic and military circles for the last decade or more; your 'own soldiers have been making their plans for it; this sudden 'assumption of a chivalrous defence of the weak is the merest 'hypocrisy, an excuse to take us at a disadvantage.'

Even were the accusation true on all counts, the Germans cannot claim to hold us to a code of honour between nations that they themselves have repudiated; they struck Belgium on the plea of necessity, because they considered that thereby they could best secure their national existence; we might adopt the same low plea and justify our intervention by the advantage to be derived from fighting Germany alongside our friends, instead of alone and discredited because before we had left those friends in the lurch. But we deny, and have the right to deny, the view that to concert measures for the assistance of Belgium if attacked, or even for the defence of her territory without her co-operation, is a violation of her neutrality or in any way equivalent to the invasion by Germany, for our action was conditional only on the crossing of the Belgian frontier by German troops.

Above all things the accusation ignores the popular element in our government. Whatever the experts may have known about the danger to Belgium, the British public was both heedless and ignorant, nor could it have been brought to believe by any authority short of the fact that Germany had planned her attack along such lines. Be it our national hypocrisy or what you will, it was incredible to the ordinary English mind that a great nation like Germany would deliberately bring war into the territory of a peaceful neighbour in order to gain the first blow in her quarrel with France. To England at large the invasion of Belgium came as a shock, and it shows how densely preoccupied with its own point of view German diplomacy must have been that it did not realise how such an action could not fail to precipitate into a declaration of war all the natural jealousies of Germany's growing power that existed among us, all our inevitable misgivings as to our own position should France be battered into powerlessness by war.

Men forget that a nation is diverse and many-sided ; they pick out the manifestation that best suits their own point of view, and talk about hypocrisy when some other current of feeling comes uppermost and leads to action. Hypocrites all nations must be in the sense of being composed of men with conflicting aims and contradictory feelings. England is more susceptible to attack in that her people have always indulged in free and violent speech, whereas Germany has been drilled to a greater homogeneity of thought as of action. It is easy to bandy about accusations of hypocrisy ; our peacefulness may have often been but a cloak for our self-seeking ; still more illusory to other nations seems that German peacefulness which is conditional upon ' justice,' i.e. her own way, being accorded to her. Even the real British hypocrisy that rouses so much contempt in the German mind and gives our own intellectuals so many searchings of heart, our incapacity to face facts and take a clean line of action on the expert evidence before us, is not entirely slackness of mind, it also represents an inarticulate belief in the existence of aspects of the truth that escape the classifications of the expert. Our refusal to prepare for war may have been largely sloth and the disinclination of politicians to risk any action that would rouse widespread opposition without any

corresponding gain of votes, but it also stands for real conviction that the dominance of a military party may be worse for a nation than a defeat in the field. Our treatment of the C.D. Acts, our resolution of the problem of governing conquered South Africa are other instances; in both cases our action appears intolerably slipshod and sentimental to men with an instinct for governing and the desire to compel men to move along the plain, forthright lines dictated by the best information; yet in both cases the British instinct for freedom and growth has justified itself and attained the practical end more effectively than the direct application of force could have done. Doubtless a great deal of the talking that is done on these occasions is as insincere as it is ill-informed, and a foreigner who fixes his attention upon it may excusably dub us a nation of hypocrites.

But the great indictment made against us by the Germans is that we are unworthy as a nation because we do not treat the bearing of arms as a duty each man owes to his country.

In speaking of patriotism and national duty we have to distinguish between the motives moving the individual and the State. The individual, 'mercenary' or 'conscript,' goes through his training and does his fighting because it happens to be his job for the time being; how it came to be his job as a rule he does not ask. According to the German theory, it does not matter what the soldier thinks, his function is simply to obey. In war time, in this war at any rate, we may concede to the soldiers on all sides a full measure of personal patriotism, of willingness to risk their lives in their country's cause. But what Germany possesses and what we lack is that collective sense of duty which regards the training for war as the very essence of citizenship. The Germans have whole-heartedly accepted this belief with all the onerous obligations it entails upon the individual, and to that extent they have become a State with a conscious and more developed patriotism than our own. The danger is that patriotism of this kind comes not only to be the highest virtue but to include all the other virtues.

The State recognises no higher law than that of self-preservation; moreover, its interests, its ambitions, its desires for expansion and domination become equally sacred, equally beyond criticism, because they are the will of the nation. The

ideal of universal duty for defence thus passes into the conception of war as an instrument in national progress; as Treitschke says: 'The second essential function of the State 'is to make war,' and a war to secure power is as righteous as a war of defence. The German case is based upon the conception of the nation as the most sacred of all entities. Hence it has to be assumed that the nation is divinely guided; the citizen need feel no responsibility for its actions; his only function is self-sacrifice and obedience to the call.

Now the principle of nationality is rapidly becoming the curse of Europe, the factor that will eventually prostrate it economically before America, where, at least, the individual has been freed from so many of the inherited burdens by which mankind in Europe is still bound. The strong States demand the right not only to reduce all alien elements within their borders to their own common denominator, but also to extend their boundaries and expand at the expense of adjoining weak States, pleading only the law of nature that the strong must prevail. Treitschke's contempt for the small State is as naïve as it is dangerous—'The whole development of our 'company of States aims unmistakably at ousting the States 'of the second rank.'

While the principle of nationality is thus made the excuse for filibustering on the part of the powerful States that have achieved at least a mechanical unity, on the other hand the same principle is a source of disintegration and expense within the nations themselves. What has it profited Norway and Sweden to separate? The people of the peninsula now support two kings, two courts, two consular and civil services, two administrations instead of one; a frontier has been erected, with its apparatus of custom-house officers, fortifications, and watching armies; war is brought nearer and has to be insured against. In the British Islands we are busily setting up separate administrations for each 'nation'; the most palpable result is a multiplication of posts, for which place of birth and local lobbying become substantial qualifications. There is no limit to the fissiparous tendency of nationalism. Even so small a nation as Belgium has of late had its efficiency impaired and its administration rendered more expensive, by its division into the two camps of French and Flemish speaking races. Nowadays when organisation is understood, the making, or

at any rate the exploitation, of a 'nation' offers an easy career to the intellectual adventurer. When one considers the welter of races and creeds in the South East, how are we to suppose that Europe can ever attain to any measure of rest and stability if nationality is allowed to become the prime factor in human affairs? As long as large nations are ambitious for expansion, small nations insistent on possessing the full apparatus of separate States, Europe must remain an armed camp, with the large units equipped to pursue their destinies, and each of the small ones overstrained in the effort to make itself too prickly a morsel for its neighbours to swallow. In the end Europe must break under the sheer expense, and fail to sustain the competition of the Americas, where the people are comparatively free from the burden both of armaments and national establishments; where, too, the individual has a better chance of developing his capacities, because he has not to be continuously spent in building up his country's military strength.

Moreover nationality, pure and sacred cause as it is, becomes the cloak and excuse for some of the meanest passions to which the human mind is subject—envy, suspicion, hatred. The Germans have taught us how in the name of nationality a great State feels it a duty to maintain a force of spies, to suborn treachery, to bribe officials, to sow mistrust and disaffection, to buy newspaper opinion, to work in any underground fashion that will undermine the stability and resources of rival but avowedly friendly nations—acts to which no man of honour would stoop in his own interest, acts, too, which have their harvest of corruption and pollution within the nation which resorts to them.

Still more does the inflated nationalism that is fostered by the sort of press spread over the world to-day, intensify the provincialism of the natural man, which leads him not only to misinterpret the spirit of alien peoples but to neglect and undervalue in sheer ignorance the lessons they may have to teach. Unpalatable as the doctrine may be just now, it is precisely from Germany that we shall have most to learn after the war—her long tradition of thought, her respect for things of the mind. The fundamental fact is that men and women, all the world over, have more in common than they have apart; in Western Europe, at all events, the peoples all possess the same prime basis of ideas, and their differences are

more the products of accidental circumstance and of temporal environment than of the essence of their minds. There are racial differences, of course, but they are questions of degree rather than of kind, to be estimated by percentages and not thrown into different categories. Though the nations fall from time to time under the sway of very different ideas, dominated by opposing interests and schools of thought, the individual Englishman finds no difficulty in intercourse, no barrier to a common understanding with the individual German or Italian, any more than with the individual Irishman. But the distorting influence of nationality leads man to label with the name of another country all that he sees diseased in civilisation, all that he looks at as evil in the turbid current of modern life. The little knot of poets and thinkers who so passionately wave the flag of Irish nationalism are chiefly united by a common hatred of certain aspects of modern industrial life—its ignorance, its squalid poverty and equally squalid wealth, its cruelty, its aimlessness and lack of faith; they pick out these qualities in England, and on her they fasten their detestation of features that are common to mankind. These idealists have never stopped to ask themselves to what extent such evils are specially characteristic of English men and women, any more than they have made the inquiry of how far the Ireland of their dreams, their dear City of God, is present in the actual world. The world will have to purify or, if that be impossible, to tame the spirit of nationality as before it had to deal with the spirit of religion. In how many centuries was not Europe torn and rent, was not true civilisation set back, was not war and destruction invoked, in the name of religion? That tyranny has been curbed with no loss to pure religion and undefiled; so too must the intolerance of nationality be dealt with.

If then we are to assume—and it is the fundamental assumption upon which the world's peace and progress ultimately depend—that the peoples of England and Germany are in essence alike, however temporarily in conflict, how are we to understand the general hatred we have evoked? For the course of the war has shown us that we are fighting against not a mere military or official caste, but against a whole people. Nations, like men, have their moods, and as a fit of anger,

however passionate, however tremendous in its consequences, by no means represents the whole of a particular man, so we must believe even at this black hour that Germany's fury and determination to make an end of British power need not be regarded as a permanent characteristic of her people. You cannot draw an indictment against a whole nation, but you can understand how certain elements in human nature, certain sections of the body politic, may obtain for the moment a complete predominance over its actions.

It is not difficult to trace the manner in which during the last forty years Germany has come to be so possessed by false ideals that she has grown to be a menace to the peace of the world, despite her not insincere protestations that she has only desired peace. Signal success is always apt to be intoxicating to the romantic Northern temperament, more especially success that seems to have been due to one's own skill and forethought and not to the co-operation of some of the slow, silent forces outside. The successive defeats of Austria and France, the creation of the Empire, had all the aspects of a deliberately wrought design—the great work of men who moved nations about the chessboard of Europe according to the strength of their will and thought. The later growth of German commerce, the organisation of her cities, the development of her science, all her cultivation of the doctrine of efficiency, further encouraged the illusion that man, at any rate German man, had at last become the master of things. Add to these real grounds of self-esteem the malign influence of that new disease of modern life—the press, with its machinery of boom and self-advertisement, its continual flattery of popular prejudice and ignorance, its pursuit of 'copy' by way of challenge and counter-challenge to the press of other nations—and you render self-conscious and sensitive a section of the people that is vocal out of all proportion to its real strength.

The British Empire was made by men who did not talk about it. Some thirty years ago the period of self-glorification began, and sundry writers began to indulge us in the contemplation of our importance; militant imperialism set in, and whatever good it may have wrought in our own administration it certainly produced a corresponding reaction and a heightened feeling of opposition in Germany. For the soil there was better

prepared for such theorising than with us. The average German has certainly received a more grown-up education than the average Englishman; he has imbibed a respect for logic, and has been brought into contact with some general ideas and broad outlines of universal history. As Von Bülow remarks, 'Weltanschauung' is a word always recurring in German parliamentary speeches. Hence the conceptions of writers like Sybel and Treitschke could be utilised by the journalists and sown broadcast by the press; the general reader could at least follow the line of argument, even if he could not check the premises and discount the conclusions, until Germans became familiar with and gave a kind of intellectual assent to the thesis that a world dominion must await the thoroughness of German military and intellectual organisation. We need not seek for innate racial differences; the drill of school and regiment, to which every German is subject, in itself makes him particularly susceptible to the preachings of the Professors of Welt-Politik, to the doctrine of a deliberate pursuit of power.

But self-consciousness, the sudden sense of masterfulness and prosperity, has inevitably one result, and Germany, like the new rich man who has got a footing in a society hitherto denied to him, has acted as the *parvenu* among nations, determined to assert his strength, but not knowing how to do it without offence. German diplomacy has troubled the waters and kept the world in a state of nerves for the last thirty years; it has been one repeated story of aggressive movements that have had to be retracted. We recall most readily perhaps the Kruger telegram, but really the Kaiser's speech at Damascus in 1898—'The three hundred million 'Mahommedans who live scattered over the globe may be 'assured of this, that the German Emperor will be their friend 'at all times'—was a far more provocative and dangerous instance. To what end could such a declaration be meant but to sow dissension? It was the beginning of the policy that has drawn Turkey into the present war and prompted the fruitless propaganda of revolt in India and Egypt. These tentative aggressions, followed by ungracious withdrawals, while they created a growing sense of insecurity among the other nations, had their worst effect at home. Without doubt, conscious Germany, the Germany of politicians and the press,

has grown increasingly restive, more and more irritated from the feeling that due respect was not being paid to her position and strength, because of the unnecessary jostlings and rudenesses in which German diplomacy has indulged itself. In truth, if German efficiency had been as impregnable as her people believed it to be, they had only to wait for the plum to ripen; in another half-century neither worn-out France nor effete England could have pretended to oppose German world dominion.

The same spirit of self-sufficiency and intolerance, the same lack of manners, has crept into German science and scholarship of late years, where the pride of performance has led the smaller men not merely to belittle but to ignore the existence of any work outside their own borders. English men of science have been familiar with the growing omission amongst German specialists of any reference to or acknowledgement of work done in this country; some of them have even experienced the appropriation and republication of their own investigations under another name in Germany. Every scholar can supply examples of the kind within his own subject where chauvinism and national pride have been allowed to do duty for thoroughness, and have blinded Germans of the younger school to the opportunities for learning the truth from other than their own people. It is just such a neo-German contempt for other people's mental processes and points of view that has led them so astray in their anticipations of the events that would arise with war. Complete as was their intelligence department, its agents could not get outside their own mind, but reported what they wished to be true—Great Britain would never fight, Ireland would dissolve in civil war, the Colonies would drop off, the Indian and Egyptian peoples would rise against us. A certain type of German is so well informed that he can dispense with facts. I have known an educated Prussian at my own dinner-table lay down with insistence the law that the English never took soup, and that the article of which he was partaking owed its presence to German connexions or residence. The particular instances that one man can assemble are trivial enough, but they mark a growing temper of arrogance and impatience in the educated class, which ought above all to preserve a sane and experienced judgment in a nation. We were plentifully warned of the gathering storm, and the ante-war alarmists

now reproach us with our sloth and cowardice in not preparing to strike as swiftly, as unscrupulously, as the Germans. But such counsels sprang from the very temper we are combating in our enemies; they have been justified by the event, but just as there are some suspicions too mean for a man of honour to entertain, so before the war it was truer wisdom to trust in a gradual accommodation with Germany than to prepare for the combination of accident and diplomatic perversity that precipitated the catastrophe.

The continued pressure has, however, served its purpose, and Germany, as her thinkers and statesmen see her, has become a conscious nation, animated by a common purpose, attuned to sacrifice whereby her destiny may be assured. Her people have accepted the call of duty and the necessity for discipline, whether it be that preparation of the individual for efficient service which constitutes education, or the abnegation of self which makes for organisation and so builds up on the one hand an ordered corporate life and on the other an intellectualised and successful commerce.

Above all, her people are willing to suffer to be strong. The heavy taxation for armaments and the years of each man's life that universal service exacts are both cheerfully rendered by the German citizen because they sustain the power of the State of which he is a part. The German ideal is thus one of a community responsive to orders, directed by its available wisdom to act with full economy of all its resources for the welfare of the State as a whole. The function of the rulers of Germany is to co-ordinate and set in motion the forces possessed by the people, and the actions of the individual are to be determined according to the needs of the nation rather than by his own will.

Such an ideal remains inevitably far from realisation in an imperfect world, but the course of the present war may well have taught us that the unity of Germany is not wholly drill, and that her efficiency has been determined by her capacity for organisation and her people's response to the conception of self-sacrifice.

It has been claimed that German single-mindedness—the willingness to be marshalled for a common purpose—is an effect of race; the one cause, as Disraeli used to say, that ultimately counts.

Houston Stewart Chamberlain, that Englishman who,

however much he may deny his birthright, still remains a typical British product—the anti who will stand on his head rather than be confused with the crowd that walks on its feet—sees in the Germans the one pure-bred race, to whom is thereby guaranteed the rulership of the earth. Ethnologists not obsessed by Welt-Politik may smile at the idea that the people living in Germany can claim to be descended from any one race which can be scientifically discriminated; historians will ask for evidence of any connexion between power and purity of breeding; nevertheless, it has been the general adoption by the German people of a conception of power to be won by strength and self-sacrifice, that alone has made of them a conscious, homogeneous nation, compared with whom we are little more than an accidental congeries of peoples. Now as nations live or die in virtue of the ideals they pursue, what have we to set against this proud and not unworthy conception of a State? Can a sustained purpose be discerned amid the confused and vacillating course of English politics and international relations during the last century? Have we any real answer to the reproaches addressed to us, not only by German critics but by those of many other nations, that we are actuated only by short and self-interested views, that we are permeated by *laissez-faire* doctrines only calculated to give an unchecked scope to the greed of modern industrialism, that 'Business as usual' is our only motto, and that our politics have degenerated into a welter of conflicting interests?

We are told that though by accident and rapacity we have inherited many of the kingdoms of the earth, we have brought to them neither sympathy nor understanding, and as we possess neither the intelligence to use them nor the courage to make ourselves strong to hold them, the best interests of the world demand that they shall be torn from our nerveless and faction-weakened grasp. Does England stand for any principle in life—have we any national ideal? Let each man at this crisis search his soul and answer this indictment for himself. I for myself maintain that England does stand for the cause of freedom as against government, and that she has been endeavouring to work out the problem of the reconstruction of society on the basis of individual liberty.

Practical society is based upon government and law; in the ideal society there is no compulsion, because each man

acts rightly of his own will, and though we know that in this imperfect world we shall never realise the anarchical conception of dispensation with external law, yet the dream is an essential part of human nature, and the desire to make the dream take shape upon earth will ultimately sap the foundations of every society based upon force. Everyone can prognosticate the alternations of weakness and violence that are let loose by the relaxation of law, but the progress of human society has been the gradual release of the individual from the external control of taboos, customs, and laws. Whatever evils anarchy may have in store for us, it will be hard to match the evil that has been wrought in the past in the name of Government.

What does Government amount to in practice? What in fact is the outcome of the German ideal of a nation ruled by its wisest and directed by a single will? In the actual world that sacred entity—the nation—comes to be manipulated by the ambitions and prejudices of a limited privileged class who are in power, not because of their pre-eminent wisdom, but by accident of birth. It is not mere megalomania that has prompted the German Emperor to claim to rule by divine right, it is the logical outcome of the German theory of Government and the State. But Englishmen finally broke with the theory of divine right some two and a half centuries ago. Just as the statistician will only concede a certain margin of probability in favour of the wisdom of an hereditary ruling class, so the man of the world is too well acquainted with the seamy side of courts and chancelleries, with the shifts by which power is attained and influence exerted, to believe that Government is an attribute of any man or class. Broadening the basis of Government does eliminate certain risks. The ambitions and prejudices of a people form indeed a sufficiently sensitive powder, but an autocratic Constitution supplies a trigger whereby the discharge of that powder is at the mercy of something not far from caprice. Doubtless a popular Government may find itself going to war as unjustly, as ignorantly, and even more accidentally and short-sightedly than an autocratic Government; but more of those who actually make the war will then have to pay for it in person, and at least the machinery will not have been so organised that one perverse hand can precipitate a catastrophe. The will of a

people can be delivered from the adventures of dynastic ambitions and the struggles of a privileged class to preserve its position.

There is much truth in Monsieur Bergeret's cynical discussion of the French Republic:

> 'Elle gouverne peu. Je serai tenté de l'en louer plus que de tout le reste. Et puisqu'elle gouverne peu, je lui pardonne de gouverner mal. Je soupçonne les hommes d'avoir, de tout temps, beaucoup exagéré les nécessités du gouvernement et les bienfaits d'un pouvoir fort. Assurément les pouvoirs forts font les peuples grands et prospères. Mais les peuples ont tant souffert, au long des siècles, de leur grandeur et de leur prospérité, que je conçois qu'ils y renoncent.'

Against the conception of a state of governors and governed the English are labouring to construct a society that works on a basis of participation; we will have no Government that does not at bottom proceed by consent.

The most fundamental desire of a man is to be let alone to manage his life as seems best to him, and the more he becomes educated, the further he progresses along the path of true civilisation, the more are certain faculties and capacities developed in him that require freedom and leisure if they are to obtain their expression. It is not that the man wishes to be anti-social; many forms of personal activity demand society for their realisation; one man may find his outlet in organising his industry, another in singing in a choir; but every man who is worthy of consideration, as soon as his daily bread is secure, feels that he has a self and that his chief concern is to give that self free play. It cannot be pretended that this feeling obtains as yet any adequate realisation. The majority of the men and women we see about us grow up maimed and stunted from their earliest years, perhaps without the capacity for, certainly without perception of, the enjoyments they are denied. Poverty is the final barrier to the development of most individuals, but the continued and inevitable poverty of one class is just what our English policy seeks to put an end to.

It is true, and always must remain true, that we all have to pay for life—to pay in routine work, to pay in social service, to pay in conformity to custom; the point is that we want to pay as little as possible. For paying is not an end in itself.

Great as are the virtues of hard work, of self-sacrifice, of renunciation, they are after all virtues which require to be justified by some ultimate gain to the community or the individual. Moreover, they are virtues which appear most admirable at a distance among the 'people,' while the governing class enjoys a supermorality of its own. But the English ideal holds out for freedom and a minimum of interference in all grades of society; in the lowest as in the highest there are faculties to be exercised, powers of self-expression and of self-denial that are part of the inherent equipment of man. English politics, seen largely and broadly, have represented an attempt more or less conscious to give effect to this principle —that each man has a destiny and must be allowed an opportunity to work it out, and that the old society based upon power and privilege must be reconstructed to admit of this opportunity.

However weakly and haltingly, this is the line we have been following, the desire to make the burden of Government light and to substitute for compulsion the readjustment of society on the basis of the willing participation of the individual in the framework of order. The attempt to give effect to this policy requires above all things peace, not merely actual freedom from war, but the liberation of the State from the military control involved by continual preparation for war. The professional soldier at his best becomes an idealist, to whom the conception of a nation under arms is a noble end in itself; his demands for longer service, more thorough preparation, must always be rising, until the nation becomes as purely an organisation for war as the German Empire has grown to be. In the imposition of that final military control over the State lies a greater ultimate danger than even in a defeat in the field.

Of course this goal of individual liberty remains far from attainment, and the pursuit has been attended by such exhibitions of cowardice and time-serving on the part of our politicians, of class greed and idleness, that the watching German, wedded to the theory of governing and governed, may well have thought that all fibre had gone out of us. We may indeed have faith in the essential community of feeling in all classes, and believe that the wisdom of the few will eventually inform and actuate the masses in a State enlightened by the experience of true

citizenship, yet we must at the same time admit that such a principle will not infrequently result in flattering the passions and furthering the injustices of the least informed but most numerous section of the community.

The history of our last half century's dealings with Ireland is a case in point; from one point of view it is a record of concessions to violence, of condonations of outrage, of the legislative robbery of the minority as the easiest way to satisfy the clamour and secure the votes of the majority, of the weakening of the law and the degradation of the administration, a policy of doles instead of development, ending in a parasitised people taking its orders only from a disloyal faction. Yet running like a golden thread through this tissue of vacillation and time-serving has been the conviction that by the removal of, even the compensation for, some of the wrongs the Irish people have suffered in the past, by the conferring of responsibility, by freedom in fact and by freedom alone, they would take their place alongside our own people as willing participators in a common order. But a solution along those lines requires both patience and faith; it would be so much quicker, so much easier, so much more congenial to the temperament of the dominant class to govern Ireland strenuously for its own good.

The same may be said of our dealings with the wage-earning classes and with women. Ignorant blusterings have been opposed to sloppy argument; surrenders prompted by flabbiness have alternated with violences that were mere reactions; one side has selfishly held on to what the other side as selfishly sought to grab; but slowly and grudgingly we do move along a line dictated by the conviction that all men and women alike have souls to be saved, and therefore must in the main be conceded a social environment to which they can give consent.

A similar principle is at work even in our treatment of subject races. Travellers are fond of comparing Java with Ceylon to our disadvantage; Java is a model typical dependency, Java is 'run' by the Dutch, Java is efficient, its productivity, its order, its organisation put the happy-go-lucky administration of Ceylon to shame. But in Ceylon the endeavour has been to keep the burden of government as light as possible on the native, to preserve him as far as may be from the interference of the white man; under the Dutch he may, as a rule, be no less happy, may indeed be better off than

under us, but the one system does aim ultimately at making fellow-citizens, while the other is content with subjects of the order of slaves.

On this basis, then, England takes her stand. This is her ideal to set against the German—freedom as against governance, the individual rather than the State. We have preferred a loosely knit society, proceeding by consent, to one more firmly bound by external law,—we will take our risk of suffering from the cowardice of the crowd if we may be delivered from the bullyings of the police officer. We claim that the ideal of the free individual is nobler and more permanent than that of the unified State ; for the State was in the beginning nothing more than a contrivance whereby and within which the individual could attain some share of freedom and be delivered from all tyrannies but one. The German ideal can attain no permanency ; if it came to be realised in universal dominion, the strong nation would equally fall to pieces from within, undermined by the lust for freedom that is in man.

But the German ideal has one lesson for us and is teaching it amid blood and tears—there is no virtue without strength. No man is free who cannot fight for his freedom, no nation can afford to pursue any principle, however ultimately righteous, if in the process she renders herself unable to defend her people and the cause for which she stands. Peace shall not prevail save with a sword. Indeed, hateful as war may be, it has this element of the eternal about it, that it does apply an ultimate test to human affairs and human character. As the sailor boasts that no lie can live long at sea, so the evasions and plausibilities that pass muster in civil life are torn to pieces in the field of battle. As far as any human affairs can be lifted above chance, success in war is determined by the honesty, moral and intellectual, of the nations engaged and of their component men. We write intellectual honesty advisedly, because that implies a willingness to face facts, to admit that all other virtues are vain without strength, and that strength involves foresight and sacrifice.

How much of life we shall have to pay in the future in order to preserve our ideal we cannot as yet tell. That will largely depend upon the temper in which the German nation emerges from the war. Since 1870 Germany has set the pace in Europe, and imposed upon all other nations the steadily increasing

burden of living as nearly as they could up to her standard of preparation for war, until the whole male population of central Europe has had to spend two or three years of its life under arms. We cannot tell whether Germany will forego her dream of the domination of Europe ; we cannot tell whether the Allies can enforce a general measure of disarmament, or whether the poverty ensuing from the war will of itself compel some alleviation of the burden. We may hope that the natural peace-loving man who constitutes the bulk of the people in Germany, as here, will be able to make his views prevail in the policy of his nation ; but he may remain bound to a mistaken national ideal and at the mercy of the men who have forced on the present conflict. We must be prepared to find that the German people will again respond to the call of their rulers for self-sacrifice, and that they will set to work to build up afresh that tremendous organisation whereby they hope to accomplish what they conceive to be their national destiny. Our part is to proclaim boldly that we, too, have an ideal for which we are willing to fight and to make sacrifices, confident that our ideal is the nobler one—the ideal of humanity and not of one nation alone. In the pursuit of that ideal strength is necessary, and we are now of a temper to put on our strength—the strength, as this war has already shown, of a World Power and not merely of a European State. No one can foretell whether peace will ensue in this generation or the next, but to the end our ideal will stand.

In la sua voluntade era pace.

A. D. Hall.

SOME ASPECTS OF EMILE VERHAEREN

1. Œuvres de Emile Verhaeren. *Passim.*
2. Emile Verhaeren. By LEON BAZALGETTE. Paris. 1907.
3. Emile Verhaeren. By STEFAN ZWEIG. English translation. Constable. 1914.

THE prestige of what an American philosopher has called the 'specious present' has always fascinated men's minds. The present alone exists; in the present alone are we alive. The past and the future are inferences, or, if you are very sceptical-minded, acts of faith. The present moment is metaphysically unique. And not only metaphysically; the sensation is one felt by many who have no turn for speculation.

In the case of these, the sensation takes the form of the assertion of the absolute modernity of the present moment. The past could show nothing like it, and the future is conceived as dominated by it. On us—the actually existing present generation—the ends of the earth are come. The future is in our hands. Behold, we make all things new. When we turn, however, to history—the record of this discredited past—we find that this assertion has been frequently made before. Our ancestral religion started its career by promising a new heaven and a new earth, and, in the judgment of many, no doubt, produced those novelties. We cannot, indeed, trace this feeling to each past generation in turn: history is not sufficiently detailed, and mankind does not speak at all moments with the same degree of explicitness; but no one who considers the matter can doubt that it has accompanied each fresh generation of men—sometimes finding definite and victorious expression, sometimes remaining implicit in their consciousness, and to be detected only by indirect symptoms.

Psychologically speaking, it is the triumphant sensation of youth which discovers life and love for the first time transferred to the imagined personality of the race. Without it the monotony of experience were unendurable: it is the seed of hope and the cause of progress. We have

said that this feeling of the absolute modernity of the present does not always find equally successful expression. This is true, and it is also true that it is only when such expression is found that humanity becomes at all adequately self-conscious. Human consciousness, for the most, drowses between the bedclothes of inherited physiological habit, hypnotised, as it were, by experience into the daily round of action needful for self-preservation. A man accomplishes these menial tasks with habitual mechanical facility, and consciousness becomes by degrees less and less involved in their due performance. 'Habit is second nature, and nature 'is perhaps a first habit,' said Pascal. Then, of a sudden, humanity finds a voice which proclaims the gospel of the incredible novelty of this adventure of life. We listen to one who bears that witness as we listen to no other. It matters little where the prophet finds the novelty. He may, as in the early days of the Italian Renaissance, find it in the restoration of a glory and beauty long banished from the earth, he may even place it in some obscure mythology of a 'future life,' or he may point it out in circumstances of our daily experience. It is enough if he show it to us. Such a witness is borne to us in our own day by Emile Verhaeren.

The Belgian poet was born at Saint-Amand, a village of East Flanders, just sixty years ago next month. The country is flat and uninteresting in appearance, fecundated and enriched by the stream of the Scheldt along which pass great barges with huge grey or brown and orange sails moving in solemn procession towards Antwerp. Gustave Verhaeren, the father of the poet, had retired to end his days in the meditative peace of the little East Flemish village, and here in the midst of the great windswept plains, dotted with village spires, the youth of the poet was passed. Some delightful poems, called 'Les Tendresses Premières,' speak of the joys of his boyhood. He tells us how he scampered across the broad prairies with their feeding herds of cattle, how he would clamber into the lofts where the golden grain was kept, how he climbed steeples, watched the peasants at their sowing and reaping, and listened to the maids at the wash-tub singing old country songs. He would also watch eagerly the skittle-players, and wander with them from fair to fair. He would sit on the river's bank and gaze at the ships and barges, follow-

ing them in his dreams to vast distances. So a daily physical familiarity with the things of nature which surrounded him became his inalienable possession. He was also at one with the people of his village. He has never lost this sympathetic touch with humble lives. He still goes in and out among his peasant friends as their equal, loves to chat in the village *estaminet*, and hear talk of weather and harvest and all the little interests of their simple days. And this is perhaps why he is the only one among modern poets in French who is really popular with his countrymen of all ranks.

His country upbringing did more than this for him. It caused him in later years to feel the psychological effect of great cities differently and far more intensely than the poets who were city-bred. He found materials for astonishment, admiration, terror, and love in what to them were the commonplaces of existence. Just as town-dwellers are impressed by the solemnity and beauty of alpine ravines so he has been affected by city streets : at first slowly accustoming himself to them, then living with them their tragic life ; exploring them, describing them, celebrating them. In middle life he has returned to his beloved fields, taking refuge once more under the lonely skies of Flanders. There he lives, or rather lived—until the recent tragic events—the greater part of the year, a life as simple as that of his childhood, hobnobbing with the gossips of the village and working.

Verhaeren left Saint-Amand at the age of eleven for Brussels and the Institut St. Louis, which he left after two years for the Jesuit College of Ste. Barbe at Ghent, preceding, on the benches of the 'bons pères,' by a few years, Maeterlinck and Van Lerberghe. Here he made friends with Georges Rodenbach, and, under the encouragement of their Latin professor, Père Volders, the two boys of fifteen commenced authorship. Their models were Chateaubriand, Lacordaire, and Lamartine—Hugo being a 'mauvais auteur' for the young Barbistes. Once more the Society of Jesus trained an enemy. M. Bazalgette relates a story of the future poet, 'kept in' on a plea which appeared to him unjust, hurling furniture through a window into the chemical laboratory and smashing all the glass bottles that it contained. Expulsion was threatened, but his academic successes pleaded for him and he remained, his father making good the losses caused by his outburst. At the close of the

curriculum of Ste. Barbe, Verhaeren entered the University of Louvain in order to obtain his degree with a view to joining the Bar. Neither the priesthood (apparently his father's wish for him), in spite of the ardent Catholicism which the good Fathers at Ghent had cultivated in him, nor the oil-works of his uncle, in which an alternative career awaited him, appealed to the young man. It was at Louvain that he found himself and his true vocation. That vocation first took the form of an untameable zest for life. To this day the poet enjoys telling of those fiery days and nights. Moderation has never been a feature of the Flemish character, and, as a true Fleming, he eschewed temperance. The students of Louvain, except for those who took the ecclesiastical faculty, were a wild lot. They drank deeply (though probably of Belgian beer only), they danced at the *kermesses*, and on propitious occasions got into trouble with the police. The dreamer of the prairies of East Flanders became a gallant and a roysterer. He did not, however, neglect his intellectual life. A group of students interested in literature formed itself. Paul Siret, Camille Desguin, and Emile van Arenbergh were among them. These young men called themselves the greatest poets of their day, and passed their verses to each other every week. They went farther afield in their reading than the discipline of Ste. Barbe had permitted; to the masters of those days were now added Hugo, Musset, Gautier, Baudelaire, Leconte de Lisle, Coppée, and Richepin. In spite, however, of these heretical studies, the group was militantly ultra-Catholic. Belgians, as the world knows to-day, are good fighters, and it was part of the self-imposed task of these young knights of the pen to defend 'the Faith' against the infamous tendencies of modern thought. For this purpose they founded a little paper called 'La Semaine,' in which Verhaeren, under the pseudonym of Rodolphe, published his first effusions. 'La Semaine,' says M. Bazalgette, 'con-'spuait hebdomadairement' the 'peeterman,' who is the Belgian equivalent of the Philistine, the police, Liberals, and all the enemies of the Church. One Max Waller founded an opposition sheet, 'Le Type.' It was a happy thought, and both journals waxed fat on abuse of each other. The verses which Verhaeren published at this date have had no independent survival. The poet's judgment must be respected.

All delightful things, and among them undergraduate days,

come to an end, and the time came for Verhaeren to take up his career at the Bar of Brussels. But he soon found the barrister's gown as stifling as he had feared the priest's cassock would be, and so in the end, following the advice of Edmond Picard, he threw it wherever ex-barristers throw their gowns, and resolved to devote himself freely to a career of letters. He joined the staff of the 'Jeune Belgique,' edited by his quondam rival of 'Le Type,' Waller, and contributed to other reviews. He was a regular guest at Camille Lemonnier's Friday parties, where the young *littérateurs* of Brussels assembled, and at the hospitable house of Edmond Picard. Here it was the custom to exhibit improbable waistcoats, and it is said that the poet still keeps at the bottom of a drawer a garment of brilliant yellow silk, cut out of a pair of curtains, that the Spanish painter, Dario de Régoyos, had found in his mother's house at San Sebastian.

One rainy day at the beginning of 1883, Verhaeren burst into Lemonnier's rooms, and, with the brief introduction, '*Je veux vous lire des vers!*' proceeded to recite the manuscript of 'Les Flamandes.' Lemonnier realised what he was hearing, encouraged the reader, suggested a few modifications, and soon those wonderful word-pictures of the life of Flanders, overflowing with exuberant vitality, appeared. Europe had a new poet. But although to an unprejudiced mind there could be no doubt of the quality of the poems, Belgian *bien pensante* society, as well as all the critics, was at first horror-struck at such an explosion of strength. Verhaeren's strictly orthodox family was also scandalised. The respectable Press fell on him. 'M. Verhaeren a percé comme un abcès,' was one appreciation. 'Le Raphael de la crotte,' was another. In fact one cry of indignation went up all over the country. What was this book that created such a commotion?

'Les Flamandes' appeared at a critical moment. The realistic novels of Zola were just then the object of everyone's discussion; and though Verhaeren was very far from being a mere naturalist, he was so far of the school that he saw and wished to show in his writing the physical aspect of reality. Camille Lemonnier, to whom 'Les Flamandes' had been read in the first instance, was an apostle of the school in Belgium, and no doubt influenced the young poet in the same direction.

But, as has been said, he was far—even in 'Les Flamandes,' his most 'naturalistic' work—from confining himself to the material aspect of things. To him psychological reality, a state of soul, was revealed through the traits of physical nature. Naturalism influenced him to the extent that he resolutely avoided the sentimental and romantic, and expressed in his verse only the coarse, primitive, and savage. He had a natural hatred for the soft and the weak, for any sort of sentimental idealisation. This led him deliberately to emphasise the brutal and 'unaesthetic' elements of life. These poems, barbarous in their strength, resemble the incursions of Teuton tribes into Latin lands, where they rushed clumsily into battle with weird, raucous shouts, to learn, after a time, a higher culture and finer instincts from their conquered enemy. Verhaeren's old schoolfellow, Rodenbach, had already described the sentimental beauty of Flanders, the peals of its belfries, the moonlit melancholy of its evenings reflected in the canals of Bruges, brooding over broad fields framed with dykes and willow-hedges. Verhaeren closes his eyes to this elegiac aspect of his native land and cries for the Flanders of old as it survives on the glowing canvases of Rubens, Jordaens, and Breughel. Take the following lines:

ART FLAMAND.

'Art flamand, tu les connus, toi,
Et tu les aimais bien, les gouges,
Au torse épais, aux tétons rouges;
Tes plus fiers chefs-d'œuvre en font foi.

Que tu peignes reines, déesses,
Ou nymphes, émergeant des flots
Par troupes, en roses îlots,
Ou sirènes enchanteresses.

Ou femelles aux contours pleins,
Symbolisant les saisons belles,
Grand art des maîtres, ce sont elles,
Ce sont les gouges que tu peins.

Et pour les créer, grasses, nues,
Toutes charnelles, ton pinceau
Faisait rougeoyer sous leur peau
Un feu de couleurs inconnues.

Elles flamboyaient de tons clairs,
Leurs yeux s'allumaient aux étoiles,
Et leurs poitrines sur les toiles
Formaient de gros bouquets de chair.'

What an evocation of the old Flemish masters! He says truly:

'Les femmes pâles et moroses
Ne miraient pas dans vos tableaux,
Comme la lune au fond des eaux,
Leur étisie et leurs chloroses.

Leurs fronts tristes, comme les soirs,
Comme les dolentes musiques,
Leurs yeux malades et phtisiques
Où micassent les désespoirs.

Leur grâces fausses et gommées,
S'alanguissant sur les sofas,
Sous des peignoirs en taffetas
Et des chemises parfumées.'

Some of the poems in 'Les Flamandes' are direct verbal transpositions of certain interiors and genre-pictures of the Flemish painters, orgiastic scenes of rustic sensuality, peasants dancing in drunken jubilation round the inn table. But the lubricity of these wonderful word-pictures is never the cold lubricity of vice. It is the warm, palpitating lubricity of super-abundant energy, of the *trop-plein* of life which, like some virgin spring seeking the broad river into which it will presently discharge itself, frets and foams and overflows its borders. Verhaeren shares the disdain of Walt Whitman, with whom in his earlier work he has more than one affinity, for 'the sly settee and the unwholesome adulterous couple.' Naturalistic literature is, however, at bottom pictorial rather than poetic. And it cannot be denied that in 'Les Flamandes' Verhaeren has not yet found himself. It is true, as has been said, that even here he is more than a mere naturalist. He always looks for the soul behind the body. But his method of approach is too external, the scope of his vision too purely plastic. He still has far to travel before becoming the poet of his prime.

Strong lights cast strong shadows. There is the Flanders of the Primitives as well as the Flanders of Rubens. Belgium has its ascetic cloisters as well as its *kermesses*. Any healthy

elemental race has the weak amongst it as well as the strong, and its very strength is apt, in proportion to its intensity, to take devious channels. In ' Les Moines,' which saw the light in 1886, Verhaeren dealt with the religious past of his country, his own religious past as well. Near his home, at Saint-Amand, was the Trappist monastery of Bornhem, whither he had often accompanied his father to Confession and listened to the rough, majestic plain-chant of the monks. Here, in the plain Cistercian chapel, he received his first Communion. In these poems Verhaeren's monks, like his ' Flamandes,' are on the whole approached *ab extra* and pictorially. Certainly, admitting that point of view, they could not be better done. He has dwelt in ' Les Moines ' on what may be called the traditional poetry of the cloister. He has there fixed, in a remarkable series of poems, the ' Gothic ' horizons ' of the monastery, the calm, uneventful days of prayer and penance—all that the word ' monk ' calls up in the mind of an imaginative reader. He has done this once for all in a literary form that suggests by its perfection the needle of Rembrandt. The following ' Croquis de Cloître ' is a good example of his manner in this book :

CROQUIS DE CLOÎTRE.

' Sous un pesant repos d'après-midi vermeil,
Les stalles en vieux chêne éteint sont alignées,
Et le jour traversant les fenêtres ignées
Etale, au fond du chœur, des nattes de soleil.

Et les moines dans leurs coules toutes les mêmes—
Mêmes plis sur leur manche et même sur leur froc,
Même raideur et même attitude de roc—
Sont là, debout muets, plantés sur deux rangs blêmes.

Et l'on attend à voir ces immobilités
Brusquement se disjoindre et les versets chantés
Rompre, à tonnantes voix, ces silences qui pèsent ;

Mais rien ne bouge au long du sombre mur qui fuit,
Et les heures s'en vont, par le couvent, sans bruit,
Et toujours et toujours les grands moines se taisent.'

It is probable that Verhaeren himself realised the inadequacy of the descriptive method to the battles of the soul that go on within monastic walls, for we find him in a later work, ' Le

' Cloître,' adopting a different and more psychological manner. As we shall see in his mature work—the work in which he has become fully self-conscious—poetry to him is expression, not, except quite secondarily, description, while the task of the poet is so to identify himself with the springs of the phenomenon, faithfully re-creating it in his mind, as to give it again to the world in the shape of a definite irrevocable phrase. The true poetry of monasticism could not, then, consist for him in any mere description, however beautiful, of the external conditions of monks' days, but was rather to be found in the re-living by the poet of their interior life, in his sympathetic penetration of their motives, in the degree of his power of self-identification with ' all the fever of some differing soul.' ' Le ' Cloître ' is the tragedy of the soul of a monk.

It is written in dramatic form, and although not by any means what the average producer would call *bon théâtre* is nevertheless a true drama. For drama results from the clash of wills, and there are two wills in the soul of Dom Balthasar, the sombre hero. This monk, ' in the world ' Comte d'Argonne and Duc de Rispaire, is obviously indicated by the sanctity of his life, his commanding character, and his social rank to succeed the Prior of the monastery, who feels himself to be approaching his end. The Prior designates him to the brethren as his successor. Many of his fellow monks are, however, jealous of his spiritual and temporal advantages and intrigue against him. The play opens in the monastery garden. The monks are engaged in theological discussion, and Père Thomas poses the dilemma that we are told to fear God and that evil is the only object of fear. Dom Balthasar interrupts him with a brusque ' Vous raisonnez trop,' and at last bursts into a confession of his faith :

' Moi, j'ai la passion, j'ai la rage de Dieu,
Je ne comprends que ceux
Qui le proclament,
Presqu'avec fureur comme si leur âme
Folle n'avait trouvé, pour le louer, qu'un cri,
Qu'un seul, toujours le même,
Mais clair, mais pur, mais fort comme un baptême.
Dieu ne demande point d'être décrit,
Pesé et consigné dans des livres superbes
Et solennels comme l'orgueil.

* * * * * * . *

Il est d'autant plus Dieu qu'on ne le comprend pas.
C'est quand la foi, c'est quand l'amour sont las
De porter Christ, sanglant et nu, devant le monde,
Qu'on perd son heure à l'expliquer, par de profondes,
Et complexes et futiles raisons.
Or, il rit de ces combinaisons
De malice et d'orgueil où l'on s'exerce.
Il ne veut pas de ce banal commerce
De textes et de mots où l'on cote son nom
Suivant qu'on argumente adroitement ou non.
Il est plus haut que l'humaine sagesse,
Il est trop vaste ou trop géant ou trop profond
Pour qu'on en fixe la hauteur ou bien le fond;
Et c'est uniquement dans une ivresse
Violente d'amour, de sacrifice et de ferveur,
Qu'un Saint est quelquefois monté jusqu'à son cœur.'

Further scenes show the brethren caballing against Dom Balthasar's chances of succession to the Prior's stall. Dom Thomas, a well-drawn superficial modernist, says that Dom Balthasar ' est de trois cents ans venu trop tard sur la terre,' and poses his own candidature as a safe man. Dom Balthasar's tragedy unfolds itself against the background of the trivial worldliness of his mediocre brethren. A great crime drove him into the shelter of the cloister. In a moment of passion he murdered his father, allowing an innocent tramp to pay the penalty of the law. He has always lacked the humility necessary for true repentance, and when he is confronted in the confessional with a murderer, in whose place an innocent man is to be executed, and on whom he enjoins the penance of public confession, his own remorse rises afresh in his soul and drives him to public expiation. In vain the Prior explains to him that his sin has been forgiven long ago, that it is only his pride that calls out for this theatrical purgation; he insists, at least, on the right, now obsolete, of confessing to the brethren. Unwillingly the Prior consents. Eventually he confesses his crime not only to the monks but to the assembled people in the church, and he is turned out of the monastery to suffer at the hands of the law. Repentance, for which he lacked the necessary humility, would have saved him; remorse destroys him. Dom Marc, a child-like novice, who with complete theological incompetence has urged him to confess to the world and might, himself, have stepped out of the Paradise of Fra

Angelico, has always loved Dom Balthasar, and invokes the Divine Mercy on the fallen outcast :

' Du plus profond de ta miséricorde
Seigneur sois sécourable
Au frère de mon âme, Balthasar.
Toi seul, tu sais la part
Que s'est fait, pour l'avenir
Et pour le ciel, son repentir ;
Seigneur, assiste-le, à l'heure
Où les hommes lui sont fureur,
Et le monde, supplice et vilenie,
Et ses frères, injure et fange ;
Seigneur, assiste-le, dans sa rouge agonie,
Avec tes anges ! '

Verhaeren pierces here to the soul of the cloister. The passions of humanity rage, if anything, more fiercely in the narrow confines of the monastery ; the fundamental passion for the infinite, which makes the monk, seems to enhance and dilate every feeling of which he is capable.

In ' Le Cloître ' we have a distinct advance of method on ' Les Moines.' The poet is no longer content with outlines, however beautiful. He is determined to penetrate to the heart of his subject. But whether he feels himself cramped by the limitations of that subject, or whether the purely intellectual nature of his sympathy with it fetters his power of expression, it is certain that he has not yet completely found himself. Many of us, indeed, need limitations in order to find ourselves. Some of us would be happier and more successful, as Newman has remarked, if we realised once for all that we are men of one idea. Not so a Verhaeren. The eagle requires space, and ever more space, for his circling flight.

Verhaeren, at his maturity, does not stand for any particular set of ideas. He is a world-poet and a life-poet. He can hardly even be said to stand for any particular literary school. He has identified himself in a most astonishing degree with the whole of life, and expresses its freshness, intensity, and beauty as no other poet of our time has done. As was said in the first lines of this article, he bears witness to his generation of the inexhaustible fecundity of life, of its never-failing novelty and unexpectedness, of the virgin divinity, as it were, of the present moment.

It may help us to understand this better if, before turning to the poet's later work, we glance for a moment at the intellectual and social conditions of the age in which we live, the age which Verhaeren illuminates and interprets.

At first sight these conditions seem to be in a state of hopeless confusion. The main characteristics of Christian civilisation are still with us—kings and priests are still to be found in Europe ; but another civilisation has begun to grow up in our midst, dislodging its predecessor as one plant drives another off the soil, and kings and priests are no longer what they were. People contract what the law of the land calls Christian marriage on Pagan principles, our whole social and mental life seems to be in a state of anarchy. A new spirit is slowly and surely filtering upwards into our life as from some subterranean spring : it is the spirit of international democracy, grim and iconoclastic, emancipated from the law and religion of the past and still seeking its own expression of those necessities.

In one of his ingenious symposiums, Mr. W. H. Mallock makes one of his characters say ' It took Christianity three ' hundred years to replace Paganism, it has not taken Atheism ' thirty to replace Christianity.' The statement has, of course, a characteristic exaggeration, but there is truth in it. Christianity remains, but it is not the Christianity of our grandfathers or even of our fathers. Neither, for that matter, is the anti-Christianity of our day the anti-Christianity of the last generation. The Freethinkers or ' Agnostics ' of the latter half of the last century were ' hard-shell ' rationalists ; they considered the claims of Christianity to be intellectually disproved, but they continued, with a few notable exceptions, to take a Christian view of morals. Hard-shell rationalism is to-day almost as rare a state of mind as genuine faith in supernatural religion, and opposition to Christianity is as much directed against its moral values as its dogmatic theology. Meanwhile, the incessant infiltration of the new spirit goes on. To many trained in the schools of the past this new spirit appears to be a purely barbarous force animated by a definite hatred of beauty and wisdom, by a deliberate preference for the formless and the chaotic. We protest in vain ; it possesses us through our language and our fashions.

Another remarkable characteristic of the present situation

is that this confusion is to be found in the interior of the individual as well as in the world around him.

'In the eighteenth century,' says Mr. Santayana, 'it was easy to perceive how many people Voltaire and Rousseau might be alienating from Bossuet and Fénelon. But how shall we satisfy ourselves now whether, for instance, Christianity is holding its own? Who can tell what vagary or what compromise may not be calling itself Christianity? A bishop may be a modernist; a chemist may be a mystical theologian; a psychologist may be a believer in ghosts.' *

And the same philosopher goes on to remark by way of explanation that:

'the living organism has many strata: on any of which, at a given moment, activities may exist perfect enough to involve consciousness, yet too weak and isolated to control the organs of outer expression; so that (to speak geologically) our practice may be historic, our manners glacial, and our religion palaeozoic.'

This explanation rests on the hypothesis that scientific materialism is the last word of philosophy, and that is a hard saying for many; but even if we accept it, we do but describe analytically a given situation. We do not alter it. We cannot find in that explanation any ground for hope that our religion will become less palaeozoic or our manners less glacial or that we may be able to make these disparate functions of our personality truly complementary to each other. Meantime, although we may yearn with St. Augustine or speculate with Hegel, we move with Nietzsche; for the life of which we are a part moves and carries us on its current.

We move with Nietzsche. There can be no doubt that Nietzsche stands as the authentic symbol of the progressive forces, the forces that are moving onward in humanity to-day. We may like or dislike this, but it is the fact. This does not mean that any appreciable number of people believe in his doctrines. Very few, we imagine, would positively assert that they believed in any of his positive doctrines in detail. 'Super-man' and 'Eternal Return' may go; but his faith in life, in the capacity of men—or at all events, of some men—to work

* Winds of Doctrine, p. 7.

out alone their own salvation, is living all round us, even in quarters where his prejudices would have made him think it impossible. For Nietzsche was in theory an aristocrat. He hated modern democracy, which he considered to be a sort of bastard Christianity. But philosophers do not choose their disciples.

The first and most striking characteristic of this diffused Nietzscheanism—if, in disobedience to the master's orders, we may call it so—is that it is purely atheistic. We forget which of Maxim Gorky's heroes says that humanity is making a new experiment in these days: men are attempting to live and organise life without any relation whatever to the gods. Even the poetry of Goethe's Pantheism has gone. No Olympus of any kind presides over, much less rules, the play of the world's forces. Moreover, those forces at last appear to the emancipated eye in a fair field and with no favour. The arbitrary and mutually destructive distinctions of all the theologies have vanished together. Once more, as to Peter, a message has come to declare that there is nothing common or unclean. We have said that this new spirit is atheistic. It does not follow from this that it is irreligious. But it worships on earth instead of in the sky. Life itself is the object of its devotion, and life, in its supreme flowering, 'the 'holy spirit of Man.'

Belgium stands, as it were, at the cross-roads of Europe. The arteries of its railways transport the traveller in a few hours to Germany, France, and Holland. Its ports give access to all countries. It is, or was until last year, relatively the richest country in Europe. It is agricultural, industrial, and commercial, and every inch of it has been exploited by the untiring energy of its population. All the contrasts of modern European life are to be found in this tiny land, which is a sort of microcosm of the modern world. It is at once conservative and socialistic, Catholic and free-thinking, wealthy and wretched. The Belgians themselves are the restless product of two races: the Latin Walloons and the Germanic Flemish. This blend has already become a new race. Pol de Mont, in spite of his name, is a Flemish poet; Verhaeren, Maeterlinck, and Van Lerberghe, though no Frenchman can pronounce their names, are French writers. And this race of such comparatively

recent formation is strong, energetic—*volontaire*, as the French say.

> ' Je suis le fils de cette race,
> Dont les cerveaux plus que les dents
> Sont solides et sont ardents
> Et sont voraces.
> Je suis le fils de cette race
> Tenace,
> Qui veut après avoir voulu
> Encore, encore et encore plus ! '

So sings Verhaeren in proud stanzas.

Les dents aussi ! The Belgian race pulses with physical vitality. Excess of every kind is in their tradition and they apparently thrive on it. Nowhere in Europe is life so intensely enjoyed as in Flanders, nowhere is the pleasure of the senses given so high a place in the scale of values. Jordaens' models may still be met at every *kermesse*. In the consumption of alcohol Belgium, a few years ago, stood at the head of Europe. Nearly every other house is an inn or a café ; even small villages have their brewery, and the brewers are the wealthiest men in the country. In the case of Flanders, Puritanism was for once on the side of the Church and the inquisition ; Flemish patriots fought against the morose morality of the Holy Office rather than against its theology. Side by side with this joy in the freest, most unbridled expression of life stands the stern figure of Asceticism. In the suburbs of Ghent is the great Béguinage. Bruges, with its numberless churches and cloisters, is only a few miles distant from Brussels, not precisely a pious place.

Verhaeren aptly represents the contrasts of the Belgian character. He is a ferment of diverse elements that have taken time to harmonise. The Latin in him gives him his language and his form, the Germanic Fleming gives him his depth of feeling and that sense of the sacredness of reality which is the keystone of his religion. Before, however, he reached the harmony of his mature work, he had to suffer. Soon after the publication of ' Les Moines ' he turned from the contemplation of nature and the past, to the cultivation of his mind. He travelled widely, visited Paris and London, Spain and Germany. Where he was first taken ill, or what exactly his malady was, seems uncertain. Zweig speaks of a nervous affection of the stomach accompanied by excessive neuras-

thenia. He reached in these years of illness the lowest depth, in fact the crisis, of his vitality. All sound became intolerable to him, the bell on the door had to be removed, those who lived in the house had to wear felt slippers, the windows had to be kept perpetually closed. A 'soudaine lassitude' attacked his moral nature. The earth became a chaos, the sky an empty space, every ideal seemed to founder in a frightful nihilism. It was the 'Dark Night of the Soul' of St. John of the Cross. Such crises have occurred before now in the lives of poets, and they have almost always been sterile. Not so in the case of Verhaeren. In the series 'Au Bord de la Route,' 'Les Soirs,' 'Les Débâcles,' and 'Les Flambeaux Noirs,' psychopathology has as important a document as literature. The landscape of these poems is no longer that of Belgium, it is indeed no longer that of the earth. It is a land of grandiose nightmares. It is filled with the freezing cold of the core of Dante's Hell. The sun, the flowers, the trees, are dead; the moon of death lights up frozen marshes:

'Et la crainte saisit d'un immortel hiver
Et d'un grand Dieu soudain, glacial et splendide.'
('La Barque.')

Like a heavy fog, fatigue settles down on his soul. First pleasure goes and then the desire for pleasure. The energy of the nerves is spent, the senses are too feeble to translate impressions into experience:

'Il fait novembre en mon âme
Et c'est le vent du nord qui clame
Comme une bête dans mon âme.'
('Au Bord de la Route.')

Slowly and irresistibly one evil thought rises and spreads over the surface of his consciousness, like some stagnant oily deposit on the surface of a pond; the thought of the senselessness of life, the secret longing for death:

'Mourir! comme des fleurs trop énormes, mourir!'
('Les Soirs.')

The soul would fain tear itself from the poor used-up body:

'Pour s'en aller vers les lointains et se défaire
De soi et des autres, un jour,
En un voyage ardent et mol comme l'amour
Et légendaire ainsi qu'un départ de galère.'
('Au Bord de la Route.')

Then comes the anticipation of madness :

' Aurai-je enfin l'atroce joie
De voir, nerfs par nerfs, comme une proie
La démence attaquer mon cerveau ? '
(' Les Flambeaux Noirs.')

And there is another terrific poem in the same series, in which the poet sees the corpse of his reason floating down the Thames :

' Elle est morte de trop savoir,
De trop vouloir sculpter la cause.
. . . .
Elle est morte, atrocement,
D'un savant empoisonnement,
Elle est morte aussi d'un délire
Vers un absurde et rouge empire.'

He hails madness as though it were his salvation. ' Je ' veux marcher vers la folie et ses soleils.' And he resolves ' à chaque heure, violenter sa maladie ; l'aimer et la maudire.' This cry for madness, the extreme document of human despair, implies a heroism for which we have no name. It fulfils Nietzsche's great saying in ' Ecce Homo ' :—' For a Dionysiac ' task, the hardness of a hammer, the pleasure in destruction ' itself, is most decidedly one of the preliminary conditions.' In Verhaeren's mysterious malady it was the turning point. Slowly he pressed onward through that hell to new life and strength. The life he found on the other side of that crater of pain was not the life he had left. The fire had consumed everything. His whole previous relation to the world had broken down. All seemed lost. But without this terrible pilgrimage he would never have become the Verhaeren who inspires our life to-day. Only one who has drunk the cup of sorrow to the dregs has the right to sing the praise of life as he does. Only one who has been crucified can rise again.

Verhaeren was delivered from the Valley of the Shadow of death-in-life by a flight to realities. He turned from introspection to the world of phenomena. Poets had long felt themselves alien from the realities of our day. It had long been a commonplace to speak of the danger to art of industrialism and democracy, of scientifically designed machinery which makes life uniform and kills the individuality. The rise of uneducated instinct against the ' rationalism ' of the schools

seemed to mean the destruction of all that it had taken centuries of patient reason to build up—railways, monster cities, the telegraph, the telephone, all the triumphs of engineering were put aside as unsuitable motives for poetry. Ruskin wanted to demolish workshops and chimneys. Tolstoi wished finally to destroy modern civilisation and bring man back to what he imagined to be his primitive condition of innocence. In the face of this state of opinion Verhaeren has accomplished a great feat: he has effected no less than a transmutation of poetic values. By rejecting no phenomenon of the modern world, however unpromising, he has infinitely extended the boundaries of poetic art. He has in this way justified Nietzsche's words: 'My formula for grandeur in man is *amor fati*: 'that a man should ask for nothing else, either in the past 'or in the future, in all eternity. We must not only endure 'what is necessary, far from concealing it—all idealism is lying 'in necessity's face—but we must love it' ('Ecce Homo'). He has discovered the interior sense and necessity of the modern conditions of life and by doing so has discovered their beauty. 'Les Villes Tentaculaires,' first published in 1896, is the supreme expression of this feeling. The modern city like an octopus drags human life into it from the country:

> 'L'esprit des campagnes était l'esprit de Dieu.
> Il eut la peur de la recherche et des révoltes.
> Il chut; et le voici qui meurt, sous les essieux
> Et sous les chars en feu des récoltes.'
>
> ('Les Villes Tentaculaires—Vers le futur.')

The town becomes a seduction which the peasants cannot resist:

> 'Pourtant, lorsque les soirs
> Sculptent le firmament de leurs marteaux d'ébène
> La ville au loin s'étale et domine la plaine
> Comme un nocturne et colossal espoir;
> Elle surgit: désir, splendeur, hantise;
> Sa clarté se projette en lueurs jusqu'aux cieux,
> Son gaz myriadaire en buissons d'or s'attise,
> Ses rails sont des chemins audacieux
> Vers le bonheur fallacieux
> Que la fortune et la force accompagnent;
> Ses murs se dessinent pareils à une armée
> Et ce qui vient d'elle encore de brume et de fumée
> Arrive en appels clairs vers les campagnes.'
>
> ('La Ville.')

The aesthetic aspect of the town does not blind the poet to the ethical problems it involves. From all sides human energy streams in upon it. 'Tous les chemins se rhythment 'vers elle.' The fever of its streets creates a yearning for new conditions, new aspirations, a new God.

> 'Le Rêve Ancien est mort et le Nouveau se forge.
> Il est fumant dans la pensée et la sueur
> Des bras fiers de travail, des ponts fiers de lueurs,
> Et la ville l'entend monter du fond des gorges
> De ceux qui le portent en eux,
> Et le veulent crier et sangloter aux cieux.'
> ('L'Ame de la Ville.')

'Les Villes Tentaculaires,' 'Les Campagnes Hallucinées,' and the drama 'Les Aubes' may be considered as a trilogy of the social revolution of which Verhaeren is no uncertain adherent.

At this point then we leave him, the poet of the present and the future. He has served his apprenticeship to the past which has died and risen again in his soul. The awful events which have submerged for the time his country may check temporarily the normal development of his art. They have, of course, inspired him, and a volume entitled 'La Belgique Sanglante' is soon to appear. This volume will no doubt be an interlude in his work, just as those terrible events can only be considered as an interlude in the development of the human spirit. For who can doubt that the future of our race is not with autocracy, militarism and feudalism, but rather with industrialism, science and peace? When this ghastly interruption of the progress of man is over, and over for ever, Verhaeren, who is in the maturity of his strength and of his art, will be one of those, and not the least of them, who will guide our feet towards that rational control of ourselves and of our destiny, which—however strangely expressed, however obscured at times—has never ceased to be the ideal of our nature and the secret spring of all our advance and well-being.

ALGAR THOROLD.

THE MIDDLE EAST

1. **Abbas II.** By the EARL OF CROMER. Macmillan. 1915.
2. **Arabia Infelix : or the Turks in Yamen.** By G. WYMAN BURY. Macmillan. 1915.
3. **The Anglo-German Problem.** By CHARLES SAROLEA. Nelson. 1912.
4. **La Question d'Orient depuis son Origine.** By E. DRIAULT. Paris. 1898.
5. **Deutschland's Auswärtige Politik.** By GRAF ERNST ZU REVENTLOW. Berlin : Mittler. 1914.
6. **Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.** Cd. 7716. 1914.
7. **The New Map of Europe.** By HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS. Duckworth. 1915.

THE sudden and dramatic appearance of an Anglo-French Fleet at the Dardanelles, the equally dramatic bombardment of the Smyrna forts by the 'British East 'Indies Squadron,' reminded the world that the war is not limited to the Continent of Europe. True, it will be decided there ; for it is only by the overthrow of the great armies she has pushed forward beyond her Eastern and Western frontiers that Germany will be reduced to submission. But it may be that to the observer of the future the bombardment of the Dardanelles will seem no less important than the bloody battles in Flanders and in Poland. He will not fail to note that the war originated in that 'Eastern 'Question' which had perturbed and perplexed Western statesmen for so long ; that it was a direct, and, as he will probably think, an inevitable, sequel to the two Balkan wars. He will know that the German and Austrian legions had been set in motion to support the efforts of German and Austrian diplomatists and financiers to gain a predominating influence, political, industrial, and economic, over the whole of that Near East and Middle East which stretches from the Danube and the Save almost to the delta of the Indus ; and

he will be able to trace the results of this misdirected effort and its colossal failure.

It is the irony of Germany's fate that her deep-laid schemes to destroy or weaken her rivals will end only in increasing their strength. We might look with compassion on this national tragedy if it were not so largely due to national perversity and a carefully fostered national insolence. The aim of the ruling military and political group has been to bear back the Slavonic tide, and push the Teutonic landmarks far into the retreating waters. But the war will leave the Slav peoples more firmly planted, not merely in the semi-Oriental territories of the South and East, but also within the European circle that Germanism claims for its own. In the same way Germany's challenge to England's sea power and world power will leave the British Empire stronger than ever. After nearly five centuries, another 'Fall of Constantinople' is impending. Throughout the reign of the present German Emperor his agents and ministers have been preparing to use Turkey as a weapon against the British Empire. The weapon has turned in their hands; and the abortive stroke will leave England more firmly seated on the main highway of the world, and more secure in her leadership of those Eastern peoples whom she is bringing into the circle of self-conscious and self-dependent nations.

Once more we shall have profited by sheer good fortune and the mistakes of others rather than by our own prevision and policy. If we had planned and fought for such a result as is likely to ensue we might justly claim it as a triumph of statesmanship. But we did not plan; we were forced into this fight, whatever German politicians and journalists may say, against our own wishes. Assuredly we did not go to war, and we never would have gone to war, to effect the downfall of Turkey, or even to counteract the German advance in the Middle East. When we reluctantly drew the sword to support France and liberate Belgium, we were anxious to restrict the area of hostilities. We wished to deal with our enemy in Western Europe and in his own colonial possessions, without dragging Turkey and Egypt into the quarrel, and without raising those larger problems which the extension of the conflict to the East must involve. In conjunction with our Allies we invited Turkey to remain

neutral, and offered on that condition to guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman dominions. Our Ambassador at Constantinople, with tact and patience, did his best to dissuade the Sultan and his restive ministers from taking the irretrievable step and launching their Empire upon its doom.

From the beginning Sir Louis Malet must have felt that the effort was almost hopeless. When he returned to Constantinople on the 16th of August, he found the situation very bad, owing to the pressure of the pro-German intriguers upon those members of the Cabinet who favoured neutrality. Some acts and omissions of our own had made matters worse. At the outbreak of the war two great battleships, the 'Sultan Osman' and the 'Reshadieh,' were building for Turkey in a private English dockyard. The British Government refused to allow these vessels to leave the country, and ordered them to be hurried to completion and placed in commission in the Royal Navy. Legal, political, and military considerations may have abundantly justified this appropriation. Even if we had not been anxious to add to our margin of Dreadnought superiority over Germany we could hardly have permitted these formidable instruments of war to pass into the possession of a Power whose neutrality might become doubtful. It might, however, have been possible to keep them temporarily out of Turkish hands without seizing them ourselves. At any rate the transaction roused deep natural resentment throughout the Ottoman Empire. The two Dreadnoughts had been ordered under the inspiration of that passionate movement of nationalism and Moslem feeling which followed the Balkan Wars. They were intended to restore to Turkey the command of the Ægean, and to make good the humiliation her fleet had suffered from the Greeks. A portion of the enormous sum required for the construction of the sea-monsters had been raised by a public subscription in which all classes of the Moslem population participated as a patriotic and religious duty. The battleships, while they were yet skeletons of steel plates and frames on the Tyne, were made familiar by crude pictures to peasants and townsmen throughout the Sultan's dominions. The confiscation of these popular favourites caused many good Mahommedans, who had been on the whole well disposed towards England, to side with England's enemies; and Sir Louis Malet is constrained

to admit that the detention of the ships gave the Turks 'a 'concrete and substantial grievance against Great Britain.'

Even more unfortunate was the arrival of the 'Goeben' and the 'Breslau' in Turkish waters on the 10th of August. We do not yet know how it was that the great German battle-cruiser with her consort was enabled to reach her goal, threading her way in safety from Sicily to the Dardanelles without interference from the fleets which theoretically commanded all the waters of the Mediterranean. The failure to intercept the 'Goeben' was immediately disastrous in its results. The German party in the Turkish Ministry and outside was rendered more aggressive by the presence of this potent auxiliary; and the moderates were reduced to quiescence by the knowledge that the guns of the battle-cruiser could, and probably would, lay the Yildiz Kiosk in ruins under the eyes of the Caliph if he hesitated too long.

But even without these contributory causes Turkey would doubtless have been drawn into the war by German pressure and persuasion, although for a time the opposition to the pro-Teuton policy was strong, and included some influential personages. It may be taken for certain, says Sir Louis Malet, that the Sultan, the Heir Apparent, the Grand Vizier, Djavid Bey, a majority of the Ministry, and a considerable section of the Committee of Union and Progress, were opposed to so desperate an adventure as war against the Allies. Even Talaat Bey, the most powerful of the Committee leaders, hesitated for some time before he definitely joined the war party. Enver, of course, played Germany's game with the utmost conviction; and this adventurer was once more able to control events in Stamboul, with more ease since his own Praetorian guards and hired stabbers were now backed by German swords and guns. No arguments were needed to bring over Enver to the cause of his German friends. Some of his doubting associates may have been influenced by the hints and insinuations which the Kaiser's emissaries poured upon them.

'German success in the European War was said to be assured. The perpetual menace to Turkey from Russia might, it was suggested, be averted by a timely alliance with Germany and Austria. Egypt might be recovered for the Empire. India and other Moslem countries, represented as groaning under Christian rule,

might be kindled into a flame of infinite possibilities for the Caliphate of Constantinople. Turkey would emerge from the war the one great Power of the East, even as Germany would be the one great Power of the West.'

Some of the Young Turks and other German partisans, perhaps Enver himself, may have really been deluded by these fantasies; the 'more thoughtful,' as the Ambassador points out, felt that even if Germany were victorious there was no certainty, and small prospect, of any advantage to the Ottoman Empire. Germany, however, took short measures to overcome their scruples. During the first three weeks of October four million sterling in bullion was secretly imported into Constantinople and consigned to the German Ambassador. After the arrival of the 'Goeben' and 'Breslau,' the armed forces of the State practically passed out of the control of the Sultan and his ministers. The Turkish War Office became a branch of the German General Staff, and the Turkish Admiralty was the battle-cruiser's ward-room. The Syrian towns were full of German officers, who were provided with large sums of money for suborning the local chiefs. Orders were given to obtain estimates for the making of Indian military costumes at Aleppo, so as to simulate the appearance of British Indian troops. This is mentioned as 'an example of German thoroughness.' But it is possible to be too thorough by half, as it is to be too clever.

The end of it all was that on the 29th of October armed Bedouins were sent on a raid into the Sinai Peninsula with the Suez Canal as their objective. On the same day Turkish ships under the orders of the German admiral made an attack upon Odessa. The British, French, and Russian Ambassadors at once asked for their passports; and so the last phase in the Decline and Fall of the Turkish Empire in Europe opened.

Did the Germans foresee that result and all it meant for their Moslem auxiliary? Perhaps. But it was no business of theirs to consider Turkey and Turkish interests. Their immediate purpose was to create a diversion sufficient to occupy and distract two of their most formidable adversaries. A movement in the Near East might relieve Austria of the Serbian menace, and call off several Russian Army Corps from the Vistula. This was one object. The other and the more important was to attack England through Egypt.

History does not often repeat itself; but it sometimes seems to plagiarise its own creations. There is a startling resemblance between the German plans for the overthrow of British power and those which were devised by the French in the revolutionary and Napoleonic era. The Directory and the First Consul agreed in thinking that the most effectual way to fetter England in a European war, next to fomenting an insurrection in Ireland, was to attack her in the East. India, or rather the road to India, was supposed to be her vulnerable point. It was with this object that Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt was organised. If the French army once set foot on Egyptian soil, said Talleyrand, the destruction of British dominion in India was a certainty. The idea haunted Napoleon long after the failure of his ambitious raid, and he was constantly forming grandiose schemes for the conquest of the Middle East with the aid of Russia or Turkey or both. The project has been revived and canvassed again and again by writers like Bernhardi and Frobenius and Count von Reventlow, who have been engaged for years past in considering how best England could be met and checked in the long-predicted Anglo-German conflict. They have insisted that, while we might be incommoded by commerce-destroying and the *guerre de course* in the North Sea, we could only be seriously weakened by revolts in our Colonies and Dependencies, and particularly by an attack in force upon Egypt and the Suez Canal. For if that succeeded the main artery of the Empire would be severed, our Asiatic dominions would be left 'in the air,' and the effort to guard our communications and recover our position would render it impossible for us to intervene with effect in the main European theatre of hostilities.

Such, we may assume, were the calculations which induced Germany to drag her luckless Moslem ally into the contest. She wanted the assistance of the Turkish army to force us out of the Nile delta or, at any rate, to keep our hands so full in that quarter that we should have little energy to spare for the Yser and the Meuse, and should be unable to bring either Australian or Indian troops to northern Europe. But could the German General Staff hope that the enterprise would meet with success? The members of the Potsdam board of war are supposed to be sternly practical men, masters of facts and figures, weighing the forces and the resources of nations

in their laboratory with a cool scientific detachment. But they have shown a singular incapacity to work out their calculations correctly, and have been frequently misled by their prepossessions and prejudices, or it may be by those of others. They grotesquely exaggerated the military efficiency of the Turks, and even the collapse of their favourites in the Balkan War did not shake their faith in the pupils of Marshal von der Goltz. Similarly they have always formed an absurd underestimate of British military capacity. The Emperor's alleged sneer at 'French's contemptible little army' may be apocryphal; but the phrase represents the sentiment not only of the Emperor's subjects but of his military experts. That an Anglo-Indian or an Anglo-Egyptian force could make a formidable resistance to the Ottoman troops, led and organised by picked Prussian officers, they did not believe. Ignorant of Oriental conditions they expected to pass sixty thousand or eighty thousand Turks across the Sinaitic desert, and they did not conceive that the British War Office would be able to concentrate in Egypt an army sufficient, either in numbers or quality, to cope with this invasion.

They were, moreover, looking for aid from another quarter. They hoped that the defenders of the Suez Canal would be struck in the back by those whom they were protecting. They held that Egypt was seething with disaffection, and that the outbreak of war with a Mussulman Power would be the signal for a national and religious rising that would tax British resources to the utmost. The Egyptian regiments would mutiny and murder their British officers, the most influential personages in the country would put themselves at the head of the movement, the towns would be held by riotous mobs, the fellahin would obey the orders of the ulema and strike for the Sultan and the Faith. False as these anticipations have proved, the Germans had some excuse for indulging in them. They knew how slender is the chain of military force by which we hold together the vast territory between the Mediterranean and the Equator. There must, indeed, have been moments when the situation in the Sudan may well have been critical. What if Moslem fanaticism, never quite asleep in that land, had been roused by the invocation from Stamboul? What if a new Mahdi, with a promise of German gold and guns, had sprung up among the dervishes?

The crisis passed, through the tact and judgment of the Sirdar and his officials. Sir Reginald Wingate found the Egyptian officers of the Khedivial army uneasy and perturbed over the prospect of war with Turkey. He spent some time in Cairo in close discussion with these doubting soldiers, and brought them round to a better comprehension alike of their own position and the British attitude. He then returned to Khartoum, where he laid the situation frankly before the principal sheikhs and notables of the provinces in various informal gatherings, and finally addressed them in Arabic at a great public meeting in Omdurman, when he went fully and clearly into the causes and significance of the war. His statement on this occasion, and the proclamation he caused to be published in the 'Sudan Gazette,'* should be a lesson to those who imagine that Orientals are impervious to straightforward argument and must always be treated like grown-up children. The Sirdar laid the British case candidly before the religious and secular chiefs of the Arab community, and appealed to their reason and good sense. As a result he obtained the uncompromising support of the ulema class from the Grand Mufti downwards, of the sheikhs, the mercantile community, and the officers of the Sudanese battalions. There has always been some grumbling against British control in the Upper as well as the Lower Nile regions; but when the test comes it is seen, here as elsewhere, that there is a real appreciation of the rigorous justice and settled order which our officials secure for native and subject populations. The Germans misunderstood the feeling in Egypt and the Sudan as they did that of Ireland, India, Canada, and South Africa. But at the outset there was abundant material for an explosion, which was only averted by very cautious and skilful handling. The Empire is more indebted than it perhaps has leisure at the moment to acknowledge to the capable band of civil and military officers who helped to steer Egypt and its southern annexe through this exacting crisis.

It added considerably to the burden of the British 'advisers' of the Khedive that they had to reckon with the treason of the sovereign who was their nominal employer and paymaster. Many of us in England, many even among Anglo-Egyptians,

* They are printed in full in the Times of December 29, 1914.

were surprised when the news came that Abbas II. had abandoned his country and thrown himself into the arms of the Turks and their Teutonic patrons. We should have been less astonished if we could, at the time, have had before us the incisive picture of that shifty and shiftless potentate which Lord Cromer has since given to the world. This extremely interesting little monograph is the sequel to its author's 'Modern Egypt,' and it has the same qualities of insight, shrewd perception, and admirable balance which distinguished that valuable work. When it was written some years ago there was, as the Greeks would have said, a great ox on the tongue of the ex-proconsul. He could not speak his mind freely about Abbas Pasha while that prince was still the occupant of the Khedivial throne under our protection. Perhaps he does not speak quite without reserve even yet; one may conjecture that he had more trouble, not merely with Abbas but with some influential personages in a country far removed from Egypt, than he cares to confess. But we can see that the ex-Khedive was always a perilous intriguer, constantly chafing at the firm supervision which kept his throne safe and his country prosperous, badly in need of those stern reminders which Lord Cromer occasionally found it desirable to administer.

One might have felt, as indeed many people in England did feel, a certain sympathy with a high-spirited young sovereign condemned to dependence and tutelage. But that was not in reality the character of Abbas Pasha. He is shown in these pages, written in no vindictive spirit, to have been utterly unscrupulous, egotistical, conceited, and covetous; with no more strength of character than his father, Tewfik, and without that amiable potentate's kindliness, good sense, and genuine concern for the welfare of his subjects. Abbas cared nothing for the great mass of the fellahin, the hardworking, simple-minded peasantry, who are the best and most stable element in Egyptian society.

'I never knew him,' says Lord Cromer, 'to take any real interest in the larger questions of internal administration; but he constantly interfered in the nomination of officials, his selections being wholly governed by his personal interests and predilections. In contradistinction to what happened in the days of his father, for whose memory he showed but little filial piety, the friction which arose between us was almost entirely due to personal questions. The Khedive's main wish in life apparently was to enrich himself by

every possible means in his power. As a matter of fact, he did amass great wealth, which he squandered, and eventually got himself into a very embarrassing financial position.'

Lord Cromer says that he had a certain personal liking for Abbas, who was well-mannered and pleasant in demeanour and by no means destitute of a sense of humour. But his confidants and associates were the semi-occidentalised adventurers of Cairo and Alexandria, and the gang of Turkish agents who were engaged in carrying on an underground conspiracy with Constantinople. Englishmen at home have, until recently, been inclined to take at their face value the apologies made for the proceedings of Abbas II. as presented to them by superficial or deluded observers; they did not know how much of sheer cunning, selfishness, and avarice there was in his pose of patriotism. It was possibly his financial embarrassments, quite as much as his rooted Anglophobia, which induced him at the last to throw in his lot with the enemies of Great Britain, being no doubt under the impression that he was joining the winning side, and laying up for himself a most substantial reward when the Turco-German victories should have overthrown British influence in the Nile region.

It was a final proof of the lack of real foresight and ability which went hand in hand with his disingenuousness. No Englishman could have had close relations for long with Abbas without finding him out. Even Sir Eldon Gorst, who took over the control of affairs at the British Agency full of sympathy for Egyptian aspirations, and quite resolved to treat the Khedive and his ministers with the utmost indulgence, was beginning to modify his views. Lord Cromer has a strong conviction, based on conversations with Sir Eldon shortly before his premature death, that 'his honey-'moon with the Khedive, which is a very common episode 'when Englishmen are first brought into close contact with 'Orientals of the type of Abbas II., was approaching its close.' The perfectly sincere attempt which Gorst made, with the support of his employers at home, to expedite the process of Egyptian self-government, and provide the country with a large apparatus of representative institutions, would probably have been abandoned in any case. As it was, Lord Kitchener came into office, resumed the Cromer tradition, and speedily

gained the confidence of all sections of the Egyptian public, not by allowing the Egyptians to govern themselves, but by exercising a stringent control over the proceedings of the Khedive and his Anglophobe sycophants, and re-establishing that careful supervision of the Egyptian administration by competent British officials which has been the main source of the revival of Egyptian social prosperity and industrial security.

Egyptian constitutionalism must advance by easy stages. The time will come when the Nile lands may be governed not only for the people but by the people; but the time is not yet. In the meanwhile, Egypt can only be grateful to Abbas II. for having come into the open at last. If he had continued to intrigue in the dark he might have occupied the Khedivial throne till the day of his death. Now that he has gone, rendering it possible for the British Government to give effect to the situation created by the Turkish war, Egypt, as an independent sultanate under British protection, will obtain those genuine reforms for which her ablest administrators have long sighed, as it seemed, in vain. The Capitulations will go—those hampering conventions which, as Lord Cromer wrote in 1908, 'practically involved 'a condition of legislative impotence injurious to the interests 'both of the native and the European population.' It will then be possible to enforce equal law and justice on all residents in the country, and at the same time to allow the foreign inhabitants a larger voice in the administration of affairs than it was desirable to give them while they occupied a position of extra-legal privilege. It will no longer be necessary to obtain the unanimous consent of the Powers, great and small, before a new tax can be levied or a new law imposed; and the internal affairs of Egypt will become as free as those of other civilised countries from the collective control of alien governments. No difficulty, it may be presumed, will be raised either by France or by Russia to the abrogation of the Capitulations, for these Powers will know that the rights of their subjects are secure in a British protectorate; Germany and Austria will not be consulted; and the Turkish Government, with which the Capitulations were originally concluded, will cease to count.

Assuming this to be the case the war will have conferred

benefits on Egypt which will far outweigh the financial burden it will throw upon the country for some years to come. It will have removed the irregularity which lay upon the British occupation from the beginning, and will have given Egypt a perfectly definite status as a British protectorate ; it will have dissipated the vague black shadow of the Turkish suzerainty, and cut away for ever the tangle of intrigue and interference from Constantinople, thus rendering it possible for the administration of the Nile lands to be directed with a single eye to the welfare of their peoples. Abbas II., when he listened to the voice of his anti-British tempters at Stamboul and Vienna, builded for Egypt and for Great Britain better than he knew or intended.

Not less important than the influence of the war upon Egypt is its reflex upon that extensive region which is sometimes specifically described as the Middle East. The Persian Gulf districts, the Persian hinterlands, Mesopotamia, Arabia, Syria, Asia Minor from the Levant to the Black Sea, will all be vitally affected by the coming collapse and disruption of the Ottoman Empire. From the point of view of Germany's interests in these quarters, it is clear that Teutonic diplomacy blundered in forcing on the war so soon. If it had been delayed a few years longer the political and financial predominance of Germany, from the Mediterranean to the Euphrates estuary, might have been too firmly consolidated to be overthrown. By the end of the war it will have been destroyed for ever. The results of years of persevering and tenacious effort have disappeared ; German money and German energy have been poured out upon the sands of Chaldaea in vain ; all that astute merchant-diplomatists, pertinacious agents, explorers and exploiters and company-promoters, dexterous consuls and subsidised shipping agents, have worked for at Konia and Aleppo, at Baghdad and Basra, and along the Gulf from Koweit to Oman—all this has gone. The brilliant little campaign of the Anglo-Indian Force on the Euphrates and Tigris (scarcely noticed amid the vast operations of the great armies in Europe) has blown the entire fabric into the air. The battles at Sahil and Kurna would hardly be deemed more than skirmishes on the Yser or the Vistula. But if their results are confirmed and followed up, they will have had all the effects of memorable

victories. Not only will they have put an end to Germany's ambitions on the Persian Gulf but they will have been instrumental in rescuing for civilisation a noble region of Asia, historically, perhaps, the most interesting tract of the whole surface of the globe, which has been blighted for centuries by the incapacity of the Turkish Government.

It is often forgotten that on the Persian Gulf the Turk is a newcomer. Before the Sultan's emissaries had ever looked upon its waters the English were there, trading, negotiating, fighting. It was not till 1668 that Basra was captured by an Ottoman army, and the Turkish flag hoisted over its citadel. But forty-six years earlier, on the 19th of January 1622, an English force captured the Portuguese fort on the Island of Kishim, opposite Hormuz; and a few months later, in conjunction with a Persian army, the English seized and sacked that famous place itself, and could have made themselves masters of 'the spoils of Ormuz and of Ind,' all along the coast of the Gulf. They preferred to make a treaty with the ruler of Persia, by which they undertook to protect and defend the Gulf, and to keep two men-of-war, at least, patrolling its waters.

To that 'scrap of paper,' and all it implied, our country has been consistently faithful for three centuries. We have certainly not shown ourselves a robber-empire in our dealings with the peoples, tribes, and potentates on and about the Asiatic Mediterranean. We have policed the Gulf, suppressed its pirates, kept open the trade of its ports for all nations, attended to its harbours and sea-marks, checked its slavers and gun-runners, made peace among its truculent chiefs, and rendered its navigation safe and its commerce profitable. We might have established our sphere of influence far inland; we could, if we had pleased, have annexed large sea-board slices of Arabia and Persia, with the riparian districts of the Euphrates and Tigris up to Baghdad. It might have been better for the world if our statesmen had been less reluctant to 'enlarge our responsibilities.' But we went on quietly doing our constabulary work in the Gulf, while the Turks gradually made themselves masters of the western shores; and we were only roused to activity when other European Powers—Russia, France, and Germany—began to acquire on the Persian sea-board stations and 'concessions,' with obvious political and

strategic possibilities. The danger thus threatened was met by Lord Lansdowne's famous declaration of the 5th of May 1903:

'I say it without hesitation, we should regard the establishment of a naval base, or of a fortified port, in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it by all the means at our disposal.'

This statement has been suggestively called * 'our Monroe 'Doctrine in the Middle East.' It is at any rate a clear and definite warning to all foreign Powers.

It is needless to go into the complicated history of the Baghdad Railway scheme, and the persistent attempts of Germany to gain a sort of politico-economic hegemony over Mesopotamia.† Our own diplomacy in relation to this question has been clumsy and irritating; but we have, at any rate, been consistent in opposing all the efforts of the Germans to get down to the Gulf, and it was for that reason that we took steps to regularise our position at Koweit. If the war had been postponed, the Germans would probably have secured ample opportunity for their enterprise on the whole route from Basra to Konia; and it would have been strange if that enterprise had not been used for political and strategic, as well as commercial, purposes. The war makes an end of these dangers. It does more: it will probably place Great Britain in a situation she never would have assumed except under the compulsion of circumstances, and enable her to assist in bringing to the great district of Mesopotamia the advantages of some more progressive form of government than the Turks could ever provide.

By a very wise forbearance we abstained from the annexation of Egypt, and restored to another member of Mehemet Ali's family the throne vacated by the defection of Abbas II. This was an extremely prudent step, which not only satisfies local opinion but has had an excellent effect upon the entire Moslem world. The new Sultan is the ruler of the most civilised and

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* In a very ably written summary of our transactions in the Persian Gulf region, published in The Times 'History of the War,' Part 29 (March 9, 1915).

† They are described by Dr. Sarolea in his informing chapter on 'The Baghdad Railway and German Expansion in the Near East,' and summarised, lucidly and concisely, in The Times 'History.'

the most united of Islamic communities, with a capital which is, and has been for centuries, a much more genuine centre of Moslem learning and religious life than the Greek city by the Bosphorus. Cairo, with its great, and it may be hoped extensively reformed, university of El-Azhar, may do much to influence the spiritual and intellectual development of the Islamic peoples. The problem of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and indeed the whole problem of the government of Arabia, remains to be determined; but we are pledged to protect the sacred places from external attack, and we shall certainly carry out that pledge.

It may be that this task can best be confided to the Sultan of Egypt. In that event there will be a shifting back of the centre of gravity of Islam to the point whence it was violently displaced by the half-heathen Turanian horde that broke in upon the world of Hellenic and Semitic culture from the steppes of Central Asia. Islam, under Arab direction and control, was a progressive and civilising faith; the Islam of Omar founded an Empire which was almost worthy to rank beside that of Rome and Byzantium, not only for its extent but for its government, its laws, its prosperity, its care for learning and literature. It was the Islam of the Middle East, the Islam of Egypt and Arabia and the Euphrates Valley, which developed the exquisite and characteristic Moslem art that glows to-day at Granada and Agra; which taught Europe algebra and astronomy and chemistry; which kept alive the study of logic and metaphysics till the West was ready to revive the forgotten sciences of the ancient world. It was this Islam which sent its priests and teachers and traders over half the earth, and scattered noble cities and gracious mosques from the foot of the Pyrenees almost to the Pacific. In the hands of the Semitic and the Persian peoples Islam was a vital and a fruitful faith: not a symbol of reaction and mere brute violence, as it has been with the Tartars and Turks. So it may be again, with the revival of the Arabic and the Egyptian tradition of Mahommedanism. When the German Kaiser proclaimed himself the protector of Mahommedans, he was taking the first step, however little he intended or foresaw such a result, towards the reconstruction of the Moslem world on the ruins of the military despotism which had usurped the Caliphate.

Confronted with this displacement of the Islamic balance, political and moral, we can regard the future of Constantinople with equanimity. The City of the Straits is no longer the 'key to India,' if indeed it ever was save in the Napoleonic and the Palmerstonian imagination. Some time there will be a tunnel under the Bosphorus, and passengers and mails will run straight through from Boulogne to Bombay; but that will only make Stamboul an important point of transit, like Marseilles or Brindisi, which nobody regards as keys to India. Constantinople is the key to the Black Sea, and the Powers who are most concerned in its fate are those whose possessions border on that sea. Our vital interests lie elsewhere, and in any post-war settlement it is essential that these interests should be secured. We are concerned with the Middle East—Egypt, Arabia, Mesopotamia, Persia, the Gulf—and it is there, as the accidentally beneficent result of this calamitous war, that we may help to rebuild a vanished civilisation, and restore something of their ancient prosperity and splendour to the cradle of the great religions and the birth-place of the human race.

SIDNEY LOW.

MEXICO

1. The Mexican Year Book. McCorquodale and Co. Limited. 1914.
2. Un Puéblo, un Siglo, y un Hombre. By Dr. FORTUNATO HERNANDEZ. Mexico City. The Geographical Society. 1909.
3. What does the Future hold for Mexico? By HENRY LITCHFIELD WEST. New York. Harper. 1908.

DURING the hundred years of revolution and rapine —of purposeless material destruction and mutual revengeful extermination—which have characterised the evolution of the Latin-American States from enslavement to freedom, no more sorrowful spectacle has been presented than that of Mexico to-day. A fruitful country laid waste, the products of a full century's work in economic development rendered nugatory, a once-flourishing treasury exhausted—these have been the results of four years of almost incessant dissension. The only comparable cases are those of the five years' Paraguayan War (1865-1870) and the four years' Colombian revolution (1899-1903). But in neither of these devastating upheavals were foreign interests so seriously menaced nor foreign lives so wantonly sacrificed.

In Mexico neither material prosperity nor the spread of education has apparently served to lessen the evil of revolution; while the interference of diplomacy has made confusion worse confounded. The two foreign Powers mainly interested in the preservation of peace within the Mexican borders have both completely failed to discharge their duty towards their own nationals. Great Britain recently refused to shoulder any responsibility for the safety of British subjects, deputing their defence to the United States. That Power initiated proceedings but speedily withdrew, not only without effecting any improvement in a situation dangerous in the extreme, but having succeeded in aggravating it still further. British subjects and American citizens alike have been abandoned to a fate at once unexpected and undeserved, no serious effort having been made by their respective Governments at any time during the present troubles to uphold their interests

or to redress their wrongs. While American residents in Mexico have had occasion to complain with some bitterness of their betrayal by the United States, British subjects have had even greater reason to protest against the policy pursued by His Majesty's Government. The consequence of that policy has been that the position of Englishmen in Mexico has become undermined and the safety of their property seriously jeopardised. To fully appreciate the issues involved, it is necessary to give a brief sketch of the relations between Great Britain and Mexico from the earliest days of the young Republic, and to note the part which this country played in helping the Mexicans to attain their freedom.

George Canning was among the first to recognise the independence of Spain's American colonies. To use his own phrase, when addressing the House of Commons on the 12th of December 1826 —a few months before his death—he had 'called the New 'World into existence to redress the balance of the Old.' But British sympathy did not begin and end with bare official recognition of the new Republic's sovereign independence. The most valuable of all support—that of practical financial aid—was forthcoming from the beginning of the young State's existence, and greatly helped its economic expansion. The Mexican National Constitution was promulgated in 1824, and in the same year the London banking house of B. A. Goldsmidt & Co. advanced the new Government a loan of £3,200,000 bearing interest at 5 per cent, but issued at the severely depreciated figure of 58 per cent in view of the unstable condition of the country. The following year another London firm—Barclay, Richardson & Co.—advanced a further £3,200,000, on more favourable terms, namely a six per cent loan issued at $89\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. From that time onward, notwithstanding repeated defaults in interest payments and numerous readjustments of principal, British capitalists have lent to Mexico about £45,000,000. Of this sum, £15,000,000 has been repaid, leaving £30,000,000 still outstanding.

Not only was British capital thus forthcoming for the benefit of the new Government at a time when no other European financiers would 'look at' Mexico as a borrower, but in addition British capital has constructed the greater part of the railways of Mexico, has built her port and harbour works,

installed her tramways and electric-power plants, and financed her gold, silver, and copper mines. Nothing has been asked or expected in return for this assistance but a fair percentage upon the amount of capital laid out and some reasonable security for its due return. Neither political influence nor territorial acquisition has played any part in our relations with the Republic, and, except upon one occasion, our intercourse has proved uniformly friendly.

In 1861 the British Government, very reluctantly, was induced to take part in Napoleon's mad Mexican enterprise; but it was then distinctly laid down that whatever the result of the invasion—which had originally been brought about by the refusal of the Mexican Government to discharge certain financial obligations and to acknowledge claims for compensation—'there was to be no interference in the domestic 'affairs of that country, and especially no exercise of pressure 'on the will of the population with regard to their choice of 'a government.' This was the well-defined policy of Lord John Russell.

The small British expedition sent in conjunction with those of France and Spain against Mexico in 1861 consisted of two ships, four frigates, a proportionate number of vessels of a lighter class, and a detachment of 700 marines. It landed at Vera Cruz in the month of November, and was recalled to England in the following April, Lord John Russell declaring: 'Let Mexico work out her own salvation—if she can. The 'British Government asks nothing better; but it does not 'wish to interfere.'

This episode forms the one unpleasant break which has occurred, within a hundred years, to mar our friendly relations with the people of Mexico. During the long presidency of General Porfirio Diaz the association between the two countries became notably closer. The efforts of that great soldier-statesman and of his astute Minister of Finance—Señor José Yves Limantour—were largely devoted to improving and consolidating this feeling of friendship, to the increase of our mutual trade relations, and to the attraction of British capital for Mexican enterprises. Every Englishman travelling in Mexico became a *persona grata*: indeed, nowhere throughout Latin America was there extended to British subjects a more hearty or a more genuine welcome. The

sentiment of friendliness and good will existing was clearly reflected in the gracious act of his late Majesty King Edward VII. when he conferred upon the Mexican President, for the first time in history, the coveted Order of the Bath.

Between 1861 and 1864 diplomatic relations between the two countries were suspended; they were resumed, however, when in June of the last-mentioned year the Emperor Maximilian took possession of his unstable throne. Upon his final overthrow and execution, in 1867, the British Government again withdrew its Minister and remained without diplomatic representation. In 1883 Mr. Lionel Carden, then the British Vice-Consul at Havana, having visited Mexico with the object of writing a commercial report, availed himself of the opportunity to initiate pourparlers with the Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs; these resulted in the appointment of Special Envoys by both countries, and the ultimate conclusion of an agreement for the resumption of diplomatic relations. The Special Envoy named by Great Britain was Sir Spencer St. John, who was afterwards appointed British Minister in Mexico.

In due course he was succeeded by Mr. le Poer Trench, Sir Henry Dering, Sir George Greville, Sir Reginald T. Tower, Mr. Francis William Stronge, and Sir Lionel E. G. Carden. It was during the term filled by Mr. Stronge that the present revolutionary troubles in Mexico commenced, and when he quitted the capital towards the close of 1912 they appeared to be approaching a crisis. Then it was that Sir Lionel Carden, who had shortly before displayed great strength of purpose, tact, and discernment while enforcing a settlement of the British claims from the difficult President of Guatemala, Señor Don Manuel Estrada Cabrera, was entrusted with the yet more onerous task of conducting the British Legation in Mexico, in the midst of a political convulsion which for real seriousness had not been previously approached, even in that often-disturbed country.

The amount of British capital invested in Mexico is enormous. The deputation which visited Sir Edward Grey in November 1913 stated that it represented 250 millions sterling of British capital invested in Mexico. This, of course, included financial as well as commercial and industrial interests. It included such undertakings as railways, tramways, electric

light and power plants, frozen-meat factories, oil-wells, irrigation and agricultural ventures, and a few mining enterprises.

A small percentage of Mexican undertakings financed in England have proved, from one cause or another, unsuccessful, but at no time during the past five-and-thirty years until lately had there been any serious loss of capital through deliberate bad faith or unprovoked illwill upon the part of the Administration. It was the great aim of the late Porfirio Diaz—an aim fulfilled and maintained to the last hour of his government—that foreign capital, once attracted to the country, should be regarded as inviolable. That policy was also upheld by Presidents Madero and Huerta, but Presidents Carranza, Garza, and Gutierrez undoubtedly used their opportunities as heads of the executive to enrich themselves by accepting bribes and extorting blackmail, thus fattening upon the foreign capital which had found its way into the Republic. In effect the present political leaders virtually repudiate the foreign indebtedness of their country, and even threaten to annul all foreign-held concessions, some of which have been peacefully enjoyed and exploited for the good of the country for a period of over forty years.

The nearest historical parallel to this threatened piracy is to be found in the repudiation by the Government of the Mexican Republic, in 1864–6, of the two French loans, amounting to nearly £20,000,000, which Napoleon's Government had floated in Paris. But it must be added that only a fractional part of the proceeds of these loans had found its way to Maximilian's treasury. The bonds, still known as 'petits bleus,' were disowned by President Benito Juarez, and have never since been paid. The American Confederate Bonds issued at about the same period have equally been repudiated. French investors in the Mexican loans, moreover, had been duly warned, by proclamation, of the probable fate awaiting their subscriptions.

In refusing to take any steps to defend British interests in Mexico, Sir Edward Grey is giving an entirely unwarrantable extension to the Monroe doctrine. He leaves our interests in American hands, forgetting Burns' words:

> 'Be Briton still to Briton true,
> Among oursel's united,
> For never but by British hands
> Maun British wrangs be righted.'

When France, in 1861, sought to vindicate her claims—mainly fictitious—against Mexico, she entirely ignored the pretensions of the Monroe doctrine.

At an earlier period, when both France and England established a blockade along the entire Argentine coast, in order to protect Uruguayan independence from threatened Argentine aggression, the 'Yanquis' proclaimed the Monroe doctrine from Panama to Cape Horn, but no notice was taken of their claims. The Monroe doctrine was also put forward by the Americans in 1848, when our ships attacked San Juan del Norte in Nicaragua, but again it was ignored. More significant still is the fact that in 1890, when a British force was landed at Corinto, in Nicaragua, to enforce the collection of some claims, no protest was made by the United States' Government.

As a matter of courtesy, when any of the European nations have reason to quarrel with one of the Latin-American States it is not unbecoming to invite the co-operation of the United States—in much the same manner as the good offices of a British Minister are sometimes invoked to decide a claim preferred by the United States aganist one of the South American Governments. This occurred in the case of the United States *v.* Colombia, *re* the steamer 'Montijo.' Another instance was the submission in July 1911 of the United States demand—known as the Alsop Claim—against Chile to the arbitration of King George V. In connexion with certain Spanish, Italian, German, and Dutch claims for indemnity made in times past, the assistance—not the intervention—of the United States has likewise been sought and conceded.

But in leaving the Government of the United States to defend British interests in Mexico Sir Edward Grey has initiated an altogether novel policy and established a dangerous precedent; he has implicitly acknowledged the validity of a doctrine which has no authority in international law; and he has rendered it difficult for Great Britain in future to protect the material interests, or to safeguard the lives, of her subjects in Central and South America.

The earlier history of Mexico suffices to prove that an American Administration can, when deemed expedient, complacently ignore the terms of the Monroe doctrine. In effect it has frequently been used solely as a means to obtain special privileges for Americans, and to obstruct the legitimate commercial expansion of Europe in Latin America.

The lofty spirit which is breathed through the original Monroe Message, and so frequently quoted by Pan-American Chauvinists, has rarely been observed—it is doubtful if it has ever been understood—by American statesmen; all that the doctrine has succeeded in effecting has been the exploitation of the smaller States for the benefit of the larger, and the use of them as mere pawns in the game of New World politics. Monroe's Message has had, and can have, no place in the ordered succession of benefits gained for the political liberty of the Western Hemisphere.

The late Prince Bismarck characterised the doctrine as 'a piece of international impertinence.' M. Ollivier described it as 'a combination of astuteness and *naïveté*'; while the late Dr. Saenz Peña, when President of the Argentine Republic, called it 'absurd.'

Prominent North Americans have also admitted the danger of upholding this doctrine. Mr. Francis Burton Harrison, a New York Congressman, declared in the House of Representatives at Washington, in 1911, that 'the position of the United 'States as a consequence of advocating the Monroe doctrine 'is untenable, and some day we shall have to retire from it 'with mortification.'

When the Foreign Secretary selected Sir Lionel Carden as British Minister to Mexico, in substitution for Mr. Francis William Stronge, he was generally and deservedly complimented upon having made the happiest possible choice. Sir Lionel—who certainly entertains no delusions concerning the Monroe doctrine—had passed his whole official career in Latin America, where he had earned the reputation of being a staunch upholder of the dignity and interests of his country. In Mexico he had spent sixteen years, chiefly as Consul, from 1883 to 1899, and was most deservedly popular there, having done much by his commercial reports to arouse interest among British investors in the immense resources of Mexico.

Had Sir Lionel met with sufficient support from the Foreign Office, he might have been enabled to effect a settlement of the Mexican imbroglio where no other foreigner could have hoped to succeed. His personal influence with General Huerta was considerable, while all political parties alike esteemed the diplomat who had effected so much in the early days of the Diaz *régime* to aid in the establishment of

Mexican credit upon a sound basis. But almost from the first the jealousy of the United States' Administration had to be encountered; conspiracies, petulant opposition, and finally unconcealed hostility towards the British Minister were manifested, and the British Foreign Office unhappily seemed to possess neither sufficient political resolution nor innate loyalty to support its representative.

The situation attained its most serious aspect early in November 1913. Speaking in the House of Commons on the position in Mexico, in reply to a question put by Mr. A. Fell, the Member for Yarmouth, Sir Edward Grey declared that 'it might be found desirable to send one of His Majesty's 'warships.' But the Government was still undecided, for at the Lord Mayor's banquet, a few days later, the Prime Minister said that 'there was not a vestige of foundation for 'the "rumour" that the British Government had ever intended 'to intervene in the affairs of Mexico.' Nevertheless the step foreshadowed by Sir Edward Grey was taken, and Admiral Cradock, commanding the Fourth Cruiser Squadron, was sent out with three ships to Vera Cruz a few weeks after the British Minister had arrived at Mexico City. Thereafter Sir Lionel Carden remained in touch with the squadron until it left upon the declaration of war against Germany. While there is no doubt whatever that Admiral Cradock lent valuable aid in protecting British interests and British lives on the east coast of Mexico—especially during the fighting around Tampico—the foreign residents at Mexico City had reason to expect that at least a part of the force from home would have been despatched to protect the British Legation, or deputed to assist the United States' marines in protecting the lives and property of their nationals at Vera Cruz.

Early in 1914 (February 20) occurred the murder of a British subject, one William Smith Benton, shot at Ciudad Juarez by the revolutionist Villa. Sir Edward Grey's declaration of non-interference had borne effect. Villa expressed 'the most 'complete contempt' for the British Government, while his colleague Carranza, a short time previously, had boldly denounced Great Britain as 'the bully of the world.'

Sir Edward Grey did nothing. 'Under present conditions,' he confessed, 'we ourselves have no means of exercising 'any influence in this region' —a remarkable statement to fall

from the lips of a British Minister in the same House of Commons which had re-echoed the stern warnings of a Pitt and a Palmerston to all abroad who dared to interfere with the liberties of British citizens! But while the voice of English criticism and protest seemed dead, that of United States politicians succeeded in making itself heard to some effect. Speaking at Washington on February 24, 1914, Senator Albert B. Fall, of New Mexico, denounced in unmeasured terms not only the assassination of Mr. Benton, but also the policy adopted by the Administration of the United States and its mischievous effects in Mexico.

So completely did Sir Edward Grey appear to be under the impression that nothing could or should be done without the consent of the United States, that he declined to carry out even the most ordinary steps to inquire into the outrage committed upon a British subject. It had at first been decided to send Mr. Percival, the British Consul at Galveston (U.S.A.), to investigate the Benton murder, instructions being cabled from London to that effect. But Sir Cecil Spring Rice, the British Ambassador at Washington, having discovered that such independent inquiry might not be palatable to the United States' Administration, caused the directions to be cancelled, and Mr. Percival was forbidden to undertake the mission originally entrusted to him. Even later, when it became known that the wholly defenceless Benton had been first shot by Villa and 'executed' afterwards, so as to afford some apparent pretext for the deed, neither the British nor the American Government took any steps to bring the ruffianly Villa to task. Fearful of creating 'complications,' and heedless of the serious effect that such a timid course of action might have upon the impressionable Latin-American mind, the task of investigating a deed which previously had been denounced by Sir Edward Grey as 'a cold-blooded murder' was complacently abandoned, nor has either Administration at any time since displayed a desire to reopen it.

Not only has British policy—or the absence of policy—imperilled the personal safety of His Majesty's subjects and seriously jeopardised their material interests in Mexico, but it has lowered the prestige of this country in the esteem of the Latin peoples of the Western Hemisphere. And if our position has been compromised, that of the United States has been

even more damaged. Probably never again will simple diplomacy—unaccompanied by actual force, and not by the mere display of it—succeed in intimidating the Mexicans, who now have had unmistakable evidence of the weakness and indecision of the Northern Colossus.

In order to demonstrate the unreasonableness of the attitude assumed by Dr. Wilson towards the election of General Huerta, which explains all the subsequent trouble, it is only necessary to recall the history of presidential contests in Mexico, and to show how the occurrences to which the United States' Government took such strong exception varied little from practices which in these Latin-American republics are almost sanctioned by prescription. Revolutions have occurred in Mexico almost as long as the Republic has existed. The longest period of inactivity was during the twenty-five years that the iron hand of Porfirio Diaz held the reins of government. Some of the disturbances in the period before Diaz were merely local in origin, and so transient in their effects that they can best be described as political riots. Others were more serious. Between the days of the first Mexican President, the insurgent chieftain Guadalupe Victoria, and those of Porfirio Diaz, there were endless revolts against the Federal Government ; indeed, it may be said that a considerable number of Chief Magistrates —including Manuel Montaño in 1825, Guerrero in 1827, Anastasio Bustamante in 1829, Santa Anna in 1836, José Joaquin Herrera in 1848, and Porfirio Diaz himself in 1876— came to power through successfully organised revolution. It was not before the year 1851 that the first peaceful transfer of the Federal power took place, General Mariano Arista then succeeding to the presidential chair through constitutional election at the polls.

Between 1824 and 1915, that is to say in the course of about ninety years, there have been forty-one duly constituted presidents, two emperors, and nine different *de facto* governments. Both emperors and at least one president suffered public execution. Numerous other Mexican politicians were in the same period executed, banished, or sentenced to long terms of imprisonment as the recognised penalty for political failure. In the same spirit the power to plunder the national treasury and to execute savage vengeance upon opponents and critics was virtually recognised as the legitimate reward of success.

It will, therefore, be seen that nothing politically new occurred when Francisco Madero, General Huerta's enemy and rival, met with a violent death on February 23, 1913. Yet solely on account of this occurrence President Wilson withheld official recognition from General Huerta, who was assumed to have been the originator, if not the actual perpetrator, of the crime.

This was an entirely new departure in American policy. In 1831 President Jackson took no such action when the Mexican President Bustamante, himself a revolutionist, caused his predecessor, Vicente Guerrero, to be shot in much about the same manner as Francisco Madero was assassinated. Possibly the United States' Government might contend that Guerrero was submitted to a form of trial, whereas Madero had none. But history has denounced Anastasio Bustamante as an assassin pure and simple, and even his own disgusted followers rose against him, and compelled him finally to relinquish his office. The fact remains that the United States' Government in 1831 officially recognised Bustamante, notwithstanding the character of his succession, just as later on it recognised the despicable Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, until the time arrived to invade the country under his government and to deprive the Mexican Republic, under a flimsy pretext, of one-third of its territory.

In previous revolutions in Mexico, as soon as the disputants had been allowed to adjust their differences in their own picturesque manner, the economic injury inflicted upon the country proved to be of the slightest. It is therefore reasonable to assume that, but for the hesitating interference of an alien though neighbouring Government, the Huerta imbroglio would have proved as easy of adjustment, and as little injurious to economic interests. The two or three leaders—who have since increased to about a dozen—would undoubtedly, in the absence of interference from outsiders, have agreed among themselves regarding the successor to the presidency, and political affairs generally would have followed a normal course.

The whole history of the relations of the United States with Mexico unhappily shows that whenever the American Government has interfered in the domestic affairs of Mexico it has acted as a partisan rather than as an arbiter. During the long fought-out struggle (1861–1867) to place Maximilian of Hapsburg upon a Mexican throne, the North Americans, while proclaiming

to the world their intention to maintain complete neutrality, continued to render assistance, in the form of money, arms, ammunition, and sanctuary, to the Republican troops ; at the same time they placed every obstacle in the way of the Monarchists. Juarez's followers, and Juarez himself, invariably found safety upon United States soil whenever they found themselves hard pressed ; but when Maximilian's officer Ortega fled for shelter across the American border he was promptly seized by General Sherman's orders and sold back to Juarez's savage follower Escobédo. Even the execution of Maximilian at Queretaro, on the 19th of June 1867, failed to elicit any formal protest from the United States' Government, although President Lincoln and his Secretary of State, William Henry Seward, attempted to exercise their personal influence with Juarez in order to secure the release of the condemned prince, and doubtless would have succeeded but for the cowardice of their missioner, Lewis D. Campbell—United States' Minister to the Mexican Republic—who basely deserted his post rather than undertake the journey into Mexico.

The most recent interposition of the United States in Mexican affairs bears evidence of the same spirit of partisanship. The Government of the United States, while refusing to change its own line of conduct by a hair's-breadth, has strained every nerve to break the resistance of its stubborn opponent Huerta. No measures have been left untried. A special envoy, in the person of Mr. John Lind—a close personal friend of President Wilson—was despatched in August of 1913 to treat with General Huerta. The anomaly of thus negotiating with the head of a State who remained unrecognised officially does not seem to have occurred to either party, and the parleying proceeded. The experiment proved, as might have been expected, a failure, and in the following month the breaking point was reached. United States' troops were despatched, in conjunction with emergency forces, to the Mexican border in Texas ; a veritable war fever broke out in both countries, and Europe looked on amazed at the bold defiance shown by the smaller nation. The simple hope expressed that the cumulative effect of the United States' preparations for invasion of their territory would daunt the Mexicans was shattered. The Latin people apparently were not to be intimidated. Optimistic reports from Washington alleging that 'Mexico was giving way' were also soon disproved.

From first to last the Mexicans conceded nothing. The comedy of 'flag saluting,' enacted early in April of last year, was in no way a triumph for either party, although it succeeded in covering both with ridicule. But the attitude of the Constitutionalists—the most powerful of the opponents of Huerta—in suddenly turning against the United States, notwithstanding the encouragement received in their revolutionary propaganda, proved the most bitter disappointment to the United States' Government. The whole of the Mexican people, independent of party or faction, declared themselves affronted, and the complete failure of peaceful means of dealing with them seemed imminent. Nothing apparently could prevent the war which President Wilson had done so much to provoke, and, having provoked, strove so strenuously to prevent.

In the last days of April 1914, United States' troops landed on Mexican soil. Thus the invasion, long threatened, was carried out. Over 10,000 troops from the United States took possession of Vera Cruz, where the American flag was displayed, not for the first time. In the earliest encounter, United States' marines to the number of twenty-two and Mexican soldiers to the number of 150 were killed. Still the United States' Government maintained the fiction that 'there 'was no war.'

The anomalies of the situation increased daily. Officially the Government of the United States was engaged in exacting reparation for certain affronts and indignities committed against the American flag by the agents of the Mexican President, whose authority it disputed; actually the United States was being drawn into operations which, if pursued, must have inevitably resolved themselves into a campaign, or a series of campaigns, against Mexico, its Government, and its people.

At this stage the American Government discovered that it was impossible to wage war upon General Huerta without bringing in the whole of Mexico. From that enterprise the United States rightly shrank. One avenue of escape remained open, and it was followed. Why not seek the mediation of some neutral Latin State? The notion proved popular and seemed feasible. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile having offered their good services, a conference was arranged, and took place at Niagara in May and June 1914. But it resembled

the play of 'Hamlet' without the Prince of Denmark, for Carranza—one of the principal actors in the drama—refused to appear, and the conference dissolved without any conclusion being reached. The subsequent suggestion put forward by the United States' Administration, that a provisional Government—to be formally recognised—should be set up, also proved unworkable owing to the opposition of Villa. Señor Carbajál, who had been Mexican Minister in London, was elected provisional President, but he failed to exercise any authority. Mexico City, with its large foreign population, fell—or rather surrendered—first to one pirate chief and then to another. Carranza entered 'triumphantly' on the 21st of August, only to retreat ignominiously a few months later, to be succeeded by Villa.

Señor Carbajál, tired of standing betwixt the devil and the deep sea, likewise discreetly fled, and was replaced by Señor Eulalio Gutierrez. This patriot's brief occupation of the Chief Magistracy was distinguished by the purloining of $2,000,000 from the National Treasury. Upon the disappearance of Gutierrez—and the $2,000,000—Señor Garza was elected provisional President, his rule lasting less than six weeks, notwithstanding that he was supported by Villa and his soldiery. Thus things continued to drift month by month throughout the year, until—without explanation or apparent reason—the United States' troops, which had occupied friendly territory for close upon eight months, were suddenly withdrawn and returned to their own country.

Then, on the 10th of January last, to the astonishment of the Americans and Mexicans alike, President Wilson publicly declared at Indianapolis that, so far as he was concerned, 'Mexico might continue to stew in her own juice.' Naturally a comparison of this statement was made with that by the same statesman who, on the 5th of June 1914, had declared—'the 'mission of the United States in Mexico is one of service to 'humanity. It is the duty of the United States to serve the 'world.'

President Wilson is before all things a scholar. It is unfortunate that his classical studies have not familiarised him with the Latin adage: 'Cave ne quidquam incipias 'quod post poeniteat.'

PERCY F. MARTIN.

THE PROBLEM OF POLAND

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I.

'La question *la plus exclusivement européenne* est celle qui 'concerne la Pologne.' Thus wrote Talleyrand to Metternich during the Congress of Vienna, precisely one hundred years ago. It may be doubted whether the full significance of Talleyrand's words was adequately apprehended by the diplomatists of 1815. Certainly, since that time, the deeper meaning of the words has, for the most part, eluded historical commentators. Every student of European history is, of course, aware that among the problems which confronted the monarchs and diplomatists assembled at Vienna that of Poland was perhaps the most complicated and perplexing. A solution was, for the time at least, pro-

vided by the promptitude and determination of the Czar Alexander. Inspired on the one hand by the liberal enthusiasm of his Polish counsellor Prince Adam Czartoryski, on the other by the promptings of an ambition as generous as it was shrewd, the Czar insisted upon the restoration of an independent Kingdom of Poland. He insisted, further, that of the revived kingdom he must himself be the first king. These resolutions brought the Czar into sharp conflict with Metternich, who was supported by Great Britain, France, and Holland. At the beginning of 1815 a secret treaty was concluded between these last Powers, and war between them and their Eastern allies seemed imminent, when news reached Vienna which caused all such minor dissensions to be put aside and the bonds of alliance to be drawn closer than ever before. Napoleon had escaped from Elba, had landed at Cannes, and was once more Emperor of the French. The restoration of the Empire was followed by the episode of the ' Hundred Days,' an episode closed by the victory of Wellington and Blücher at Waterloo.

Meanwhile, in regard to Poland, Alexander's will prevailed and the ' Congress Kingdom ' came into being.

Five years ago a brilliant French critic introduced to French readers the very remarkable work which stands first in the list of authorities prefixed to this article. In performing this function M. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu employs language which curiously recalls that of Talleyrand at Vienna.

> ' La question polonaise,' he writes, ' est essentiellement une question européenne dont aucun Européen, dont aucun Français surtout, ne peut se désintéresser, car d'elle dépend l'avenir de l'Europe, le maintien ou la ruine de ce qui reste de l'équilibre européen, la balance des pouvoirs et le sort des alliances.'

M. Leroy-Beaulieu's meaning is rendered abundantly clear by M. Dmowski's singularly interesting and temperate treatise. M. Dmowski, it should be said, writes on this subject with unique authority. He represented Warsaw in the second and third Dumas, and as leader of the Polish Parliamentary Group was the principal exponent in the Duma of the nationalist aspirations of his fellow countrymen.

His work ' La Question Polonaise ' has a twofold significance.

On the one hand, it affords at once a revelation and an illustration of the change which, since the fiasco of 1863, has passed over the spirit of Poland's dream. On the other hand, it explains, with admirable lucidity, the close connexion between the national aspirations of Poland and the international situation in Europe as a whole.

'Cette lutte [for Polish liberties] a une portée immense non seulement pour l'existence nationale des Polonais, mais pour l'Europe tout entière. Pour que l'Europe entière n'en vienne pas un jour à être gouvernée sur des ordres de Berlin, il faut que la nation polonaise conquière les conditions d'un développement rapide, la possibilité d'un travail large et fécond, et par là les forces nécessaires pour mener à bien une lutte historique, longue et difficile. . . . Le principal danger qui menace l'existence nationale de la Pologne réside dans l'accroissement disproportionné de la puissance allemande sous la direction de la Prusse. . . . Les peuples slaves voient leur existence menacée par l'accroissement de l'influence allemande sur leurs territoires ; ils comprennent que c'est le résultat de la lutte entre le polonisme et le germanisme qui décidera dans une grande mesure de leurs propres destinées. . . . C'est précisément par ce lien qui la rattache à la cause de tous les Slaves et à la question du rôle de l'Allemagne dans toute l'Europe orientale, que la question polonaise, sous sa forme actuelle, est d'une importance capitale et cela non seulement pour les seuls Polonais, mais, nous le répétons, pour l'Europe tout entière.'

Considerations such as these go far to explain the importance attached to the proclamation issued to the Poles by the Grand Duke Nicholas on August 14, 1914. The full text of that proclamation is as follows :

'Poles !

'The hour has struck in which the sacred dream of your fathers and forefathers may find fulfilment.

'A century and a half ago, the living flesh of Poland was torn asunder, but her soul did not die. She lived in hope that there would come an hour for the resurrection of the Polish nation and for sisterly reconciliation with Russia.

'The Russian Army now brings you the joyful tidings of this reconciliation. May the boundaries be annulled which cut the Polish nation to pieces ! May that nation re-unite into one body under the sceptre of the Russian Emperor. Under this sceptre Poland shall be re-born, free in faith, in language, in self-government.

'One thing only Russia expects of you : equal consideration for the rights of those nationalities to which history has linked you.

'With open heart, with hand fraternally outstretched, Russia steps forward to meet you. She believes that the Sword has not

rusted which, at Grünwald, struck down the enemy. From the shores of the Pacific to the North Seas, the Russian armies are on the march. The dawn of a new life is breaking for you.

'May there shine, resplendent above that dawn, the sign of the Cross, symbol of the Passion and Resurrection of Nations!

'(Signed) Commander-in-Chief General Adjutant,

'NICHOLAS.'

'1 (14) *August* 1914.'*

As to the precise degree of significance to be attributed to this proclamation opinions naturally differ. In some quarters there is a disposition to regard it as a mere 'artifice of war'; it has been pointed out that similar proclamations were issued by the German allies †; that expectations not less exalted were held out to the Poles a century ago by the Czar Alexander, and that they remain unfulfilled. But it is noteworthy that the motives of the Russian Government are least mistrusted in quarters where suspicion would be most pardonable. Representatives of the leading democratic parties in Poland—the Democratic National Party, the Polish Progressive Party, the Realist Party, and the Polish Progressive Union—met in Warsaw on August 16, and in response to the Grand Duke's Proclamation forthwith issued the following important manifesto:

'The representatives welcome the Proclamation . . . as an act of the foremost historical importance, and implicitly believe that upon the termination of the war, the promises uttered in that proclamation will be formally fulfilled, that the dreams of their forefathers will be realised, that Poland's flesh, torn asunder a century and a half ago, will once again be made whole, that the frontiers severing the Polish nation will vanish. The blood of Poland's sons, shed in united combat against the Germans, will serve as a sacrifice upon the altar of her Resurrection.' ‡

It would, perhaps, be pedantic to expect more precise and particular definition in proclamations issued at a moment of high political excitement and intended for popular consump-

* The above proclamation was issued in the Polish language, in the Gazetta Warszawska of August 16. It is here reproduced by kind permission from Miss Laurence Alma Tadema's pamphlet 'Poland, Russia and the War.'

† I am not aware if these proclamations have been published in this country, nor do I know what was the reception accorded to them in Polish Prussia and in Galicia respectively.

‡ Cf. Miss Alma Tadema, *op. cit.* p. 14.

tion. The appeal must necessarily be to sentiment, and the force of sentiment might well be impaired by precision. Prudence also may forbid excessive particularisation. The publicist is, however, entitled, and indeed required, to scrutinise the language of the Grand Duke somewhat more closely.

That the living flesh of Poland was torn asunder by the partitions of the eighteenth century is undeniable. Equally undeniable is it that ever since those days the Polish nation has lived in hope of a resurrection. The desire for 'sisterly 'reconciliation with Russia' is, however, a sentiment of more dubious authenticity, or at any rate of more recent growth. It was not manifested very vividly in 1830 or in 1863. Again: 'the boundaries which cut the Polish nation to pieces are to 'be annulled.' But which boundaries? What is to be the *terminus a quo*? Are you going to start from the *status quo ante*-partition—say from 1770? Or do you mean to go further back? You allude to Grünwald—to the famous victory won, in 1410, by the Poles against the Teutonic Knights near Tannenberg. Do you then mean to claim for Poland the Duchy of East Prussia, as well as West Prussia and Posen? These are merely samples of the many questions which the critical historian, perhaps also the practical politician, would fain address to the Grand Duke Nicholas, to the Polish democrats, and to all those sympathisers who throughout the world have enthusiastically applauded the Grand Duke's Proclamation.

Whatever line the authentic answers may eventually take, one thing is immediately and indisputably clear—the Proclamation of August 14 is a document of first-rate historical importance and it challenges in an acute and arresting fashion a final solution of an historic problem.

To sketch the historical evolution of that problem, and to examine critically its bearings, is the purpose of the pages that follow.

II.

During the later Middle Ages and well beyond them: before the many Russias had attained to any semblance of unity: before the Hohenzollern had set foot in Brandenburg: before the Habsburgs had acquired either Bohemia or Hungary: before Constantinople had fallen to the Turks: while the issue of the Hundred Years' War between England and France

was still uncertain: before the Spanish kingdoms had united under the Habsburgs: while the Moriscoes were still in Granada, Poland was the greatest Power in Eastern Europe and among the foremost Powers of the Continent. Formless, and, save for its superb river system, featureless, the great plain of Poland stretched at one time from the Baltic to the Black Sea, almost from the line of the Oder to that of the Dwina and the Dnieper, from Danzig in the north-west to Kiev in the south-east, from beyond Cracow in the south-west to beyond Witebsk in the north-east.* But the heart of Poland proper is and always has been the basin of the Vistula. Much of the soil is fertile; iron, copper, and lead are procurable in considerable profusion, while the salt mines of Cracow have always formed a coveted source of wealth.

Poland emerges into the light of authentic history in the later years of the tenth century, when she accepted Christianity —unlike the Russias—in its Western form. Towards the end of the fourteenth century the marriage (in 1386) of her Queen Jadwiga to Jagiello, Grand Duke of the adjacent land of Lithuania, at once established Poland's territorial position and gave a decisive bias to her policy. Including, as at one time it did, Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Lusatia, and Pomerania, Poland might have been expected to challenge the German Kingdom in Central Europe, and to aspire to a place in the States-system of the West. But between the twelfth and the fourteenth centuries Poland lost most of her western territories, while the union with Lithuania drew her irresistibly towards the north-east.

In that region she found herself in conflict with the famous military Order of the Teutonic Knights. These knights, one of the many Orders called into existence by the Crusades, were summoned, in the thirteenth century, to the task of conquering, civilising, colonising and Christianising the heathen lands along the Baltic littoral. Early in the fourteenth century the Order established its headquarters at Marienburg, and from there directed an elaborate political organisation extending over Prussia and Livonia and some parts of Lithuania and Pomerania. Under the influence of excessive wealth and

* These limits of course include Lithuania and Courland, Volhynia, Podolia and the Ukraine.

prosperity the Order rapidly degenerated and, in 1410, on the historic field of Grünwald, near Tannenberg, the Knights sustained a crushing defeat at the hands of the Polish king Ladislas. From that defeat the Order never recovered, and in 1466 the Poles dictated to the Teutonic Knights the terms of the famous treaty of Thorn. Once again the Poles regained the command of the mouths of the Vistula; the district of West Prussia, including the cities of Danzig, Thorn, and Marienburg, was incorporated in the kingdom of Poland, while the district of East Prussia was restored to the Knights, to be held by them henceforward in fief from the Polish Crown. The Order itself was secularised, at Luther's suggestion, in 1525, and the then Grand Master, Albert of Hohenzollern, became the first hereditary Duke of East Prussia, though he still held the Duchy as a vassal of Poland. The Prussian Hohenzollern became extinct in 1618, and by an arrangement known as an *Erbverbrüderung* the inheritance passed to the Hohenzollern Electors of Brandenburg. By the treaty of Wehlau (1657) the latter succeeded in throwing off the suzerainty of Poland, and when, in 1701, they attained to kingly rank, took their title not from the Electoral Mark of Brandenburg, but from the still isolated Duchy of East Prussia. This choice, apparently fortuitous, was not devoid of high political significance.

Thus early in their career had the Hohenzollern come into conflict with the neighbouring Slavonic people with whose fortunes their own were destined to be so closely intermingled. Meanwhile, the Polish Kingdom had already attained and passed the meridian of its greatness. The beginning of its decline is usually dated from the end of the sixteenth century. Thirty years earlier its security had seemed to be cemented by the compact of Lublin (1569). Under that instrument the connexion with Lithuania, hitherto merely personal, was converted into an organic legislative union. Hardly had the union been consummated when a heavy blow befell the united realm.

It was under the House of Jagiello that Poland-Lithuania had attained to a position of dazzling ascendancy in Eastern Europe. In 1572 the male line of the Jagiellos became extinct, and the Polish monarchy was exposed, in grim reality, to all the perils and uncertainties involved in an elective throne.

Precisely two centuries separated the extinction of the Jagiellos from the first partition. During the whole of that period Poland plays a considerable part in European politics, and is responsible for one or two really brilliant episodes. The first is supplied by the reign of Stephen Batory, who, after the flight of Henry of Valois, was elected to the Polish throne (1675). Batory 'by his sole merit,' to adopt Krasinski's phrase, 'had risen from the rank of a simple Hungarian 'gentleman to the dignity of sovereign prince of Transylvania,' and proved himself, in the same writer's judgment, to be 'the greatest monarch that Poland has ever possessed.' Whether this praise be deserved or not, Stephen undoubtedly left his mark, despite the brevity of his reign (1575–86), upon the domestic institutions and upon the external position of his kingdom. He founded the University of Wilno; he organised the famous Cossack regiments; he temporarily repressed the selfish and suicidal turbulence of the Polish aristocracy; and, finally, by vigorous opposition to the Czar of Muscovy, Ivan the Terrible, he acquired the whole of Livonia for Poland, thus thrusting back the Russians from long-coveted access to the Baltic littoral. His own subjects he treated with a frankness which was indicative of his independence, and might, if taken to heart, have saved theirs. 'Poles,' he said, 'you owe your preservation not to laws, 'for you know them not, nor to government, for you respect 'it not; you owe it to nothing but chance.'

Chance served them ill during the next two centuries. On Stephen's death Boris Godunoff, then virtually ruler of the Russias, made a vigorous attempt to secure the throne of Poland for his brother-in-law the reigning Czar. The terms he offered to the Poles looked sufficiently alluring. The two peoples were to be united in eternal and indissoluble friendship; Russian arms would be ever ready to defend Poland and Lithuania against external foes; Esthonia was to be cleared of Danes and Swedes and annexed, with the exception of Narva, to Poland-Lithuania; similarly, the Turks were to be expelled from Moldavia, Wallachia, Servia, Bosnia, and Hungary, and these provinces to be absorbed by Poland; freedom of intercourse and trade was to be guaranteed mutually to the subjects of both kingdoms, and the internal liberties of Poland to be scrupulously preserved. Perhaps

the promises seemed too glowing. Anyhow, the Polish oligarchy declined them and the crown was offered to and accepted by Sigismund Vasa, the lineal heir to the throne of Sweden, and through his mother a Jagiello. At once ambitious and unsuccessful in his foreign policy, Sigismund did nothing to remedy anarchy at home, and the situation, grave during his reign, grew rapidly worse under his sons and successors Ladislas (1632–48) and John Casimir (1648–65). The latter—the last of the Vasa-Jagiello kings—found his position insupportable, and in 1668 abdicated.* Before, however, taking leave of his subjects he had given utterance to a remarkable prediction :

> ' God grant that I may be a false prophet, but I warn you that unless you take steps to heal the diseases of the State, the Republic will become the prey of its neighbours. The Muscovites will do their utmost to detach the Russian provinces up to the Vistula. The greedy Hohenzollern will seize Great Poland. Austria will pounce upon Cracow. Each of these Powers will prefer to partition Poland rather than possess it as a whole under the anarchical conditions of to-day.' †

John Casimir's abdication was followed by a perfect orgy of foreign intrigue at Warsaw. Louis XIV., in particular, made a vigorous effort to secure the Polish crown either for the Prince of Condé or for his son the Duc D'Enghien. He was foiled in his immediate purpose by the election of a noble of Ruthenian descent, Michael Korybut (1669–73), but he founded a tradition in French diplomacy which lasted until Poland itself was extinguished.‡ Michael's election meant one more nail in the coffin of Poland. The losses incurred by Poland had already under John Casimir been serious. The treaty of Wehlau (1657) permitted the Hohenzollern to renounce Polish suzerainty over East Prussia ; by the treaty of Oliva (1660) Poland resigned to Sweden, Esthonia, Livonia, and the island of Oesel ; by that of Andruszovo

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* His farewell speech, in Latin, is still preserved in the Bodleian Library, Rawlinsonian MSS.

† Cf. Recueil des Instructions, p. lxxxi.

‡ Cf. Recueil des Instructions. A collection of diplomatic documents indispensable to the student of European politics in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

(1667) she lost to Russia, Smolensk, Kiev, and all the left bank of the Dnieper. It was not, however, only Germans, Swedes, and Russians who were advancing at the expense of Poland. In 1672 the Turkish vizier, the famous Ahmad Kiuprili, dictated to the Poles the treaty of Buczacz. Its terms were terribly humiliating to their pride. The Poles agreed to cede Podolia to the Sultan, to acknowledge his suzerainty over the Ukraine, and to pay an annual tribute of 220,000 ducats.*

The rot had manifestly set in, though its progress was temporarily hidden beneath the brilliant military achievements of John Sobieski (1674–96). Renowned as the conqueror of the Turks and the deliverer of Vienna, Sobieski did little, however, for his native country. The Czar Nicholas I. once remarked that John Sobieski and himself were the two most foolish kings Poland had ever had, since they were the only kings of Poland who had ever gone to the help of Austria. There was more than a grain of truth in the cynical remark. The interests of Poland might have been better served by leaving Vienna to its fate, and by cultivating a steady alliance with France. The treaty of Carlowitz (1699) did indeed restore to Poland the Ukraine, Podolia, and Kaminiec, but Sobieski's achievements in the field had done nothing to arrest the internal decay of his kingdom.

After his death (1696) all the disintegrating forces acquired fresh momentum. Before we enter upon the last period of Poland's existence as an independent State, it may be well to see precisely what those forces were and how they severally contributed to the final catastrophe.

III.

Few events in the history of the modern world have left upon the mind and conscience of mankind an impression so ineffaceable as the erasure of Poland from the map of Europe. The rectification of frontiers, the shifting lines of political geography do not, as a rule, touch human interest very closely.

* After Sobieski's successful campaign the treaty of Buczacz was denounced.

But the complete annihilation of an ancient State is a spectacle sufficiently rare and imposing to stir the most sluggish imagination. It is, therefore, natural that men should seek an explanation of a disaster so conspicuous and complete. Consequently, the causes of Poland's decrepitude have been analysed with a minute assiduity which threatens to render them the commonplace of the school-boy essayist. It is, however, essential to a just apprehension of the present problem that they should be constantly before our minds, and it is necessary, therefore, to recall them. The causes, as usual, were partly external and partly internal. The destruction of Poland has been described, *ad nauseam*, as the most cynical crime in modern history. The cynicism of the partitioners can scarcely be exaggerated. But the event seems to possess the characteristics less of a crime than of a tragedy. Professor A. C. Bradley has taught us that the essence of Shakespearian tragedy lies in the conjunction of assault from without with some canker of character within. Before a tragedy can be achieved—as distinct from the commission of a vulgar crime—there must be a traitor within the citadel.

Pre-eminently was this the case with Poland. The fortress was surrendered by treachery. Nevertheless, the multiplication of external enemies was sufficiently ominous: the consolidation of the Russias; the brilliant military exploits of the Vasa kings of Sweden; the persistent progress of the Hohenzollern in north Germany; the increasing cohesion of Habsburg power in the south—all these things, mainly the fruit of the seventeenth century, unquestionably threatened the position long ago achieved by Poland. But they offered an insufficient excuse for the singular fatuity which was characteristic, during that period, of Polish policy. During the first half of the seventeenth century, thanks to 'the collapse 'of Muscovite tsardom in the east and the submersion of the 'German Empire in the west by the Thirty Years War, Poland 'had,' as has been well pointed out, 'an unprecedented oppor-'tunity of consolidating once for all her hard-won position 'as the dominating power of central Europe.' It would then have been 'no difficult task for the Republic to have wrested 'the best part of the Baltic littoral from the Scandinavian 'powers and driven the distracted Muscovites beyond the 'Volga. Permanent greatness and secular security were

'within her reach at the commencement of the Vasa 'period.' *

Why was the opportunity neglected? Why, instead of taking a bold offensive, did Poland suffer repeated blows at the hands of her neighbours—Sweden, Russia, Brandenburg, and Austria—until, pitied by some but despised by all, her name was finally erased from the map of Europe? 'The Republic,' said Waclaw Rzewuski in bitter scorn, 'died long ago, only it has forgotten to tumble down.' The disease from which Poland suffered was indeed of long standing. What was its specific nature? Montesquieu's aphorism, as brilliant as it is penetrating and profound, supplies an unequivocal answer. 'L'indépendance du chaque particulier est 'l'objet des lois de la Pologne et ce qui en résulte l'oppression 'de tous.' While Poland was hugging the phantom of aristocratic 'liberty,' Russia, Brandenburg, and even Sweden, were submitting, more or less cheerfully, to the discipline of centralising autocracies.

In Poland, on the contrary, the monarchy was steadily losing ground. It had always been, in constitutional theory, elective, and after 1572 practice conformed to theory. At each vacancy the Crown was in fact put up to auction by the greedy and selfish aristocratic electors. A Frenchman, a Hungarian, three Swedes, one or two Gallo-phil Poles, two Saxon kings nominated by Austria, and, finally, the discarded lover of the Empress Catherine of Russia—such were the men upon whom during the last two centuries of 'inde-'pendence' the oligarchy conferred the dubious honour of the Polish Crown. It is little wonder that under these circumstances Warsaw became a hot-bed of foreign intrigue. France, in particular, took incessant pains to maintain French influence in Poland. In regard to the crown itself neither Louis XIV. nor Louis XV. was particularly successful, but the 'Recueil 'des Instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de 'France' proves how minute and continuous was the attention which France devoted to Polish affairs, and how highly she valued Poland as an asset in the diplomatic game. The more recent French works named at the head of this article

* 'A Short History of Austria-Hungary and Poland,' by H. W. Steed, W. A. Phillips, and D. Hannay, p. 120.

prove that the tradition of eighteenth century diplomacy survives in the twentieth.

The Polish aristocracy not only elected their kings: they imposed upon them, at each election, a humiliating capitulation known as the *Pacta Conventa*, which restricted the action of the Crown within the narrowest limits. The ridiculous privilege of veto (*liberum veto*),* possessed by each individual member of the aristocratic Diet, rendered hopeless all attempts at reform. The clergy, like many of the nobles, were enormously wealthy and possessed high privileges. For a hundred years or more after the Reformation, Poland set the example of genuine religious toleration. The Diets of 1563, 1568, and 1569 conceded equal civil rights to the members of all religious denominations. Even Socinians and Anabaptists, excluded from toleration by the most liberal States elsewhere, found in Poland not merely an asylum but a home. In the seventeenth century, however, the Jesuits became all-powerful, and from that time Poland surrendered this eminent distinction; and all non Catholics or 'dissidents' were deprived not merely of all privileges but of the ordinary rights of citizenship. True, those rights were restored in the latter part of the eighteenth century, but it was at the bidding of interfering foreigners and from motives that were wholly sinister. The social and economic condition of the country was not less hopeless than the political. The 'nation' consisted of 150,000 noble families. The mass of the people were serfs, tied to the soil, though not entirely devoid of rights. A native middle class did not exist: commerce was almost entirely in the hands of Germans and Jews; the few towns, therefore, afforded no counterpoise to the power of the nobles, and no avenue of ambition to the peasants.

Rotten within, Poland could offer no resistance to assaults

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* Neither the *Pacta Conventa* nor the *liberum veto* were, as is often erroneously supposed, institutions peculiar to Poland. Both devices find a place, in one form or another, in many medieval constitutions. (Cf. 'Une Antithèse du Principe majoritaire en Droit polonais,' by Dr. Konopczyński, pp. 336–347; ap. Essays in Legal History (ed. Vinogradoff), Oxford University Press, 1913.)

It was the unhappy fate of Poland not to have been able, like more fortunate countries, to emancipate herself from these oligarchical shackles. As a fact, the *liberum veto* was first exercised in Poland in 1652.

from without. That her territory had remained so long intact was due chiefly to the fact that it had suited the interest and convenience of her neighbours to respect her nominal independence. Russia, in particular, was well content with the existing situation. From the moment (1733) when she put Augustus III. of Saxony upon the Polish throne Russia treated Poland as a vassal state. Government in Poland there was none. The Saxon king rarely visited the 'Republic'; there was no central executive; no regular administrative system; the legislature met periodically at Grodno and Warsaw, but was rendered impotent by the *liberum veto*; each nobleman did what was right in his own eyes, and dealt as he would with the chattel-serfs. No other class, except that of the nobles, counted.

Such was the condition of affairs when in 1763 Augustus III. died. The moment was an intensely critical one for Poland and indeed for Central Europe. The Seven Years' War had just ended. Despite the strength of the coalition opposed to him, Frederick the Great had managed to keep his hold on Silesia and to come through the war territorially unscathed. He would hardly have done it but for the opportune death of the most determined of his opponents—the Czarina Elizabeth of Russia. Elizabeth entertained a conviction, which has recently obtained an increasing measure of assent, that Prussia could be rendered harmless to her neighbours only by restricting the Hohenzollern to their original Brandenburg Electorate. East Prussia was to reward the sacrifices of Russia. Elizabeth's death (January 2, 1762) saved Frederick. Her successor Peter III., a madman, a fanatical admirer of the Prussian king, was permitted to reign only a few months. Still, his brief reign gave a new and fatal direction to Russian policy.

His widow, Catherine II., is generally accounted one of the shrewdest and most successful rulers Russia ever had. In the light of later events her Polish policy stands revealed as not merely a dastardly crime but a gigantic blunder. For the first partition she was not, may-be, primarily responsible. But if this fact is held to diminish the criminality of Catherine, it enhances her stupidity. Had she stood firm against the criminal suggestion of Frederick the Great, the game was in her hands. She threw away the trump cards by pursuing simultaneously two incompatible policies. The dream of a Slav

Empire at Constantinople created for Russia the Polish problem and compelled Petersburg for a century and a half to pay to Berlin more deference than was consistent with self-interest or even with self-respect. France, the natural ally of Russia, had long been interested both in Turkey and in Poland. When Poland was threatened, France, powerless at the moment to afford direct assistance, pulled strings at Constantinople, and Catherine, attacked by the Turks, yielded to the solicitations of Prussia.

From the policy of Russia we may turn for a moment to that of Prussia. Frederick's motives were as transparent as his success was unequivocal. He was in general greatly impressed by the rapid development of the power of Russia, and, in particular, he dreaded a renewal of the alliance between Russia, Austria, and France—an alliance which had so nearly proved fatal to Prussia in the Seven Years' War. How was he to retain the friendship of Russia and at the same time remove from Austria the temptation of flinging herself into the arms of either Russia or France? The problem, says M. Albert Sorel, would have been insoluble, 'si la Pologne, 'pour son malheur, ne s'était trouvée là.'

That Frederick was the first to conceive the idea of a partition of Poland is not the case. Charles XI. of Sweden had actually proposed a scheme in 1667; it had been mooted between Peter the Great and Frederick I. of Prussia in 1710; Augustus II. had suggested it to Frederick William I. in 1733. Still, it was Frederick who translated dreams into the terms of political actuality. The one chance for Poland was a radical reform of 'the most miserable constitution that 'ever enfeebled and demoralised a nation.' * A group of Polish patriots, led by the Czartoryskis, was anxious to initiate reforms—in particular to make the Crown hereditary and to abolish the *liberum veto*. Frederick and Catherine accordingly intervened to perpetuate the prevailing anarchy. In April 1764 a memorable treaty was concluded between them: they agreed to procure the election to the Polish Crown of Stanislas Poniatowski, a Polish nobleman of irresolute character and one of Catherine's discarded lovers; to secure toleration and

* Lecky, 'History of England,' p. 539.

equal civil rights for the Polish dissidents, who had long been a fruitful source of internal weakness; and to veto the constitutional reforms promoted by the Czartoryskis. Stanislas was accordingly seated on the throne, and in 1768 a Diet, elected under the influence of a Russian army of occupation, repealed all existing laws against the dissidents, declared the *liberum veto* and other intolerable abuses to be integral, essential, and irrevocable parts of the Polish Constitution, and placed that Constitution under the guarantee of Russia.

A little group of patriots made yet another effort to escape from the toils in which their devoted country was being enmeshed. Taking advantage of a recognised constitutional device they met in Podolia, and, encouraged by Austria and France, they formed the *Confederation* of Bar. The objects of the confederates were to put an end to Russian domination and to restore the supremacy of Roman Catholicism. This was the point at which Vergennes in the desperate hope of saving Poland stirred up the Turks to declare war upon Russia. 'La France,' as Sorel puts it, 'essaya de soutenir les 'confédérés catholiques avec les armes des Musalmans.' The Turkish attack brought disaster upon themselves * and did not save Poland. On the contrary, as we have seen, it precipitated partition. Catherine II. would very much have preferred the maintenance of the *status quo* in Poland. Her preoccupation in south-eastern Europe inclined her to listen to the voice of the Prussian tempter.

Austria, too, was on the move. The Empress Maria Theresa was strongly opposed, on grounds alike of policy and of morality, to the idea of partition. Nor can it be doubted that she was right. Poland, even in its decrepitude, was an invaluable buffer interposed between the Habsburg and the Russian dominions. It is true that in 1769 Austria, alarmed by the Russo-Turkish War on her frontiers, deemed it prudent to reoccupy the County of Zips, which had been mortgaged by Hungary to Poland in 1412; but, nevertheless, Maria Theresa was perfectly sincere when, in 1771, she protested

* The Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, concluded between Catherine II. and the Turks in 1774, was the real beginning of the transference of ascendancy in the Black Sea and the Balkans from Turkey to Russia.

unalterable friendship for Poland and repudiated the idea of partition.

Early in 1769 Frederick had definitely proposed a partition to Russia, and in 1771 the latter disclosed the project to King Stanislas. The wretched monarch made a desperate but fruitless appeal to France. France, however, could do nothing; Maria Theresa was overborne by her minister Kaunitz and by her son Joseph II., greedy of territory and hypnotised by Frederick; and Catherine, despite the advice of some of her wisest counsellors, succumbed to the same malign influence.

Thus, in 1772 the first partition of Poland was consummated. Austria obtained parts of Galicia and Podolia, the Palatinates of Lemberg and Belz, and half those of Cracow and Sandomierz, with a population of 2,700,000 people and a large revenue. Prussia acquired West Prussia and the Netze district, but was denied the great prizes of Danzig and Thorn; Russia's share included Polish Livonia, with the Palatinates of Witebsk and Mstislavl and parts of those of Polock and Minsk. Thus Poland lost in all about one-third of her territory and more than one-third of her subjects. The cessions were formally recognised by a Diet at Grodno in 1773, and in 1775 Poland accepted a revised constitution. The new constitution had some merits, but it retained the two worst features of its predecessor: the *liberum veto* and the elective monarchy.

Two questions seem, at this point, to demand an answer: first, Upon whom does the responsibility for this nefarious transaction primarily rest? and second, How was it regarded by contemporaries?

It may not be devoid of interest to recall the fact that this 'Review,' in the only article * ever contributed on the subject to its pages, ascribes the responsibility to the Czarina Catherine. That opinion was at one time widely entertained. But later researches have conclusively proved that the great criminal was Frederick of Prussia, and he had ample motives for the crime. As things then were, Prussia alone of the partitioning Powers had anything to gain by it.

As to the second question, it is sometimes † affirmed that the transaction was little regarded by contemporaries and

* Vol. xxxvii. for 1822.

† E.g. by Mr. R. Nisbet Bain, 'Slavonic Europe,' p. 396.

that the moral indignation which it has evoked was the product of a later and more sentimental age.

The 'Annual Register' for 1772 exists to refute this assertion. The passages here cited are instinct with the political philosophy of Burke and were almost certainly indited by him :

'The breach that has now been made in those compacts that unite States for their mutual benefit establishes a most dangerous precedent: it deprives, in a great measure, every separate Power in Europe of that security which was founded in treaties, alliances, common interest, and public faith. It seems to throw nations collectively into that state of nature in which it has been supposed that mankind, separately, at one time subsisted, when the security of the individual depended singly upon his own strength, and no resource was left when it failed. . . . The present violent dismemberment and partition of Poland without the pretence of war or even the colour of right is to be considered as the first very great breach in the modern political system of Europe. . . .'

But though Burke was quick to apprehend the significance of events in Eastern Europe neither of the two great Western Powers was in a position in 1772 to make effectual protest. Still more conspicuously was this the case when, after the outbreak of the Revolutionary Wars, the work of partition was continued and completed.

In the interval, the Poles made a real effort to put their house, or what remained of it, in order. Nor was the European situation unfavourable to the attempt. The alliance between Catherine and Frederick came to an end in 1780; in 1786 Frederick himself passed away; and in 1788 Russia found herself involved in two wars: with Turkey on the one side; with Sweden on the other. The same year witnessed the conclusion, mainly through the diplomacy of Pitt, of a triple alliance between England, Prussia, and the United Provinces, and directed against the policy of the two Eastern Empires. Poland might have secured the protection of the Triple Alliance, but only on a condition certainly painful to her pride and perhaps injurious to her interests. Prussia, though endowed with West Prussia, had not yet got either Danzig or Thorn. The price which Poland was now asked to pay for Hohenzollern friendship, carrying with it that of Great Britain, was the cession of these two great Vistula fortresses. The Vistula, as has been said, is Poland, and Poland naturally demurred

to the price. Could she have brought herself to pay it, Pitt would have afforded her protection against Russia; while Frederick William II. of Prussia promised to secure to her the restoration of Galicia, Austria being indemnified for its loss at the expense of Turkey. Poland, however, preferred Danzig and Thorn to Galicia, and the diplomatic opportunity was allowed to slip, never to return. In 1790 England and Holland refused further support to the somewhat unscrupulous policy of Prussia, and the latter (in the treaty of Reichenbach) came to terms with the Emperor Joseph II.

Poland, deserted by Prussia, sought salvation in a monarchical revolution. Ever since 1788 a Diet, in continuous session at Warsaw, had been engaged on the task of constitutional revision. Nothing had really been effected when, in 1791, King Stanislas, yielding to the pressure of the 'Party 'of Patriots,' suddenly propounded a comprehensive scheme of reform. By a stroke of the pen Poland was to be transformed. The Crown was to be made hereditary, and to be advised by a responsible ministry; the Legislature was to be bicameral, and the Lower House was to include representatives of the cities; the *liberum veto* and right of *Confederation* were to go; the caste system was to disappear; citizens might become nobles and nobles might engage in trade; the condition of the serfs was to be ameliorated, and all citizens were to be equal before the law; Roman Catholicism was to remain the established religion of the State, but there was to be complete toleration for other creeds; the larger towns were to have municipal self-government, and social and economic reforms were to be taken seriously in hand.

The Diet promptly accepted the proposals of the King, and all except a handful of deputies took a solemn oath of fidelity to the new constitution. The 'Edinburgh Review' described this event as 'a glorious revolution' and proceeded to predict: 'History will one day do justice to that illustrious 'body [the Diet of 1790] and hold out to posterity as the perfect 'model of a most arduous reformation, that revolution which 'fell to the ground from no want of wisdom on their part, 'but from the irresistible power and detestable wickedness 'of their enemies.' *

How did those enemies regard the *coup d'état* of King

* Vol. xxxvii. pp. 501–2.

Stanislas ? Austria, now under the wise rule of the Emperor Leopold, was cordially and unaffectedly pleased ; Frederick William of Prussia, uncertain as to his relations with Russia, thought it prudent to congratulate Poland and actually concluded a treaty with Austria involving the acceptance of the new Polish constitution (July 1791). Catherine, meanwhile, was cudgelling her ' brains to urge the Courts of Vienna and ' Berlin to busy themselves with the affairs of France ' so that she might have her ' own elbows free.' The German courts played her game for her. Provoked by their inane Declaration of Pilnitz (September 1791), France, in April 1792, declared war, and Catherine's ' elbows were free.'

Internal faction in Poland contributed to the same end. In May 1792 a discontented minority formed the Confederation of Targowica, denounced the new Constitution as the establishment of despotism, and implored the assistance of Russia for the protection of their ' liberties.' In a few weeks Poland was again in the grip of a Russian army, and in January 1793 the Second Partition was consummated. Prussia, admitted to a share of the spoils, got the provinces of Great Poland, Posen, Gnesen, and Kalisch, together with the long coveted districts of Thorn and Danzig, comprising a population of one million and a half. Russia's share, in Eastern Poland, was, in area, four times as large as that of Prussia, with about twice as many inhabitants. Austria, deeply engaged in the Western war, and the Polish patriots, were alike impotent to ward off this second blow—a blow even more cynically cruel and much more disastrous than the first. The Diet interposed all the delays of which it was capable, chiefly in the hope of sowing dissension between the partitioners, but all to no purpose, and in September 1793, under pressure from Russia, the Diet at Grodno gave a silent assent to the revocation of the Constitution of 1791 and to the terms of the Second Partition.

The final act in the tragedy was not long delayed. In 1794 the Poles, driven to desperation by the insolent tyranny exercised by the Russian Minister at Warsaw, rose in revolt, proclaimed the famous Kościuszko commander-in-chief, and expelled the Russian garrisons from Cracow, Warsaw, and Wilno successively. But their triumph was short-lived. Prussia, leaving the French to work their will upon the Rhine, concentrated her attention upon Poland ; Russia sent a strong force under Suvaroff ; Kościuszko and his forces were routed,

and in November the Russians entered Warsaw in triumph. Catherine, thereupon, advanced her frontier to the Bug and the Niemen, leaving Austria and Prussia to quarrel about the rest, though with a disposition in favour of the former. Ultimately, Prussia got the provinces subsequently known as South Prussia and New East Prussia, including Warsaw; Austria got Cracow and western Galicia. Thus the curtain falls upon the last act. It is comparatively easy to annihilate a State; it is far more difficult to extinguish a nation. 'On a supprimé,' as M. Vimard graphically puts it, 'à la fin 'du xviiie siècle, un État de 13 à 14 millions d'habitants, pour 'avoir, cent vingt ans plus tard, une nation de 24 millions 'd'hommes.'

Of the transactions sketched above widely divergent views have been expressed. The conduct of the partitioning Powers is, with varying degrees of vehemence, generally condemned. But not invariably. If the political philosophy of Treitschke is to be accepted as sound, Poland had forfeited all right to continued existence as an independent nation-State. History, as he points out, 'shows the continuous growth of great States 'out of decadent small States. . . . The State is power. . . . 'Of all political weaknesses that of feebleness is the most 'abominable and despicable; it is the sin against the Holy 'Spirit of Politics.' In destroying Poland, then, Frederick the Great and his partners and successors showed an intelligent anticipation of the philosophy of Treitschke and afforded material assistance to the operations of the Holy Spirit. In opposition, however, to this view, reliance has been placed upon two distinct lines of argument. On the one hand, it has been urged that political expediency demanded the preservation of a buffer and barrier State between the three great Eastern Empires. On the other, it is argued that respect for the principle of nationality forbade its destruction. Detailed examination of these arguments is beyond the scope of this paper, but a brief reference may be permitted to the views of one of the most respected of English Foreign Secretaries. In an essay contributed to the 'Quarterly Review' in 1863 the late Lord Salisbury argued that long before the partitions Poland had ceased to be a nation; that it consisted of 150,000 intolerant and narrow-minded slave-owners; that for the mass of the peasantry the partitions amounted only to a change of masters, not wholly for the worse; that Polish anarchy was

incurable; that her neighbours had no alternative except perpetual tutelage or partition; that Russia had no interest in partition and that the real 'criminal' was Frederick of Prussia. 'Spoliation was the hereditary tradition of his race. 'The whole history of the kingdom over which he ruled was a 'history of lawless annexation. It was formed of territory 'filched from other races and other Powers, and from no Power 'so liberally as from Poland.' Some of Lord Salisbury's arguments are unanswerable, but can there be any question that he seriously, and indeed cynically, underrated the force of Polish nationality? Almost negligible, perhaps, in the period of relative prosperity, it has proved its persistence during a long century of adversity.

IV.

To this last period brief reference must now be made. After the final dismemberment of Poland a large number of Poles took refuge in France, and a Polish legion was formed to fight under the banner of the Republic, in the hope, of course, that the gratitude of France would take a practical shape. Napoleon's advance upon Prussia (1806) roused to a high pitch the expectations of the Poles. When the Emperor actually set foot on Polish soil he was enthusiastically acclaimed as the liberator of the country, and thousands of volunteers flocked to his standard. His own declarations, however, were distinctly evasive and conditional. 'I wish to see if you deserve to be 'a nation.' Apparently he was only partially convinced, for after the treaty of Tilsit he offered Polish Prussia to the Czar Alexander with the title of King. The Czar was shrewd enough to decline Napoleon's offer, and consequently the whole of the territory acquired by Prussia in the second and third partitions was erected into the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, and conferred upon Napoleon's faithful henchman, the King of Saxony. Two years later Western Galicia, snatched from Austria, was thrown into the Grand-duchy. To Napoleon's 'Grand Army,' collected for the invasion of Russia, Poland contributed 80,000 men, and earnestly petitioned the Emperor for a restoration of the kingdom. It is now generally admitted that in refusing the petition Napoleon committed a serious blunder. If instead of advancing upon Moscow he had halted at Smolensko and had reconstituted the ancient kingdom of the Poles, he would have saved the Grand Army and paralysed

the opposition of Russia. There might then have been no war of German liberation, no Leipzig, perhaps no Waterloo. But Napoleon had so far forgotten the catch-words of his youth that he could no longer pay even lip-homage to the principle of nationality.

To this principle Alexander inclined a more sympathetic ear, particularly when it was inculcated by his confidant, Prince Adam Czartoryski. Accordingly, he came to the Congress of Vienna fully resolved upon a restoration of the Kingdom of Poland. The difficulties in his path were by no means negligible. Prussia had no mind to surrender the provinces assigned to her in the second and third partitions. Yet the Grand-duchy of Warsaw now belonged to Russia by right of conquest. Ultimately, Prussia was permitted to retain the provinces of Posen and Gnesen, together with Thorn and Danzig, not to speak of large compensations in central and western Germany. Austria retained Galicia; Cracow was constituted and until 1846 remained an independent republic under the guarantee of the Powers; the rest of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw passed to the Czar as King of Poland.

These arrangements were far from satisfactory to the Western Powers. Lord Castlereagh, in particular, strove earnestly but in vain to secure a restoration of Polish independence; failing that, he pleaded for the largest possible measure of autonomy.

He so far prevailed that the first article of the *Final Act* of the Congress ran as follows:

> 'The Duchy of Warsaw . . . shall be irrevocably attached to [the Russian Empire] . . . in perpetuity. His Imperial Majesty [of Russia] reserves to himself to give to this State, enjoying a distinct administration, the interior improvement which he shall judge proper. . . .
>
> 'The Poles who are respective subjects of Russia, Austria and Prussia shall obtain a Representation and National Institutions regulated according to the degree of political consideration that each of the Governments to which they belong shall judge expedient and proper to grant them.'

To the 'Congress Kingdom,' as distinct from Lithuania and Russian Poland, large concessions, modelled upon the French Charter of 1814, were, accordingly, granted by the Czar: a bicameral legislature; a Senate consisting of nobles and bishops selected by the Crown, and an elected Chamber

of Deputies ; biennial Parliaments ; a ' responsible ' ministry ; a separate budget ; liberty of person and of the Press ; a national army under the national flag ; municipal self-government for the towns, and the use of the Polish language for official purposes. On paper the guarantees for the recognition of a separate Polish nationality were ample, and that the Czar genuinely meant to observe them is unquestionable. The Czar's good faith is proved by the fact that the Vice-royalty and the command of the Army were offered to Kościuszko, the leader of the insurrection of 1794. On his refusal, the former office was conferred upon General Zajaczek, a native Pole who had served under Napoleon, while the command of the Army was given to the Czar's brother, the Grand Duke Constantine.

Three years later (1818) the Czar presided in person at the opening of the first Diet, and earnestly exhorted his new subjects to ' prove to contemporary Kings that the liberal ' institutions which they associated with doctrines threatening ' the entire social system with a frightful catastrophe were ' not a dangerous illusion.'* Unhappily, the exhortation was ignored, and no inference favourable to liberal institutions could be drawn from the history of the Congress Kingdom. The aristocratic oligarchy seemed bent only upon proving that, like the restored Bourbons, they had learnt nothing and forgotten nothing during times of adversity. The natural leaders of the people were mutually suspicious and agreed only in factious opposition to the sovereign. Consequently, the second Diet (1820) was compelled to acquiesce in severe curtailment of liberty and the reign of Alexander closed (1825) in gloom, disappointment, and disillusion.

His brother and successor Nicholas was a man of very different temper: much less ' Western ' in outlook than Alexander ; shrewd but uncultured ; utterly devoid of any leanings towards liberalism or nationalism ; a man of magnificent physique, of strong character, and, above all, Russian to the core.

His Polish kingdom, despite exceptional economic prosperity, was seething with discontent. With very little encouragement discontent would blaze out into insurrection. The July Revolution in Paris (1830) sufficed for the purpose,

* Skrine, ' Expansion of Russia,' p. 65.

and towards the end of November revolution broke out in Warsaw. The Czar Nicholas promptly sent into Poland a Russian force of over 110,000 men under Marshal Diebitch, who had lately brought the Turks to their knees. Diebitch was less successful in Poland; the Poles, who had a well-trained army of 60,000 men, fought with magnificent courage, and for a time with conspicuous success. But in council they showed themselves incapable of eradicating the faults and weaknesses which had been their undoing in the past, and the insurrection ultimately collapsed. Prussia had carefully guarded Russia's northern flank, and Lord Palmerston had been too much concerned with Belgium to interfere in Poland. The collapse of the revolution was followed by a policy of russification. The Congress Kingdom became a Russian province; the constitution of 1815 was replaced by an Organic Statute; the Polish Army was suppressed; the Universities of Warsaw and Wilno were abolished, and the official use of the Polish language was prohibited.

For thirty years the system of repression was consistently and, to all appearance, successfully pursued. In 1863, however, the embers of discontent again burst into flame. The insurrection was ill-advised, inopportune, and from the outset hopeless. It served to set back a movement towards reform which, thanks to the concord of the Marquis Vielopolski and the new Czar Alexander II., had already achieved considerable success; it deprived Poland of her last remnants of autonomy; it sent thousands of her noblest sons into exile; it afforded the Czar Alexander an excuse for complete russification; above all, it gave Bismarck the chance of demonstrating afresh the insidious and calculated friendship of Prussia for Russia. As a consequence, Russia was still further enmeshed in the toils of the Prussian alliance, and Bismarck, relying upon the friendly neutrality of Russia, could play with completer confidence the clever but hazardous game which by the three stages of 1864, 1866, and 1870, at last led to the attainment of German unity. Bismarck's friendship gave Russia the opportunity of denouncing in 1870 the Black Sea Clauses of the Treaty of Paris, but otherwise Russia has paid dearly for Prussian friendship. A discontented Poland has, in fact, deflected Russia from her natural policy, alienated her natural friends, and subordinated her interests to those of Berlin.

What was the policy of Great Britain during the crisis of 1863? Lord Russell wrote a number of dispatches in his most approved homiletic manner: appealing to the Treaty of 1815; extolling the merits of parliamentary Government; lecturing, hectoring, and even threatening. But Bismarck had taken the measure of Whig diplomacy, and Gortschakoff's rejoinders to Great Britain were at once admirable in temper and conclusive in argument. In effect, Lord Russell was told to mind his own business—the last thing of which that fussy and vain, though amiable, politician was capable.*

Meanwhile, Russia has signally failed to conciliate the eleven million Poles under her rule. Poland itself has, however, in the last half-century, undergone a remarkable transformation. A large middle class has grown up; industry flourishes; towns like Lódź have developed into great centres of population and trade.† But neither commercial prosperity nor steady russification has produced any weakening of the national sentiment. The Poles ardently desire the recognition of their distinctive nationality though under the sceptre of the Czar. They hailed the Proclamation of August 14, therefore, as a promise for the fulfilment of their moderated hopes; they rely upon the Czar's good faith, and they have confidence in the sympathy of his Western allies.

But how will the fulfilment of those promises affect the Poles under the rule of Austria and Prussia? The former have had little to complain of. In Poland, as in Italy, Metternich's rule was harsh and unsympathetic; the absorption of Cracow into Galicia (in 1846) was at once a breach of faith and an affront to Polish sentiment; but during the last half-century Habsburg rule in Poland has been enlightened and successful. All the more remarkable, therefore, is the indubitable fact that the Austrian Poles would welcome reunion with their brethren in an autonomous Poland under the Russian Czar.

Still more ardently do the Prussian Poles long for reunion. But their position presents a problem far more complicated than that of their Austrian brethren. The restoration of the *status quo ante* 1772 would inflict little damage upon the

* The relevant dispatches will be found *in extenso* in the appendices to Day's 'Russian Government in Poland,' and are well worth perusal.

† In 1792 its population was 180, it is now well over 500,000.

Habsburgs; to the Hohenzollern, on the contrary, it would now mean political humiliation and territorial dismemberment. It is true that all their elaborate efforts to 'Germanise' their Poles have ludicrously failed; that every move in the Prussian game—the attacks upon the Catholic Church, upon the Polish language, upon Polish schools, upon local administration—has been countered by the ingenuity of the Poles; that the German 'colonisation' scheme has ironically resulted in an actual multiplication of Polish proprietors.* Still, the facts of geography are stubborn, and though West Prussia is predominantly Polish, it is geographically almost unthinkable that the Hohenzollern should be left in possession of East Prussia and deprived of the territory which intervenes between it and Brandenburg. If the Hohenzollern are beaten to their knees they might of course be called upon to surrender not only West Prussia but East Prussia as well, but the latter would be a tough morsel for either Poland or Russia to digest. The minimum that could be asked, however, would be Posen, Thorn, and Polish Silesia, together, perhaps, with strips of East and West Prussia and, above all, with an effective guarantee for the free navigation of the Vistula.

This minimum Russia seems pledged to obtain for the Poles, and it is in her own interest to remain steadfast to her pledge. Nor is it less in the interests of her Western allies. If France could have averted the destruction of an independent Poland in the eighteenth century she would have done so. England would gladly have seen Poland reconstituted in 1815. A pacified Poland would do hardly less than a victory in the field to emancipate Russian diplomacy from its thraldom to Potsdam; it would form an effective barrier between the Teutonic and Slav Empires, and would offer some guarantee for the maintenance of European peace. By listening to the voice of the Prussian tempter, Catherine II. helped to destroy the Polish State; but she could not kill the soul of the Polish nation. That nation still survives, and is to-day prepared and eager to acclaim Nicholas II. as king of a reunited autonomous and contented Poland.

J. A. R. Marriott.

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* For details of Prussian policy in Poland, see Bülow, 'Imperial Germany' (Eng. trans.), pp. 243–268.

THE NEW MECHANISM OF WAR

WAR is like human nature: the same always and yet always different. At intervals, thanks to man's ingenuity, its implements alter, and with them the method by which it is waged: the fundamental effort remains—to achieve destruction, as overwhelmingly as possible.

The alterations have all endeavoured to extend and enforce the mere muscular potential. There is only difference in degree between Samson's 'jawbone of an ass' and a German 'Jack Johnson.' A bone or a cudgel lengthened the arm and added weight to it; the slung stone and the arrow carried the blow further; catapult and cannon still further increased its range; the bursting shell only enlarged the scope of it; and the aeroplane has now extended to many hundreds of miles the length of man's striking muscles. The present conditions are thus the consequences of a long continued extension; but in warfare soldiers have always been disinclined to admit the inevitable succession which has turned war aside from the path of personal and chivalrous prowess towards the ideals of the slaughter-house.

One can remember Roger Ascham's advice to 'all the 'gentlemen and yeomen of England not to change the long 'bow for any other thing'; George Silver's 'Paradoxes of 'Defence, wherein is proved the true grounds of Fight to be in 'the short auncient weapons. . . . Together with an admoni-'tion to the noble, ancient, victorious, valiant and most braue 'nation of Englishmen, to beware of false teachers of Defence, 'and how they forsake their own natural fights'; the scorn that was heaped upon Niccolo Tartaglia's advocacy of the 'nova scientia' of artillery, and even, seventy years later, on Diego Ufano's prescient views of its possibilities, formed, it is interesting now to remember, 'en las guerras de Flandes'; and, most of all, that pathetic refusal of the mailed knight to admit the ever-increasing efficiency of bourgeois weapons, till he and his fame were crushed within their armour, like an obsolete crustacean, on the field of Pavia.

Curiously enough the soldier has always been the last to admit the charges which the civilian's ingenuities have imposed on warfare, the last to understand the industrialising, if one may so call it, of his art by the introduction of machinery. But whenever the soldier has understood the process, he has always reaped victory. Cromwell, Gustavus Adolphus, and Napoleon were all good men of business who adapted their tactics to their times, tactics soon stereotyped by their successors, and thus, in their turn, put out of date by time.

Germany in the present war has illustrated typically this soldierly stiffness of intellect. She has never got beyond 1870. Even in 1870 she was not where she should have been ; she had learnt nothing from the New World, from those four years of civil strife, the unorthodoxy of which she despised so thoroughly. She declined to be taught anything by South Africa—we were, in her opinion, a crowd of cowardly boobies. The long Manchurian battles carried no conviction, they might serve well enough for Slav or Mongol, but Germans would manage the business differently.

This reliance on the super-efficiency of her own people, though it has served many desirable purposes, has provided her with a standard of comparison responsible for some of her worst mistakes ; she has postulated the superiority of the German and measured the world by that imaginary scale. Consequently, she has got most of her measurements wrong. She said that the German was so much braver and better disciplined than the men of other armies that nothing could be foretold for him from their behaviour under fire. Watching manœuvres in Germany shortly after some articles of mine on the changed conditions of warfare had been translated into a German military journal, I was amazed, in the paternal criticism of senior staff officers, to discover how completely a highly cultivated national egoism had dulled their critical faculties to the logic of events. They were perfectly and pathetically sincere in their belief that, though British infantry might need open order, German infantry could advance in a locked triple line, and German cavalry crush by its mass even machine-gun fire. Both the Kaiser and his Minister for War have already, with creditable frankness, apologised to the army, and to the cavalry in particular, for the errors in training them, for many of which the Kaiser was personally responsible.

But it is not only the German who has reason to deplore a certain professional stiff-neckedness. Additions to the mechanism of war have been doggedly resented in our own army. The opposition in high places to the machine-gun has been amazing. It was christened 'a weapon of oppor-'tunity' and supposed to be damned thereby. It was nobody's child, and as a cavalry adjunct especially met with continual discouragement; yet it has proved in scores of fights, more often perhaps than any other weapon, a decisive factor. The motor cycle again has only won its most valued place in spite of much opposition, and the new facilities offered by the automobile for the rapid transport of troops were long neglected; the armoured car, though occasionally to be seen, was not seriously considered. Whitehall was even slower in appreciating the tremendous influence on strategy that the aeroplane was to exercise.

Such a reluctance to learn is no doubt inevitable. Any severe professional study fortifies the mind against new ideas, and there is a natural reluctance to abandon the showy paraphernalia which heighten in peace time the effect of the soldier. Thus it came about that our cavalry had to learn over again in Flanders the lessons which South Africa had vainly taught it, and that all arms had to deplore the imprudent reduction of our artillery by a recent Minister of War.

Now, however, that we have outlived our surprises, we must consider how far the operations of war are going to be permanently influenced by the new conditions. Is the improved mechanism of war going to impose upon its conduct the spectacle, frankly absurd and indescribably dreary, at which the world has been wondering for so many months in Flanders and Northern France? Is war to become an opposed defensive between hundreds of miles of contiguous trenches until one side or the other has to give way to exhaustion, or is the present situation due to a faulty strategy and an inability to handle the immense armies which national service has produced?

The concealment of what would most contribute to our understanding makes difficult a definite reply, since the question of numbers must always dominate the methods employed, and at the numbers in the western battle area we can only more or less inaccurately guess. It is extremely

probable that one side or the other has, since the beginning of September, possessed a considerable preponderance of force, and the strategy of that side must be suspected of a failure in its conception of an effective expenditure of means to an end. We are not here considering the relative strategical skill of the two sides, but whether we may expect that war in the future will degenerate to this wearisome futility of siege operations in the field, and that the mobility of the main armies, on which in the past so much depended, will remain no longer of supreme account.

In Poland, indeed, there has been a closer resemblance to more classic methods: battles have been won by rapid concentration, though only in one instance was a decisive conclusion thus obtained, and then merely because operations which were admittedly unsound had been undertaken to relieve pressure elsewhere. In other respects, the discouraging features in the western area have been reproduced on the eastern front: an immensely long line of battle, so long that the importance of operations against its flanks was vitally diminished and even a penetration of its centre might lead to no definite result. But mobility has in the eastern area retained its advantages; on the German side rapid concentration by rail has more than once contributed to success, and, on the Russian, the magnificent marching of the men in the worst of weather has saved many a critical situation. It is a cheering reflection that the Grand Duke Nicholas, who alone of those in supreme command has shown himself capable of the strategic offensive on a large scale, has preferred throughout to retain his mobility, has never been hypnotised even by political considerations into permanent entrenchment, and has established his superiority as often by his retirements as by his advances. By such means he has succeeded in retaining the initiative during the most difficult moments of his campaign, and has forced the Germans even in pursuit to conform to his dispositions.

Here again, however, our information as to the numbers engaged in any action is too indefinite to offer security for conjecture. The Grand Duke has shown a commendable persistence in his strategical idea; but an overwhelming superiority in numbers is a considerable aid to such persistence, and we cannot infer that the old strategical methods would

still be possible were the discrepancy in strength to be removed. Those methods are chiefly discredited by the increased efficacy of the defensive, and by improved reconnoitring facilities which tend to disperse the fog of war. It is still true that no war can be successfully brought to a conclusion by defence, but it has also become true that defence has rendered successful conclusions a much sterner and more prolonged business. Thus for month after month we have witnessed a practical deadlock between two immense armies from the North Sea to the Rhine.

That such a deadlock was unavoidable it may be difficult to imagine. The considerations which may have hampered the Allies' progress one does not know. At one stage they appeared to suffer from a want of enterprise, when the Germans were falling back from Paris with one flank dangerously exposed and in some confusion. A resolute blow struck then at their communications would have relieved the pressure everywhere, and a great commander might possibly have taken the risk of penetration elsewhere to gain so great a strategical advantage. A grave deficiency in numbers may prove to be the explanation of the French commander's caution, but it was the very moment when the tyranny of numbers was of least account and the moral effect of resolution stood at its highest value. Resolution there doubtless was—resolution that of itself was puzzling. The Allies followed so hard upon the retreating Germans that when their advance was finally checked the opposing lines were only a few hundred yards apart. Such a situation leaves one guessing at intentions. The Germans, one imagines, can only have contemplated a temporary defensive. They had fallen back to a position previously designed or prepared, but to be abandoned as soon as possible for a fresh move on Paris, since such a move was politically imperative.

But the Allies! what was their intention? Did they contemplate the offensive? It hardly looked like it; it has looked even less like it since. Yet, if defence were intended, why press so hard upon the foe? Why reduce by so much as a yard the distance over which his subsequent attacks would have to be delivered? Why, above all, did the Allies hang on to lines, indifferently suited for defence, to which they had been accidentally pinned, when a superior position might be obtained

a short distance to the rear? The answer to the first part of the question seems to be that when we were pursuing the enemy we had no conception where that pursuit would end. We went ahead as fast and as far as we could, without very clear views as to the preparations the enemy had made or the troops he could collect to stop us. When we could advance no further we dug ourselves in, and the prejudice against yielding ground once gained, even in exchange for a more favourable position, kept us where we were, and ever since have been.

It is interesting to note how differently this question of abandonment is viewed in opposite theatres of the war. Neither Russian nor Serbian cares a fig for that morale which is supposed by the British and the French to be imperilled by the abandonment of an unsuitable position. The Serbians obtained their most striking success by the abandonment, not only of a position, but of a considerable portion of their own country. The Grand Duke Nicholas has not only shown throughout a complete indifference to the direction of his marches, but he has been notably the more dangerous fighter when in retirement. In Flanders we have hung on to trenches dug by error in swamps and watercourses, for which little could be said from a hygienic or military point of view, sooner than risk the supposed discouragement produced by the loss of a few yards of country.

After the immediate deadlock following the battle of the Aisne, the struggle was prolonged, westward, north-westward, and finally northward, by a determined attempt of each side to outflank the other, and by this means the opposed double line of trenches was lengthened out till it reached the sea, and the present very curious situation, which has endured with little change for six months, came into being. It will be for the military critic to decide, when all the facts are before him, whether the Allies could not have forbidden the enemy's access to the Pas de Calais more effectively by pressure elsewhere upon a line in which he was vitally concerned; since the more direct modes of denial seldom prove in military matters the most conclusive.

But whatever be the ultimate verdict on the Allies' methods, opinion is unlikely to be divided as to the strategy of the Germans. On both fronts, their energies have been concentrated on objectives which have been moral instead of

military, and points of political advantage have been preferred to the defeat of the enemy in the field. The attempt on Paris can doubtless be justified, since the capture of a capital must always depress the national spirit and influence adversely the nation's power of resistance. There was also some strategical justification for the second attack on Warsaw, though there seems to have been little enough for the first, and none at all for the costly pertinacity to achieve Calais. But the weakest point of German strategy in the west was the abandonment of the offensive in the early days of last September. Whether the cause were contempt of a still unbeaten enemy, or the diversion of troops to East Prussia, the mistake was fatal to the prospects of an invader ; that black scribble of trench across Northern France, of which our eyes have wearied in the daily journals, wrote an Empire's doom as surely as those fingers of a man's hand upon the plaster in Belshazzar's palace.

What mainly concerns us here is the fact that despite a considerable superiority in numbers, wonderful courage, and a reckless sacrifice of life, the Germans, with a totally different end in view, were obliged to conform exactly to their opponents' methods. Is this, one may ask, a confession of the new superiority of the defensive, which is to deliver war in the future into the hands of the gunner and the engineer ?

That such is the general expectation may be inferred from the wonder that has been expressed at the mere attempt at a strategic plan to which the Russians have adhered. The fact that the Grand Duke had chosen the only practicable avenue of approach to his objective and declined to be diverted from it by hostile menace, that he allowed no temporary advantage to distract him from that defeat of the enemy's forces which alone can be relied on to bring wars to a conclusion, and that his battle-grounds were chosen almost solely with a view to that defeat, has attracted a wondering admiration from every critic during the past six months, although in previous struggles these simple strategical aims would only have been conspicuous if they had been absent. Four times have the Russians turned on their too confident pursuers to inflict a serious defeat, and the gallant Serbian army has, with even more startling success, repeated the operation.

In each case we have been led to believe that victory has

been won by a considerable preponderance in numbers, a preponderance it has been possible to conceal from the enemy's scouts. But those who incline to the older fashion in war must have their spirits damped by the reflection that in every case defeat was administered to the offensive. The Austrians at Lublin and in Galicia, the Germans on the Niemen, the Vistula, and the Bzura, were beaten by their own dynamic, broken by a foe who stood to meet them, and broke them by standing. That mistakes were made is very likely; in Serbia we know what they were; but the failure of the offensive in the other cases must be considered significant.

Apart from other disquieting considerations we might take this fact to be of hopeful augury for the peace of nations, making invasion a more doubtful business than it has ever proved in the past, and lending a greater sense of security to the less pugnacious Powers. But though, for the moment and in one direction, an unlooked-for equilibrium seems to have been reached which has discredited as a force the old 'resolute offensive,' the newer weapons of war may in the near future disturb the balance and regain for the offensive its earlier advantage. It must be remembered that when this war began there were several weapons in the military armoury which had been little tried or not tried at all in war—the aeroplane, the dirigible, the high explosive shell, the heavy howitzer, the armoured car, and the automobile.

Of the dirigible as a military weapon it is difficult to hold a high opinion; its great length makes it an ideal target for the gunner, and on the battlefield the artillery is now too potent and too diversified to offer to such an object much chance of escape. At night it may prove of service to disturb the security of reserves and rest camps, and to destroy depots and railway junctions, betrayed by their needful lights; but with the development of flight in other directions, and the increased illumination by night of exposed areas, it is probable that the dirigible will be hunted into what appears to be its proper sphere, as super-scout to naval squadrons, operating within range of its base, a range likely before long to be considerably extended.

The military possibilities of the aeroplane are altogether different. Its early promise, especially in this country, was obscured by that soldierly distrust of new inventions to which

reference has been made already; but even long after its proved ability for flight had made observation a new factor in strategy, there was a disinclination to admit the potentiality of its offensive, a jealous distrust of it as a weapon. An article, written little more than a month before the war, which urged the offensive possibilities of the aeroplane brought many remonstrances from military men, who saw in any serious consideration of the new arm a certain shortening of supplies for the older ones. In this country it is an axiom with the Exchequer that money required for new military developments must be provided from within the Department, an axiom which naturally does not foster a progressive attitude of mind amongst those soon to become sufferers by a shortening of already insufficient funds. But though the offensive machinery of the aeroplane was still in embryo at the outbreak of hostilities and many aids to accuracy have yet to be perfected, the new weapon has already taken its place in the armoury of war.

It may be that the nations in their wisdom, at the next Peace Conference, considering that the art of flying can add little to the content of mankind and must so grievously enlarge its miseries, will proscribe all further attempt at the conquest of the air. For flight puts at the disposal of the unscrupulous an implement never possessed before. Heavy artillery can work far greater mischief, but great guns must be transported upon ships of war, or carried in the train of an army, and cannot therefore approach their objective without the serious business of an expedition. But these navies of the air can, without warning or obvious preparation, be despatched to accomplish the destruction of great cities, and to cripple the administrative and financial activities of a people before war has been declared. It has, of course, always been possible for an unscrupulous opponent to do a certain amount of damage by dispensing with a formal declaration of his intentions, but he has never before been able within a few hours to strike at the very heart of his opponents' energies; to set dockyards, barracks, and arsenals on fire; to demolish banks, manufactories, and railway junctions; to explode magazines and ammunition factories, and spread panic and consternation through an entire country.

This is what will be possible in the future, when the few

experimental planes of to-day have been replaced by thousands of swift and stable air-craft with an increased radius of action and loaded with deadlier implements of obliteration than we have even dreamed of. But, since it is incautious to expect too much from the protective wisdom of humanity, it will be as well to assume that air-craft will continue to be manufactured for the amusement and destruction of mankind, and that, when relations become strained between any two countries, all their airmen will be mobilised for duty, and will either wait the arrival of their opponents or prepare to invade their territory.

Something corresponding to the engagements between the independent cavalry of hostile armies thus seems to be indicated in the air, except that, whereas the horseman was out primarily for information, the airman will be out for discriminating destruction. We shall probably see in the air fleets of the future, for the front line, a fleet-winged type of vessel, capable of long-sustained flight and swift ascent, burdened with no weapon but the bomb or the arrow, and, behind them, gun-carrying craft designed for the defeat of the former, and posted not on the frontiers but at vulnerable places, where they will keep a continuous outlook from the air against threatened dangers. The defensive craft would have to be maintained at their stations so long as war continued, or until the enemy's vessels had been beaten out of the air. That, however, would be a very improbable contingency, since where the forces are about equal neither side will care to submit its power of threat to the chances of a general engagement, and a weaker force will try to achieve its ends rather by cunning than by an open challenge. It remains to be seen by what means the stronger force will be able to make its superiority felt. In former days when cavalry had beaten cavalry, infantry and artillery remained to confront the victor, but when one air-fleet has swept another from the sky there will be nothing further for it to meet. Will it, like a hawk hovering over partridges, be able to keep the beaten game to the ground? That seems unlikely, for in these days of extended battle-fronts even ten thousand aeroplanes would not leave many guards to the mile, and we must remember that, when fighting begins among the planes, many of the arts of strategy which they seem to have banished from the forces beneath them will be

reborn in the air, and rapid and skilful concentrations may lead to the defeat of superior establishments.

In the present struggle, though the paralysing influence of air-craft on strategy has been admitted, there has been comparatively little fighting in the air, and no concerted attempt on either side to crush the air-craft of its opponent. This, no doubt, arises from a disinclination to risk so valuable and irretrievable a service on a very uncertain enterprise, and also from the difficulty, where the area is so considerable and the combatants so few, to force a fight on an unwilling opponent. At present very few air-craft can be spared from reconnaissance duties, but when a commander can dispose of a large number to attack troops and fortified places, it would seem to be in his power to compel some sort of general engagement in the air. When such an achievement has been reached, it is obvious that we have in sight, not a new conditioning force, such as, so far, the plane has proved to be, but a new development of warfare. The attack from the air will have become so deadly that, until it is dealt with, the operations on the surface can make but little progress. The opening problem of every campaign will be the command of the air, and much will depend on whether the weaker squadrons will be able to decline combat. Will they lie under cover of their guns in bomb-proof shelters, and attempt to obtain by subtlety a local and temporary superiority of strength: in short, will all the old expedients of strategy, naval and military, be repeated in the air, but with far more terrible consequences to the belligerent?

Upon the answer to this question must depend the use which may be made of that other new adjunct to the offensive, motor transport. By the motor we are at present feeding our armies as they have never been fed before, and motor-cars and motor-buses have been used to a limited extent for moving the men themselves. But that is a different matter from the use of motor vehicles as the implement of a tactical or strategical objective. It was, indeed, reported that the Germans made use of a fleet of cars on their entry into Belgium, but no reliable information on the point has been forthcoming. Such a weapon would have been of great service to them for harassing the flank of our retirement on Paris and creating false impressions of the progress of their main body. Detours could have been

made to avoid the track of destroyed bridges left behind us; and though in such movements some opposition might have been expected from our cavalry, the mere throwing of this extra work upon our horse would have been a gain to the enemy. For such operations lorries, quite simply protected and capable of carrying machine-guns, would offer useful fighting qualities in exchange for an inferior mobility. The weak point of such a force would be its liability to be trapped. A broken bridge in front and another behind it might impose very awkward conditions against an enemy that could swim rivers and cross fields. Pontoons would doubtless soon form part of the equipment for such a force, able to ferry the lorries across water of not too great a width, their engine power being employed to assist the ferrying.

But it is plain that we shall have to face in the future the destruction not of bridges and embankments only but of the roads they carry. Some of the shells at present in use can make a road impassable for transport for many hours, and there can be no doubt that the systematic destruction of the roads it has traversed will be the practice of an army in retreat, thus adding a new and dangerous duty to those already demanded of the engineer.

These considerations appear to limit the offensive possibilities of motor transport to operations immediately preceding or following a declaration of war, such as the capture or destruction of strategic points, the rapid carriage of troops to the concentration areas, to raids on lines of communication, or to the harassing of flanks—if a flank that can be harassed is ever likely to reappear.

When millions of men are put into a front of battle that stretches from one neutral to another, exposed flanks cannot be of common occurrence, and those daring and delightful excursions behind the enemy's lines, which preserved from hum-drum development so much of the old charm and spirit of warfare, can no longer be looked for, once the main bodies are definitely opposed. On a front of close upon a thousand miles, and with a great superiority in numbers of horsemen peculiarly fitted for the task, the Russians have been able to do very little damage to their opponents' lines of communication. The Cossack has shown his mettle in many fights, but though he is an adept in living on the country—indeed it is part of his

special training—and is master of varied wiles in manœuvre, no great achievement has been reported to his credit in rear of the enemy's reserves, which may be taken as proof of the hindrances now imposed on cavalry by the length of the battle line. The motor-car would largely increase the radius of raiding action, by putting into the field a less vulnerable force, and one considerably greater in proportion to its column of march ; but against these advantages must be set the disabilities implied by its restriction to the road, which would include an almost continuous exposure to observation from above, whereas even a large body of cavalry may find concealment in fairly wooded country.

There would, moreover, be intrinsic limitations to the size of a force thus carried. Even with lorries especially designed for the end in view, the length of the column in proportion to the front it might have rapidly to furnish would impose inexorable restrictions on its indefinite extension for raiding purposes. Thus the use of such a train appears likely to be restricted to the earlier and more irregular operations of a campaign, and to the rapid transport of troops from rail-head to the fighting line, on occasions when the repair of the railway line—as would happen during the pursuit of a beaten enemy—would impose a long delay on the train service. Bridges can be hastily patched up or constructed to carry a vehicle which might be used loaded for the transport of a platoon. That troops have been more than once thus hurried forward in the present campaign has been admitted. The London omnibus, much overloaded, has already aided many a valorous resistance, when by no other means could the force required have been transported in time, and we have been told that the reserve which arrived at such a critical moment for the defence of Paris was carried by road in every description of motor vehicle which could be impressed into the service. Such haphazard equipment is, however, not likely to be allowed to serve the purpose of the future, and we may see the development of a standardised lorry for commercial purposes to be put at the disposal of the authorities in time of war.

The reaction of this growth of mechanical traction on the breeding of the horse will prove, if the horse is to be retained in warfare, a serious consideration in this country, since the production of the horse for military purposes has been left in

the hands of the civilian breeder, who has generally had other aims in view. There has been until recently a large trade and agricultural demand for draught horses, and one less considerable for hacks and hunters. The military horse has been something of a by-product, light draught horses serving for the guns, and types of the 'pleasure' horse being used to mount our cavalry. But even before the war the right kind of gun horse was rapidly growing rarer, and now that so many tradesmen have been forced by the commandeering of their horses to adopt motor vehicles, the required type may gradually become extinct, and our supply be limited to heavy farm horses, and the various kinds used for recreation. The production of cavalry and artillery horses thus seems likely to prove a more artificial and expensive affair than it is at present, and one that must be held to have a bearing on the new mechanism of war.

The armoured car has been already mentioned in connexion with raiding-trains, but it seems assured on its own account of a substantial future. Like every other weapon which is dependent for its progress not only on a road but on the road's condition, it has its obvious limitations. Now that heavy artillery, from many miles beyond the line of battle, can accomplish the destruction of a roadway which the gunners cannot see, one must not expect the armoured car to score its successes in the main field of combat during the periods of trench stagnation to which the armies of the future seem likely in large measure to be condemned. For use in the first days of a campaign to hold up the enemy's scouts and mounted patrols it should prove of great value, though of course a force acting on the defensive in its own country will have a sense of security along its lines of communication the absence of which must somewhat hamper an invader's schemes.

When hostile cavalry overflows the border and begins to feel for its opponents' armies, very few troops can be spared to safeguard its lines of retreat. In the case of cavalry, able to dispense with bridges and disregard roads, such disability is not a serious matter, but when that first influx is supported by engines which must cling to the roads, and are difficult to carry across rivers, a new consideration must be given to all especially vulnerable structures by which the road is carried. And while, in the past, the destruction of such avenues has had to be dependent on great guile and courage, the aeroplane has

added a fresh facility for destruction and laid a heavier rate of insurance on all users of the road. In this way one foresees the neutralisation of one new engine of war by another, and the field in a measure left to the more ancient arms.

Thus the aeroplane, a mere scout to begin with, calls forth from man's inventiveness a special weapon to counter it, and in its turn hangs bombs about its body to deal, not only with the new gun, but with all the old ones. It flutters like a hovering kestrel, thousands of feet above the enemy's lines, to direct the fire of its own artillery, but before long it is itself transformed into a kind of artillery, and the gun, outdistanced and out-devilled, may, for all one knows, be consigned in the near future to the museum's armoury, to tell, beside the arquebus and petronel, of man's expanding efforts to destroy his fellows. Yet, in the immediate future, one sees a function for the armoured car, especially in screening a retreat. In such a case the car would probably have nothing worse than the enemy's field artillery to fear, and would be able, by prolonging its hold upon the roads, greatly to assist the withdrawal of the slower-moving cavalry by which the retirement was being covered, and to procure for the engineer a few more invaluable moments, where demolitions have to be accomplished, between the passage of the retreating troops and the advent of their pursuers.

The value of novelty in weapons of war often consists in their effect on the morale of the troops that have first to endure them, and it seems generally to be admitted that, in the open, the worst damage done by the big howitzer and the high explosive shell has been to the nerves of the men who have had to sit helpless under their assault. All our intimate news of the war has so far been supplied, despite the King's regulations, by officers at the front, and charming as many of their communications have been, breathing just the right spirit of the fighting man, gay, gentle, and indifferent to danger, they produce the sense of a general impression which is at some distance from the truth. It is, of course, only the cheerier epistles which find their way into the papers, but, apart from that, a soldier is naturally loth to speak of feelings which he considers discreditable to his profession, though the fact of doing his duty in spite of them is more creditable to himself. Thus the light-heartedness of our soldier correspondents,

sincere though it be, may not quite accurately represent the general feeling of the force, and to strike an average one must consider the opposite extreme of shattered nerves and impaired mentality of which there is no hint in the gay combatant courage which alone gets into print.

The lady who told the private that he was the first man she had spoken to, back from the front, who had not expressed an earnest desire to return to it, was met with the reply that all the other fellows must have been fools or liars, and without endorsing the explanation it must surely be plain that all the old attractiveness of war, and there was plenty of it, is at an end for men forced to endure, week after week, with no outlet for their energies, the monotonous expectation of death. The effect of the howitzer's heavy and high explosive shells must therefore not be measured by the actual physical and material damage with which they may be credited, or by the jokes made at their expense. Under the imminent menace of destruction men have been known to joke till they began to rave, and they are often unaware of the strain upon their nerves till the mischief has been done by it.

It is, of course, the fixed character of the modern battle which has permitted the arrival of the big howitzer on the field, and the fact that the highest German military authorities declined to authorise the purchase of such weapons is proof, if proof were needed, how little they foresaw of the tactics that would be imposed upon them. It was assumed after the fall of Liège, Namur, Maubeuge, and Antwerp that the new heavy artillery had sealed the doom of fortresses, but that may prove a premature conclusion. Schemes of fortification will doubtless be altered to meet the new menace, but with guns of an adequate calibre within the defences, and the new delicate and wonderful methods to locate by sound the position of the investing batteries, there seems to be no reason why the better protected weapon should not still have the advantage. On the other hand, so fearful is the havoc wrought on cities by the heavier projectiles, and so extended the works required for their protection, that we may see the adoption of fortified military camps forming part of the general line of defence, despite the difficulty presented by the dreariness of such stations in time of peace. The immunity of Belfort, the security of Verdun, and the defence of Nancy are signifi-

cant of the helpful co-operation of field armies and strong places, but they tell us nothing of what might be the fate of a fortress, adequately armed, abandoned to an investment.

There is one other question which must be left to the future, though we have learnt enough to justify some speculation. In the early days of last August we heard much of the flood of German cavalry let loose over Belgium. Uhlans were everywhere, a dribble of them down every road, a distributing pool in every village; the whole land shrank and shivered under the influx, and paid in fear its tribute to the daring of scout and patrol. The thing worked out just as the text-books had explained it would, the scattered cloud of horsemen feeling along lane and highway for the presence of the foe. Omnipotent and omnipresent, they seemed an advertisement for the German theorist to which no exception could be taken. Yet already the ignorant and obsolete system of their training was beginning to work disintegration in that amazing force.

The next we heard of it was when our own troopers, fighting desperately to cover the retreat from Mons, were flung against its triumphant and overwhelming front. Victory was not to be hoped for, but, wherever the enemy was met with any approach to equal numbers, our men did as they pleased with him, whether the onslaught were with lance, sword, or rifle. 'We went through them like brown paper' was the description of one of our cavalry leaders, who is not given to vain boasting. Our losses were heavy, as they must always be when cavalry is used to supply deficiencies in the other arms, but we established, despite those losses, an ascendancy which remained undisputed till the long black line of trenches closed across the front, a fatal barrier to the horseman's movements. Yet those brief weeks were sufficient to indicate the soundness of the British conception of the cavalryman's training, the most complete and most exacting which has ever been imposed upon the soldier.

And now the problem which confronts us is—to what end has been that labour, to what use in this underground struggle can cavalry be put? General von Bernhardi long ago warned his compatriots that cavalry would have to look away from the battlefield for the scene of their new achievements, but his wisdom, warmly resented by almost every German cavalryman, did not foresee the obstacles to be imposed even on the

most circuitous of the horseman's efforts. It certainly looks as if the cavalry, more now than ever, would have to wait an opportunity, but not at all that the opportunity will be denied them; on the contrary, when the chance does come to them, there seems every likelihood of its being more valuable than ever.

So far this review of the new mechanism of war has expressed wholly a personal opinion; it may be as well to add that the opinion expressed would not be entirely endorsed by the men whose experience at the front best qualifies them to speak on the subject. They by no means share the writer's belief in the influence to be exerted by the aeroplane of the future. They point out that already that influence is being overtaken by an increased vigilance and subtlety in concealment; that the plane has been repeatedly baffled in its recent efforts to locate howitzers and heavy artillery in action; so much so that invention has been stimulated to produce a method on which greater reliance can be placed. They believe it will still be possible to achieve the old strategical concentrations, without increased risk of discovery, by night marches and the careful use of villages and woods; and that even long lines of heavy transport on the roads, required for such movements, may be concealed by cleverly painted tarpaulins hung over them by day. They therefore do not anticipate that revolution in warfare foreshadowed in this article.

Their views on military matters are entitled to far greater respect than those of the present writer, but they do not appear to him to have taken into account the inevitable developments of the near future. Not only is the plane in its infancy, but the family to which it belongs is there too. To-day an attack by forty planes excites surprise; conceive the contrast when a flight of four thousand may be a commonplace. It is to those days surely that we should look, if we would try to visualise the warfare of the future. Of late years especially our weakness as a nation has been an inability, or perhaps a disinclination, to look ahead or even to make ourselves acquainted with developments around us. We have possessed the knowledge, but its dissemination has been for various reasons prevented.

Nothing of that sort is happening in the Army to-day. Its

eyes are wide open ; it is most anxious to learn ; it has followed closely and cleverly the enemy's lead.

But something more than that is required. In every detail of the new armoury Germany had outdone us on the opening of war. She had made no new discoveries, she had invented no new weapons ; she merely had the intelligence to furnish herself in advance with an abundant supply of the best available. We have been working desperately for eight months to make good our deficiencies ; we have been sedulously manufacturing machines that might have been ours a year ago, and in one arm alone have we established a superiority. We may not have so many aeroplanes as the enemy, but those we have are better and they are better flown. The superiority we have developed in the air is the most amazing sight with the army in Flanders. We sweep the skies as once we swept the seas, with inferior but more effective forces. Will we understand the power that fate and our national temperament have once more put into our hands? Will we treat the aeroplane as a scout whose opportunities are even now declining, or will we grasp, mentally and mechanically, the tremendous possibilities that lie before it as a weapon of offence? To consider of supreme importance the reply to such a question may seem to the military mind redolent of the amateur. But war is a game at which the amateur may have the greater facilities for observation ; he may see more fighting than any soldier.

H. F. Prevost Battersby.

THE RULES OF MARITIME WARFARE

1. Commerce in War. By L. A. Atherley-Jones. Methuen. 1907.
2. War: Its Conduct and Legal Results. By T. Baty and J. H. Morgan. Murray. 1915.

A WAR in which all the principal commercial and industrial countries of the world, with the exception of the United States of America, are engaged must necessarily in these days, when the prosperity of States is mainly dependent upon international commerce, vitally affect the economic condition of neutral States, and excite the liveliest solicitude on the part of their Governments to maintain those rules of international law which have been framed for the protection of neutrals.

Hence arise the remonstrances of the United States to Great Britain against the alleged violation by her of the usages and rules of maritime war. It is the hard fate of neutrals during the present war that the American Republic, puissant though she be, is the only capable protector of their rights; it was otherwise during a period of the Napoleonic wars, when a league of great European Powers, known as the 'Armed 'Neutralities,' was able to offer not ineffectual resistance to belligerent aggressions far less dangerous to commerce than those which characterise the present war. But, solitary though America be, we shall do our utmost to maintain a mutual friendship which is founded on community of race and, despite temporary distraction, is supported by identity of interests.

The following constitute the main heads of the American remonstrance as to the alleged breaches of maritime law by Great Britain, viz. that:

(*a*) She has captured innocent cargoes in transit to German ports.

(*b*) She has captured cargoes which fall within the category of conditional contraband in transit to neutral ports.

(*c*) She has indiscriminately applied the law of contraband and that of blockade with their distinctive penalties under identical conditions, with the result that 'neutrals have no

'standard to measure their rights or to avoid danger to their 'ships and cargoes.'

(*d*) She has in the exercise of her right of visit and search unduly delayed ships in the prosecution of their voyages.

(*e*) She has permitted the use by her merchantmen of the American flag in order to avoid capture or destruction.

In order to ascertain how far these alleged acts constitute breaches of international law, and, if committed, what justification can be advanced by Great Britain, it is necessary to review, so far as they are material to the question, the usages and rules of maritime war which obtained before the outbreak of hostilities and the sanctity which attaches thereto as a branch of international law.

The 'law of nations' consists of those customary, conventional and legislative rules by which nations are collectively bound in their relations to each other: customary as resting upon those principles of justice which nations recognise should regulate their mutual relations; conventional as derived from treaties; legislative as the product of congresses and conferences.

A certain school of publicists denies that international law can be regarded as true law, because it has not the quality of a command capable of enforcement; in other words, it is not the creation of a sovereign authority able to employ force for its observance. It is true that an individual State which violates the rules of international law cannot, save in the rare exercise of active intervention, be physically coerced into obedience; but it must be remembered that in the domain of municipal law physical force plays a minor part in compelling submission; the main sanction of municipal law, even under an oriental despotism, is the good will of those whose conduct the law is intended to control; similarly individual States are reluctant to incur the odium of violating a rule which has been established by the community of nations for the general good; further, those courts which administer international law are able, in certain departments of maritime law, to apply positive sanction to their decrees. The flagrant violation by Germany of long established rules and usages does not detract from the general truth of these observations, for even she has been unwilling to face the universal opprobrium which awaited her most ruthless transgressions, and consequently instead of adopting

an attitude of open defiance has sought refuge in counter-charges.

The position of neutrals in relation to belligerents may in general terms be thus stated: they are the friends of both belligerents, but they must be impartial in their treatment of both; they must not interfere in the war and they must do equal and exact justice to both parties* ; it is doubtful if their neutrality can be modified by treaties entered into with one of the belligerents antecedent to the war. An exception to this rule is to be found in the admitted right of a belligerent—subject to regulations under municipal law—to send his warships into a neutral port for repairs and provisions, but not to take in arms or munitions of war.

On the other hand, neutrals are entitled to carry on their usual commercial relations with both belligerents, and are not responsible for the acts of their subjects in breaking blockade or in carrying commodities to the detriment of one or both belligerents. From time to time belligerents have attempted to impose upon neutrals responsibility for such acts, and in 1793 Great Britain made a demand upon the United States to stop the exportation of arms by their citizens. Mr. Jefferson made a reply wholly consistent with the established principles of international law: 'Our citizens have always been free to 'make, vend and export arms. It is the constant occupation 'and livelihood of some of them. To suppress their callings, 'the only means perhaps of their subsistence, because a war 'exists in foreign and distant countries, in which we have no 'concern, could scarcely be expected. It would be hard in 'principle and impossible in practice.' Again in 1870, during the Franco-Prussian war, Prussia remonstrated with the British Government for permitting contracts to be entered into by the French Government with British merchants for the supply of arms and ammunition. Neither remonstrance was pressed, and it is hardly necessary to observe that there is no judicial decision countenancing this belligerent position.

In former times, indeed, there was no obligation upon neutral powers even to prohibit the fitting out of ships of war or the raising of armed forces within their territorial jurisdiction for the benefit of foreign belligerents. In 1721, during a war

* Bynkershoek, 'Invest. Jur. publici,' lib. I. c. 9.

between Russia and Sweden, a complaint was made by the latter country, which was then at peace with Great Britain, that ships of war were being fitted out in British ports and sold to Russia. The House of Lords, before whom the lawfulness of this act was considered, ordered the judges to attend and give their opinion, and all save one answered that there was no power by law to prohibit the same.* However, in 1794, as a result of an attempt by M. Genêt, the Minister of France, to take advantage of the sympathy of the people of the United States with the revolutionary party in France, and to involve the United States in the war then proceeding between Great Britain and France, an Act of Congress was passed to prohibit the fitting out of war-ships, or the enlisting of persons to serve as soldiers or marines, or the increasing of the armament of any belligerent. In 1819 Great Britain, following the example of the United States, passed the Foreign Enlistment Act, and European nations generally have pursued a similar course.

But from very remote times neutrals have recognised the right of belligerents to prohibit the access of commodities to the enemy's country, and also to prevent the access to, and the egress from, their enemy's littoral of neutral merchant ships. The former right is exercised under the designation of the law of contraband ; the latter under what is termed the law of blockade. Upon these rights, through long and laborious process, neutrals have, for the protection of their commerce, imposed limitations and conditions, the interpretation of which has been and still is the fruitful source of acute controversy between belligerents and neutrals.

Prior to the great work of Grotius in 1625 † the law of contraband rested upon no scientific principle, and belligerents sought to prevent the access of commodities of all kinds to the country of their enemy. Grotius succeeded in establishing a distinction between things which might and might not be permitted access, and the classification which he formulated has been in principle observed by belligerents and neutrals up to the present time. He divided commodities into three classes : those directly serving the purposes of war, which

* Fortescue's ' Reports,' p. 388.
† De Jure Belli et Pacis.

we term absolute contraband; those serving not merely the purposes of war but also, and mainly, those of peace, which we term conditional contraband; and, finally, those which can under no circumstances be of service in war.

Absolute contraband, therefore, consists of arms, munitions of war, military and naval equipment, warships and their component parts, and implements and apparatus made exclusively for the manufacture of arms and war material. But the list is not stereotyped. Belligerents sometimes bring into the category of absolute contraband things—e.g. horses—which more properly belong to the category of conditional contraband; further, scientific invention has brought new things—e.g. airships—into the list of absolute contraband and has superseded the warlike use of other things. According to the Declaration of London conditional contraband includes food-stuffs, money, vehicles of all kinds, fixed railway material of all kinds, fuel and lubricants, materials for telegraphs, wireless telegraphs and telephones; while raw cotton, rubber, and metallic ores are classed as non-contraband. Later on it will be pointed out in what respect Great Britain has varied these lists.

The law of contraband, in addition to indicating the nature of the articles which fall within its ban,* also provides for the conditions under which a belligerent is entitled to seize ships carrying contraband, and the penalties attaching to the owners of the ship and of the cargo respectively.

With regard to absolute contraband, the rule, which with some exceptions secured general assent and observance until the commencement of the present war, was that if the ship conveying articles of that class were met with on the voyage to enemy territory she might be captured, and ship and goods, by the judgment of a prize court, would be forfeited. The ship's destination to enemy territory, as evidenced by the ship's papers, alone afforded the right of capture. If she were bound for a neutral port, even though that neutral port was in close contiguity to enemy territory and there was the strongest ground for suspicion that it was intended by transhipment or land carriage to convey the goods to the enemy, she was immune. The evidence of the ship's papers was conclusive

* Contraband='contra-bannum,' in violation of a decree.

as to the destination of the ship except where rebutted by statements of the crew, or by the fact that the ship was out of her course to the neutral port and on her course to an enemy port.

As to conditional contraband, the rule as to evidence of destination was identical; but articles of conditional contraband were only liable to seizure if the destination of the ship were to a naval or military port of the enemy, arsenal or station; they could not be seized if the ship were destined to a commercial port. Further, in the case of occasional or conditional contraband, the doctrine of 'pre-emption' was generally applied, by which the owner of the cargo received its true mercantile value from the captor, and freight was paid to the carrier and the ship restored to her owner.

Closely allied to the question of contraband is that of the protection afforded (1) to neutral cargoes—not being contraband—carried in enemy ships, and (2) to enemy cargoes—not being contraband—carried in neutral ships. The rules of the *Consolato del Mare*, which prevailed down to the latter part of the sixteenth century, were:

(1) 'Neutral goods on board enemy ships are free from 'capture.'

(2) 'Enemy goods may be captured on board neutral ships.'

These rules were based on the intelligible principle that the quality of the goods should be determined by the character of the owner. This doctrine was universally accepted in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, and Great Britain thereafter consistently abided by it in theory and practice; the United States of America, save by occasional treaties, never swerved from the British practice, though they consistently endeavoured to introduce the new rule, 'Free ships, free goods,' as a rule of international jurisprudence. In 1854 Great Britain and France held diametrically opposite views; the latter Power respected enemy goods in neutral bottoms and confiscated neutral goods on board enemy ships. To meet this embarrassing situation during the Crimean war each Power abandoned part of its theories and adopted part of its ally's theories. Out of this compromise was evolved the Declaration of Paris:—'A neutral flag covers enemy goods, except contraband 'of war. Neutral goods, except contraband of war, are not 'liable to seizure under an enemy flag.'

The first part of this rule has been violently assailed by Mr. Gibson Bowles and others, mainly on the ground that thereunder an enemy is enabled freely to obtain useful commodities other than contraband, thus diminishing the force of 'economic pressure,' to which much importance attaches during the present war. Even from the point of view of neutrals there is much to be said for Mr. Bowles's proposition, for undoubtedly one effect of the abrogation of the old rule has been to induce belligerents to extend the severity of the law of contraband by making large additions to the list of contraband articles. This being so, the restoration of the old rule, combined with a reduced list of contraband, might work for the advantage of neutrals; for, under the present law, if contraband be found on a ship captured, ship and cargo are forfeited; whereas under the old rule, while the enemy's goods were confiscated, the ship was restored and the freight paid unless the cargo were contraband.

The Declaration of London has not been ratified, but Sir Edward Grey has intimated that, with certain modifications which will be mentioned hereafter, the Allied Powers will, during the present war, consider themselves to be bound by its provisions.

The principal changes in maritime law wrought by the Declaration are as follows:

(1) The test of the destination of the ship is superseded by that of the cargo, and the doctrine of 'continuous voyage,' as interpreted by Chief Justice Chase in the United States Prize Court during the Civil War, is applied to absolute contraband. Consequently, where contraband is 'shown' to be destined to the enemy State or forces, whether by transhipment or overland transport, it becomes liable to capture.

(2) The doctrine of 'continuous voyage' does not apply to conditional contraband.

(3) It is no longer necessary in order to constitute conditional contraband that the goods should be destined to a naval or military port, arsenal or station; it is sufficient if they are destined to a 'base' of supply or operations, or consigned to a trader in the enemy country ('commerçant') known to have dealings with his Government. Under this provision it is obvious that every commercial port in Great Britain might justly be regarded as a base of supply to the army or navy.

(4) The old rule of 'pre-emption' is abrogated, neither is the ship released nor the freight paid; the ship is only released if the quantity of contraband on board is insignificant.

(5) The destruction of a neutral ship was unprecedented before the Russo-Japanese War, and almost unprecedented in the case of enemy merchant ships: under the Declaration this barbarous act is permitted if crew and passengers are placed in safety and the exigencies of navigation or war, in the judgment of the naval commander, render it advisable.

The Declaration of London owes its origin to the hasty and ill-considered acceptance of the ideal of Continental jurists—the compilation of an international code of maritime law to be administered by an international tribunal. Our Government was anxious to have the Declaration ratified, in spite of the disapproval of Professor Holland and the majority of British publicists and the strenuous opposition of the great majority of the Chambers of Commerce, shipping and mercantile associations. Happily, in order to render the Declaration effective, it was necessary that a measure should be passed for the establishment of an International Prize Court. That measure was rejected by Parliament. Nevertheless, as above stated, at the beginning of the present war, our Government announced that, with certain modifications, they would be bound by the provisions of the Declaration. It is difficult to understand why this announcement was made, for the men who made it promptly proceeded to discredit their own handiwork.

Since the war began the British Government have violated the provisions of the Declaration of London in the following particulars:

(1) The rule of 'continuous voyage' has been applied to conditional contraband with the result that neutral vessels, carrying to neutral countries commodities falling within that category, may be seized on the presumption of the naval officer that they are subsequently to be carried to the enemy.

(2) Conditional contraband which, on its voyage to an enemy country, could only be seized if destined to a naval or military port or station, to a Government department or a trader contracting with his government, can now be seized if consigned to a 'trader' or other person 'under the control of the Authori-'ties of the Enemy State.' As all persons are under the control of the authorities of their State, this order is tantamount to the

exclusion of neutrals from all commerce with the enemy save in articles contained in the free list, i.e. raw materials for manufacture and ornaments.

(3) Articles which, under the provisions of the Declaration, could not be excluded from the free list have been transferred to the list of contraband.

Great Britain has also taken the bold course of rescinding in its material effect the Declaration of Paris, which protects enemy goods under the neutral flag. In the declaration made on March 1, it is stated that : 'The British and French Governments will hold themselves free to detain and take into port 'ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership or origin. It is not intended to confiscate such 'vessels or cargoes unless they would otherwise be liable 'to confiscation.'

The last sentence of this paragraph is obscure. It obviously means that contraband articles, and ships conveying them, will be confiscated, but it is not clear what course is intended to be pursued with non-contraband cargoes of enemy ownership. Under the old rule of the *Consolato del mare* enemy goods in neutral ships were confiscated. Since the neutral flag no longer affords protection to enemy goods, it would be more reasonable to revive the old rule and render enemy goods liable to confiscation, whether carried on a neutral or on an enemy ship.

Great Britain has also declared a blockade of the German littoral in the North Sea. Under the changed conditions of naval warfare, blockade has become an obsolete operation of war ; the true conception of blockade, as it has been understood and practised by belligerents, cannot be better defined than by the words of Mr. Oppenheim in his admirable treatise on international law : 'The blocking of the approach to the 'enemy coast or a part of it by men-of-war for the purpose 'of preventing ingress or egress of all vessels.' * That is to say, a blockade must be maintained by a force sufficiently large to render access or egress highly dangerous, timely notice must be given to all neutrals, the radius of action (*rayon d'action*) must be duly declared, and no vessel may be seized

* Commercial vessels—blockade is not operative against men-of-war.

outside its limits. The vessels guilty of breach of blockade may be seized and are subject to condemnation, as also the cargoes, unless special circumstances cause the prize court otherwise to direct.

It is an absolute rule of blockade, as stated in the Declaration of London,* that the blockading forces must not stop access to neutral ports or coasts. Thus in 1870, during the blockade of the German coast on the North Sea, the mouth of the river Ems was not affected because that river passes through Holland.

Before declaring a blockade of the German coast, Great Britain had already declared her intention to seize neutral ships carrying contraband or non-contraband cargoes, except raw materials and ornaments, which might be ' presumed ' to be intended for the enemy, even though destined for neutral ports ; also to seize goods of enemy ownership or origin carried in neutral bottoms. The application of the law of blockade, with the reservations as to non-forfeiture with which it is accompanied, in no way facilitates these objects. It may therefore be assumed that the purpose our Foreign Office had in view was to strengthen their legal position in case of possible protest from neutrals. It must be admitted that at no time throughout the history of maritime warfare have neutrals been treated with equal severity. A blockade injures only the enemy and those neutrals who directly trade with her. But the seizure of ships on the ' presumption ' that the cargoes, though ostensibly (as evidenced by the ship's papers) intended for neutrals, may find their way to the enemy territory has the certain effect of injuring two neutrals, namely the exporting country and the importing country, as well as the possible effect of injuring the enemy.

On December 28 Great Britain received a formal protest from the United States against her action in capturing American vessels proceeding with cargoes—not absolute contraband—to neutral ports, and against the undue delay caused to American shipping in the exercise of our unquestioned belligerent right of visit and search. Under the older rules of international law the first part of the protest would have been unanswerable. The old rule was that if the destination of the ship, as evidenced

* Art. 18.

by her papers, was to a neutral port, she was immune from capture, whatever the nature of her cargo. The Declaration of London modified this rule so far as absolute contraband is concerned by applying the theory of 'continuous voyage'; but not in the case of conditional contraband, and this was the case in question. But Sir Edward Grey, in his reply, urged that the ultimate destination of the ship or cargo justified the seizure, and asserted the right of a belligerent to make good prize of a ship carrying conditional contraband, if the ultimate destination of the cargo was to the enemy. In support of his contention he stated that Lord Stowell, one of the greatest English jurists, had so held; but an examination of Lord Stowell's judgment in the case of the 'Imina'* establishes that he took exactly the opposite view.

Sir Edward Grey placed the British case on firmer ground when he pointed out that the Supreme Court of the United States had, during the Civil War, sanctioned the identical action of which the United States now complains as a breach of international law, when it held, on the false analogy of the English doctrine of continuous voyage, that the 'Peterhoff,' a ship proceeding on a voyage to a neutral port, was properly made prize on the ground that it might reasonably be inferred that it was the intention of the shipper to send her cargo up the river in lighters to the enemy territory.† Despite energetic protests by British shipowners and merchants, Lord John Russell declined to make this and similar incidents the subject of a diplomatic dispute, and expressed confidence in the sense of justice and the wisdom of the American Courts.

The complaint of the United States as to the abuse of the right of visit and search by undue detention of their ships rests on no sound foundation. On this point Sir E. Grey's reply is conclusive. The period during which a vessel may be detained for the purposes of search is entirely dependent on circumstances: the state of the weather, which may render it dangerous to launch the visiting boat ‡; suspicions as to the nature of the cargo, which may necessitate prolonged search; the presence of enemy warships in the vicinity, to which may

* S. C. Robson, 167 (1809).
† S. Wall, 47.
‡ Ortolan, liv. iii. c. 7.

be added the peril to which a stationary vessel is exposed by the action of submarines. Equally untenable is the position of the United States with regard to the use of a neutral flag by British vessels. In the case of the 'Eleanor,'* which was decided in the Prize Court of the United States, it was held that flying a false flag was an ordinary *ruse de guerre* and there was nothing reprehensible in it, the only limitation of the right being that though a warship may chase under false colours she must hoist her true colours before attacking. It is obvious that what may be legitimate in the effort to compass destruction or capture must also be legitimate for the purpose of avoidance.

The American Government, in a later despatch, took exception to the declared intention of Great Britain to interfere with neutral commerce by availing herself both of the procedure under the law of blockade and that of contraband. On this point the American Minister naïvely observes that neutrals 'have no standard to measure their rights or to avoid danger 'to their ships and cargoes.' Possibly, Mr. Page, when he thus wrote, hoped to draw our Foreign Secretary into an attempt to justify his intended action on legal grounds. That was impossible, for the law of blockade is only operative within a defined radius of action and the law of contraband only applicable to illegal cargoes, but Great Britain had declared her intention to prohibit the access to Germany of all cargoes, whencesoever coming and whether contraband or not. Sir Edward Grey adopted the wise course of not attempting any legal justification, but, what was more to the point, he gave the United States the assurance that neither ships nor cargoes would be confiscated unless there was violation of the law of contraband or, presumably, the law of blockade.

It is the duty of belligerents to refrain as far as possible from involving neutrals in the evil consequences of war. At the same time the action of belligerents must necessarily be regulated by the exigencies of warfare and the paramount consideration of self-preservation. In the words of that great publicist Gentilis, who, forty years before the work of Grotius was written, essayed the noble task of leading contending States to have regard in warfare to laws of honour, humanity, and fair play :—'Est æquo æquius, et favorabili favorabilius,

* 2 Wheaton, 245 (1817).

'et utili utilius. Lucrum hi commerciorum sibi perire nolunt. 'Illi nolunt aliquid fieri quod contra salutem est. Jus commer-'ciorum æquum et hoc æquius tuendæ salutis. Est illud gen-'tium jus, hoc naturæ est; illud privatorum, hoc regnorum.'

Germany, in the prosecution of a war which is intended for the dismemberment of our Empire, the subjugation of our country, and the humiliation of our people, at the outset scattered automatic contact mines over the sea-routes of our commerce. By these means the merchant ships of Great Britain and of friendly nations—for the mine can exercise no discrimination—were to be sunk, and their inoffensive crews and passengers were to be drowned, and the supplies of food to our people excluded. In laying these mines Germany violated not only the laws of civilised warfare but the assurance of her own representative at the Hague Conference. It is to be profoundly regretted that the British delegates, who sought to impose an absolute prohibition on the use of automatic mines except for port and harbour defences, did not withdraw from the Conference instead of yielding to the pressure of Germany and assenting to that qualified use on the high seas under Article 3, which provides that:

'When automatic contact mines are employed, all possible precautions ought to be taken for the safety of peaceable navigation. The belligerents undertake to arrange as far as possible that such mines shall become innocuous in a limited time, and in case they are not kept under observation to give notice of the danger zone as soon as military exigencies shall admit by a notice to mariners, and also to governments through diplomatic channels.'

Perhaps the British Delegates were reassured by the words of the German Delegate: 'As to the sentiments of humanity, 'I cannot admit that there is any government or country 'which is superior in these sentiments to that which I have 'the honour to represent.'*

As the result of this action on the part of the German Government, Great Britain declared her intention to prohibit the access to the German coast of all vessels conveying commodities, whether contraband or non-contraband, which of course included food-stuffs. On technical grounds she appears to justify this measure by the argument that, inasmuch as the German Government had assumed the control of all food-stuffs, she was able to avail herself of the provision in the Declaration

* War: its Conduct and Legal Results, p. 221.

of London that food-stuffs and other articles of conditional contraband may be seized in certain events, one of which is their consignment to a department of the enemy Government. The Government did not need this technical and not very convincing defence for their action. The true and complete justification for British naval policy is to be found in the outrages which Germany has committed against the public law of the civilised world, *τὰ τῶν πάντων ἀνθρώπων νόμιμα*. British action is justified as a means of compassing a speedy abatement of intolerable iniquities, and of securing her own protection, not against legitimate warfare, but against acts of merciless ferocity.

Germany denounced this action of the British Government on the ground that it was contrary to the law of nations to intercept the carriage of food-stuffs for the consumption of the civil population of an enemy country. As a technical objection based under the law of contraband, Germany might have been right ; but as a point of substance it was valueless, for, without any illegality and with equal or greater effectiveness, Great Britain might have brought about the same result under the law of blockade, which she in fact has now applied to the North Sea littoral of Germany.

Blockade by sea warfare is very much of the same nature as siege by land warfare ; both are normal and legitimate operations of war ; both are designed, by depriving the garrison and the civil inhabitants of the necessaries of life, to compel the submission of a city or a state ; both may reasonably be regarded as comparatively humane methods of war. Far different is the bombardment of an unfortified, ungarrisoned and defenceless town, or the consignment of the crews of peaceful merchantmen to sudden death. Blockade and investment leave it open to the defenders to save their lives by submission ; the bursting shell, the hidden mine, and the launched torpedo offer no alternative.

Public opinion has been much exercised upon the question whether the employment of submarines to sink merchant ships may properly be regarded as piracy entailing punishment for that crime upon the immediate perpetrators. Professor Holland, whose views upon any point of international law it is presumptuous to question, expressed in a letter to the 'Times' his strong opinion that neither the officers nor the

crews of the submarines who sank non-resisting merchantmen could, according to the law of nations, be regarded or treated as pirates, since they were the executive servants of a sovereign State, acting under its authority. The test which Professor Holland applies is in conformity with the general view of jurists. Mr. Hall's definition is undoubtedly wider: ' . . . the power must always exist to treat them (i.e. depredators on the High Seas) as pirates so soon as they actually overstep the limits of political action. The true view then would seem to be that acts which are allowed in war, when authorised by a politically organised society, are not piratical.' * The expression ' allowed in war ' must mean ' allowed ' by the law of nations, with which the acts in question are in direct conflict. There are two instances in modern times where the test applied by Professor Holland was not accepted by a belligerent State. In 1839 France, at war with Mexico, notified she would treat every privateer sailing under the Mexican flag as piratical if the captain and two-thirds to of the crew were not Mexican subjects by birth ; and in 1846 the United States, when at war with Mexico, indicated in the Presidential Message to Congress that they would pursue the same course with regard to Mexican privateers. Undoubtedly this view would conflict with the rule applicable to the test above cited, since in both cases the privateers acted under the authority of a properly organised sovereign State to which they were responsible. There is nothing in the etymology of the term pirate, which is derived from a Greek word signifying attempt or enterprise, nor in its historic origin, to narrow its application to the meaning usually assigned by jurists. The source of its present limited meaning is to be found in the era in which it was defined. By jurists in remote times it was regarded as an honourable form of warfare practised by organised sovereign States ; during the later period of the Roman republic it was an essential part of belligerency by barbarian states, of which the last formidable survivor was Algeria. With the growth of international law and the establishment of rules of maritime warfare based on equitable principles, conspicuous among which is that which forbids the destruction of peaceful merchantmen, it can hardly be

* Hall, p. 255, sixth ed.

doubted that the perpetration of such acts constitutes in its true historical meaning the offence of piracy. With all deference to the authority of Professor Holland, it is difficult to understand why persons who sink peaceful merchant ships and drown, or expose to the peril of drowning, their crews, should not stand *in pari delicto* with those—also acting under the authority of the State by which they are employed—who make treacherous use of a flag of truce, or poison the wells from which their enemy derives supplies, or act as spies or as assassins within the zone of the enemy's operations. To none of these does the law of nations afford protection from the punishment of death, although in the case of spying the practice is not regarded as dishonourable. As Professor Pollard recently pointed out, the perpetrator of a crime can never advance as an effective defence the fact that he was acting under the orders of an employer.

If, however, we treat the offending crews of these German submarines as pirates, we must be prepared to face, under the pretext of reprisals, acts of vengeance upon British captives. We cannot rely upon the observance by Germany of the recognised law of reprisals, which precludes resort to acts of inhumanity, for she has manifested her complete repudiation of the principles which govern warfare between civilised States. Her methods of warfare are governed by the terrible doctrine of 'Kriegsräson,' which despises every sentiment of humanity and overrides every obligation of honour. Of this doctrine a distinguished American publicist * observed on its promulgation by the German Headquarters' Staff: 'If 'Germany ever attempts to put some of these doctrines into 'practice she will have to confront the reprobation of the 'civilised world.' Her action is all the more indefensible in view of the fact that the German Government was a party to the Article of the Hague Regulations which declares: 'The 'right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is 'not unlimited.' This declaration, dictated by sentiments of humanity, is now proclaimed by Germany to be nothing more than a 'scrap of paper.'

It may indeed safely be said that the convulsions of this great conflict of nations have shattered to its foundations the entire

* Hershey, 'Essentials of International Law.'

system of international maritime law ; the principle of ' liberum ' mare ' which ensures the security of neutral commerce on the high seas has been violated ; the rules of contraband have been superseded by the prohibition of all commerce, not only with a belligerent, but with neutrals, if the presumption arise that cargoes consigned to their ports may ultimately find their way to enemy territory ; the rule that ships on seizure should be taken to port to abide the adjudication of a Prize Court has been habitually ignored by German cruisers, who have proceeded to the instant destruction of ships they have overhauled.

There is a disposition manifested by some persons to criticise the attitude of the United States in vindicating the rights of neutrals as being inconsiderate and unfriendly to Great Britain. There is no justification for that view. Even when the rules of maritime warfare are rigidly observed, no State can regard with complacency and indifference injury to her overseas commerce, but when those rules have been superseded by practices prohibitive of commerce, with the added danger of the destruction of ships, it is highly unreasonable to resent remonstrances which have been characterised by courtesy and consideration.

On the other hand, the United States have no just cause of complaint against us ; we have met their representations in no ungenerous spirit. To the knowledge they possess that we shall commit no outrage against persons or property we have added the assurance that, except in those cases where well-established rules of international law have been violated, we shall be prepared to indemnify owners of ships and cargoes against any financial loss. More than this, in such a crisis, a belligerent cannot be reasonably asked to concede.

There is one aspect of the attitude of the United States which justly causes disquietude in the minds of those who have witnessed with dismay the subversion by the German Government of the most vital principles of international law. As the one great civilised State which is free from the entanglements of European diplomacy and the intrigues of Courts, with her vast resources and her lofty standard of civilisation, America occupies in the community of nations a position of commanding influence and power. That position involves the responsibility of protecting the fundamental principles of international law against violation by any individual State.

The United States cannot rightly repudiate her obligation to maintain against any transgressor the sanctity of those laws, in the creation of which, together with other States, she participated.

It must be conceded that interventions, whether forcible or diplomatic, on grounds of humanity can only properly be resorted to in extreme cases. Mr. Hall, in his 'Treatise on International Law' (p. 248, sixth ed.), observes, in respect of interventions of this character, that they must be justified:

'when not authorised by the whole body of civilised States, accustomed to act together for common purposes, as measures which, being confessedly illegal in themselves, could only be excused in rare and extreme cases in consideration of the unquestionably extraordinary character of the facts causing them, and of the evident purity of the motives and conduct of the intervening State.'

In modern times intervention on grounds of inhumanity has been confined to cases of misgovernment of its subjects by the sovereign authority, as in the case of Naples, or of excesses committed in revolutionary wars. On the other hand there have been no instances in recent times of inhuman methods of warfare by one belligerent against another, with perhaps the single exception of the Franco-Prussian War, when the German military authorities did resort to methods inconsistent with the rules of war.

There is a course less open to objection, because less extreme, than that of diplomatic intervention—namely, that of protest or remonstrance, for if disregarded it involves no ulterior consequences. Unless the conduct of Germany in her warfare by land and sea is to be regarded as a precedent in future wars, that protest should be made. In the dark pages of history which will record the horrors of this war, the burthen of reproach on civilised man would be at least lightened if it were also recorded that neutral nations did not stand unmoved spectators of the crimes committed by Germany against the laws of humanity.

EMERGENCY MEASURES

The Defence of the Realm Act, 5 George V., Chapter 8, 34 & 37.

ONE of the inevitable results of the war has been the adoption of various measures of internal control and organisation, which would never have been tolerated by the country if first proposed in time of peace. These emergency measures fall naturally into two categories: first, measures restricting the liberty of the subject, and secondly measures authorising the Government to undertake functions previously left to private enterprise. Of the former, one of the best examples is the establishment of a Press censorship, which was dealt with in this Review in some detail three months ago; of the latter a very favourable example is to be found in the steps taken by the Government to relieve the financial deadlock on the outbreak of war. The general bearing of these steps was described in the October issue of this Review. But the activities of the Government, both in the direction of control and of organisation, go far beyond these examples, and it is worth while here to call attention to some of the other measures and to see how far they were justified and whither they lead—if they lead anywhere.

As regards the general scope of the powers taken by the Government, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that, under the various Acts passed for the Defence of the Realm, the executive Government has power to do practically anything it chooses. If the country had been actually in a state of siege the powers conferred upon the Government could not have been more ample. It is open to grave doubt whether this wholesale subordination of the laws and customs of the country to the autocracy of the Cabinet was really necessary. But happily the powers so lavishly given have, on the whole, been sparingly used, and though several foolish things have been done, nobody can accuse the Cabinet of having in any way abused the tremendous trust confided in it. The main fault of the Government has been a desire to do too much. This is a fault which the members of the Cabinet have shared

with their subjects. (We are all of us now the subjects of Lord Kitchener, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Churchill, and Sir Edward Grey.) Just as the society lady rushes and fusses in the quite laudable hope of helping her country in a great national crisis, so Cabinet ministers and Government officials are all eager to do something, and rush into new forms of activity without pausing to think out the consequences of their interference. Even those financial measures taken by Mr. Lloyd George at the outset of the war, though on the whole based upon sound advice, erred on the side of excess. We have yet to learn the full extent of the liabilities to which the national exchequer has been committed, and it is arguable that a good many of these liabilities could have been avoided if the Government had been content at an early stage to adopt the old-fashioned and fully tested remedy of suspending the Bank Charter Act.

But while these financial measures were in the main necessary, and are only liable to criticism in detail, there have been others since for which no reasonable defence can be found. Prominent among these inexcusable blunders is the action taken by the Government in connexion with the sugar trade. At the outset of the war the price of sugar suddenly rose to a very high figure. The fact was not surprising. Normally, we draw a very large proportion of our sugar supplies from Germany and Austria; those sources of supply were suddenly cut off, and it was impossible immediately to make good the deficiency from more distant countries, especially at a time when the freedom of the sea was imperilled by the presence of an appreciable number of enemy war vessels. Naturally, sugar-speculators seized upon the situation to make a profit for themselves. The resulting inconvenience to the rest of the country, however great, was certain to be temporary; for the very height to which the price of sugar rose was the best possible guarantee that throughout the world sugar-growers, merchants, and shipowners would all strive to their utmost to forward fresh supplies of sugar to this country with the least possible delay. Even so, it may be argued that great hardships would in the interval be inflicted on the poorer classes and on manufacturers who use sugar as a raw material. The latter class are a particularly important body, for they account for at least one-fifth of the total consumption of sugar in this

country, and an excessive rise in price would bring their business to a standstill, and throw a very large number of men out of work. It appears, however, that these manufacturers were not even consulted by the Government.

Assuming that it was desirable to diminish the evil caused by the temporary shortage of sugar and by the speculation based upon that shortage, the most straightforward course would have been to prohibit under heavy penalties any person or firm from holding more sugar than was required for immediate needs. This would have still left the ordinary operations of commerce free ; it would have left the price of sugar at a moderately high figure as the result of the temporary shortage, but it would have stopped the additional and artificial rise due to the fact that a few persons had been able to obtain control over a large quantity of the sugar actually available. This course was not sufficiently sensational for Cabinet ministers bursting with a desire to do something. Instead, they decided to become sugar-speculators, and plunged into the sugar market with the recklessness of men who are speculating with other people's money. Simultaneously, in order to protect this gigantic gamble, they proclaimed a Government control over the whole supply of sugar in the country.

The immediate sequence was undoubtedly a fall in the price of sugar. Obviously, however, that fall was not due to the fact that the Government had entered the market as a buyer ; the appearance of a new buyer with unlimited means and unrestrained desires in any market must raise, not reduce, prices. If the fall which followed the Government intervention was in any way due to that intervention it must have been due to the power of control which the Government assumed, not to the fact of purchase, and therefore the result could have been secured by the control without the purchase. It is, however, probable that a large part of the fall was due to purely commercial causes. The momentary panic was dying down ; people engaged in the trade had begun to see that there was plenty of sugar to be had in other parts of the world, and to realise that a good deal of it would soon reach this country in spite of the danger from German cruisers. It is no more possible for a few speculators to corner the sugar supply of this country than it was for Mr. Leiter of Chicago fame to corner the wheat supply of the world. There have

been serious shortages of continental beet sugar in previous years, but in each case the period of high prices has quickly passed. The real result of the Government intervention last autumn as a buyer, instead of as a controller, was to keep up prices after the period when they would otherwise have fallen. As soon as Mr. McKenna, to whom the matter was entrusted, had completed his first great plunge, prices began to fall. Then, after a brief delay, the true nature of the transaction was revealed, for the Government found itself landed with enormous stocks of sugar, which could not be sold at a profit at the current market rates. In these circumstances the straightforward course for the responsible minister would have been to confess that a blunder had been made, and to ask Parliament either to vote the money necessary to cover the losses incurred by the Exchequer, or to prohibit the importation of all sugar until the Government stocks had been cleared off at a monopoly price. In the former case the loss resulting from Mr. McKenna's colossal gamble would have openly fallen upon the tax-payer, in the latter upon the British consumer of sugar. Neither of these straightforward courses was adopted. Instead, the Government by executive act prohibited the importation of any foreign sugar on the pretext that this was a war measure designed to prevent Germany obtaining money by selling sugar. The falsity of this pretext is proved by the fact that the Government had itself bought sugar in Holland, and it is certain that even if this sugar were really Dutch, as Mr. McKenna assured the House of Commons, its exportation from Holland left an opening for the importation of German sugar into Holland. Thus the action of the Government in buying sugar has not only injured the British consumer but has also benefited our enemy.

In spite of this very grave warning against the danger of ministerial fussiness, we find the Government at a later date embarking upon another speculation, this time in connexion with dye-stuffs. The question of dyes, though financially less important than the sugar gamble, has attracted more public attention, because it touches issues which have long been matters of fierce party controversy. The tariff reformers have scented in the aniline dye industry an apparently strong case for the application of their principles; the free-traders have been afraid to deal with the problem by any customs

measure lest they should create a precedent for further measures of 'tariff reform.' But though this aspect of the question has led to a certain amount of public controversy, it is noteworthy that both parties have to a large extent abandoned their basic principles. Underlying all the ordinary arguments of tariff reformers is the assumption, often expressed with almost passionate vehemence, that problems of commerce and industry must be approached from the point of view of the producer and not from that of the consumer. On thousands of platforms tariff reform orators have been in the habit of denouncing the meanness of the consumer for wanting to buy cheaply, and of arguing that if only the producer can be sure of work, yielding good wages for the workman and reasonable profit for the employer, the wheels of industry and commerce will go round smoothly and everybody will be happy. Suddenly the dye controversy arises and tariff reformers find themselves with equal vigour pleading the cause of the consumer. In the whole of the recent controversy not a word has been said from the point of view of the persons engaged in producing dyes; the case has been entirely argued on the ground of the importance of securing an ample and certain supply of dye-stuffs for the dye-consuming industries.

In this, probably unconscious, *volte-face* British tariff reformers are not alone in the world. The moment war was declared people in every belligerent country became anxious, not for the continued employment of producers, but for the continued supply of the necessaries of life to consumers. Here, as in many other respects, the war has been a great revealer of realities. It is easy enough in time of peace—especially when addressing meetings of working-men mainly concerned about their wages—to argue that British work should be reserved for British workmen; but in time of war even the most rabid protectionist discovers that what a nation wants is not work but the things that work produces—corn and sugar and cotton, gunpowder and cannon and khaki—and that it wants these things in as large a supply as possible from wherever they can be got and at the lowest price that the producer, foreign or domestic, can be induced or compelled to accept. It is in this spirit that British tariff reformers have approached the dye problem, arguing with undoubted force that it is a matter of national importance that we should free ourselves

from the risk of having our supply of dye-stuffs cut off by war, or raised in price by foreign syndicates.

The free-traders have equally shifted their ground. The essence of the free-trade case is that the imposition of customs tariffs, unaccompanied by countervailing excise duties, involves the concession of a favour to the industries selected for protection. It is of course obvious that this favour cannot be extended to all industries. No conceivable tariff could benefit either bricklayers or barristers, typists or bank clerks, dentists or dock labourers, poets or painters, doctors or journalists, school teachers or railway men. Nor, again, can a tariff benefit those great industries which in practice are scarcely touched by foreign competition in the home market, and are only concerned to produce as cheaply as possible to meet competition abroad. Among them are the cotton industry, the coal industry, the shipbuilding and the shipping industries. These four great industries together account for a very large proportion of the industrial and commercial activities of the country. The free-trader, therefore, argues that since these industries, and the purely domestic industries above enumerated, with many others of like nature, are able to maintain themselves and to thrive without Government favours, it is better that the rest should be left to prove their own vitality by their own exertions. Free-traders further argue that not only is the granting of favours to selected industries essentially unfair, but that it opens the door, as foreign experience proves, to a hateful system of political corruption.

All these arguments the present writer holds to be absolutely sound; but they clearly apply not merely to favours given by means of tariffs, but also to other forms of Government favouritism—as for example, the loan of Government capital on easy terms. Yet the present free-trade ministry; while continuing to assert with emphasis that never, never, never, will they impose a tariff for the benefit of any industry, make no scruple of advancing capital—very inadequately secured—to a particular company; and further promising to give that company an annual subsidy, speciously disguised as a grant in aid of scientific research. On free-trade principles this proposal is clearly even more unfair than a tariff; for the benefit of a tariff would be shared by all the firms engaged in the protected industry, whereas the benefits of the proposed

Government grant of credit and of cash are confined to the members of a particular company. All the other firms engaged in producing dye-stuffs are left to their fate; they have to face not only foreign competition as before, but in addition the subsidised competition of the Government-favoured company.

Apart from the spirit of ministerial fussiness above referred to, it is difficult to discover what motive could have induced the Government to countenance this scheme. Two problems are involved: (*a*) the problem of obtaining the necessary dye-stuffs during the continuance of the war; (*b*) the problem of securing after the war a source of supply which shall be independent of the control of a German syndicate. Neither problem is solved by the Government scheme. As to the first it is clear that the company which it is proposed to create will not be able to make any appreciable addition to our stock of rare dyes for at least another year, and there is a general and reasonable expectation that the war will by then be over. The second problem remains equally unsolved. In the earlier drafts of the Government scheme it was proposed that the firm should give preferential terms to customers who would bind themselves for a period of five years after the termination of the war not to buy dyes elsewhere. When this proposal came to be put on paper it was so whittled down that in effect it bound nobody. Nevertheless, even the appearance of a binding agreement was objectionable to the supporters of the company, and towards the end of March it was decided to abandon this feature entirely. Thus the new company, with £1,500,000 of the British taxpayers' capital invested in it, will have no kind of guarantee to guard it against the competition of a German syndicate alleged to have an enormous reserve of capital and no reserve of scruple. If that allegation be true, there is nothing to prevent the German syndicate from selling at a loss for several years to British buyers until it has ruined this British State-created and State-subsidised company.

It may be that the strength of the German syndicate has been exaggerated. But if so, why did the Government intervene at all? Surely the men who have built up our great textile and other dye-using industries, estimated to have an output of £200,000,000 a year, are quite capable of taking

measures for securing the supply of dye-stuffs for themselves without the assistance of the permanent officials of the Board of Trade and their political chief. Mr. Walter Runciman is a very active and capable minister, but he is by profession a shipowner, and by practice a politician, and neither of these occupations gives him any special qualification to deal with the intricate commercial and scientific problems involved in the development of the aniline dye industry. His officials have spent most of their lives within the four walls of the Government barracks in Whitehall ; their attention has to be spread over a mass of problems from the collection of statistics to the settlement of labour disputes, and it is difficult to see how the scraps of time they can give to the dye problem are likely to contribute appreciably to its solution.

From every point of view it would have been better if the Government had left the matter alone. In that case, the manufacturers who want dyes would have promptly taken their own measures at their own expense to get them. But the moment the Government intervened everybody hung back in the hope of squeezing better terms out of the Exchequer and many useful months have been lost. Meanwhile, the Government has licensed the importation of German dyes to meet immediate needs. This of course involves trading with the enemy, but is probably on the whole a wise step, for a long time must elapse before the new company will be able to produce dyes of the quality and quantity required. The company has indeed gone to allotment, the necessary capital having been secured after considerable pressure. Some firms have subscribed because they had been induced to believe that it was a patriotic duty to do so ; others because they were afraid that, if they did not go into the scheme, a Government monopoly might be set up to their detriment. But the provision of the capital does not remove the difficulties that have to be overcome. Apart from the difficulty of finding at short notice a sufficient number of men competent to deal with this highly specialised branch of applied science, there is more than a probability that our engineering firms, already overloaded with war contracts, will be unable to supply the necessary new machinery except after great delay. Therefore, there is little reason to expect that the new dye company will even be able to start the production of dye-stuffs for many

months to come ; so that looked upon as an emergency measure the scheme is useless.

As regards the future, we have to decide whether it is worth while to make some sacrifice to wrest this particular industry from German control. There is here no question involved between free trade and protection. Every sane free-trader understands that free trade is not an end, but a means to an end ; and if it can be proved that in any particular case we can gain a national advantage, without too great cost, by suspending the general policy of free imports, by all means in that particular case let it be suspended. This is certain, that if the present scheme goes forward with Government capital sunk in it, the present ministry, if they are still in office, will be the first to propose the exclusion of competing German dyes to protect Mr. Runciman's investment just as they have excluded sugar to cover up Mr. McKenna's gamble.

As regards the policy of exclusion on its merits, all that can be said is that the case remains to be proved. All sorts of extravagant statements have been made on one side and the other, but it is admitted that some British firms have for years been producing dyes at a handsome profit in spite of German competition. There is also always the possibility that some new scientific development may diminish the importance of the aniline dye problem. In any event, the general proposition remains true—that our industrial success in the world must finally depend, not upon any tariff tricks or Government grants, but upon our capacity to produce the best article at a lower cost than our competitors.

The measures for controlling the liberty of the subject and regulating the management of industries to meet the emergency of the war are much less open to criticism than the attempts of the Government to enter into the sphere of private enterprise. And the reason is fairly obvious. As Mr. Gladstone was fond of saying: the business of a Government is to govern and not to trade ; and governments, like private persons, when they meddle with matters outside their proper business generally bungle.

To some extent there is of necessity in certain cases an overlapping of the two functions. For example, it was imperative that the Government should assume a general control over the railway service of the country in order to ensure the

uninterrupted dispatch of troops and munitions of war. This did not, as some enthusiasts for railway nationalisation have hastily assumed, mean that the Government undertook to manage the extremely complicated and technical business of all, or indeed of any, of the railway companies of the kingdom. In what was done there is not even a remote likeness to railway nationalisation. The railway directors and the staffs they employ still manage the business of the respective companies as before ; they still order and pay for all material ; still control and pay all their employees ; and still divide as before the profits among the shareholders. All that has happened is that the Government claims the right to use the railway rolling-stock and the railway track when and how it requires, and on this account takes power to alter, if the necessity arises, the time-table of the ordinary train services. But the railway companies provide the service for the Government ; and the only trading element—if the phrase may be used—that enters in is with regard to the arrangement made for remunerating the companies. Instead of paying so much for each train-load of troops, or each truck-load of ammunition, the Government has undertaken to compensate the companies for the loss of their ordinary earnings. The year 1913, which happens to have been a particularly good year for the companies, was taken as a standard, and the profits of the companies are made up to that level by the Government. This arrangement has the convenience of simplicity. But it has the disadvatage from the taxpayer's point of view that it has rendered the Government, while the arrangement lasts, a quasi-partner of the companies : with the result that the taxpayer has become financially involved in the wages dispute between the companies and their employees, and may have to find a very large sum of money to provide an increase of wage for all the railway men of the kingdom. If, however, the profits of the companies during 1915, after paying the increased wages, reach the standard of 1913, there will be no deficiency to make good, and the liability of the Government for the increased wages bill will lapse.

The demand for increased wages put forward by the railway men and conceded by the companies and the Government is one of many similar demands. In every case the plea has been that the cost of living has gone up and that therefore

wages ought to be raised. It is perhaps worth while to consider that plea for a moment. Superficially it is extremely plausible; but its weakness can at once be detected if the argument be reversed. Suppose the cost of living had fallen, would the wage-earning classes accept that fact as an excuse for a general reduction of wages? They would certainly reply: 'Our 'labour is worth as much as we can get for it, and if the 'necessary cost of living has gone down that is our good 'fortune; it leaves us more to spend on the pleasures of life.' To base wages on the cost of living amounts to saying that the wage-earner ought to be content if he can provide for his family the barest necessaries. Happily he is not so content. The large majority of wage-earners in England and Scotland are living well above what may be called the subsistence line, and a considerable minority are earning yearly incomes which would seem riches to the poorer members of the professional classes. There is no reason in equity why men in such positions should be compensated at the expense of the nation for a rise in the cost of living which affects them to no greater extent than it affects their fellow citizens.

The truth is that the real cause of, and the true justification for, the rise in wages is not the increased cost of living, but that very Law of Supply and Demand which the more ignorant type of labour leader appears to regard as a crafty and diabolical invention of the capitalist classes. Wages in the United Kingdom have gone up because the war has drawn away to France and to Flanders a large part of our normal supply of labour, and has simultaneously greatly increased the demand for labour to provide all kinds of munitions of war. If events had turned out otherwise, if for example the prophecies of Mr. Norman Angell had been realised and the war had resulted in the general destruction of industry and the interruption of trade, then, though prices of food might have gone up to starvation-point, wages would inevitably have gone down. Even now there are classes of workers whose wages have fallen despite the increased cost of living, for the simple reason that their work is not in demand. No one is entitled to blame wage-earners for insisting on the rise in wages which the Law of Supply and Demand enables them to exact; the only pity is that some of their leaders should have confused the issue by putting forward a sort of appeal *ad misericordiam* based

upon the increased cost of living. That appeal is neither economically defensible, nor morally justified.

The question of wages is very closely connected with some of the most important emergency measures sanctioned by parliament. These measures empower the Government to take possession of, and use for naval and military purposes, any factory or workshop of any kind and the plant belonging to it, and also to take possession of unoccupied premises for the purpose of housing workmen engaged in the production of war material. The same Act (Defence of the Realm Amendment No. 2 Act, 1915) empowers the Government to require that any work done in any factory or workshop shall be done in accordance with Admiralty or War Office directions, so that the labour and the plant may be made as useful as possible for the production of war material. This Act further empowers the Government to shut down work being done in any factory or workshop and to remove the plant to other factories or workshops. These provisions, it will be observed, give the Government complete control over all industries of the country. The objects aimed at are, first, the diversion of industry when possible and desirable from the production of the implements of peace to the production of the implements of war, and, secondly, the speeding up of the rate of production in those factories and workshops already devoted or about to be devoted to war material.

As regards the first point, there can be no question that the Government was justified in asking for the large powers conferred upon it, and will be justified in using those powers wherever the conditions are suitable. The trouble to be dealt with arises partly out of the thoughtlessness of the public and partly out of the persistent preaching of false economics. At the beginning of the war many of the daily papers were persistent in urging that the country should carry on ' business ' as usual,' and even advised the well-to-do classes to continue their ordinary scale of expenditure, lest the persons employed in what may be called the luxury trades should be thrown out of work. Slowly the hard facts of war have compelled even these advisers of the public to realise that one sovereign will not pay two sets of wages, and that if a lady buys an expensive frock or her husband treats his friends to a champagne supper, the money so spent cannot also be used for maintaining our

soldiers in the field or providing comforts for the wounded, or sustenance for widows and orphans. Doubtless the sudden cessation of any type of expenditure does inflict hardships upon the persons whose employment depends upon that expenditure, but it is of national importance that trades which are not necessary to the national life should be cut down in time of war, so that the plant and labour embarked in them may as far as possible be utilised for war purposes.

The attainment of this object can be sought in two ways: either by a moral appeal—possibly backed in certain cases by a legal sanction—to private individuals to abstain from spending money upon superfluities; or by the action of the State in forcibly diverting labour and capital from superfluous industries and directly employing that labour and capital upon war industries. It is the latter course that has been adopted in the Defence of the Realm Act just referred to. This method of dealing with the problem has the great advantage that it throws nobody out of work. The Government only interferes with those industries in which the labour and plant are suitable for the production of war material. There is consequently no cessation of employment, but a mere diversion. The only danger is that the Government might be tempted to interfere with industries, which, though not vital in the sense that the production of war material is vital, are still of very great importance to the nation. It is, however, reasonable to assume that before interfering with any particular branch of manufacture the Government will take precautions to ascertain whether it possesses real importance as a link in the chain of national industry. There are a good many industries, for instance the motor-car industry, which are not links at all. Their cessation would have no other effect than to deprive the final consumer of the chance of spending money on that particular comfort or luxury. If he were thereby induced to save his money or to spend it upon war purposes, there would be a further gain to the nation.

These general considerations have some bearing upon the special problem of the consumption of alcoholic liquors, but they obviously do not cover the whole ground. Wine and spirits, and perhaps also beer, may be described as superfluities, but they are something more than that. Though in many cases their consumption only gives pleasure and perhaps

sometimes health, in others it destroys efficiency or even leads to crime. Therefore the problem cannot be treated as merely a particular case of the indulgence in superfluities. Nor again can it be approached from the point of view of production. It is easy enough to order a motor-car manufacturer to cease making cars and to produce motor lorries instead; but it is a very different matter to discover in what way a whisky distiller can use his plant and his employees for the production of war material. If, then, the drink trade is interfered with, the interference must be based, not on the ground that the plant and labour are required for war purposes, but on the ground that the general consumption of alcoholic liquors is injuriously affecting the output of munitions of war. This is the case put forward by Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Kitchener for the greatest of the emergency measures that has yet been suggested. The question to be settled is essentially one of fact. If it be really true that the production of war material cannot be expedited without the total prohibition of the production and sale of alcoholic liquor, then this drastic step must be taken. But the step itself is fraught with the gravest danger. It may prevent intoxication, but it may produce sulkiness; it may lead to an effective saving of the money now spent upon drink, but that saving may be almost wholly counterbalanced by the compensation that the State would have to pay to the vast army of persons who would be forcibly deprived of their livelihood.

The case for voluntary abstention from alcoholic liquors during the war is far stronger, and the King has rendered a great service to the country by setting an example which everyone can see and understand. Voluntary abstention can create no feeling of resentment, such as would certainly be aroused among large sections of the population by compulsory prohibition. Admittedly it is possible that voluntary abstention may not cover that portion of the field that is most important at the present moment, but it will cover a sufficiently wide area to remove popular opposition to any special measures which may be necessary for dealing with special difficulties.

There is, however, some reason to fear that the attention devoted to the drink problem may throw into the shade a difficulty which, as regards engineering shops in particular, is probably even more serious than drink—namely, the deliberate

restriction of output by trade union regulations. Even in time of peace it is atrocious that a man who can quite easily do a particular job—say in ten minutes—should be compelled by trade union pressure to dawdle over it for twenty or even thirty. The defence of the unions is, that if expert men were allowed to work at their full pace the employer would fix the rate of pay per piece to suit that rate of work, and the average man would be compelled either to work beyond his strength or to be content with an inadequate daily wage. This defence only throws the complaint a stage further back. There must be something fundamentally wrong in the relationship between employer and employed if no scheme can be devised which would enable the expert man to utilise his skill and strength to the best advantage for himself, for the firm, and for the nation, without injuriously affecting the pecuniary interests of his less expert comrades. Various devices have, it is true, been attempted to secure this end, but it must regretfully be admitted that their success has been blocked by the men's jealousy of one another and their suspicion of their employers. As has above been said, this is bad enough in time of peace; it is scandalous in time of war. Yet, at the present moment, in engineering shops engaged in producing war material many men are still working at half or two-thirds of their real capacity while their comrades in the field are giving every ounce they possess to their country's cause. This is the main justification for the proposal that factories and workshops engaged in producing war material should be taken over by the Government. Power to this effect is given in the last Defence of the Realm Act. At present the plan is rather sketchy; but apparently what the Government proposes is that the profits of the employer should be controlled and that the workmen should in return agree to abandon the policy of restricting output. Presumably also the workmen will agree not to press for higher wages.

If these arrangements are carried out, the general effect will be to place the industries concerned on what may be called a social instead of an economic basis. That is to say, both employer and employee will be content to give their best services to the State for a moderate remuneration instead of each holding out for the best price he can get. In so acting they will be doing nothing more, and indeed a good deal less,

than our officers and soldiers in the field. This, if accomplished, will indeed be a tremendous revolution, bringing us nearer to the general conception of State Socialism than any other change effected by the war. But the revolution will be due not to the fact of Government control, but to the moral impulse provided by the peril of a colossal war. The idea which so many Socialists appear to hold—that the mere fact of transferring an industry from private control to State control will alter the whole moral outlook of the persons employed—is contradicted by the experience of every government in the world. Government servants are not a whit more self-sacrificing than private servants; they are almost invariably less industrious. Indeed, it would be nearer the truth to say that the transference from private service to Government service, so far from moralising the workman, tends to demoralise him by removing the vigilant control which the private employer in his own interest is bound to exercise.

Whether the war will have a sufficient moral influence to effect, even temporarily, this great revolution in the conduct of our industries, is at the moment doubtful. There is is as yet no evidence that either masters or men are generally prepared to forego the opportunity of making as much as they can for themselves out of the necessities of the nation. The truth is that the motives which regulate men's conduct in industry and commerce are, for reasons inherent in human nature, fundamentally different from the motives which regulate the conduct of the soldier. It may conceivably be possible during the emergency of war to impose—partly by the pressure of public opinion and partly by the coercive power of the law—the soldier's ethics upon the industrial population; but after the war economic motives will certainly resume their sway. We must console ourselves for their relative ugliness with the reflection that to them the world owes its industrial progress.

EDITOR.

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